' MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANGIRI, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 13-3-1997 passed by a learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court, Multan Bench. Dismissing Civil Revision No 600-D of 1995 in limine.
2. The facts of the case briefly stated in the impugned order are that Muhammad Azam, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, was an oustee of Islamabad. He was accordingly issued an entitlement Certificate against which !And was to be allotted to him in Punjab Muhammad Azam deceased, therefore, allegedly executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of Haq Nawaz predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners on 2-11-1966 for the purpose of getting the land allotted and thereafter, to transfer it in favour of any other person. Muhammad Azam deceased also purportedly entered into an agreement to sell. Dated 1-11-1966 for the sale of disputed land in favour of Haq Nawaz for a consideration of Rs,15,000. It was further alleged that after getting the land allotted. Haq Nawaz took possession thereof; brought it under cultivation; paid the instalments; constructed a house thereon; installed a tubewell and, thus incurred a sum of Rs,2,00,000. In the meantime Muhammad Azam died and the land was mutated in favour of respondent No,1 who had not only backed out of the. Agreement to sell executed by his deceased father Muhammad Azam but also wrongfully transferred the land in favour of defendant No,2 by virtue of registered sale-deed, dated 7-10-1981. Hence, the suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell against the respondents.
3. The defendants-respondents contested the suit denying not only the execution of agreement to sell but also the registered General Power of Attorney executed by Muhammad Azam. In the alternative, it was pleaded by defendants-respondents that the impugned agreement to sell, if any, was violative of the provisions of section 19 of the Punjab Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act V of 1912. Besides, the claim of payment of instalments by the petitioners was also repudiated. A number of issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties were settled the evidence was recorded and the suit was initially dismissed on 21-10-1995, During the pendency of the appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, an application under Order XLI, Rule 27, C.P.C. Was moved for permission to adduce additional evidence. The learned Additional District Judge who was seized of the appeal. Vide his judgment, dated 6-2-1991, remanded the case with the direction to the trial Court to allow the parties to lead further evidence and simultaneously allowed the petitioners to produce their additional evidence. Both the parties sought revision of the impugned order of the Appellate Court. The learned Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court accepted the Civil Revision No,97 of 1991, set aside the order, dated 6-2-1991 and remanded the case to the Appellate Court with a direction to dispose of the application of the petitioner for permission to lead additional evidence. In post remand proceedings, the learned Additional District Judge, in his turn vide his order, dated 13-2-1993, remanded the case to the learned trial Court after framing additional Issues Nos.6, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C. 6-D. 6-E and 6-F. The parties adduced further evidence before the learned trial Court. After close of the evidence. The petitioners filed another application seeking to adduce additional evidence in the shape of documents. The learned Civil Judge who was seized of the application at the relevant time vide order, dated 24-5-1993 dismissed it against which the petitioner tiled a Revision Petition but it was later on dismissed as withdrawn. Ultimately, the learned Civil Judge vide his order, dated 27-6-1994 non-suited the petitioners which order was affirmed in appeal by the learned Additional District Judge by virtue of his order, dated 20-6-1995.
Even during the pendency of appeal, it was, inter alia, contended that the learned Civil Judge had erred in law by rejecting their application for additional evidence and simultaneously also filed still another application under Order XLI, Rule 27. C.P.C. For permission to adduce additional evidence in the shape of document. This application and the appeal were also dismissed. The petitioners.
Feeling aggrieved, filed the Civil Revision, out of which this petition has arisen.
4. It appears from the record that on behalf of the petitioners it was contended before the High Court 'that the evidence on record was not correctly appraised by the two Courts below while non- suiting the petitioners'. The learned Single Judge in the High Court was taken through the evidence 'in a bid to convince him to arrive at a different conclusion' The learned Judge, however, dismissed the civil revision on the following reasoning:-- "I am afraid re-appraisal of evidence is not permissible in revisional jurisdiction. No misreading or non-reading or evidence could be pointed out so as to justify interference in these proceedings.
Merely because another view of the evidence could be framed is no ground for substituting the same for that concurrently formed by the two Courts below."
5. Raja Muhammad Bashir, learned Advocate Supreme Court, in support of this petition contended that the dismissal of the application for adducing additional evidence, firstly, by the trial Judge and later on dismissal of another application by the learned Appellate Court, for adducing additional evidence was suffering from legal infirmity of the kind warranting interference by the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel section 19 of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act (V of 1912) does not at all create a bar against the right of an allottee of land to enter into an agreement to sell the land after the allottee eventually acquired the proprietary rights in the land.
6. We have not been impressed by either of these contentions. Under Rule 1 of Order XIII of the C.P.C., the petitioners were required to have produced at the first hearing of the suit all the documentary evidence of every description in their possession or power on which they intended to rely which were already filed in Court. The only exception is provided in Rule 2 of Order XIII (ibid), which lays down that no documentary evidence in possession or power or any party which should have been but has not been produced in accordance with the requirement of Rule 1, shall be received at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for non-production thereof and the Court receiving any such evidence shall record the reasons for so doing. It would, thus, be noticed that a good cause has to be shown to the satisfaction of the trial Court for non-production of the documents. The learned trial Judge has in an elaborate order, dated 24-5-1993 had come to the conclusion that good cause has not been shown to his satisfaction for non-production of the documents. This order has been upheld even in appeal. Even from the perusal of the facts narrated in paragraphs 2 to 4 ante it would be clear that after the case has remained pending in the two Courts below and the learned High Court over years some document was sought to be produced before the trial Court without assigning any reason as to why such an unconscionable delay had taken place in moving the trial Court after the cage had been remanded twice to the trial Court. We find that the order of the learned trial Court duly affirmed by the learned Appellate Court in declining to allow production the documentary evidence at that belated stage is not exceptionable on any ground whatsoever. The second contention raised by the learned counsel and taken note of by us in paragraph 5 ante is equally untenable. The two Courts below had come to a definite conclusion that the bed-rock of the petitioners' case, namely execution of the impugned agreement to sell and payment of sale consideration to the deceased had not been proved, These findings being of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court at this stage.
7. There is no merit in the petition. The petition is accordingly dismissed.