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PLD 2002 Supreme Court 403

DILMIR vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD and 2 others

CitationPLD 2002 Supreme Court 403
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Appeal No,28 of 1995
Date2002-01-23
Judge(s)Sh. Riaz Ahmad, Muhammad Nawaz Abbasi
ResultAppeal allowed

JAVED IQBAL, J.---This appeal with leave of the Court is directed against the judgment dated 25- 5-1993 passed by learned Lahore High Court, Lahore, whereby revision petition preferred on behalf of respondent has been accepted by reversing the concurrent findings duly arrived at by the learned trial and Appellate Courts by means of judgments and decrees dated 21-7-1988 and 22-7- 1989 passed by the learned Civil Judge and Additional District Judge respectively.

2. Briefly stated the facts of the case as enumerated in the impugned judgment are to the effect that the dispute relates to land measuring 3 Marlas over which four shops have been constructed which is part of Khasra Nos.3263/1638 comprising Khata NO.372 in village Maghiana Chak Abadi, Tehsil and District Jhang. Bahadar Khan deceased predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners on 23-44984 filed a Suit that he was the owner of the said land measuring 3 Marlas consisting of four shops by virtue of Khangi Taqseem. The property has been assessed to property tax and in the property tax record its number is 51/17, Block I.IX, Toba Road, Jhang Saddar. The respondent contested the suit. It was averred that the land in dispute was part of land measuring one Kanal which he purchased from Allah Baldish etc. Co-sharers in the land comprising abovementioned Khata through sale-deed dated 3-10-1954 (Exh.P.7) on the basis of which Mutation No,3385 was sanctioned by the Revenue Officer on 15-6-1951 (Exh.P.12/D.5). It was also pleaded that Bahadar deceased during his lifetime on 7-5-1983 through a deed (Exh.D-1) admitted by way of relinquishment of his rights in the land in dispute i,e, 3 Marlas consisting of 4 shops that he had no connectionwith the said property which relinquishment was made expressly in favour of Dalmir the respondent. The trial Court after appraisal of the evidence produced by the parties on the issues framed came to the conclusion that the petitioners failed to establish that Bahadar was the owner of land by virtue of Khangi Taqseem as no Khangi Taqseem was proved through evidence and the evidence of entries in PT.' Register of the Property Tax Department in favour of Bahadar was held to be not the evidence of ownership as such the respondent was held to be the owner of the property in dispute as part of land measuring one Kanal which he purchased from joint owners of Khata through afore-mentioned sale-deed and mutation. This finding has been upheld by the learned Additional District Judge in appeal filed by the petitioners". Being aggrieved a revision petition was preferred by respondents which has been accepted by means of impugned judgment which has been assailed before this Court and leave to appeal was granted vide order dated. 11-1-1995 which is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:-- "Leave to appeal is granted to consider whether in the circumstances of the case the learned Judge in the High Court was justified in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the C.P.C. To reverse the concurrent finding of fact of the Courts below.

2. Subject to notice, the parties shall maintain status quo, as to possession."

3. Heard Mian Saeed-ur-Rehman Farrukh, learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of appellant who mainly contended that concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the learned trial and Appellate Courts could not have been reversed without sufficient lawful justification which is badly lacking in this case. It is urged with vehemence that no attention whatsoever has been paid to the evidence as led by the appellant to substantiate his claim, but on the contrary certain pieces of evidence rendering assistance to the case of respondents- were picked up causing serious injustice to the appellant.

4. Mr. S.M. Masood, learned Advocate Supreme Court appeared on behalf of respondents and vehemently controverted the view-point as canvassed by Miann Saeed-ur-Rehman Farrukh, learned Advocate Supreme Court and supported the impugned judgment being free from any illegality or serious irregularity. It is contended vehemently that the concurrent findings being not sacrosanct can be reversed by the revisional Court in exercise of power as conferred upon it under section 115, C.P.C. Which has been exercised in view of the apparent non-reading and misreading of evidence which was never appreciated in its true perspective either by the learned trial or Appellate Courts resulting in serious prejudice.

5. We have carefully examined the respective contention as agitated on behalf of appellant 'and for respondents in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. We have minutely perused the judgment and decree dated 22-7-1989 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Jhang, judgment and decree dated 21-7-1988 passed by the learned trial Court as well as the impugned judgment. The entire evidence which has come on record has been scanned thoroughly. There is no denying the fact that three major steps were taken by Bahadur Khan to get his property disposed of one of the major steps was the execution of 'Dastbardari Nama' which according to learned counsel for the appellant was a deliberate and complete surrender of the land in dispute alongwith shops constructed thereon. On the contrary the learned counsel for the respondent was of the view that three major steps could not have been taken by an old person like Bahadur Khan and moreso, that the 'Dastbardari Nama' was a 'relinquishment deed' having no legal sanctity being an unregistered document. Insofar as the first limb of the argument regarding disposal of property on one and the same day is concerned that cannot be questioned because it is not possible to anticipate the spring of human action. It is, however, to be noted that the learned Courts below have not examined as to whether 'Dastbardari Nama' was in fact a 'relinquishment deed' and as to whether it was required to be registered or otherwise and up to what extent it can be relied upon to resolve the controversy. Besides what has been stated above it is emphatically canvassed on behalf of respondents that an application for leading additional evidence was moved concerning interpolation in the Revenue Record which could have been proved by producing 'Parth Sarkar' was not disposed of which resulted in serious miscarriage of justice. It is noticeable that heavy reliance has been placed on 'Jama Bandi' (Exh.P.6) by the learned Judge in Chambers but its real import could not have been examined without keeping it in juxtaposition with that of 'Part Sarkar' before concluding that Bahadur Khan was one of the owners in joint Khata including Khasra No,1638 in dispute which was part of the Khata. The "Part Sarkar" has not come on record in spite of the fact that an application for its production was moved. It transpired from the scrutiny of record that such an application. Was moved and in our considered view the production of "Part Sarkar" would have a substantial bearing on the merits of the case.

6. It is worth-mentioning that the question of limitation was neither dilated upon nor decided by the learned revisional Court. In our considered view the question of limitation should have not been left unattended to having a substantial bearing on the fate of the case. It is bounden duty of the Court to notice the question of limitation irrespective of the fact whether it was agitated or not. In this regard we are fortified by the dictum laid down in case titled Muhammad Buta v. Habib Ahmad PLD 1985 SC 153. There is no cavil with the proposition that any order or judgment passed by trial, appellate or revisional Courts should indicative of the fact that the Courts concerned were not only aware but conscious regarding the question of limitation be dealt with the same with diligent application of mind prior to dilating upon and deciding the controversy on merit because disposal on merit alone would not be sufficient to presume that the delay was condoned. In this regard reference can be made to case titled Ahsan Ali v. District Judge PLD 1969 SC 167, which still holds the field and relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:-- "It has also been held by this Court in several cases that mere disposal of the appeal on merits is not sufficient to lead to the inference that the delay must have been condoned. There must be something in the order or judgment itself to show that the Court concerned was conscious of the fact that the proceeding was out of time and had applied its mind to the question of limitation before dealing with the proceeding on merits, vide Ata Ullah Malik v. The Custodian of Evacuee Property and others PLD 1964 SC 236; Syed Azmat Ali v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and others PLD 1964 SC 260 and Muhammad Farooq Imam v. Claims Commissioner and others PLD 1964 SC 585."

7. It is an admitted feature of the case that learned Judge in Chambers while exercising revisional jurisdiction has reappraised and re-evaluated the entire evidence which could have been done when finding is based on insufficient evidence, misreading of evidence, non-consideration of material evidence, erroneous assumptions of facts and patent errors of law. It has, however, been observed in the same wake of event that the evidence led by the appellant has not been scrutinized vigilantly and no reason has been given for discarding the same.

8. In the light of foregoing discussion we are inclined to accept this appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and case is remanded back to decide the question of limitation, application moved on behalf of respondent for producing additional evidence including any other question as may be deemed fit and proper for just decision of the case after affording proper opportunity of hearing to all concerned. The appeal is accordingly accepted with no order as to costs.

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