1. The land in dispute was sold on 30th of October 1964. The suit for pre-emption was filed on the 22nd of November 1965. The vendee raised, inter alia, a preliminary objection that the disputed land was evacuee property. The objection appears to have been taken with a view to challenge the jurisdiction of the framed:- "Whether the land in dispute is evacuee property, if so, what is its effect?"
2. The learned trial Court held that, no doubt, the land was evacuee property when it was allotted to the vendor, but in the jamabandis (Exhs. D. 1 and D. 2) pertaining to the period 1961-62 and 1962-63 the vendor had been shown as full owner of the suit property which meant that on the date of sale- he had become full owner. This finding of the learned trial Court has been challenged by this Revision petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged the following points:-
(1) That admittedly the property once was evacuee property and as held in Muhammad Hassan v.
3. Mumtaz Hussain (PLD 1965 Lah. 35) and Sugaran v. Rehmat Ali (PLD 1965 Lah. 580) notwithstanding the fact that the land has been acquired by the Government under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, it continues for the purpose of the above Act to carry the label of "evacuee property" with the result that it would continue to be immune from the jurisdiction of the civil Courts in view of the provisions contained in section 41 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957. Reliance was also placed on Ali Muhammad v.
4. Mahmoodul Hassan (PLD 1968 Lab. 329) in which it was held that the right and interest of a person in the property allotted to him under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme is immovable property and its sale is covered by sections 4 and 6 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913), yet section 16 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act (XII of 1957) is a complete bar to a suit for possession to enforce the right of pre-emption through a civil Court; and (2) Alternatively the suit was barred by section 6 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958. And reliance was placed on Ruknud Din v. Ghulam Mustafa and another (PLD 1970 Lab. 797) where it was held that for so long as property remains in the compensation pool a Court is altogether precluded from proceeding by any process against it and section 6 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement)
5. Act, 1958 debars all suits against the property.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not challenge the finding that in the copies of the jamabandis for the years 1961-62 and 1962-63 (Exhs. D. 1 and D. 2) the vendor has been shown as fall owner of the property. It has also not been alleged that any other evidence was produced to show that this entry was in any way incorrect. On the present record, therefore, there is nothing to justify the inference that the property was in the compensation pool on the date when the sale was effected or that the property could not be proceeded against for any claim whatsoever in execution of a decree or order by any process of Court or other authority. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, rested his argument on a legal plane that by virtue of amendment introduced by the Displaced Persons (Laws Amend--ment) Ordinance XIII of 1964 and rule 7 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Rule, 1959, the provisional permanent allottee of the land acquired rights in the land as absolute owner only with effect from 24th December 1964 and before that date the property must be deemed to be a part of the compensation pool. In similar circumstances where a sale was effected on the 30th of July 1960 (i.e. Much before 24-12-1964) and there was nothing to show on the record that the property was in the compensation pool, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in Saeed Muhammad and another v. Talib Hussain Shah (1970 SCMR 641) that this matter could not be decided without evidence and the fact that in the last column of the jamabandi there was an entry regarding mutation No. 760 under which the name (presumably) of the Rehabilitation Commissioner was expunged lent support to the claim by the plaintiff that the suit land was permanently settled on the vendor before he effected the sale in favour of the defendants. Impliedly, this authority is also an answer to the question whether the property which was evacuee property originally carried the same label even after acquisition of the property by the Central Government.
7. Even if it is assumed that permanent rights in the property were obtained on the 24th of December 1964 and not earlier, there can be no legal objection to the maintainability of a suit for pre-emption and to the competence of the civil Court to pass a decree of pre-emption in regard to property which has been sold before the 24th of December 1964 provided it had ceased to be a part of the compensation pool on the date of sale. That the sale of rights of provisional permanent allottee is pre-emptible now admits of no doubt in view of not only the above-mentioned 'Supreme Court authority, but also the earlier pronouncements in Taza Gul and another v. Said Ghulam (PLD 1967 Pesh. 157) and Babu Ali Muhammad v. Mahmoodul Hassan (PLD 1968 Lah.329). The controversy whether after a property has been acquired under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, it still is evacuee property has also been set at rest by the Supreme Court in A. R. Niazi v. Pakistan (PLD 1968 SC 119) where it was held that "the property, after acquisition by the Central Government by notification under section 3 of the Act, had vested in it for all pur--poses and all evacuee interest in it had been extinguished, by ope--ration of law, with effect from the date of that notification". For this proposition, A. R. Niazi's case has been relied upon in Sher Muhammad and others v. Azmat Ali (PLD 1968 Lah. 1171), Ruknud Din v. Ghulam Mustafa and another and Mehra v. Zahur Ahmad (PLD 1971 Lah. 834). Of late, a controversy has, however, raged on the question whether in view of section 6 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide and entertain pre-emption suit arising out of sale of allottees' rights in property which is in the compensation pool. In Sher Muhammad v. Azmat Ali a learned Single Judge held that section 6 of the above Act was not a bar. Same view was taken in Allah Ditta v. Fateh Khan and others (PLD 1970 Lah. 168). In Ruknud Din v. Ghulam Mustafa a different view was taken by a Division Bench and it was held that by entering upon a suit with respect to the property in a compensation pool the Court is in effect proceedings against it although section 6 precludes the Court from proceeding by any process against any property forming part of the compensation pool and all the suits against such property are barred.
8. The question in the present case, however, is whether a property which has been sold when it was in the compensation pool, will still remain immune from pre-emption suit or from being proceeded under section 6 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act of 1958 even after 24th of December 1964, when it has ceased to be a part of the compensation pool. The applicability of section 6 is apparently confined to the point of time when the property ceased to be a part of the compensation pool and according to the learned counsel for the petitioner this date is 24th of December 1964. There is no law or principle of law that a suit which was not comeptent on the date when the part of cause of action arose, would remain incompetent even after the removal of the bar against that suit. What a pre--emptor has to show is only this much that he was invested with the right of pre-emption on the date of sale and continues to remain so invested on the date of the suit and the date of the decree. See Hayat Bakhsh v. Mansabdar Khan and others (AIR 1935 Lah.
9. 529) and Thakur Madho Singh and another v. Lt. James R. R. Skinner and another (197 I C 227=AIR 1941 Lah. 433). The preferential right that a person possesses at the time of the sale and retains, firstly, till the institution of the suit, entitles him to file a suit within the period of limitation provided by law. This right cannot be curtailed by a reference to a bar of jurisdiction of the Court on the date when the sale was effected. Even if it is assumed that the property remained a part of the compensation pool, up to 24th of December 1964, on the date of sale the respondent-pre-emptor was invested with the right of pre-emption as held to the cases referred to above, and he was within his right to file the suit after the bar of jurisdiction, if any, was removed provided the suit was not barred by limitation. Section 6 also obviously refers to a bar about property which forms part of the compensation pool and not the property which once was a part of that pool. Its scope cannot be extended beyond what is envisaged therein.
10. There are number of cases in which it has been held that even a premature suit can be continued after maturity although initially the suit may be susceptible of being thrown out as being premature. Reference in this connection may be made to Subbaraya Chetty v. Nachiar Ammal (AIR 1918 Mad. 143 (1)), Valluru Appalasuri and others v. Sasapu Kannamma Nayuralu (AIR 1926 Mad.
11. 6) and Kanshi Ram v. Jaimal Singh (AIR 1923 Lah. 590). Even if the suit had been filed before 24th December 1964, and it could be shown that it would be within time on the 25th of December 1964, such suit could also be continued on the basis of the principle laid down by the above mentioned cases. There is, therefore, no reason why a new suit cannot be filed after 24th of December 1964 for an earlier cause of action when the suit is not barred by limitation. In Mehra v. Zahoor Ahmad the mutation of sale was effected on 27th of May 1964 and the suit was filed after the 24th of December 1964, i.e. On the 27th of May 1965. It was held that the land in dispute was permanently settled on the allottee at the latest by the 24th of December 1964 and thereby the bar in the way of the suit was also removed and the suit filed on the 27th May 1965 was, therefore, competent.
12. The order of the learned trial Court was, therefore, unexcep--tionable and the Revision petition has no force and is dismissed as such, but without any order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.