' RUSTAM S. SIDHWA, J.---This is an appeal by Haji Mohibullah & Company and others appellants challenging the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 5th December, 1987, accepting the writ petition filed by Khawaja Bahauddin respondent and upsetting the judgment of the Rent Controller, Rawalpindi, and the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, rejecting the eviction petition filed by the said respondent.
2. The brief facts of the case are that on 29th July, 1978, Khawaja Bahauddin, the present respondent filed a petition before the Rent Controller, Rawalpindi, seeking ejectment of Haji Mohibullah & Company and others, present appellants Nos. 1 to 3, from godown bearing No, V-231, situated in Ganj Mandi, Rawalpindi, on the ground of default and personal need of his son Misbahuddin. In the eviction petition it was stated that the premises were required by the respondent for his son Misbahuddin in good faith for his use and that neither the respondent nor his son were in possession of any other property suitable for their business. The petition was contested. On the basis of pleadings, the following issues were framed:-- "(1) Whether tenants have been paying or tendering monthly rent to the petitioner? OPP.
(2) Whether the landlord in good faith requires the premises in dispute for the use of and occupation of his son Misbahuddin ?OPP.
(3) Relief."
3. At the trial, issue No, 1 was given up by the respondent, but issue No, 2 was, however, decided against him. In rejecting issue No, 2, the learned Rent Controller held that the respondent had failed to mention the fact of his being in possession of accommodation in 'the same premises which was not suitable and insufficient for his need, that the failure on the part of the respondent to mention in his petition that he was in possession of some other commercial property projected his mala fides, that the application for agency which had been filed seven months prior to the institution of the petition was not referred to in the pleadings and that there was nothing in the evidence to show that the premises in possession of the respondent were not suitable for his need.
4. Respondent thereupon filed an appeal, which was heard by a learned Additional District Judge of Rawalpindi, on behalf of the respondent it was inter alia urged that it was not mandatory on the part of the landlord to disclose the nature of the business which he intended to carry on in the disputed property, that though there was no mention in the eviction petition that the landlord's son had applied for agency of flour and maida, of which reference was made at the trial, this did not reflect the respondent's mala fides, and that the evidence on the record was sufficient to show the bona fide need for the record was sufficient to show the bona fide need for the premises, which was sufficient for the Court to order ejectment. The learned Additional District Judge rejected the appeal. Ii coming to the conclusion, which he did, the learned Judge inter alia held that though it was not mandatory on the part of the landlord to disclose the purposes for which he required the premises claimed, but in order to ascertain his bona fides it was necessary to examine the basis on which he sought ejectment of his tenant and since the respondent had not mentioned in his petition anything about the agency for which he had applied and for which he sought ejectment and as to how much space was required by him for storing atta and maida and the fact that he possessed a garage near the disputed premises, the learned Judge held that the respondent was in possession of sufficient area (namely the garage measuring 14' x 27') which he could very easily use for his godown and the fact that respondent had already raised a false plea of default, clearly showed that he had not filed his petition with bona fide intention and that he did not require the disputed property in good faith for the use of his son.
5. Being aggrieved by the above judgment, the respondent filed writ petition before the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which was accepted on 5th December, 1987. The learned Judge, after recording the gist of the evidence produced by the respondent, held that he had proved to the hilt his bona fide need for the disputed property and that the opinion of the two Courts below was based on an erroneous view of the law and misreading of the evidence.
6. The present appeal challenges the findings of the learned Judge of the High Court recorded above. On behalf of the appellants it is submitted that the respondent did not mention in his eviction petition that he was in possession of the garage which was not suitable for his need, that he also did not mention in his eviction petition what business he was going to do. Or that he had applied for any agency, for which he required the premises. It is further submitted that the disputed property comprises a large number of rooms spread over three compact blocks and that nothing was stated by the respondent about his exact requirement and which particular room or rooms he required. It is next contended that many shops fell vacant during the pendency of the respondent's writ petition, which the respondent could have used, but he did not, and that though an application was made by the appellants in the High Court to lead evidence in the said connection, the same was wrongly disallowed. On the proposition that the High Court should have taken into consideration shops that fell vacant, as it can take into consideration subsequent events, the learned counsel has cited Mst. Amina Begum and others v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir PLD 1978 SC 220 and Muhammad Younis Malik v. District Judge, Lahore etc. 1982 SCMR 834. It is lastly submitted that concurrent findings of fact having been recorded by the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge. The High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter. In this connection learned counsel has cited Mahboob Elahi v. Muhammad Zaman 1983 SCMR 37, Mst. Ismat Khanum Toor v. Rao Riaz Ali Khan 1978 SCMR 335 and Sheikh Abdus Sattar v. Malik Muhammad Afzal and others PLD 1985 SC 148. As regards the authorities cited by the learned Judge; it is submitted they are in respect of second appeals and therefore not applicable to the case.
7. On behalf of the respondent it is submitted that it is not necessary for a landlord to disclose in his eviction petition the nature of the business for which he requires the particular premises. In this connection Mst. Toheed Khanum v. Muhammad Shamshad 1980 SCMR 593 and Mst. Saira Bai v.
Syed Anisur Rahman 1989 SCMR 1366 have been referred. It is further submitted that though section 13(3)(a)(ii)(b) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance does require the landlord seeking non-residential property to state in his petition that he is not occupying any other similar property in the same area suitable for his needs, yet the Supreme Court in Muhammad Sharif v. Nisar Ahmad and others 1988 SCMR 1587 has held that failure to mention this fact would not defeat the petition, if otherwise the bona fide need was established. As regards the asscertion that many shops fell vacant during the pendency of the writ petition, it is submitted that they have no relevancy in writ proceedings, though they may otherwise have relevancy in appellate proceedings. As regards the assertion that the respondent was duty bond to state clearly what his exact requirement was, it is contended that as the disputed premises were leased out as one unit, it was being claimed as such and the necessity of specifying the number of room or rooms required did not arise. As regards the final submission that the High Court could not have interfered with concurrent findings, it is submitted that the High Court can interfere in such cases, if there is misreading of the evidence or legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court have not been followed. In this connection learned counsel has referred to Muhammad Sharif and another v.
Muhammad Afzal Sohail etc. PLD 1981 SC 246, Muhammad Younas v. Naseer Ahmad and others 1989 SCMR 1321 and Abdul Hamid v. Ghulam Rasul and others 1988 SCMR 401.
8. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties we have gone through the oral and documentary evidence on the record and given our anxious consideration to the arguments addressed by them. In writ jurisdiction the High Court ordinarily does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. However, where there is misreading of the evidence, or omission to take into consideration material evidence, or where any statute law or rule of law laid down by a superior Court has not been applied by the Courts below, the High Court can interfere. The main question, therefore, that calls for determination is whether there has been misreading of the evidence or failure to apply the correct principles of law on the part of the Rent Controller or the learned Additional District Judge in the instant case. This Court has already held that there is no legal requirement on the part of the landlord to disclose the nature of the business he intends to conduct in the premises, for which he has made an application seeking possession. It has also been held by this Court, notwithstanding the statutory requirement as contended under section 13(3) (a)(ii)(b) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, that though there may be a failure on the part of the landlord to mention in his eviction petition that he was not occupying similar commercial property in the same area suitable for his needs, it would not be fatal to his case, if otherwise his bona fide need was established. The Rent Controller, Rawalpindi, was ignorant of the law declared by this Court and referred to such failure on the part of the respondent as directly showing his mala fides. The learned Additional District Judge, however, whilst accepting the legal principle, yet referred to the lapse as affecting the respondent's bona fides, without properly appraising the evidence regarding this matter. As regards the main question, namely, whether there has been misreading of the evidence, we have no hesitation in endorsing the view of the learned Judge of the High Court. The evidence of Parvez Akhtar (PW 1), Misbahuddin (PW 2) and Khawaja Bahauddin (PW 3) is clear and sufficient to prove the bona fide need of the respondent for the disputed premises for the requirement of his son Misbahuddin (PW 2). Though Misbahuddin (PW) has in his evidence clearly referred to the fact that the roof of the garage which was in their possession was broken, the same was not taken into consideration by the two Courts below as justifying the need of the respondent for the premises in dispute. The disputed premises consist of a number of rooms. Since they were leased out en block as one unit, the eviction petition was filed seeking the possession of the total premises as one unit. In these circumstances, the respondent was not required to state how many rooms he desired out of the same. Taking all circumstances into consideration, the judgment of the learned Judge of the High Court appears to be legal and proper and does not call for any interference. There being no merit in this appeal, the same is dismissed with costs.