1. ' NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-The relevant facts are that respondents Nos. 3 to 10 are successors-in- interest of one Shahab Din, who, in his lifetime, had rented out Shop No, 53/P, Ward No, 1, Street No, 1, Mandir Gali, Karkhana Rail Bazar, Faisalabad, to the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs, 200 with effect from 5-10-197i. A lease agreement for a period of 11 months was also executed wherein it was, inter alia, stipulated by him that if the petitioner continued to pay rent regularly, he (the landlord) would not be entitled to seek ejectment of the petitioner on any other ground. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner this clause was inserted because the landlord had received Rs, 17,000 from the petitioner as advance (pagri).
2. ' After the demise of the said Shahab Din, the petitioner attorney to respondents Nos. 3 to 10 and continued to pay rent at the previously settled rate i,e, Rs, 200. The case of the petitioner is that on the demand of respondents Nos. 3 to 10 he enhanced the rent from Rs, 200 p.m. To Rs, 225 p.m. In 1978. About 2i months prior to the institution of the ejectment application by respondents Nos. 3 to 10 they demanded enhanced rent i,e, Rs, 400 which was refused. This led respondents Nos. 3 to 1 to file an ejectment application against the petitioner on 6-12-1979 on the ground that they required the shop for their personal need. It may also be mentioned that the respondents had filed another petition against their other tenant of the adjoining shop, Babu Khan, on the same ground.
3. ' The petitioner pleaded that the respondents did not have the right to, eject him out of the disputed premises on any ground except that of default in payment of the agreed rent. He, no doubt, also took the plea that the landlord did not require the premises in dispute bona fide for their personal need. The parties went to trial on the following issues :-
(1) Whether the petition is not maintainable ? 0. P. R.
(2) Whether the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners have the right to eject the tenant out of the disputed premises, if so, to what effect ? 0. P. P.
(3) Whether the petitioners bona fide require the premises in dispute for their personal need ? 0. P.
4. A.
(4) Order.
5. ' It appears that the ejectment petition filed against the petitioner as well as liabu Khan were heard together and the learned Rent Controller recorded the evidence of the parties in the case of Babu Khan which was agreed to be read in the present case as well.
6. ' The Rent Controller, in his order passed on 2-6-1980, recorded the findings that the petition was maintainable and the respondents were entitled to seek ejectment of the petitioner even on the ground of personal need because the agreement relied upon by him was only for a period of eleven months which expired in 1972 and the condition being relied upon in the proceedings which were initiated in 1979 was no longer binding upon the respondents, nor were they estopped from seeking ejectment of the petitioner on that ground. He further found that the requirement alleged by the respondents for seeking ejectment of the petitioner, namely, for running their own business in the shop was bona fide. He, accordingly, ordered the ejectment of the petitioner. The petitioner appealed to the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, against this order but without success. He then moved the High Court in writ jurisdiction which, too, proved unavailing. Hence this petition for leave to appeal.
7. ' Mr. Shahzad Jahangir, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended before us that the agreement entered into between the parties restricted the right of the respondents to eject petitioner only for default in payment of rent and that he could not succeed on any other ground.
8. ' We do not find any force in this contention. This very contention was also raised before the learned Judge in the High Court and he repelled it by observing inter alia "Viewed in its true perspective the agreement relied upon by the petitioner came to an end in year 1972 on the expiry of its term according to which it was to enure only for 11 months because there was no further renewal. So, after the expiry of the agreement the rights and liabilities of the tenant fell to he governed by the provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 which regulate the terms as to ejectment."
9. ' We endorse this view based as it is on the view taken by this Court itself in Muhammad Yusuf v.
10. Abdullah (1). The first contention is according by repelled.
11. ' The learned counsel next contended that the evidence recorded by the Rent Controller in the ejectment case of Babu Khan was copied in the instant case and no evidence was taken or allowed to be led in the petitioner's case. Hence, there was, in the eye of law, no enquiry or trial conducted in the petitioner's case and that the petitioner not having been afforded any opportunity of showing cause against the proposed order of 'ejectment, the order of the learned Rent Controller was void and liable to be set aside.
12. ' This contention was also raised before the Courts below and the learned Judge in the High Court dealt with it at some length and found no force in it because the mode of recording the evidence in the present case was agreed to by the parties.
13. We may add that there is no express procedure prescribed in the statute which the Rent Controller must adopt while dealing with applications of landlords seeking ejectment of their tenants. The only requirement prescribed in the statute is that the ejectment of the tenant should be ordered only if the Rent Controller is "satisfied", after giving him a reason- B able opportunity of showing cause against the application, that this is warranted. The significance of the word "satisfied" used in the relevant is section of the statute, has been explained in the well-known judgment of this Court in the case of Khadim Mohyuddin v. Rehmat Ali (2) as follows :- "Then subsection (3) of section 13 says that before putting the landlord in possession of the tenanted premises the Controller should be `satisfied' that the claim of the landlord is bona fide.
14. But there is no express mention of any enquiry by the Controller. If the word `satisfied' imports the necessity of an enquiry, even then it cannot be said that in holding such inquiry he will be bound by any particular procedure." (underlining is ours).
15. Thus, all that the law requires is that each parts should be afforded a roper opportunity of putting forth its case before orders are passed in an ejectment application. Any attempt to import any particular procedure, such as that prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code or in any other law and to insist on its meticulous adherence is totally alien to the intention of this statute. In fact, the Controller in discharging many of his functions is not required to act judicially but he acts at best in a quasi-judicial capacity. This aspect has also been highlighted in the case of Khadim Mohyuddin aforesaid in the following words :- "From the provisions of the Ordinance it appears that though under section 16 the 'Controller' has been given powers 'of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence' he is not bound in every case to follow the procedure as laid down in the Code of Civil. Procedure. He has been given powers under sections 4, 10(3) and 12 to make orders after holding such enquiry as he thinks fit. In such cases the
(1) PLD 1980 SC 298 (2) PLD 1965 SC 459 question of nature of enquiry is left to him. That means that in such enquiries the parties have no right to insist on production of such evidence -which they desire to adduce in support of their case.
16. Therefore, no machinery is prescribed for summoning witnesses or compelling production of documents in such enquiries. In short, these enquiries may be such as are conducted by an Executive Officer. Furthermore, the Controller has been given power to regulate the use by a landlord of his own property, inasmuch as within the Urban Area the landlord may not convert a residential building into a non-residential building. The power thus conferred on the Controller would appear to be a purely executive."
17. ' The conclusion was expressed thus :- "We, therefore, conclude from the foregoing examination of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance that though some of the functions of the Controller are judicial in character, but yet he is not required to act judicially in discharging many of his functions. In these circumstances, it will be difficult to hold that the Controller acts as a Court. At the most it may be said that he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity."
18. The contention raised before us with regard to the order of the Rent Controller being bad for not recording the evidence in the present case separately is entirely misplaced. As observed already, in these proceedings, all that is expected from the Rent Controller is that he should act fairly D and before passing final orders in the case afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to defend their respective views, but he is otherwise not tramelled by having to follow any express form of procedure.
19. ' It was lastly urged that the plea of the respondents that they require the shop in question bona fide for their personal use was also not well-founded and that it was only a device to secure the ejectment of the petitioner from the premises.
20. ' The aspect of the matter was considered by the Courts below and the appellate Court, namely, the Additional District Judge, observed as follows on this point :- "It is clear from the evidence on record that the respondents Nos. 2 to 6 are real brothers and their father died 4-5 years back and he has rented out two shops owned by him to appellant Abdul Sattar and one Babu, the respondents are running their business on retirees and they have no permanent place for carrying on their business. All the respondents being married have children and they would like to have a permanent place for carrying on their business and need of respondents in their circumstances is genuine and bona fide."
21. ' The above finding is clear and unequivocal and negates the plea raised by the petitioner. Such a finding of fact could not be interfered with by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction nor can it, a fortiori, be assailed before us in the present proceedings.
22. ' The result is that this petition must fail and is, accordingly, dismissed hereby.