' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.---This appeal as of right arises out of a Full Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court emerging from a suit for possession through pre-emption filed by the respondent against the appellant.
2. Respondent filed a suit for pre-emption asserting his superior right of pre-emption in respect of the sale of land in favor of the appellant transacted through registered conveyance dated 10-1- 1995 for consideration of Rs,3, 00,000. When the plaint came up for admission before the trial Court on 15-5-1995, he was directed to deposit 1/3rd of the sale price i,e, Rs,1, 00,000 within thirty days from the date of the order. However, before the expiry of aforesaid period, on 12-6-1995, respondent moved an application under section 151, C.P.C. With the prayer that, instead of depositing cash, he may be permitted to invest the amount in a profit bearing scheme. This application was granted by the trial Court the same day and he was permitted to, purchase Defence Savings Certificate in the sum of Rs,1, 00,000 in the name of the Court and to place it on the Court record. Respondent accordingly purchased the requisite Certificate and deposited the same in the trial Court on 14-6- 1995.
3. After the settlement of issues and examination of three witnesses by the respondent for the first time on 12-9-1998, appellant moved an application under section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1991) praying for dismissal of the suit as the respondent had failed to deposit 1/3rd of the sale price in cash as envisaged by section 24 ibid. This application was allowed and the suit dismissed vide order, dated 15-6-1998 but in Civil Revision No, 156 of 1998, the order was set aside by the High Court and the suit was remanded for decision afresh in the light of the observations in the judgment. In post-remand proceedings, trial Court upheld the objection and dismissed the suit vide order, dated 25-11-1998. When R.F.A. No,13 of 1999 directed against the judgment and decree of the trial Court came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court, learned Chief Justice was requested to constitute a Full Bench as, inter alia, following questions of public importance were involved:--- "(i) What is the legal value of the order of the trial Court, dated 15-5-1995 whereby the plaintiff was directed to deposit 1/3rd of the sale price within 30 days from the date of the order whereas the statute provides for a maximum period of 30 days from the date of institution of the suit;
(ii) Whether the purchase and deposit of Defence Savings Certificate under the order of Court and in the name of the Court, in the given circumstances, was compliance of the provisions of section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991; and
(iii) Whether a litigant should suffer for void orders of Court passed in violation of the provisions of section 24 of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1991."
4. Resultantly, a Full Bench consisting of three Honourable Judges was constituted in the Lahore High Court culminating in acceptance of the appeal and setting aside the impugned judgment and decree and remand of the suit to the trial Court for decision on merits in accordance with law.
Since the judgment rendered by the High Court has reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and value of the subject-matter of the suit was in excess of rupees fifty thousand, appellant has filed this appeal as of right in terms of Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the impugned judgment. It is, inter alia, contended by the appellant that spirit and object of section 24 of Act, 1991 was to enforce the deposit of 1/3rd of the sale price in cash with a view to ascertain the financial position of the plaintiff as well as to ensure payment of the sale amount in the event of decree in the suit, which could not be substituted by the Court by permitting the deposit of the amount in any other form.
Learned counsel attempted to argue that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to substitute the condition of deposit of cash amount by Defence Savings Certificate or any other security, as it would defeat the purpose of law. Lastly, learned counsel urged that assuming that the substitution of cash amount by valuable security was permissible; the same was placed on the record of the Court after the expiry of thirty days of the suit, which would be fatal to the maintainability of the suit.
6. On the other hand, it was vigorously contended on behalf of the respondent that investment of the cash amount required to be deposited in the Court in purchase of Defence Savings Certificate was meant to benefit the party ultimately found successful in the suit and there was no mala fide on the part of the respondent to seek permission for investment, which could even otherwise be made by the Court, after the amount was deposited in cash. Learned counsel reinforced this submission by pointing out that Defence Savings Certificate purchased in the name of the Court was as good as amount in cash and could be encashed without reference to the respondent at the discretion of the Court for which the plaintiff ought not to be non-suited. Lastly, it was pointed out that since the Defence Savings Certificates were purchased within thirty days of the order as directed by the trial Court, in substance, there was no deviation from the requirement of law as contemplated by the provisions contained in section 24 (ibid). At any rate, counsel urged that no person shall be made to suffer for the act of the Court in that plaintiff having been permitted by the Court in exercise of its lawful jurisdiction to invest the amount bona fide in purchase of the Defence Savings Certificates; he could not be non-suited on account of technicalities.
7. There can be no cavil with the proposition that the object of section 24 of Act, 1991 appears to ascertain the capacity of an intending pre-emptor to purchase the property sought to be pre- empted and to A secure advance payment to the extent of 1/3rd of the sale price with a view to ensure the payment of the balance consideration in the event of a decree in his suit. In the first instance, power is vested in the trial Court to fix a period for deposit of 1/3rd of the sale price in cash but the proviso to section 24 lays an embargo on the power of the Court by stipulating that such period shall not extend beyond thirty days of the filing of the suit. Second proviso caters for the cases in which no sale price is recorded in the sale-deed or in the mutation or the price so recorded appears to be inflated. However, in the present controversy, we are not concerned with it.
Subsection (2) of section 24 enumerates the consequences for failure to make a deposit within the period fixed by the Court or withdrawal of the sum so deposited by a plaintiff, resulting in dismissal of the suit. Subsections (3) and (4) again are not material for the resolution of the questions raised in this petition. It would appear from the record that the difficulty arose for the parties from the day one when they learned Civil Judge seized of the suit directed the deposit of 1/3rd of the sale price within 30 days of the order instead of fixing the period of 30 days from the date of institution of the suit, which was instituted a day earlier than the passing of the order itself. Again as the fate would have been, respondent for better utilization of the amount otherwise lying idle in the Court thought it just, proper and advisable to seek indulgence of the Court for investment of the amount in a profitable scheme so as to benefit the party who becomes successful in the ultimate analysis of the controversy.
8. Undoubtedly, the language used in the statute speaks of deposit of 1/3rd of sale price in cash.
Nevertheless, no exception can be taken to the power of the Court to invest the amount deposited by a plaintiff in a profit bearing security, after enforcing the payment of the amount in cash. In the present case, trial Court acting in good faith and being unmindful of the provisions of law proceeded to concede to the prayer of the respondent and allowed him to invest the amount in the purchase of a Defence Savings Certificate and to deposit the same in Court before the last date fixed by the Court. Technically speaking, the order, on the face of it, may not be sustainable but respondent cannot be punished for an act or error on the part of the Court. Indeed, he cannot be saddled with the responsibility of passing of a defective or erroneous order on the part of the trial Court, as it is well-settled that no person shall suffer for the act or omission of the Court and the act of Court shall not prejudice any one. In law, the respondent could be punished for his failure, had he not complied with the order of the Court and not otherwise, as contemplated by subsection
(2) of section 24 ibid. For reference sake, there is a plethora of precedent cases i,e, Muhammad Hanif v. Muhammad PLD 1990 SC 859, Fateh Khan v. Bozemir PLD 1991 SC 782, Abdur Rashid v. Abdul Salam 1991 SCM R 2012, Sherin v. Fazal Mehmood 1995 SCM R 584, Iftikhar Beg v. Muhammad Azam 1996 SCM R 767, State v. Asif Adil 1997 SCM R 209, Muhammad Mansha v. Sabir Ali 1999 SCM R 1782, Muhammad Iqbal v. Khan Muhammad PLD 1999 SC 35, Zahoor Textile Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 880, Imran Ashraf v. State 2001 SCM R 424, Ladha Khan v. Mst. Bhiranwan 2001 SCM R 533, Ghulam Hussain v. Jamshed Ali 2001 SCM R 1001, Fida Hussain v. State PLD 2002 SC 46 and Dar Okaz Printing and Publishing Ltd. v. Printing Corporation of Pakistan PLD 2003 SC 808.
9. Irrespective of the circumstance that the trial Court was ill-advised to pass an order permitting the respondent to purchase the Defence Savings Certificates and place it on record, the fact remains that respondent after compliance of the order and having placed the Defence Savings Certificates on the record of the Court can neither be held guilty of willful default nor non- compliance of the order of the Court, which is a sine qua non for attracting the penal provision contemplated by law. Learned Judges of the High Court, having fully appreciated the factual and legal position after detailed resume of the case-law on the subject cited by the parties, we do not think that jurisdiction exercised by the High Court suffers from any inherent defect or error of jurisdiction or of law. Needless to reiterate this Court does not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court unless it can be shown to have been exercised manifestly in gross violation of settled norms for administration of justice laid down by this Court. Impugned judgment, in our view, neither suffers from arbitrariness nor unreasonable interpretation of the provision of law. To our mind, complete justice is having been done in the matter and the suit having been remitted to the trial Court for decision on merits hardly any prejudice is caused to the appellant, who would be at liberty to agitate all other issues of fact and law raised in the pleadings. At any rate, neither any miscarriage of justice has been occasioned by the impugned judgment of the High Court nor does it suffer from misreading of record or misconstruction of law.
10. For the foregoing facts; reasons and circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. Resultantly, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.