1. SALEEM AKHTAR, J.--The petitioner was employed as Head Clerk by respondent No,
3. His services were terminated with effect from 1st June, 1982 by letter of the same date which reads as follows:- Dear Sir, Your services are no longer required. Therefore, your services are hereby terminated, with effect from 1st June, 1982. You may collect your dues including one month's pay in lieu of notice."
2. The petitioner served a grievance notice which was replied but no redress was given. The petitioner then filed an application under section 25-A, I.R.O. before respondent No,
2. In its written statement respondent No, 3 pleaded that due to reorganisation in company, the petitioner's post was abolished and consequently his services were terminated. The learned Labour Court by order dated 30-4-1983 dismissed the grievance petition. Petitioner then filed an appeal which was also dismissed by respondent No, 1.
3. We have heard Mr. M. Aqil Awan for the petitioner and Mr. Ali Madad Shah for respondent No, 3.
4. There is no dispute that petitioner's service was terminated by letter reproduced above. Mr. Aqil Awan the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the order of termination was illegal and it did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Standing Order 12(1)(2)(3) of the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance which reads as follows:- "12. Termination of employm ent.--(1) For terminating employment of a permanent workman, for any reason other than misconduct, one month's notice shall be given either by the employer or the workman. One month's wages calculated on the basis of average wages earned by the workman during the last three months shall be paid in lieu of notice.
(2) No temporary workman, whether monthly rated, weekly rated, daily-rated or piece-rated, and no probationer or badli, shall be entitled to any notice if his services are terminated by the employer, nor shall any such workman be required to give any notice or pay any wages in lieu thereof to the employer if he leaves employment of his own accord.
(3) The services of a workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service, except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance."
5. According to Mr. Syed Ali Madad Shah, the learned counsel for respondent No, 3 the statement that 'the service is no longer required' is a sufficient reason as required by Standing Order No, 12(3). A perusal of this Standing Order will show that it prohibits the termination of services of a workman or his removal, retrenchment and discharge except by an order in writing. It also provides that this order in writing should contain expressly and clearly the reasons for the action taken against the workman. Therefore, when the order of termination or retrenchment is issued it is the duty of the employer to expressly and clearly give the reasons due to which service has been terminated. Any vague statement in this regard will not amount to compliance with Standing Order 12. The Standing Orders Ordinance is a beneficial legislation intended to protect the interest of the workmen and also to create harmony in the industry. This being the nature of legislation it should be liberally construed to give the maximum benefit within the meaning and framework of law. The wisdom behind this provision seems to be that the workman whose services are terminated must be made aware of the facts leading to termination, or else it will not be possible for him to challenge it in a proper manner.
6. Mr. Syed Madad Ali Shah, the learned counsel has contended that evidence has been brought on record to show that there was reorganisation in the company and in consequence thereof, the post of the petitioner was abolished and his service was accordingly terminated. This may be correct, but the fact remains that such statement was not communicated to the petitioner. If that was the only reason for termination of service there could be no reason not to disclose it in the order of termination.
7. The statement that service is no longer required, in our view cannot be a reason for terminating the service because it calls for further inquiry that what are the reasons that the service is no longer required. This cannot be a ground or reason for termination. It is merely the outcome of the undisclosed reasons which seem to be disclosed in the evidence. The reasons for termination should be clear, unambiguous, and understandable. Mere statement that service is no longer required is an expression of desire, whim and caprice which is absolutely without any reason or ground. These words do not give any reason except that this is what the employer wants to do. The law provides and imposes restrictions on such unfettered power of the employer and therefore, such a statement will not be in accordance with law.
8. Mr. Syed Madad Ali Shah, the learned counsel has referred to several authorities to substantiate his contention. The first authority is 1989 PLC 506 (Saadat Khan v. N.-W.F.P. Labour Appellate Tribunal).
9. In this case the facts stated show that the petitioner was employed as a cook on daily wages by Pearl Continental Hotel. His service was terminated stating that 'it is no longer required'. The Labour Appellate Court accepted the appeal of the employer and maintained the termination. It was challenged in Constitutional petition and it was observed as follows:- "The minute perusal of the order of termination of service was no longer required. We have considered this aspect of the matter very anxiously and we are of the opinion that the factum that services of the petitioner were no longer required was a reason for termination of his service."
10. With due respect we are not inclined to agree with this view. We have already recorded our reasons for interpreting the Standing Order No, 12(3) in a different manner.
11. The next case cited by the learned counsel is 1990 PLC 213 Abdul Hameed Kiranvi v. Sindh Labour Tribunal. In this case service of the petitioner was terminated and the reason stated by the employer was that the factory remained closed due to off season and the services of the petitioner were no longer required. It is clear that the facts in this case are completely different. The termination order has given a reason which precedes the words "the services of the petitioner are no longer required". The service was no longer required as the factory had been closed due to off season. This case is therefore distinguishable on facts.
12. The learned counsel for respondent No, 3 also referred to 1988 SCMR 1725 (Punjab Small Industries Corporation v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal). In this judgment there is no such observation which may support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In 1985 PLC 735 Yasmeen Kausar v. Midway House there is no observation that the statement that the service of the workman is no longer required gives sufficient reason within the meaning of standing Order 12(3).
13. This judgment has not taken into consideration this aspect of the case as it was perhaps not even raised.
14. In view of the aforestated reasons we declare that the impugned orders passed by respondents Nos, 1 and 2 are without lawful authority and of no legal effect. We declare that the order of termination issued by the respondent No, 3 is illegal and of no legal effect and the petitioner continues to be in service. Mahboob Ahmad who was examined on behalf of respondent No, 3 has stated in cross-examination that after the termination of service the petitioner was running a hotel outside the premises of the respondent. In view of this fact the petitioner would not be entitled to back benefits.