' MAMOON KAZI, J.---The respondent No,2 in each of these petitions was employed by General Tyre & Rubber Company of Pakistan Limited, the petitioner in these petitions. The letter of appointment given to each of the respondents shows that he had been appointed on temporary basis for work which was likely to be over within a period of nine months.
2. The case of each of the said respondents is that while he was performing his duties satisfactorily with the petitioner his services were terminated. However, the respondent was once again directed to resume his duties after a break of two to three days after receiving a similar letter of appointment from the petitioner. Again, before the respondent had completed nine months of his service with the petitioner, his services were terminated on the ground that the same were no longer required by the petitioner.
3. The petitions filed by each of the said respondents separately before the learned Fourth Labour Court, Karachi were resisted by the petitioner, as, according to it, the said respondent was a temporary workman having been engaged from time to time for specific period not exceeding nine months for doing work which was likely to be over at any time during such period.
Consequently the action taken by the petitioner against the respondent was fully justified.
4. Each of the respondents himself gave evidence before the learned Labour Court once again supporting his case as set out in his grievance petition. The petitioner examined one Abdul Hameed Lakhani, its Personnel Officer who deposed that each of the said respondents had been employed temporarily to share extra work load in the petitioner's factory which was likely to conclude at any time within nine months from the date of his appointment. He further deposed that the respondent was never employed as a permanent workman. The letter of appointment given to each of the respondents, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure A to each of these petitions, shows that the employment of the said respondents was purely on temporary basis. The respondents had been employed for work which was likely to be completed within nine months for which each of the respondents was to be paid wages on daily basis. The letter of appointment further indicates that the services of the said respondents were liable to be terminated without any notice or pay in lieu thereof within the said period of nine months.
5. The learned Labour Court on the basis of the said evidence held that the respondents' services had been rightly terminated by the petitioner. It, therefore, dismissed the grievance petitions filed by each of the said respondents.
6. The respondents being aggrieved by the said decision filed separate appeals before the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal which by the impugned order set aside the respective orders passed by the learned Labour Court and further ordered reinstatement of the said respondents in service with full back benefits. The relevant part of the order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal which is now the subject-matter of controversy between the parties is reproduced as follows: "From the facts on record, the contentions of Mr. Gohar Iqbal are fully proved as there is nothing on record on behalf of the respondent establishment to justify such type of appointments, then termination simpliciter and then after a gap of 2/3 days, re-appointment as a temporary workman.
This action on the part of the respondent management is quite contrary to the principle of natural justice as well as the requirement of the provisions of Labour Laws. I would, therefore, hold that as the appellant was admittedly working since June, 1984 continuously on the same post and emoluments being permanent in nature, therefore, he has to be treated as 'permanent workman' and the so-called gap/break in service for only 2/3 days was with mala fide intention. The second contention of Mr. Gohar Iqbal, the learned Advocate for the appellant that being a permanent workman, the services could not be terminated simpliciter mentioning only that 'no longer required'. He, therefore, submitted that as this termination is contrary to the provisions of Standing Order 12(3) and also against the settled principle of law, therefore, it must be set aside. I have examined the record and find that there is nothing against the appellant to prove his misconduct or unsuitability for the job. Further, as per own contents of the respondent establishment in the cyclostyled prescribed pro forma of appointment letter, vide clause 9, the employments were strictly covered under the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, therefore, in vew of this fact also, the employment of the appellant was fully covered under the provisions of Standing Order 12(3) and hence, his services could not be terminated simpliciter. I, therefore, hold that the termination of services of the appellant was quite illegal, hence, it is set aside. In support of his case, Mr. Gohar Iqbal, the learned Advocate for the appellant has placed reliance on a number of authorities, which, in my humble opinion, are very well applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case."
7. Challenging the findings of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, Mr. Obaidur Rehman, learned counsel for the petitioner in each of these petitions, has argued that there was sufficient evidence before the learned Labour Court and the learned Appellate Tribunal to indicate that the said respondents in these petitions had been appointed as a temporary workmen to do work which was likely to be finished within a period not exceeding nine months and consequently, there was no justification for the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal to hold that the said respondents were permanent workmen. Reference in this regard has been made to Standing Order 1 which refers to classification of workers and wherein the expressions "permanent workman" and "termporary workman" have been defined. Reliance has been placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Yaqoob v. Punjab Labour Court No,1 (1990 SCMR 1539). In this case while referring to the said classification of "workman" as shown in Standing Order 1, it has been observed by the Supreme Court at page 1541 of the report as follows:- "4. In order to get the benefit of the Standing Orders Ordinance in the matter of termination of service, the petitioner had to show that he was a permanent workman. A 'Permanent Workman' has been defined in the Standing Orders Ordinance by reference to the nature of the work on which he has been engaged or employed. If the work is not of a permanent nature, then howsoever long may be his employment, he cannot be taken to be a permanent workman. The length of the period of employment by itself has not been made the ground or a test for determining the nature of the work. Keeping in view the nature of the work on which the petitioner was employed, namely, an addition to the regular strength of Malis for the maintenance of the gardens and the grounds on daily wages or on work charge basis, it cannot be said that such additional work being done by him was of a permanent nature necessarily. As regards the stigma attaching to the permanence of his service, the petitioner has as witness admitted that the termination order was oral and not in writing."
The question had also been earlier dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan International Airlines v. Sindh Labour Court No,5 (PLD 1980 SC 323) and while referring to the language used by the Legislature in relation to the expression "temporary workman" it was held that:- "And, the insertion of the words "likely to be" make it clear that a workman cannot become a permanent workman, if the work for which he was employed was expected to be finished within nine months, but was in fact completed after the expiry of nine months."
8. In order to appreciate the proposition advanced by Mr. Obaidur Rehman, it would be advantageous to reproduce the said expressions, "permanent workman" and "temporary workman" referred to in Standing Order 1. According to Standing Order 1(b); "A 'permanent workman' is a workman who has been engaged on work of permanent nature likely to last more than nine months and has satisfactorily completed a probationary period of three months in the same or another occupation in the industrial or commercial establishment, including breaks due to sickness, accident, leave, lockout, strike (not being an illegal !Ock-out or strike) or involuntary closure of the establishment (and includes a badli who has been employed for a continuous period of three months or for one hundred and eighty-three days during any period of twelve consecutive months.)"
' According to Standing Order 1(e); 'A 'temporary workman' is a workman who has been engaged for work which is of an essentially temporary nature likely to be finished within a period not exceeding nine months."
9. It would thus appear from the definition of the said two expressions that if the work for which a workman has been employed is of permanent character likely to last more than nine months, then if other conditions referred to in the definition of "permanent workman" are satisfied by the workman, he would be regarded is a permanent worman. However, if a workman has been engaged for work which is essentially of temporary character and the same is likely to be finished within a period not exceeding nine months, the workman is to be regarded as a temporary workman. The distinction has been clearly explained in the two judgments of the Supreme Court reference to which has just been made in this judgment and we need not dwell further on this issue. Turning to the evidence which had been adduced before the learned Labour Court by the parties, apart from the oral evidence led on behalf of the petitioner which indicated that the appointment of the respondents was purely temporary, the letter of the appointment of each of the respondents, reference to which has earlier been made in this judgment, further supports the contention that the said respondents were employed to do work of temporary nature, not likely to last for more than nine months. The said evidence, therefore, clearly supports Mr. Obaidur Rehman's contention that the said respondents were temporary workmen. Although Mr. M.L.
Shahani, learned Counsel for the said respondents, has invited our attention to the evidence adduced on behalf of each of the respondents in this regard which indicates that the nature of duties which the said respondents were required to perform was not different from the permanent workers which had been engaged by the petitioner to perform such duties, but the basic question is not whether the duties required to be performed by the said respondents were of permanent or temporary nature but whether the work for which the said respondents had been employed by the petitioner was of permanent or temporary nature. The letter of appointment given to each of the respondents clearly shows that the work for which the said respondent was engaged was likely to be finished at any time within a period of nine months. No substantial evidence appears to have been brought on record by any of the respondents to indicate that the work for which the said respondents had been engaged was of permanent nature. There was a clear preponderance of evidence to indicate that the said respondents had been appointed as temporary workmen to do work which was of temporary nature, not likely to last for a period of nine months. The learned Labour Appellate Tribunal was impressed by the fact that after the services of the respondents had been terminated in each case, which was before any of the respondents had completed a period of nine months in the service of the petitioner, he was re-employed within two or three days after termination of his employment by the petitioner. This, according to the learned Tribunal, would lead to an inference that the employment of each of the respondents was of permanent nature. We are unable to agree with the findings of the learned Tribunal in this regard because the mere fact that the respondent was re-employed within two or three days cannot necessarily lead c to an inference that his employment was of permanent character. As has been held in the two judgments of the Supreme Court referred to earlier in this judgment, in fact, the length of service was not one of the factors which could determine the nature of employment of a workman as referred to in Standing Order 1. The use of the words "likely to be", as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan International Airlines makes it clear that a workman cannot become a permanent workman if the work for which he was employed was expected to be finished within nine months, but was in fact completed after the expiry of such period. In the case of Muhammad Yaqoob, the petitioner was employed on the work charge basis for 8 years yet the Supreme Court repelled the contention put forth on his behalf that he was a permanent workman and leave to appeal was declined in his case. We are, consequently, of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Appellate Tribunal is not correct.
10. While supporting the order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal, Mr. M. L. Shahani, learned counsel for the respondent in each of the petitions has nevertheless argued that the order in each case whereby the services of the respondent were terminated only indicates that the services of the respondent were no longer required by the petitioner company. Such order, therefore, according to the learned counsel, fails to conform to the requirements of Standing Order 12(3) which enjoins that: "(3) The services of a workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged, or dismissed from service except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reasons for the action taken...."
' The learned counsel has strenuously contended that the use of the word "explicit" in Standing Order 12(3) clearly indicates that the employer is obliged to give specific and sufficient reasons while terminating the services of a workman.
11. This question came up for discussion before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ghulam Ahmed v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal (1990 PLC (C.S.) 385). In this case the statement in the letter, terminating the services of the petitioner, who was a permanent workman, viz. That his services were no longer required was held to be not in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order 12(3). The judgment in this case was delivered by Saleem Akhtar, J. (as he then was) and the relevant observations which appear at page 388 of the report are reproduced as under:- "According to Mr. Syed Ali Madad Shah, the learned counsel for respondent No,3 the statement that 'the service is no longer required' is a sufficient reason as required by Standing Order No,12(3). A perusal of this Standing Order will show that it prohibits the termination of services of a workman or his removal, retrenchment and discharge except by an order in writing. It also provides that this order in writing should contain expressly and clearly the reasons for the action taken against the workman. Therefore, when the order of termination or retrenchment is issued it is the duty of the employer to expressly and clearly give the reasons due to which service ,has been terminated. Any vague statement in this regard will not amount to compliance with Standing Order 12. The Standing Orders Ordinance is a beneficial legislation intended to protect the interest of the workmen and also to create harmony in the industry. This being the nature of legislation it should be liberally construed to give the maximum benefit within the meaning and framework of law. The wisdom behind this provision seems to be that the workman whose services are terminated must be made aware of the facts leading to termination, or else it will not be possible for him to challenge it in a proper manner."
' A similar question had also arisen in Constitutional Petition No,D-37 of 1988 (Lever Brothers Pakistan Ltd. v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal) before this Bench. It has been observed by one of us (Mamoon Kazi, J.), who delivered the judgment, as follows:- "The term 'explicit' has been defined by Black's Law Dictionary (4th Edn.) to mean as "not obscure or ambiguous, having no disguised meaning or reservation". According to its ordinary dictionary meaning, the said term would mean "stated in detail, leaving nothing merely implied; definite, outspoken." It is, therefore, clear from the definition of the term "explicit" that the legislature clearly intended the "employer to state clear and unambiguous reasons for the action taken against the workman and such reasons could not be obscured or disguised. In other words, there should be nexus between the action taken against a workman resulting in his removal or discharge from his service and the reasons on account of which such action has been taken. The reasons stated by the employer, no doubt, should provide a reasonable excuse for him to terminate the services of the workman. Consequently, if the post occupied by the workman has become surplus on account of a decision taken by the employer, the decision may be communicated to him by the employer while terminating his services which may reasonably show that the post held by the workman has become surplus but the employer would not be under any obligation to state reasons for the decision taken by him in this regard...."
' The question was also considered by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of Muhammad Ishaque v. M/s. Shezan International (1990 PLC 63). In this case, it was held that valid reasons must be explicitly stated by the employer while terminating the services of his workman which can be upheld by the Court. If the reasons stated by the employer have not been sufficiently stated to justify such action, the same would be liable to be interfered with by the Labour Court.
12. In the present case, the order terminating the services of each of the respondents states: "Dear Sir, ' As per terms and conditions of your appointment letter your services are no longer required by the company"
' No doubt, the letter refers to the terms and conditions set out in the appointment letter which clearly indicates, as pointed out earlier, that the services of each of the respondents were of temporary nature not likely to last for more than nine months and that their services were liable to be terminated at any time without any notice or pay in lieu thereof within such period but in our opinion, the said letter does not meet the requirements of Standing Order 12(3). No doubt, it was held in the case of Lever Brothers Pakistan Limited that the employer is not obliged to state reasons for the decision taken by him, but the same does not absolve the employer from his obligation to explicitly state the reasons for the action taken by him. Although the case of the petitioner in each of these petitions is that the respondents had been engaged to share extra work load which was likely to finish at any time within nine months from the date of the appointment of each of the respondents but as is evident from the said letters of termination such reasons have not been communicated to the respondents. As has been observed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ghulam Ahmed, reference to which has been earlier made in this judgment, Standing Orders Ordinance is a beneficial legislation intended to protect the interests of the workmen and to produce harmonious relationship between the employer and the workmen, therefore, it should be liberally construed to give maximum benefit within the framework of law. Not only that the workman whose services have been terminated has a right to know the reasons on account of which such action has been taken by the employer, but the reasons must be such as can be sustained by the Court of law. For such reasons, we are inclined to hold that the said letters terminating the services of the respondents fail to meet the requirements of Standing Order 12(3).
However, we find that although an oblique reference can be found in the judgment of the learned Appellate Tribunal to this aspect of the matter, but the question raised by Mr. Shahani has not been specifically dealt with by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, although, we find that the question had been raised before it by the respondents in the memorandum of appeal filed before the learned Tribunal. We would, therefore, remand the case to the learned Tribunal for considering this important aspect of the case.
13. In the result, although these petitions are allowed but the case is remanded to the learned Appellate Tribunal for a fresh decision in the light of the observations made by us in this judgment.
The learned Tribunal shall also consider the question of granting back benefits to the respondents, if need be in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Bashir v.
Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore (1991 SCMR 2087).