' RUSTAM S. SIDHWA, J.---This is an appeal by Muhammad Yousuf and others, appellants, against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, dated 26-11-1989 accepting the revision petition filed by Zafarullah and another, respondents and remanding the execution petition filed by them for further disposal by the Executing Court in accordance with law.
2. A decree for possession through pre-emption with respect to the land in dispute was passed in favour of Zafarullah and another, the present respondents, against Muhammad Yousuf and others, the present appellants, by the trial Court on 6-11-1983, subject to deposit of Rs,99,500 within one month of the date of decree. No appeal was filed against this decree which became final. However, during the course of execution, an objection was raised by the appellants that the respondents had failed to comply with the terms of decree and as such their suit stood dismissed. It was asserted that though the decree required the deposit of the purchase money within one month, the amount was deposited on 6-12-1983, which was not due compliance of the decree. This objection was upheld by the Executing Court, with the result that the execution petition filed by the respondents was dismissed on 21-12-1987. Aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal, which too was dismissed by an Additional District Judge on 11-2-1989. The respondents thereupon filed a revision petition in the High Court, which was accepted, the impugned orders of the Courts below were set aside and the execution petition filed by the respondents was remanded to the Executing Court for disposal, in accordance with law. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellants preferred the present direct appeal to this Court, which is now before us for disposal.
3. On behalf of the appellants it is submitted that the learned Civil Judge on 6-11-1983 decreed the suit of the respondents in the following terms: ' The words clearly indicate that time of one month was to be computed from 6-1-1983 and not from 7-11-1983, as has been done by the learned Single Judge. In support of his submission the learned counsel relies upon Ata Muhammad v. Malik Noor Muhammad (PLD 1978 Lah. 453).
4. On behalf of the respondents it is submitted, relying upon the provisions of section 8 of the Provincial General Clauses Act, 1956, that the date from which the period was to commence being 6-11-1983, the said date had to be excluded while computing the period of one month. In this connection the learned counsel refers to Puran Chand v. Muhammad Din and others (AIR 1935 Lah.
291) and Ramchandra Govind Unavne v. Laxman Savlerman Ronghe (AIR. 1938 Bom. 447).
5. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondents and have also perused the record. The trial Court clearly ordered the balance pre-emption money to be computed "from today within a period of one month". The legal question that arises is whether the period of one month is to be computed from 6-14-1983 or 7-11-1983. The learned Single Judge has referred to the statement of law appearing in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition), Volume 55, Para. 1127, which may be reproduced herewith advantage:-- "When a period of time running from a given day or event to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed by contract, and the question arises whether their computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first mentioned or of the last mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purposes for which the computation has to be made. Where there is room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the case may be. Expressions such as "from such a day" or "until such a day" are equivocal, since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day."
' Reference was also made to Re: Lympone Investments Ltd. (1972) 2 All ER 385) and Re: Figgis (deceased) Roberts and another v. Maclaren and others (1968) 1 All ER 999).
6. This is a case not of enactment or contract, but of an order passed by Judge. The order will therefore have to be construed as to effectuate the intention of the Court, regard being had to the context and the purposes for which the order was passed, not overlooking the need of an equitable interpretation desirable in the interest of the person who has to make the deposit and who should be free from any doubt. Now an order of the Court must have some semblance of uniformity with the interpretation which the law would put and equity support in such a case where a time is prescribed for the doing of an act by a statutory enactment. (See Ramchandra Govind Unavne's case (supra). Under section 8 of the Provincial General Clauses Act, 1956, a date from which the period of time is to be reckoned has to be excluded, while computing the period. See Puran Chand's case and Ramchandra Govind Unavne's case (supra). For the purpose of uniformity, the same interpretation should be given where a Court's order fixes the date from which a period has to commence. The view of the learned Single Judge is, therefore, appropriate and correct. His interpretation is also equitable and removes all difficulties that may arise in the way of persons who may be called upon by Courts to make such deposits and find themselves in a dilemma when trying to interpret such orders.
7. The construction suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted. The case cited by the learned counsel for the appellants is distinguishable and has no relevancy to the present case. The learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to cite any ruling of any Court directly in his favour. The view of the learned Single Judge therefore, appears to be legal and correct.
8. There being no merit in this appeal, the same is dismissed without any order as to costs.