1. ' The appellant feels aggrieved of the decision of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Peshawar, dated, 14-12-1992 whereby the grievance petition moved by him under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was dismissed and consequently his termination order dated 6-5-1991 passed by the respondent No,1 was kept in tact.
2. ' The relevant background of the litigation between the parties is that the petitioner-appellant was initially employed as time-keeper in 1982 in the respondent hotel. His designation changed from time to time but at the time of the removal from service he was working against the job of a chief steward and on account of the nature of the job he designated himself as workman. It is alleged in the grievance petition that when the petitioner joined the Employees Worker Union of the respondent establishment then the respondent No, 1 was annoyed with it and so he by order dated 6-5-1991 terminated the services of the petitioner. The grievance notice having proved futile he approached the Labour Court through an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The order of termination from service was described as mala fide, motivated by vengeance ' and violative of the provisions of section 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance and that it did not contain explicit reason for termination from service. It was in this context averred in the grievance petition that the termination order was not an order simpliciter in nature and amount to dismissal which was not legally justified. In the written statement filed by the respondents the status of the petitioner as workman was denied and the job of chief steward held by the petitioner was classified to be that of executive, managerial and supervisory nature and as such barred the petitioner to invoke the provisions of the labour laws and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court constituted under those laws. The allegations of mala fide were termed as baseless as according to the respondents the petitioner on account of his managerial post could not become member of the union. It was reiterated that the service of the petitioner was terminated because it was no more required.
3. ' The evidence examined at the trial is briefly referred so as to have a better understanding of the case set up by the parties in their evidence. PW.1 exhibited certain record in respect of the petitioner which would be referred whenever necessary. The petitioner himself appeared, as PW. 2 and gave details of the duties he had to perform from time to time in the hotel. It was stated that he was working in the Food and Beverage Department of the respondent hotel and was subordinate to the Assistant Food and Beverage Manager who in turn was subordinate to the Manager, Food and Beverage. He stated that he had no power of hire and fire nor could sanction leave. The gist of the duties which he was to perform enumerated by him in his statement appears to be including manual and clerical duties. On the side of the respondents Major (Retired) Muhammad Hassan Orakazai was examined as RW-1. This witness stated that the petitioner was inducted in the hotel as time-keeper but was then promoted as chief steward which according to him was in the management cadre. He also stated that there were 28/30 workers in the Food and Beverage Department who worked under the supervision of the petitioner. It was also disclosed that the petitioner had the power to allocate duties to his subordinates, sanction leave and initiate disciplinary action against them by bringing it to the notice of the Manager, Food and Beverage Department. The effort of this witness in his statement seems to be to prove that the petitioner was performing managerial and supervisory duties and was, therefore, excluded from the workman class.
4. ' The learned counsel representing the appellant argued that it was not clear from the impugned Judgment as to whether the Labour Court held the petitioner-appellant not to be a workman under the IRO or under the Standing Orders Ordinance. It was stressed that the appellant was bound to prove himself as workman under the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance and not under the IRO. In this context he read the definition of workman as given in the Standing Orders Ordinance and distinguished it from the definition of the workman in the IRO. He also read out the evidence of PW.1 to show that he was performing manual and clerical jobs. He argued that the reliance of the Labour Court on the charter of duties (Exh. PW. 2/2) was misplaced as according to him this document was neither signed by any one nor its origin could be traced. For his these submissions he referred to 1992 PLC 424. He next argued that the service of the appellant were terminated in, violation of Order 12 of the Standing Orders Ordinance as no explicit reason for removing him from service has been given. He relied on 1990 PLC (C.S.) 385. On the other hand the learned counsel pleading for the respondents submitted that mere non-mention of the relevant provision of law in the judgment would not nullify its effect. He highlighted thatthe definition of workman under the Standing Order 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance and submitted that this besides being limited in scope is also of routine nature and does not involve initiative or executive or managerial potentialities. He, however, admitted that the appellant would be governed by the definition as given in the Standing Orders Ordinance. He submitted that the reliance of the appellant's Advocate on 1992 PLC 424 was misplaced as it does not generally help him. He referred to citation 'D' of the said judgment to support his submission. On the other hand he placed reliance on 1992 PLC 154.
5. ' I consider these submissions in the light of the pleadings of the parties and evidence on record: ' There is no dispute between the parties that the appellant was required to prove himself as workman under the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance and not under the I.R.O. Section 2(i) of the Standing Order Ordinance defines the workman as under:-- "Workman means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical (work) for hire or reward."
6. ' Thus, under this law a person would be deemed to be a workman who performs skilled or unskilled manual or clerical job. There is no mention of the exclusion of the class of employee from this definition who undertakes duties of managerial or supervisory character. This exclusion of the executive and managerial job from the classification of workman is in the I.R.O. As under the definition of the said enactment an employee who performs duties in executive, managerial, administrative and supervisory capacities cannot be designated as a workman. It is thus obvious that if an employee could prove that he was performing skilled, unskilled, manual or clerical job then he would qualify himself as workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance and naturally the provisions of Standing Orders 12 and 15 would govern his case. The determining factor in this case would be to see as to whether the duties performed by the petitioner-appellant were those of manual or clerical nature or not. The learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court has not considered the case in this perspective but has rather held the petitioner-appellant not to be workman under the definition of workman in the IRO which was not correct legal position. The appellant himself has elaborately described the duties performed by him in the Hotel which if read as a whole would prove that he was sometime doing manual labour and sometime clerical jobs. It is also in the statement of RW-1 that the department of the appellant was headed by a Manager who was subordinate to the General Manager. This witness also stated that the petitioner-appellant was not a final authority even in granting of leave. It is thus manifest that the appellant had no executive, managerial or supervisory duties so as to exclude him from being workman even under the I.R.O. In any case the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in 1992-PLC 424 is to the effect "As a corollary, it must follow that if the services of an employee are terminated in breach of above clause (3) of the Standing Order 12, he should fall within the ambit of the definition given in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance and need not fall within the purview of the definition of 'worker' and 'workman' provided for in clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the I.R.O. However, if an employee wants to press into service section 25-A of the I.R.O. For enforcing any other right granted under the Standing Orders Ordinance other than the right covered under clause (3) of Standing Order 12, he should also fall within the definition of the 'worker' and 'workman' provided for in above clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the I.R.O. Which is somewhat different from the definition given in the Standing Orders Ordinance, inasmuch as it excludes an employee who is employed mainly in managerial or administrative capacity and who is employed in a supervisory capacity and draws wages exceeding Rs,800 per mensem or performs either because of the nature of duties attached to the office or by reason of the power vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature as pointed out hereinabove. " Thus, the appellant can safely be classified as workman under the definition of the Standing Orders Ordinance and the contrary decision of the Labour Court on this point is, therefore, bad in law and accordingly is set aside. The requirement of Standing Order 12(3) is that the service of a workman could not be terminated nor he shall be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state reason for the action taken. The mere expression of the word 'no more required' cannot be held to be explicit reason and particularly when no ground has been given as to why after all an employee holding a permanent post of C chief steward was no more required. It has also not been explained in evidence as to whether this post has been abolished or the functions performed by the incumbent of this post have been given to any other employee. In absence of any explanation on these lines the mere writing to the effect as no more required would not constitute an explicit reason.
7. Consequently, this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Peshawar is set aside and the appellant is reinstated in his post. The appellant in his statement clearly deposed "I am jobless since my termination" and the contrary has not been established by the respondents, therefore, the appellant would be entitled to all back benefits and wages. There will be no order as to costs.