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2016 PLC 160

Messrs KARACHI CLUB STAFF WORKERS' UNION through General Secretary vs

Citation2016 PLC 160
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Judge(s)Ali Sain Dino Metlo
ResultAppeal allowed

' ALI SAIN DINO METLO, MEMBER.--- The appellant has challenged order dated 5th January, 2015, of the Sindh Labour Court No,V, Karachi, permitting/directing the respondent # 2 (Registrar Trade Unions Sindh) to cancel registration of the appellant union.

2. Briefly, the facts are that two trade unions i.e, Karachi Club Employees Union, registered on 4th October, 1962, and Karachi Club Staff Workers Union (appellant), registered on 3rd January, 2012, were working in the establishment of Karachi Club.

3. On 6th September, 2014, the respondent # 2, at the instance of Karachi Club, filed application under Section 12(1) of the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013, requesting the Labour Court to permit him to cancel registration of the appellant on the ground that the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013, did not apply to employees of Karachi Club.

4. Relying upon a passage at page 125 in the book titled as Law of Industrial Relations in Pakistan' written by Shahid Anwar Bajwa and three judgments of the Lahore High Court reported as 2008 PLC 58, 1993 PLC 543 and 1989 PLC 760, the Labour Court held that Karachi Club was neither industrial nor commercial establishment and, therefore, its employees could not form trade unions under the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013.

5. The Labour Court did not rely upon the precedents of the Supreme Court (PLD 1980 SC 307 = 1982 SCM R 126) and of the Sindh High Court (2010 PLC 20) cited by the appellant holding clubs as 'commercial establishment'.

6. The book, which was not followed by the author himself while deciding the case of Syed Haider Imam Rizvi (2010 PLC 20) as Judge of the Sindh High Court, and the judgments of the Lahore High Court are not binding, while judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Court of Sindh are binding under Articles 189 and 201 of the Constitution.

7. The Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013, applies to 'establishments' and industries', while the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, applies to 'industrial establishments' and 'commercial establishments'. The definition of 'establishment' and 'industry' given in the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013, is wider than the definition of 'industrial establishment' and 'commercial establishment' given in the A Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The Supreme Court and the Sindh High Court in the cited precedents held that clubs were 'commercial establishments' as defined in the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. In presence of the binding precedents, there was no justification for the Labour Court to hold that Karachi Club was not 'establishment' or 'industry' as defined in the Sindh Industrial Relations Act, 2013.

8. There is no force in the contention of learned counsel for Karachi Club (who was allowed to argue though not party) that the club was not making any profit and was going in deficit for the last many years or that the club provided catering and other services only to its members and not to the general public. In the case of Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. The Sindh Labour Court No, V. Karachi (2011 SCM R 1709 = 2012 PLC 251), the Supreme Court has held that earning of profit was not essential for an 'industry' and trade unions could be formed in a nonprofit organization. The Karachi Chamber of commerce and Industry, a nonprofit organization providing services to its members by charging fee, was held to be an 'industry' for the purpose of formation of trade union by its workers under the Industrial Laws.

9. The other thing, which requires special attention, is that the respondent did not seek permission/direction for the cancellation of registration of the other union working in the same establishment. The act of the respondent, besides being illegal, is also improper and mala fide.

10. In view of the above facts and circumstances, the impugned order is set aside and the respondent is directed to keep the registration of the appellant intact. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

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