' FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.---These petitions, under Article 185(3) of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, for leave to appeal are directed against consolidated judgment dated 20-8- 2001, passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, in Writ Petitions Nos. 1240, 1241 and 1243 of 2001.
2. The private respondents were employed by the petitioner-factory. They filed applications before the respondent No,3, (the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation) (hereinafter referred to as the Authority) under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act No,IV of 1936 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), for recovery of wages. The petitioner filed a Writ Petition No,2027 of 2000 calling in question the jurisdiction of the Authority to hear and decide the matter. The same was disposed of by the Lahore High. Court, Rawalpindi Bench by order dated 4-9-2000 with the direction that the petitioner would raise the question before the Authority in the first instance. The Authority, by order dated 26- 3-2001, assumed the jurisdiction in the matter. The petitioner again filed Writ Petitions Nos. 1240, 1241 and 1243 of 2001, in the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, which were dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 20-8-2001. Hence these petitions for leave ' to appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, for all intents and purposes, the Authority appointed under the Act was a Court as held in the case of Works Manager, Carriage and Wagon Shops, Mughalpura v. K.G. Hashmat AIR 1946 Lah. 316 (FB) and A. Hassan v. Muhammad Shamsuddin and another AIR 1951 Pat.
14. The respondent No,3, being an executive officer and appointee of the Provincial Government, could not exercise any judicial power after separation of judiciary from the executive. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied on the cases of Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary and others v. Sharaf Faridi and others PLD 1994 SC 105; Government of Balochsitan through Additional Chief Secretary v. Azizullah and 16 others PLD 1993 SC 341 and Sh. Liaquat Hussain and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and others PLD 1999 SC 504.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length. The object of the Act is the regulation of payment of wages of certain class of persons employed in industrial or commercial establishments or by a railway administration. Section 15 of the Act lays down that the Provincial Government may, by Notification in the official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other officer with experience as a Judge of the Civil Court or as a Magistrate, to be the Authority to hear and decide the claims. Under subsection (3) thereof, the Authority may, after hearing an applicant and employer or other persons responsible for payment of wages and after such further inquiry, if any, as may be necessary, direct the payment of wages to the applicant together with such compensation as it may think fit. Section 17 of the Act, provides a remedy of an appeal before the Labour Court (previously the District Court) against a direction made under section 15(3). By virtue of section 18 the Authority is vested with all powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) for the limited purpose of taking evidence, to enforce attendance of witnesses, compelling production of documents and section 195 and of Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain any suit for recovery of wages or against any deduction from wages pf such an employee is barred by the provisions of section 22 of the Act.
5. The provisions of the Act would clearly show that the Authority appointed under section 15 of the Act is not required to follow definite rules with regard to procedures and evidence. It is free to hold such inquiry as may be necessary. For adjudicating the claim of certain employees. The procedure of adjudication by the. Authority is not provided by law. It may decide the claim by providing an opportunity of hearing to the parties, keeping in view the rules of reason, justice and fairplay. The Authority is free in the matter of deciding disputes without there being any guidance of procedural laws as to the conduct of proceedings as well as evidence. The Authority is empowered to exercise certain powers and to take judicial proceedings as are vested in a Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code but only for a very limited purpose. The Authority does not have any inherent powers which are available to a Court of justice. It cannot render binding judgments on complicated questions of law. The process of investigating or adjudicating the claims of certain employees for giving a direction for payment of wages is not a trial of suit at law. The normal Court procedure is not applicable to the Authority. All the necessary attributes and trappings of a Court of law are not satisfied in the case of the Authority. According to the definition of a Court as given by clause (d) of Rule 2 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937, the word "Court" means the Court mentioned in subsection (1) of section 17 i,e, Labour Court only. It does not act in a judicial capacity. It does not exercise a judicial power in the strict sense of the term and is not a constituent part of the judiciary. With the growth of administrative law, a number of such-like statutory Tribunals and authorities have been created by or under various enactments. Article 212 of the Constitution also envisages the establishment of certain administrative Courts and Tribunals.
6. The question raised here was considered in a number of cases. In Motabar and 14 others v.
Messrs S.M. Rehman and Company, Quetta and others PLD 1971 Quetta 47, it was held that the Authority under the Act was a Tribunal and not a Court. The judgment in the case of Motabar and others (supra) was affirmed by this Court on appeal titled Messrs S.M. Rehman and Company, Quetta v. Motabar and 14 others PLD 1981 SC 282. In A.V.D. Costa Divisional Engineer GIP Railway v.
BC Patel and another AIR 1955 SC 412, the Supreme Court of India took the view that the authority set-up under section 15 of the Act was indisputably a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction. Its power to hear and determine disputes was necessarily to be found in the provisions of the Act. In Sawat Ram Pareshad Mills Company Ltd. v. Vishnu AIR 1950 Nag. 14 late M. Hidayatullah, J expressed the opinion that the Authority was not a Court but an administrative Tribunal. The view earlier taken by the Lahore High Court in Works Manager, Carriage and Wagon Shops Moghulpura (supra) was not followed. A somewhat similar view was also taken in the cases of Sawatram Ram Prasal Mills Co.
Ltd. v. Vishnu Pandurang Hingnekar AIR 1950 Nag. 14; Mewr Textile Mills Ltd. Bhilwara v. Girdharishing and others AIR 1957 Raj. 115 (D.B.); Labangalata Dei v. SK Azizullah AIR 1958 Orissa 123 and Turabali v.Sorabji AIR 1944 Nag. 288 and Charan Singh v. Birla Textiles MR 1988 SC 2022.
7. In Khadim Mohyuddin and another v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagara PLD 1965 SC 459 this Court observed that a Rent Controller appointed under the provisions of West Pakistan Rent Restrictions Ordinance, 1959, was a prersona designata which performed quasi-judicial functions and not in the ordinary judicial capacity as a Presiding Officer of the Court. We, therefore, hold that the Authority appointed under section 15 of the Act is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction performing quasi-judicial function and is not a Court.
8. In the case of Ghulam Mustafa and another v. Pakistan Industrial Gases Ltd. And others 2002 PLC 52, a Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Syed Deedar Hussain Shah, J) was a member, had the occasion to examine the question of validity of the provisions of sections 15 and 17 of the Act. It was held therein that the Authority/Tribunal had been established through a valid legislation which did not offend or violate the concept of independence of judiciary as contemplated by Article 175 of the Constitution. The reference by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the precedent cases of this Court was inapt in view of the nature of the statute involved in the present case. The impugned judgment of the High Court based on sound reasons is plainly correct and the same does not warrant any interference by this Court.
9. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in these petitions which are dismissed and leave to appeal is refused accordingly.