JUSTICE (R.) ABDUL HAFEEZ CHEEMA, (CHAIRMAN).---The respondent Sub (Retd) Muhammad Ashraf joined the services of Army Welfare Trust (hereinafter referred as AWT) vide appointment letter Exh.P-1 as Senior Clerk on 13-5-1996. The appointment letter, inter alia, envisaged that after undergoing the probation he will be entitled to superannuate on attaining the age of 60 years and will be liable to transfer anywhere in any of the projects of the AWT. In pursuance of the condition last mentioned, his services were transferred to the Askari Guards Private Limited (hereinafter described as AGL). While serving in the AGL, he earned promotion as Senior Assistant / Head Clerk.
To his astonishment his services were however arbitrarily and abruptly terminated on 20-1-2003 considering his appointment as contractual one.
2. The respondent has claimed that he was a permanent employee of the AWT and the order of termination failed to disclose any reasons whatsoever and so also neither any notice was issued nor any domestic or any regular enquiry was ever held. This step on the part of the appellants was claimed to be in sheer violation of Standing Order 12(3) of the schedule attached to West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. He further claimed that after his ouster from service he did not remain gainfully employed anywhere. According to him he had six years and seven months service, clean and blotless, to his credit.
3. He filed a grievance petition before the Punjab Labour Court No,6, at Rawalpindi. The' grievance petition was stoutly resisted by the two appellants claiming it to be barred by time. It was claimed that as his services were contractual, hence on the expiry of the contract period were rightly terminated by AGL. After recording evidence and hearing arguments from both sides, his grievance petition was allowed and he was ordered to be reinstated in service with back benefits vide impugned judgement dated 1-6-2004.
4. Both the appellants i.e, AWT and AGL have filed separate appeals against the impugned judgment which are being disposed of by this single judgment. It was contended, inter alia, that the learned lower court had failed to consider their objections / contentions in their real perspective and the decision was contrary to all norms of justice and equity. It was emphasized that the grievance notice was in fact an appeal and not a grievance notice as such the very grievance petition was incompetent and also out of time; that although letter of appointment Exh.P-1 showed that he was appointed by the AWT but in fact he had to serve the AGL and according to the service conditions offered by the AGL his contract period was only for three years. The AGL had thus every right to dispense with his services after the expiry of the aforesaid period; that the respondent had been sailing into two boats; he had been enjoying higher perks and privileges in the AGL and also enjoyed promotion as Head Clerk and at the same time he was denying their authority of terminating his services.
5. Arguments have been heard and record has been thoroughly perused.
6. The learned counsel for the respondent has dealt with every objection of the appellants which was in fact a repetition of the objections that were discussed at length by the learned lower court and ultimately had rejected those objections on the factual as well as legal plank. After hearing arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties I have arrived at the following conclusions:--
(1) As for the validity of the letter Exh.P-3 it was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that it was issued in advance of the termination order and had been described as an appeal as such it could not be construed as a valid notice. The objection has no merit in it. A bare reading of this document shows it to be a notice, though it was described as an appeal by the respondent in his statement as P.W.1. An appeal is always addressed to the higher authorities. The use of word 'appeal' in his statement will not vitiate it if its contents show it to be a notice. This was addressed to the AGL who had issued notice of termination before the actual termination of service of the respondent so the cause of action had accrued to him on the basis of the notice issued by the AGL.
This was a valid notice though issued three days before the actual date of termination. Thus it shall be construed to be a proper grievance notice in view of the Habib Bank Limited's case reported as 1985 PLC 1100. So this objection was altogether irrelevant and the learned trial Court had rightly rejected it.
(2) The respondent was employed by the master organization i.e, AWT which had all the trappings of a permanent employment with a right to transfer his services to any of their subsidiary and subordinate organization anywhere.
(3) This was not a contractual appointment and the right of termination of service had been retained by the AWT in Exh.P-1 the appointment letter of Muhammad Ashraf, respondent.
(4) That the respondent had never accepted new rules being imposed by the AGL arbitrarily which were visibly repugnant to the terms and conditions of service settled between the AWT and the respondent employee.
(5) It is equally a fact that at the time of issuance of appointment Exh.P-1 no service rules made by the AGL were in the field regulating terms and conditions of service of their employees and only AWT rules were in field.
(6) Likewise it is an admitted fact that AGL formed its service rules after more than six years of the induction of the respondent in service by the AWT. There seems to be a logic in issuance of terms and conditions by the parent body i.e, AWT because they had retained the right to transfer persons recruited by them to direct them to serve in any of their subordinate and subsidiary institutions. The respondent had never accepted that his service was of contractual nature as declared by the AGL.
It is also an admitted fact that he declined to sign the terms and conditions offered by the AGL wherein he was to be taken as a contractual employee. Moreover, the rules which were made six years after his induction into service could not have been made to apply to the respondent retrospectively.
(7) That it ill behooves a court to non suit a claimant on the basis of hyper technical objection when it is held that the claim of the suitor was otherwise just and fair.
7. I have examined and assessed the reasoning given by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment and have found that there was no flaw or infirmity in it. As a sequel to this finding, the impugned judgment is upheld and both the appeals are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.