MAMOON KAZI, J: -- The respondent No.2 was employed by the petitioner as its Manager Incharge, Talhar Branch. The said respondent was occupying a permanent post of Assistant Accountant when he was served with a charge-sheet alleging misappropriation, negligence, etc. A case was also registered against the said respondent under the provisions of sections 409, 468, 471 and 477- A, P.P.C. And section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 before the Summary Military Court, Badin in which he was ultimately convicted on 10-3-1979 and sentenced to suffer R.I. For 12 months and to pay a fine of Rs.21,400. Thereafter the respondent remained in judicial custody till 8- 2-1982 when the said conviction was set aside by D.M.LA., Hyderabad on an appeal filed before him.
However, in the meanwhile consequent upon a show-cause notice served upon -the said respondent, his services were terminated from 19-8-1979. The respondent after his release from jail sent a grievance notice dated 17-5-1982 to the petitioner under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance") and thereafter, he filed his grievance petition before the Labour Court on 13-6-1982. The respondent had earlier sent a departmental appeal to the petitioner on 15-3-1982, but without any response from the latter. Be that as it may, but the Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad held that the petition filed by the respondent was not maintainable in view of the fact that the petition was time-barred and the respondent was governed by statutory Rules of service and consequently the grievance petition was dismissed by order, dated 11-3-1987. The respondent then filed an appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, which allowed the same and set aside the order passed by the learned Labour Court and re-instated the respondent in service with twenty-five per cent back benefits. The petitioner is aggrieved by this order and has now filed the present petition.
2. We have heard Mr. Partab R.I, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Fasahat Hussain Rizvi, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
3. The first contention of Mr. Partab R.I, learned counsel for the petitioner is that, the petition is barred by time. As it has been pointed out earlier, the respondent was dismissed from service on 19-8-1979 but he sent his grievance notice to the petitioner on 17-5-1982. Section 25-A(1) of the Ordinance provides for a period of three months within which an aggrieved workman is required to send a grievance notice to his employer in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force. Admittedly, the notice was sent by the respondent beyond a period of three months. It may however, be pointed out that, as was indicated earlier, when the services of the respondent were terminated by the petitioner the former was serving out his sentence and was in judicial custody. Although, admittedly, no inquiry was held in respect of the charges levelled against the respondent by the petitioner, but the order of dismissal was communicated to the respondent on 30-8-1979. It has been strongly contended by Mr. Fasahat Hussain Rizvi, learned counsel for respondent No.2 that. Since the respondent was in judicial custody when the order of termination of his services was communicated to him by the petitioner, the period of limitation can m no way be reckoned from the above date. The respondent had also filed a departmental appeal to the petitioner under the relevant Rules which were applicable, on being released from custody. The grievance notice was sent by the respondent after the petitioner had failed to respond to the said appeal and hence the said notice was not time- barred. Admittedly the respondent sent grievance notice without waiting for the entire period within which the appeal was to be disposed of by the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that the grievance notice was sent by him in respect of any adverse action taken in connection with the appeal. The grievance notice was obviously sent in respect of the dismissal order. Consequently, even if we agree with the contention of Mr. Fasahat Hussain Rizvi, the grievance notice was still time-barred as the conviction of the respondent was admittedly set aside by the Summary Military Court on 8-2-1982. Therefore, the grievance notice which was sent by the respondent on 17-5-1982, was time-barred. However, in any case, the second contention of Mr. Partab R.I appears to be still more forceful.
4. The second contention of Mr. Partab R.I is that the petitioner being an establishment being run under the authority of the Federal Government and its employees being governed by statutory Rules of service, namely, National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973, the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance were not applicable to the petitioner and hence no grievance petition could be filed by the respondent before the learned Labour Court challenging his said dismissal.
The proviso occurring after clause (c) of section 1(4) of the Standing Orders Ordinance provides as follows:-- "Provided that nothing in this Ordinance shall apply to industrial and commercial establishments carried on by or under the authority of the Federal or any Provincial Government, where statutory rules of service, or discipline are applicable to the workmen employed therein."
5. The question as to the applicability of Standing Orders Ordinance to the employees of National Bank of Pakistan came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court V, Faisalabad 1993 PLC 595 and it was held that the said Bank although being a corporate body was a commercial establishment being carried on under the authority of the Federal Government and the employees of the said bank were governed by National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973. Therefore, the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance by virtue of the said proviso were not applicable to its employees. Similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of National Bank of Pakistan v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal 1990 PLC 197 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal 1990 PLC 593. Although the petitioners through their Board of Governors have framed new Rules in 1980 which also govern similar matters but as was held in 1990 PLC 593 just referred to above, the Service Rules framed in 1973 are still applicable notwithstanding the Rules framed in 1980. The said proviso is therefore, still applicable in the present case. There is also no controversy on the point that, in the present case action was initiated against the respondent by the petitioner when only the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1973 were in force.
6. It is pertinent to point out that a workman whose services have been terminated or who has been removed, retrenched, dismissed, discharge from service can file his grievance petition before the Labour Court by virtue of Standing Order 12(3) which provides that in such a case "he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance". The above provisions came to be examined before one of us (Mamoon Kazi, J.), in the case of Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Karim and another 1987 PLC 846 and it was held that a person whose services have been terminated by the employer can only apply .Under the provisions of section 25-A of the Ordinance, provided the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance are applicable to him. Reference was made to a number of precedents on the point to which it would be futile to refer again in this judgment. It may, however, be pointed out that as is indicated by section 25-A of the Ordinance the same can be invoked only by a worker or a workman. The definition of "worker" or "workman" in clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the Ordinance indicates that he must be employed in an establishment or industry for hire or reward. A person whose services have been terminated or who has been removed, retrenched or dismissed from service, would therefore, be clearly excluded from the purview of the said definition. Mr. Fasahat Hussain Rizvi has referred to the case of Trustees of Port of Karachi v. Abdul Ghani 1983 SCM R 769 in support of his contention that a dismissed workman can file his grievance petition before a Labour Court by virtue of section 25-A of the Ordinance. We would however, like to point out that the question under consideration although had been raised in the said case but was not considered by the Supreme Court as no such plea had been taken either before the Labour Court or the High Court. Therefore, reference to the said case by the learned counsel for the respondent is misconceived. This case had also come up for discussion in the case of Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Karim 1987 PLC 846 earlier referred to in this judgment, but the same was for the same reasons found distinguishable. Mr. Fasahat Hussain Rizvi has also referred to the case of National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court IX, Multan 1982 PLC 528 and National Bank of Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1990 PLC 192 wherein it was held by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court that a dismissed workman could file a grievance petition before a Labour Court by virtue of section 25-A of the Ordinance. Reference has also been made by the learned counsel to an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Constitutional Petition No.194 of 1987 (National Bank of Pakistan v. The Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi and another), wherein it was held that notwithstanding the non-applicability of Standing Orders Ordinance, a grievance petition could be maintained by an employee under section 25-A(4) of the Ordinance. But as is clearly evident from the said judgment, no specific reference appears to have been made to the provisions of Standing Order 12(3). As has been pointed out earlier, Standing Order 12(3) clearly provides that in case, a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services, etc. He can take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Ordinance. The said Standing Order further indicates that thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance. If the legislative intent was that a workman or a worker whose services have been terminated could maintain a grievance petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance, such a provision would specifically have been made in the said section. If it is held that such an employee can still maintain a grievance petition notwithstanding the absence of such specific provision in section 25-A. Of the Ordinance, the above words in Standing Order 12(3) would be rendered completely redundant. However, no redundancy can be attributed to Legislature. Consequently, in our opinion, the case decided by the Division Bench of this Court is clearly distinguishable as this question neither appears to have been raised before the learned Division Bench nor the same was considered by it. No doubt, in the case decided by the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, it was also held that a dismissed workman could maintain his grievance petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance and reference to Standing Order 12(3) would not be necessary in such a case, but with utmost respect it may be pointed out that the dismissed workman does not fall within the purview of the definition of the "worker" or "workman" as given in clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the Ordinance, reference to which has earlier been made in this judgment.
7. For the aforesaid reasons, we are clearly of the view that the grievance petition filed by the respondent No.2 before the learned Labour Court was not maintainable. This petition is, therefore, allowed and the order passed by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, dated 19-8-1987 is set aside. The parties are left to bear their own costs.