' This petition under Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order was filed to call in question order of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore dated 11-4-1984, affirming the order of the Rent Controller dated 28-2-1983, directing the ejectment of the petitioner from the premises in dispute.
2. Facts, briefly stated are, that Sh. Muhammad Ramzan, respondent No,3, sought the ejectment of the petitioner from the shop forming part of property No, 66, General Bus Stand, Badami Bagh, Lahore, of which he was in possession as a tenant, on the sole ground that it was required in good faith for the use and occupation of the respondent's son, Muhammad Islam, who wanted to start business therein. Petitioner resisted the ejectment petition controverting the allegations made by the respondent-landlord. Pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues: -
(1) Whether the petitioner requires bona finely the shop in dispute for his son Muhammad Islam in good faith? O.P.P.
(2) What is the effect of previous litigation between the parties?
(3) Whether the plan and the boundaries of the shop in question are incorrect? If so with what effect?
(4) Relief.
3. In order to prove his case that he needed the shop in dispute in good faith for the use of his son, respondent landlord examined Salah-ud-Din P.W.1, his son Muhammad Islam P.W. 2, and he himself appeared as P.W.3, petitioner, on the other hand, produced six witnesses including himself.
' Respondent and his witnesses deposed that the shop in dispute was needed, in good faith, for the use and occupation of Muhammad Islam, the son of the respondent, who was without any shop and was selling the goods on 'Phairi' The evidence led by the petitioner on the relevant aspect was to the effect that the respondent/landlord owned other properties in Akbari Mandl, Shad Bagh and Sheranwala Gate. It was also stated that Muhammad Islam, son of landlord, was carrying on business in name of Suleman Trading Company.
4. Learned Rent Controller as also the learned Additional District Judge after thorough appraisal of the evidence on the record held that Muhammad Islam son of the landlord was not carrying on business independently in any other property owned by his father, respondet No,3, and that there was nothing on the record to show that the properties owned by the respondent/landlord in the aforementioned localities were lying vacant or were suitable for the needs of his son Muhammad Islam. It was further held that the respondent/landlord has proved that except the shop in dispute, no other property owned by him, was available or suitable for' the need of his son and that in any case it is the privilege of the landlord to choose any property for his use out of the properties owned by him. Thus, relying upon the evidence led by the respondent/landlord, the learned Courts below found issue No,1 in his favour and ordered the ejectment of the petitioner from the shop in dispute.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the validity of the impugned judgment on the sole ground that the statements of R.W.1 to R.W.5 have been copied out verbatim from the record of connected ejectment petition filed by the present landlord titled Muhammad Ramzan v. Muhammad Ayub. Submission of the learned counsel was that ejectment petition filed against the petitioner should have been decided on the basis of the evidence recorded in this case and not with reference to the evidence in another case. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord did not deny that the depositions of R.W.1 to R.W:5 viz. Muhammad Aslam, Abdul Jabbar, Muhammad Siddiq, Sadar Din and Sh. Noor Ahmad recorded in the case of Muhammad Ramzan v. Muhammad Ayub were transcribed in the present case. He, bow ever, submitted that this was done with the consent of the petitioner and the latter, therefore, cannot raise any objection, at this stage. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is nothing on the record to show that the petitioner gave his consent to the procedure adopted by the Rent Controller. That may be so, but it is also not borne out from the record that the petitioner raised objection when the evidence of the aforementioned R.Ws. Was copied in the present case. In the somewhat similar circumstances, it was held in Sh. Muhammad Ashraf v. Sh. Muhammad Almas PLD 1981 Lah. 52, that the procedure adopted by Rent Controller had implied consent of the parties. It was further observed that "it is for the Rent Controller as persona designate to adopt any procedure. In these circumstances, the procedure evolved or adopted with the consent of the parties impliedly or expressly cannot be commented upon unfavorably."
' In Abdus Sattar v. Muhammad Afzal PLD 1985 SC 148, a contention was raised before the Supreme Court that the evidence recorded by the Rent Controller in another ejectment case was copied in that case and no evidence was taken or allowed to be led in that case. It was, therefore, argued that no inquiry or trial was conducted in that case as the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of showing cause against his ejectment. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court with the observation that "there is no express procedure prescribed in the Statute which the Rent Controller must adopt while dealing with application of landlords seeking ejectment of their tenants. The only requirement prescribed in the Statute is that the ejectment of the tenant should be ordered only if the Rent Controller is "satisfied", after giving him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, that this is warranted." It was further observed that in the Rent proceedings, "all that is expected from the Rent Controller is that he should act fairly and before passing final orders in the case afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to defend their respective views, but he is otherwise not trammeled by having to follow any express form of procedure."
6. Respectfully following the aforementioned dicta, I hold that the procedure adopted by the Rent Controller was not open to any exception and, in any case, petitioner having raised no objection at the relevant time would be deemed to have impliedly consented to the evidence of B the aforementioned R.Ws. Being copied in the present case. He, cannot, therefore be allowed to agitate in the present proceedings against the procedure adopted by the Rent Controller.
7. Apart from what has been said above, petitioner's own statement as R.W. 6 was recorded in this case. He cannot, therefore, make any grievance even on the count of non-affording of opportunity of showing cause against his ejectment.
8. Apart from the solitary contention discussed above, learned counsel for the petitioner did not raise any other question. He did not question the findings of the Courts below on the issue of personal need. It may, however be observed that this issue of personal requirement is one of fact which has been concurrently found by the C two learned Courts in favour of the respondent/landlord and the finding recorded by them, as discussed above, is based on proper appraisal of the evidence. That being so, their finding, even if questioned, cannot be interfered with by this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction.
8. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders of ejectment are not open to any exception. This petition has no merits and the same is hereby dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.