1. ' MRS. MAJIDA RAZVI, J.---By this common judgment we intend to dispose of C.P. No,1486/91, (Capt.
2. M. Ahmed v. PIAC), C.P. No,61/92, (Bandeh All v. PIAC), C.P.No,62/92, (Aftab Ahmed v. PIAC) and C.P.
3. No,310/93 (Ghulam Nabi Shah v. PIAC) which were filed on 19-10-1991, 4-124991, 10-12-1991 and 4-2- 1993 respectively.
4. ' The brief facts giving rise to the above petitions are that the petitioners are the employees of respondent No,1 (PIAC) and have been working in different capacities since 17-3-1992, 22-4-1974, 26-6-1961 and 30-6-1975 respectively. The petitioners are governed under the terms and conditions of services as laid down under the provisions of the PIAC Employees (Service and Discipline) Regulations, 1985.
5. ' The petitioners by passage of time earned promotion and are now working as Captain of Boeing, Flight. Engineer, and Assistant Station Manager, Traffic, respectively.
6. ' During the past Martial Law, the Chief Martial Law Administrator issued Martial Law Regulation No, 52, whereby measures were taken to streamline and regulate the administrative and financial status of the PIAC and to ensure the security of the Airports, aeroplanes and passengers, the said M.L.R. Was issued so that the following actions could be taken: ' Dissolution of all unions, organizations, groups or associations of any type in the corporation and banning their activities.
(ii) To reduce in rank, retire, remove or dismiss from seryice any employee of the Corporation or any member or officer of the Force, if the Federal Government was satisfied that such employee or member or officer was guilty of subversion, corruption, misconduct, inefficiency, mal practice, gross-negligence or any other offence under any law for the time being in force."
7. ' The petitioners' services were dispensed with under sections 6 and 11 of the said M.L.R. With effect from 21-2-1984, 19-8-1981, 13-9-1981 and 18-8-1981 respectively without assigning any reason whatsoever. The petitioners submitted review petitions against their dismissal which were rejected by respondent No,2. Since the petitioners' services were terminated under Martial Law Regulation No, 52, which regulation was saved and protected by the provisions incorporated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioners could not agitate against their "unjust, illegal, political motivated and void ab initio" termination from their service. Before any Court of law.
8. ' In April, 1984, the Government of Pakistan in its Cabinet meeting took certain decisions in respect of the removal of restrictions imposed on trade union activities after 5-7-1977 and also decided to resolve the question of reinstatement of dismissed/retrenched employees of different organizations. In pursuance to this decision a Notification No,LR 17(6)/88, dated 20-5-1989 was issued and published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part III of 3rd June, 1989, constituting a Review Board for the purpose of reviewing the cases of the employees of industrial and commercial establishments set up, managed or controlled by the Government, and who were removed or dismissed from employment under an M.L.R. Or as a result of conviction by Summary Military Court or otherwise purely on political grounds, as the case may be. The said notification, inter alia, provided that review petition may be submitted before the Review Board by 31st May, 1989, after which the Review Board shall review all such cases and make its recommendation after examining the available record' and giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the applicants.
9. ' The petitioners accordingly, submitted applications to the Review Board which were examined by the said Board and an observation was given that the petitioners' termination from services was "the result of political victimisation" and was "devoid of any moral or legal sanction behind it and does not fulfil the requirement of natural justice" and subsequently the said order of termination was held to be "void ab initio". The petitioners' cases were recommended to respondent No,2 for re- employment at the same post from where the services of the petitioners were terminated.
10. ' In pursuance and on the findings of the Review Board, the Ministry of Defence issued an Office Memorandum No,112/JSAI/1/90, dated 17-1-1990 and, thereafter, offer letters were issued by respondent No, 1 to the petitioners for re-employment. The petitioners were re-employed by the respondent No,1 from 26-3-1990, 1-2-1990 and 20-2-1990, respectively. Since the petitioners in C.P.Nos.1486/91, C.P.61/92 and C.P.No,62/92 are members of Pakistan Airlines Pilots Association (PALPA) and Flight Engineers National Association (FENA), their cases were taken up by the said Associations with the Management of PIAC which resolved in the meeting held on 11-2-1990 under the chairmanship of Director, Flight Operations, PIAC, as under:- "The letters given by the respective associations in regard to the acceptance of the cockpit crew, whereby they have indicated that the original seniority would be given to then. This point was confirmed by the respective associations and accepted by the Flight Operations Management that the original level will be restored to the following cockpit crew:
(1) Capt. A. Shah.
(2) Capt. Salimul Haq.
(3) Capt. Akmal.
(4) Capt. Mansoor E. Khan.
(5) Capt. M. S. K. Lodhi.
(6) F/E Aftab Ahmed Khan.
(7) F/E Khalid Nawaz Awan.
(8) F/E Bande All
(9) F/E Naeemuddin Qazi (subject to reporting/joining PIAC)."
11. ' Subsequently, another meeting was held on 11-2-1990 between the Director, Flight Operations of the respondent No,1, PALPA and FENA in which, according to the petitioners they were given assurance that the issue of re-employment will be discussed and pursued.
12. ' The petitioners made representations to the respondent No,1, requesting that for the purposes of fixation of their pay and posting etc. Their past services with P.IA.C. Be counted for their "re- employment which was virtually reinstatement in service". In response to this representation, the petitioners were informed that "the petitioners were re-employed in P.IA.C. And as per policy of the Corporation, under M.L.R. 52, re-appointees' previous services are not counted as such they were not entitled to the grant of pension prior to their re-employment". However, their previous services will be counted only for the purposes of fixation of their pay and allowances. The petitioners being aggrieved by the respondent No, l's denial to count their previous services for the purpose of seniority for all intents and purposes including grant of pension and promotion, filed the present petitions.
13. ' The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners are:
(i) That the respondents' act to disallow counting of previous service of the petitioners for the purposes of seniority etc. Including computation of pension on their ensuing retirement from service, is unjust, improper and unwarranted as well as contrary to respondents' own acts of counting petitioners' previous service for other purposes like fixation of pay, and allowances, the posting and assignment of work.
(ii) That the petitioners' reinstatement in service with continuity of past service with the respondent No, 1 flowed as corollary to the findings of the Review Board which was constituted by a competent Authority i.e, by the Head of the State and as such its finding,s/recommendations ought to be implemented in its true perspective.
(iii) That the petitioners' reinstatement in service with continuity of past service with the respondent No,1 flowed' as corollary to Review Board's findings that the order of the petitioners' termination was the result of political victimization and devoid of any moral or legal sanctions and did not fulfil the requirement of natural justice and its definite finding that the said order.Was void ab initio.
(iv) That the word "re-employment" used by the Review Board is a misnomer and even if it is not, it stands qualified and elucidated by words "re-employ the petitioner at the same post from where the services of the petitioner were terminated" and this connotes continuity of the petitioners' past service for all intents and purposes including its counting for the purposes of pension.
(v) That the respondents' refusal to grant benefit of previous service to the petitioners for the purposes of seniority etc. Is without any justification as, according to the Review Board's Order, that the order of the petitioners' termination was void ab initio, as such the petitioners' dispensation of service .Was nullity in law which will be deemed to have never been terminated.
14. ' The respondents were represented by Mr. Khalid Hameed, Advocate, alongwith Mr. S. Ali Kazim, Advocate. Their contention is that this is a writ jurisdiction and not an appeal and as such the Court cannot go beyond the recommendations of the Board even if these recommendations are discriminatory. According to them, the Government constituied this special Review Board to give relief to the affectees of Martial Law Regulation 52 and had given certain parameters within which it could act and give recommendations to the Government and other semi-autonomous bodies whose employees were affected and their cases were being reviewed/reconsidered.
15. ' After hearing the contentions of both the learned counsel for the parties and going through the citations referred to by the learned counsel, we propose to deal with the above contentions as under: ' It will be beneficial first to see the relevant provisions of M.L.R. 52 under which the action was taken against the petitioners. These read as under: "6. Where the Federal Government or the competent Authority, if so authorised by it in this behalf, is of the opinion that the services of any employee of the corporation or any Member or Officer of the Force are no longer required for any reason whatsoever, it may dispense with the services of such employee, Member or Officer by giving him a maximum of three months' notice or salary in lieu thereof, in addition to other retirement benefits to which he may be entitled under the terms and conditions of his service.
11. The Federal Government or the competent Authority, may, by an order in writing delegate any of its or his powers under this Regulation to such person or authority, not below the rank of Managing Director in the case of corporation or the Director-General, Civil Aviation in the case of the Force, and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order."
16. ' The above Regulations have been saved by the Constitution and as such they will remain on the Statute Book.
17. ' In 1989, when the Emergency was lifted and the Government of the time was in a position to give relief to the affectees of the MLR, it constituted a Review Board to consider all cases of the applicants who applied to the Review Board for consideration of their dismissal without assigning any reason whatsoever. The letter which was issued to the petitioners, and which is identical in all the above petitions, is as under: "PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES KARACHI AIRPORT ' No, DA/P-10612/84, Date: 21st February, 1984. Captain M. Akmal, (P-10612)
18. ' DISPENSATION OF SERVICE ' We regret to inform you that your services are no longer required and in exercise of the powers under the provisions of paragraph 6 read with paragraph 11 of Martial Law Regulation No,52, the Chairman, P.I.A.C. Is pleased to dispense with your services with immediate effect and with normal terminal benefits admissible to you as per rules.
(2) Your dues will be settled as soon as you have arranged your clearance. (Clearance pro forma attached).
(3) You are required to return the Apron Pass and the Passport (if issued through P.I.A.) immediately. Following documents may also be returned immediately:
(a) P.IA. Identity Card and Crew Card.
(b) Family Card.
(c) Unutilised P.IA./Interline Tickets.
(d) Any other property/document in your possession.
19. (Sd.)
20. (SHAMIM YASIN MANTO)
21. DIRECTOR ADMINISTRATION."
22. ' This clearly shows that no reason, whatsoever, was assigned at the time of dismissal of the petitioners while the terms of their service with respondent No, 1 were regulated under P.IA.C.'s Regulations, 1985.
23. ' The Review Board, after considering the applications of the petitioners, gave the following finding: "Having carefully examined the record of termination from service of the petitioner we observe that the impugned order dated 21-2-1984 is the result of political victimisation. It is devoid of any moral or legal sanction behind it and does not fulfil the requirement of natural justice.
24. ' For the above reasons we hold the impugned order void ab initio and recommend to the Federal Government (Ministry of Defence and Aviation Division) to direct the P.IA. Corporation to re-employ the petitioner."
25. The above recommendations very clearly show that the Board had recommended to the Federal Government to direct the P.I.A.C'. To "re-employ" the petitioners (underlining is ours). In view of this recommendation, the PIAC issued an office memorandum giving a job offer to the petitioners and the said letter in unequivocal terms offered "re-employment." There is no doubt that the petitioners continued to agitate against the reemployment through their personal efforts as well as through P.E.L.PA. And P.E.NA., their respective Associations but not even an assurance was given by the respondent to these petitioners that any other action contrary to what the Board has already recommended, would be taken by them. The petitioners were given a chance for re-employment or if they do not wish to rejoin they were offered some benefits. This letter is dated 11-2-1990, stating therein that those employees who are rejoining the Airlines are not being compensated while those who are not returning to their jobs, are getting some compensation. As such the petitioners were well aware of their fate which they will face after re-employment. Para. 6 of letter dated 26-3-1990 clearly informs the petitioners that on re-employment his seniority will be fixed from the date of joining and that no benefit as mentioned in paras. 3, 4 and 5 of the said letter would be allowed on the basis of his previous employment.
26. ' It is obvious that respondent No, 1 is only acting on the recommendations which were given by the Review Board constituted by the competent Authority that is the respondent No, 2.
27. ' The learned counsel for the petitioner, while arguing the above petitions, referred to the case of S. Sharif Ahmed Hashmh v. Chairman,Screening Committee, Lahore and another (1978 SCMR 367) wherein the phrase "void order" and order without jurisdiction" have been discussed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also discussed whether and when a void order can be struck down. It was held that: "The assumption is a total fallacy, because a void order is only a type of an illegal order. This is described as void because it is so illegal that it does not exist in the eye of law, but this does not alter the fact that it was passed and by describing it as void, Courts cannot alter the fact that the order was passed. And an order which has been passed can create consequences, therefore, there cannot be a hard and fast rule that void order must always be struck down. A void order is not always to be struck down regardless of the consequences of such a decision, but that a void order must be struck down provided there is no statute or principle of law which would make it unjust or inequitable to strike down the void order. This qualification is very important, and that is why, for example, a writ may be refused against a void order if this would enable the petitioner to circumvent the provisions of a statute of limitation."
28. ' Another case which was referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner is Shabih-ur-Raza v.
29. Superintendent of Police, Crimes Branch and others (1981 PLC (C:S.) 641). In the instant case the retirement order of the petitioner was passed by an authority other than the competent one and as such it was declared to be a nullity in the eyes of law being without jurisdiction and, therefore, was set aside with immediate effect. It was held by the Hon`ble Court that such an order is void ab initio and the effect should be as if it had not been passed at all and the appeal was accepted and the appellant was considered to have been on duty and entitled to full pay, allowances, etc. For the period of his dismissal.
30. ' The next case referred to is the case of Imtiaz Bashir v. Special High Powered Committee, Government of Balochistan and 4 others (PLD 1978 Quetta 131). In the said case it was held that "the superior Courts have always the power to review the decisions of the administrative or executive or quasi-judicial Tribunals when their findings are in violation of law, or rules, or, are based on misreading or insufficient or inadmissible evidence, or the findings are found to be arbitrary one".
31. ' In the present case, we are discussing the recommendations of a Board which was created by a competent Authority and for a special purpose and with certain parameters. In the present case, the Board has not passed any order which could be called without any power or authority or that the order passed by it is void ab initio. The Board had actually given recommendations to the Government and the Government, in turn, has given instructions to the different autonomous bodies to re-employ the affectees of the M.L.R.
52. As such, there is no relevancy of the above-cited cases to the facts of the present petitions.
32. ' In the above cases, under discussion, which deals with the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958), a reference is made to the case of Yousuf Ali Mullah Noor Bhoy v.
33. The King (PLD 1949 PC 108). The relevant para. Is as follows:-- "But if the orders were nullity there was nothing to appeal against. It may well be that the Government if embarrassed by the orders of acquittal, might have applied to the High Court to quash them. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the House of Lords in Crane v. Director of Police Prosecution, (1921) 2 AC 299 step which was not incumbent, could not convert an order made without jurisdiction into an order passed by Court of competent jurisdiction.
34. Some emphasis was laid on the conduct of the Government of Bombay in appealing against the orders passed by the learned Magistrate, under section 517, Criminal P.C. It may be that the High Court ought to have entertained such appeals, but no question as to the validity of the orders made in these appeals is before the Board. It was rightly conceded by Mr. Page that the action of the Government of Bombay in appealing against the orders made by the Magistrate under section 517 could not operate by way of estoppel to confer jurisdiction upon the Magistrate which he did not otherwise possess."
35. ' As we have already observed that these cases are not relevant to the present petitions, as the recommendations given by the Board were not any orders but recommendations only and the Board itself was constituted by a competent Authority.
36. ' It will be pertinent to mention here that C.P. No,310 of 1993 which was filed on 4-2-1993 suffers from laches. The petitioner Ghulam Nabi Shah was reemployed by the respondent on 20-2-1990 and he took three years to file the present petition. In the case of S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi (supra), it has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as to when a delay in filing a writ petition can be condoned. It was held that "the law has to draw a line somewhere between delay which can be condoned and delay which cannot be condoned, and, as the delay in the instant case was too gross to be condoned the writ petition of the petitioner had to be dismissed on this ground irrespective of the question whether the impugned order was void or voidable".
37. ' Another case, which was referred on the point of laches is the case of Mir Sultan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others (1989 CLC 1495), wherein it was held that "the Constitutional remedy is to be invoked within reasonable time. In service matters reasonable time cannot be stretched beyond three months and delay thereafter shall have to be accounted for by the petitioner".
38. ' The above position in regard to C.P. No, 310 of 1993 is very clear, leading to the obvious result that the said petition, filed after three years, suffers from lathes and, as such , is liable to be dismissed.
39. ' While arguing the cases, Mr. Manzoor Ali and Mr. Nuruddin Sarki, Advocates for the petitioners, have referred to the case of Ghulam Mustafa Shah, who was one of the affectees. They have argued that Ghulam Mustafa Shah was reinstated by the respondent No,1 while the petitioners were reemployed and, as such, there is a discrimination between the employees which is against the Fundamental Rights under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
40. ' The learned counsel for the respondents has placed various documents on record to show that the case of Ghulam Mustafa Shah was different on facts compared to the present petitioners. In the case of Ghulam Mustafa Shah it was mistaken identity as his services were dismissed considering him to be another G.M. Shah (Ghulam Murtaza Shah), who was his younger brother. It has been admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the record also shows, that Ghulam Mustafa Shah has been reinstated with full back benefits but the grounds which have been given by the respondent No,1 are that it was due to the mistake of respondent No, 1 that the said employee had suffered the dismissal and as such when the mistake was discovered, it was rectified and he was reinstated. As such the case of Ghulam Mustafa Shah cannot be compared with the case of the present petitioners.
41. ' The learned counsel have relied upon the case of Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and 2 others (PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 104), wherein it has been observed as under:-- "Where the Legislature clothes an order with finality, it always assumes that the order which it declares to be final is within the powers of the authority making it, and no party can plead as final an order made in excess of the powers of the authority making it in the eye of the law such order being void and non-existent. And if on the basis of a void order subsequent orders have been passed either by the same authority or by other authorities, the whole series of such orders, together with the superstructure of rights and obligations built upon them, must, unless some statute or principle of law recognizing as legal the changed position of the parties is in operation, fall to the ground because such orders have as little legal foundation as the void order on which they are founded."
42. In the present petitions, time and again we have observed that the Board was created by a competent Authority and it had given its recommendations to the Federal Government (respondent No,2) in very clear and unambiguous terms and in turn the said respondent issued directions to the P.IA.C. (respondent No, 1) to re-employ the petitioners. There is no question of any void order or that the orders have been passed in excess of the powers conferred on such Authority.
43. ' If the petitioners are aggrieved that their respective associations, P.E.L.P.OA. And F.E.NA. Were given any assurances in this regard then the same should have been honoured by the respondent No,1.
44. ' In view of the above discussions, these petitions are dismissed/disposed of. However, the parties are left to bear own costs.