' This appeal is directed against the order dated 8-12-1979 passed by the learned 1st Rent Controller, at Karachi, directing the appellant to hand over the possession of the tenement mentioned hereinafter within 60 days. The facts leading to the filing of the above appeal are that the appellant is a tenant of the respondent in respect of Bungalow, bearing No, 43/8, Block 6, P. E. C.
H. S., Karachi since 15-8-1973. Initially the agreed rent was Rs, 1,300 per month, but subsequently, it was increased to Rs, 1,500 per month. The respondent filed an application under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) on 4-3-1977 on the grounds of default in payment of rent and of bona fide personal requirement. The learned Rent Controller granted the above application by the order under appeal on the ground of personal requirement only. The appellant being aggrieved by the above order filed the present appeal.
2. (a) Mr. Shahenshah Hussain, learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the order under appeal is not sustainable as the respondent failed to prove bona fide requirement under section 13(3)(a) of the Ordinance and that there is a distinction between a desire to occupy and a bona fide personal requirement to occupy the premises in dispute. Whereas it has been urged by Mr. Kizalbash, learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent has proved his bona fide requirement within the ambit of the above provision of the Ordinance. Mr. M. S. Kizalbash's further submission was that the respondent can support the order under appeal in addition to the bona fide personal requirement on the ground of default without filing any cross objection or appeal as the finding of the learned Rent Controller that no default was committed, is not sustainable.
(b) In support of his above contention Mr. Shahenshah Hussain has referred to the provisions of section 13(3)(a) of the Ordinance,. Which reads as follows :- Section 13(1) .
(3)(a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession-
(1) in the case of a residential building, if--
(a) he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children ;
(b) he is not occupying another residential building, suitable for his needs at the time, in the same urban area in which such building is situated ; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance in the said urban area ;
(ii) in the case of a non-residential building or a scheduled building or rented land, if- (a)he requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his male children ; (b)he or his said child is not occupying in the same urban area in which such building is situated for the purpose of his business any other such building or rented land, as the case may be, suitable for his needs at the time ; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance, in the said urban area ' Provided that where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not be entitled to apply under this subsection before the expiry of such period : ' Provided further that where the landlord had obtained possession of a residential, scheduled or non-residential building or rented land under the provisions of sub-paragraph (i) or sub- paragraph (ii) he shall not be entitled to apply again under the said sub-paragraphs for the possession of any other building of the same class of rented land unless such residential, scheduled or non-residential building or land is no longer suitable for his needs at the time."
' It has been urged by Mr. Shahenshah Hussain that in order to bring a case within the ambit of the above-quoted provisions of the Ordinance a landlord must prove the following ingredients-
(i) that he requires the residential building or shop in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of his children ; (ii)that he is not occupying another residential building or. Shop suitable for his needs in the same urban area ;
(iii) that he has not vacated any such building or shop without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Ordinance.
(c) The learned counsel for the appellant candidly submitted that in view of the case of Abdul Aziz and another v. Muhammad Ibrahim (1), a landlord is not required to prove that the residential building or shop in his occupation is not suitable to his needs in case he is a tenant and not an owner in respect thereof. In the instant case the appellant has not been able to rebut the respondent's statement that he is in occupation of a rented flat. Nor the appellant has been able to show that the respondent has vacated any residential building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Ordinance. It must, therefore, follow that in the instant case the controversy revolves on the question, whether the respondent has been able to discharge the burden of proof that he requires the premises in question in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of his children.
3. (a) Reverting to the learned counsel for the appellant's contention that the respondent has not been able to discharge the above burden of proof and that there is a distinction between a desire to occupy and a bona fide personal need to occupy the premises, it may be observed that in support of his above contention he has referred to the case of Muhammad Asghar .And 5 others v.
Mst. Jamila Khatoon (2), the case of Haji Ghulam Muhammad v. Abdul Qadir (3) and the case of Mansoor Ahmed v. Bashir Hussain Babri (4).
(b) Reverting to 1979 CLC, it may be observed that the facts of the above case were that the Rent Controller ordered ejectment on the ground of personal requirement of the landlord. The appeal filed by the tenant was rejected by an Additional District Judge and the order of the Rent Controller was upheld. In the second appeal before the Lahore High Court, it was held that as the respondent did not enter into the witness-box to say that he needed the house for her own occupation, the evidence led by her in this behalf was not sufficient to justify conclusion arrived by the learned Rent Controller. It was also observed that the fact that the landlord was in occupation of a rented house is not conclusive to prove that his need is bona fide and that he has to show that he needs the house in good faith. In my view the facts of the above case are distinguishable inasmuch as in the present case, the respondent himself appeared as a witness before the learned Rent Controller in order to support his application. Furthermore, the respondent has been able to prove his bona fide requirement for the reasons stated hereinafter in Para. 6(b). {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1977 SC 442 (2) 1979 CLC 367
(3) PLD 1975 Lab. 200 (4) PLD 1977 Lab. 532 {{FOOT NOTE}}
(c) Reverting to 1975 Lahore, it may be stated that the facts of the above case were that the second appeal was filed before Lahore High Court against the eviction order from the shop on the basis of the personal requirement of the landlord which was affirmed in the first appeal, it was alleged in the written statement by the tenant that the landlord had obtained Rs, 5,000 in addition to advance rent amounting to Rs, 4,000 from him as Pagri, initially, when the shop was rented out to him and that 2 months prior to the institution of the ejectment application the landlord demanded another amount of Rs, 10,000 as advance rent which he refused to pay, and therefore, the landlord brought ejectment proceeding in order to give the shop on Pagri. In context with the above facts, it was observed by Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed that : "As to the so-called underlying principle with regard to requirement of the landlord canvassed by the learned counsel, namely, that superior right of possession and user as against the tenant, suffice it to say that the same gets neutralised in so far as the interpretation of the provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Restriction Ordinance is concerned because, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, the preamble thereof or the underlying spirit of its provision does not contemplate any such weightage in favour of the landlord. This observation is subject to the consideration that the mode of proof of reasonableness and or good faith bona fide is dependent upon various factors and it cannot be ignored that one of the material items of evidence for consideration, of course, would be the statement on oath of the landlord himself. Unless he makes a statement in his behalf asserting his requirement it will not be possible to visualise from circumstances alone that he has a bona fide personal need. With the above discussion and these remarks, I repel the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent in so far as the general question of approach of the requirement of the landlord, is concerned."
It may be observed that one of the material evidence for considering the question as to whether the landlord requires the premises in good faith bona fide or not would be the landlord's statement on oath before the Rent Controller. It may be pertinent to mention that in the above Lahore case the concurrent finding of the two Courts below that the landlord was able to prove his personal bona fide requirement was upheld by the High Court and the second appeal was dismissed.
' In my view the above case does not improve the appellant's case. There cannot be any cavil to the proposition that simpliciter the fact that the landlord is putting up in a rented house itself will not be sufficient to prove conclusively the fact that the landlord requires the house bona fide for his personal occupation or for the occupation of his children, but this will be a material fact to be considered alongwith other facts and attending circumstances.
(e) Reverting to 1977 Lahore 532, it may be observed that in the above case also a second appeal was filed against the order of granting of ejectment by the Rent Controller on the ground of the landlord's personal requirement, which was upheld by the 1st Appellate Court, the second appeal was also dismissed by the High Court and the finding of the two Courts below was concurred with.
While dismissing the above appeal, it was observed by Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J. (as his Lordship then was) that merely an expression of desire to occupy premises in dispute alone is not sufficient to prove his bona fide. It was further observed that the landlord made a convincing statement on oath to show his bona fade need of premises by stating that his wife was a heart patient and that he had retired from the service.
4. (a) On the other hand Mr. Kizalbash in support of his contention that the finding of the learned Rent Controller on the question of personal requirement of the respondent is in accordance with law. In this regard he has referred to the case of Hassan Khan v. Mrs. Munawar Begum (1), the case of Itibal Ahmed v. Mehrban Ali (2),, the case of Ghulam Mohyuddin v. Suha Khan (3), the case of Muhammad Bashir v. Vensemal and 4 others (4), the case of Abdul Aziz and another v.
Muhammad Ibrahim referred to hereinabove in para. 2(c) and the case of Frozeuddin v. Mian Taj Din (5).
(b) With reference to 1976 Karachi, it may be observed that in the above case it has been held that assertion or claim on oath by a landlord that he requires premises for his personal use consistent with the averments in the application if not shaken in the cross-examination or disproved in rebuttal by the tenant would be sufficient evidence to warrant the granting of ejectment on the ground of personal requirement of the landlord.
(c) Reverting to 1979 Lahore, it may be stated that it was held by a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court Muhammad Afzal Zullah, J. (as his Lordship then was) that in the absence of reliable evidence in rebuttal the concurrent finding on the ,question of personal requirement cannot be interfered with in the second appeal by the High Court.
(d) As regard PLD 1977 Lahore, it may be observed that in the above case it has been inter alia held that in a case of seeking ejectment on the ground of personal use, statement of landlord as well as of persons for whose benefit premises were sought to be vacated were most relevant to determine the point in issue, and that it is for the landlord to decide which of the house or shop if he owns more than one, is to be occupied for his personal use or for the use of his children, but, it is always for the landlord who can show reasonable cause for occupying particular premises for personal use.
(e) Reverting to 1980 Karachi, it may be observed that in the above case it has been held that the words "such building" in clause (c) of section 13(3)(i) are to be construed in conjunction with clause
(b) preceding to the above clause, and, therefore, a landlord is not required to prove that he has not vacated rented premises without sufficient cause. It has been further held that the mere fact that a landlord does not examine his children in order to prove that the premises are required for their occupation, will not be fatal if the landlord has examined himself.
(f) Reverting to PLD 1977 SC, it will suffice to observe that in the above case it was held by the Supreme Court that the expression "any other such building" used in section 13(3) (ii) (b) does not cover a rented premises in possession of the landlord. The aforesaid legal position was candidly conceded by Mr. Shahenshah Hussain.
(g) With reference PLD 1975 Lahore, it may be observed that in the above case it was held that honesty of purpose makes an act, as an act of {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1976 Kar. 832 (2) PLD 1979 Lah. 127
(3) PLD 1977 Lab. 1094 (4) PLD 1980 Kar. 409
(5) PLD 1979 Note 27 at p. 17 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' good faith, and whereas a make fide act cannot be converted into a bona fide act.
5. From the above discussed cases the following principles are deducible :-- (i)That if a landlord without any plausible reason fails to appear as a witness before the Rent Controller in support of his application for ejectment on the ground of personal requirement in good faith, this, will be fatal to his application.
(ii) That the fact that a landlord is residing or is carrying on business in a rented premises itself simpliciter is not sufficient to prove the landlord's bona fide personal requirement, but it will be a material fact to be considered alongwith other facts brought on record and attending circumstances.
(iii) That a landlord's statement on oath in conformity with the averments in the rent application if not shaken in cross-examination and if not disproved by the evidence in rebuttal, shall be sufficient to record finding in favour of the landlord.
(iv) That though it is desirable that the landlord may examine his children for whose occupation, he is seeking ejectment of a tenant, but failure to examine the children will not be fatal if the landlord's statement on oath is convincing and the tenant has failed either to shake his statement in cross- examination or to disprove by the evidence in rebuttal.
(v) That if a landlord owns more than one residential building or shop, which he has rented out, it is for him to decide which of the residential buildings or shops, he would like to occupy, provided such choice is not prompted on account of bad faith. Vi) That if a landlord is in possession of a rented residential building or shop it is not obligatory for him to prove that the said premises are not suitable for his needs at the time of filing of ejectment application on the ground of personal requirement nor he is obliged to prove that he has not vacated rented premises after the commencement of the Ordinance.
(vii) That in the absence of reliable evidence in rebuttal, the concurrent finding on the question of personal requirement cannot be inferred with in the second appeal by the High Court.
6. (a) Applying the principles enunciated hereinabove to the instant case, we may examine the above case on merits in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the respondent has been able to prove his bona fide personal requirement. It may be observed that from the evidence on the record the following facts stand proved :
(i) That when the respondent had let out the house in question to the appellant in 1973 for a period of 11 months, the respondent was in service and was posted as an Educational attached in Pakistan Embassy, London.
(ii) That on the expiry of 11 months period the appellant through his letter dated ,22-7-1974 (Exh. 1/3) requested the respondent to allow him to continue to occupy the premises in dispute for another period of one year from 15th August, 1974.
(iii) That thereafter a second agreement dated 28th. August, 1975 Exh. Was executed for a further period of one year commencing from 15th August, 1975 expiring on 14th August, 1976.
(iv) In the above agreement Exh, 1/4 inter alia it was stated that the respondent had served a registered notice upon the appellant calling upon him to vacate the premises on the ground of personal requirement by the end of 14th August, 1975, but on account of the appellant's difficulty the respondent had agreed to allow him to continue for a further period of one year period.
(v) Before a few days from the date of the expiry of the period mentioned in the aforesaid second rent agreement dated 28th August, 1975, the appellant gave a notice to the respondent to the effect that he shall hand over the vacant possession of the house in question to the respondent on 14-8-1976 (i,e, the date of the expiry of the period mentioned in the said agreement Exh. 1/5).
(vi) As the appellant did not hand over the vacant possession as was promised by him in his aforesaid letter, the respondent sent a notice dated 22nd January, 1977 through. His Advocate for asking the appellant to hand over the vacant possession. It was also stated that the respondent had pressing need of the house in question for his personal use.
(vii) The present application for ejectment was filed as mentioned hereinabove on 4-3-1977.
(b) In my view the respondent has been able to prove his personal requirement in good faith inter alia for the following facts/reasons
(i) That admittedly he is living in a rented flat.
(ii) That when he had let out the house in question he was in service of the Government and was in fact not in Pakistan.
(iii) That in the second agreement dated 28-12-1975 Exh. 1/4 it had been expressly stated by the parties that the respondent required the house for his personal need, but at the request of the appellant on account of his difficulty the respondent agreed to allow the appellant to continue to occupy the same for another period of one year.
(iv) That the respondent has retired from the service.
(v) That the respondent's statement on oath on account of his personal requirement has not been shaken in the cross-examination.
(vi) That the appellant has not been able to bring on the record any fact which would indicate lack of good faith on the part of the respondent.
(c) It was also urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that in order to prove bona fide personal requirement a landlord in addition to his statement on oath should also prove the following facts or some facts asking to the said facts :
(i) That the landlord's landlord has asked the landlord to vacate the rented premises.
(ii) That the landlord has been made to pay exorbitant rent for his rented premises as compared to the rent which he is charging from his tenant be doubted, there is no legal requirement for a landlord to prove the above facts or any other facts akin to the said facts as urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. On the contrary, in my view it is for a tenant to prove bad faith on the part of the landlord in rebuttal to the landlord's evidence. The above burden of proof can be discharged by a tenant by proving any fact which will indicate lack of good faith on the part of the landlord, for example, a tenant may prove any one or more following facts or facts akin to the said facts : (i)That the landlord owns more than one tenement and that at the time of filing of the ejectment application on the ground of personal requirement he had let out a similar accommodation to another person on exorbitant rent in the same residential building.
(ii) That the landlord in the past has been filing frivolous ejectment proceedings on one ground or the other, which terminated in favour of the tenants.
(iii) That the landlord cannot in fact use the premises in dispute on account of his physical disability, for example tenement in dispute is situated on 5th floor in a building which has no lift facility and the landlord is a heart patient of 65 years old and that the landlord's claim was for his personal requirement and not for the occupation of his children.
(d) In the instant case the appellant has not been able to prove any fact, which will indicate bad faith on the part of the respondent. It may be pertinent to mention that the term "good faith" is akin to the word "bona fide". It may advantageous to refer to the definition of the word `bona fide'. It will suffice to refer to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 1 (3rd Edition), at page 314, Mosley and Whiteley's Law Dictionary (8th Edition) at page 47, and the Concise Law Dictionary of Osborn (4th Edition) at page 56, wherein the above term has been defined as follows :--
(i) Stroud's dictionary : "Bona fide.-(1) The equivalent of this phrase is "honestly".
' Mozley dictionary "Bona fide".-In good faith, without fraud or deceit. Bona fide holder of a bill of exchange or other security one without knowledge of any defect in title. See the Bilk of Exchange Act, 1882, S. 29."
(iii) Osborn dictionary : "Bona fide.-141 good faith, honestly, without fraud, collusion or participation in wrong-doing."
It may be noticed that if an act has been performed honestly, without] fraud, collusion or participation in wrong-doing shall be deemed to be also bona fide act, whereas presence of any of the above elements may render act mala fide.
In my view the respondent has not only been able to prove his desire to occupy the house in dispute but has proved his personal requirement in good faith for the reasons mentioned hereinabove in para. 6(b), and, therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent has merely proved desire and not his bona fide personal requirement is unfounded. In view of the above discussion, I am of the view that the finding arrived at by the learned Rent Controller on the question of personal requirement is in accordance with law.
7. (a) Reverting to the contention of Mr. M. S. Kizalbash that the respondent is entitled to support the learned Rent Controller's order under appeal on the ground of default though on the above question the case was decided by the learned Rent Controller against the respondent, it may be observed that the learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the case of Robert Cotton Association Ltd. v. Inayatullah & Co. (I), the case of Muhammad Tufail v. Barkat Ali (2) and the case of Moulana Qarl Zahir Qasim v. Abdul Waheed Khan (3).
(b) Reverting to 1959 Karachi, it may be observed that the facts of the above case were that the defendant filed an appeal against the decree granted by the trial Court for the recovery of Rs, 10,000. While maintaining the above decree a Division Bench of erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, observed that in view of the provisions of Order XLI, rule 22, C. P. C., the respondent was within his rights to support the decree granted in his favour on any of the ground decided against him in the Court below.
(c) With reference to 1967 Karachi, it may be stated that the rent case brought by the transferee of an evacuee property was dismissed by the Rent Controller, the above order was maintained by the First Appellate Court on a ground other than which. Found favour with the Rent Controller. In the second appeal before the High Court it was urged that the First Appellate Court was not competent to maintain the order under appeal on a ground other than on which it was passed by the Rent Controller. However, the above contention was repelled by Qadeeruddin, J. (as his Lordship then was) and it was held that in view of the clear provisions of Order XLI, rule 22, C. P. C., the appellate authority was entitled to dismiss the appeal on a ground other than the ground found favour with the Rent Controller.
(d) Reverting to 1975 Karachi, it may be stated that in the above case it was held that an appeal to the High Court from the appellate authority's order was to be disposed of as an appeal from an original decree under section 96, C. P. C. In view of section 15(4) of the Ordinance.
8. (a) It will suffice to observe that the above cases are not directly applicable to the instant case for the reason that in the said cases the provisions of Order XL1, rule 44, C. P C. Were pressed into service. It may be observed that in explanation to section 15(4) of the Ordinance, it was expressly provided that an appeal before the High Court shall be determined as an appeal from an original decree under section 96 of the C. P. C. If it is from an order of the Appellate Authority, and the provisions of Part VI of the First Schedule to the said Code relating to the appeals with such modification as the context may require, shall apply to such proceedings, whereas the present appeal is under the provisions of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the new Ordinance), in which there is no parallel provision to that contained in section 15(4) of the Ordinance referred to hereinabove. On the other hand the C. P. C. Has been made applicable for the purpose specified in section 20 of the new {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PL D 1959 Lah. 178 (2) PLD 1967 Kar. 151
(3) PLD 1975 Kar. 66 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' Ordinance. It will be advantageous to reproduce here in below the above section, which reads as follows :- "20.-(i) Subject to this Ordinance, the Controller and the appellate authority shall, for the purpose of any case under this Ordinance have powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), in respect of only the matters, namely :-
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath ;
(b) compelling production or discovery of documents ;
(c) inspecting the site ; and
(d) issuing commission for examination of witnesses or documents."
(b) It may be noticed that under the new Ordinance the provisions of the C. P. C., are made applicable to the rent proceedings or appeal arising therefrom to the extent mentioned in the above-quoted section i,e, for the for purposes specified therein.
(c) However, in my view the above-departure in the new Ordinance does not alter the position materially with reference to the point in issue. The provisions of section 21 of the new Ordinance relating to appeal are of wide import as to warrant the maintenance of a Rent Controller order on a ground other than the ground found favour with the Rent Controller provided such ground was pleaded and agitated before the Rent Controller. In this regard it may be pertinent to refer to section 21 of the new Ordinance, which reads as follows :- "21.-(1) Any party aggrieved by an order, not being an interim order, made by the Controller may, within thirty days of such order, prefer an appeal to the High Court.
(2) The appellate authority may pending the final disposal of the appeal, grant injunction staying further proceeding or action on the order of the Controller : ' Provided that no injunction shall be granted if the appeal has been preferred from the order under section 14.
(3) The appellate authority shall, after perusing the record of the case and giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further enquiry either by himself or by the Controller, make an appropriate order which shall be final."
' It may be noticed that before the appellate authority the matter is re-opened. The appellate authority is empowered to pass .Such order as it may deem fit, if necessary, after making such further inquiry by himself or by the Controller. Subsection (3) of the above-quoted section 21 is couched in the same words as was the case of subsection (3) of section 15 of the Ordinance. In the above Karachi case of 1967 Qadeeruddin, J. (as his Lordship then was) held that the first appellate authority under the repealed Ordinance was competent to maintain the Rent Controller's order on a ground other than the ground found favour with the Rent Controller in view of the provisions of Order XLI, rule 22, C. P. C.
9. (a) Having held that it is open to this Court to maintain the order under appeal on a ground other than which found favour with the learned Rent Controller, 1 intend to examine the merits of the ground of the alleged default. In the instant case it is an admitted position that the second rent agreement expired on 14-8-1976. Under the two agreements Exhs. 1/1 and 1/4 the respondent was entitled to receive quarterly rent in advance. It was urged by Mr. M. S. Kizalbash that upon the expiry of the second agreement the appellant shall be deemed to have been a tenant from month to month on the terms and conditions of the expired agreement. This contention is devoid of any force in view of the latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court in case of Muhammad Yousuf v.
Abdul/ah in Civil Appeal No, K-90 of 1978 (unreported judgment dated 30-8-1980). In the above unreported case the facts were that there was a written agreement executed on 10th January, 1964 for a plot of land for a period of 6 months, with a clause of automatic renewal for another period of 6 months. Upon the expiry of the renewed period there was no further renewal by mutual agreement of the parties. It was urged by the learned counsel for the landlord before the Supreme Court on the basis of the case of Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Sharif (1), that on the expiry of the aforesaid agreement the tenant remained a tenant on the terms and conditions of the expired lease agreement. The above contention was repelled by the Supreme Court (vide the majority judgment delivered by his Lordship Dorab Patel, J. And concurred with by Muhammad Haleem and Abdul Kadir Shaikh, JJ.). It was held that the above Lahore case was not correctly decided and that the tenant on the expiry of the period mentioned in the expired agreement became a statutory tenant from month to month. Though his Lordship, Nasim Hasan Shah, J. Agreed with the conclusion arrived at by his Lordship Dorab Patel, J., but did not agree with the conclusion that the above Lahore case was not correctly decided.
(b) In view of the above majority judgment of the Supreme Court the respondent could not have pressed into service the terms and conditions of the expired lease agreement after 14-8-1976 Exh.
1/4. In this view of the matter the appellant became a statutory tenant from month to month w,e,f, 15-8-1976. The appellant was to pay rent in terms of section 13(2)(i) of the Ordinance and not in terms of the expired lease agreement. The appellant was to become a defaulter if he had not paid rent within 60 days from the period for which the rent was payable. The respondent's averment in respect of default in the rent application is vague. However, in the written arguments submitted before the learned Rent Controller a detail of the alleged defaults from the inception of the tenancy has been given on the basis of the counterfoils of the money Exhs. 1/1 to 1/70 and the appellant's letter dated 9-3-1976 Exh. 4/5. It may be mentioned, that it is clear from the above written arguments that at the time of the filing of the rent application no amount was due and payable by the appellant to the respondent in terms of the provisions of section 13(2)(i) of the Ordinance. It may be pertinent to observe that if a landlord after the commission of a default continues to accept rent without any protest and does not take ejectment proceeding within reasonable time, it shall be deemed that he has waived such default. In the instant case in my view the respondent could not have pressed into service the alleged defaults allegedly committed from the inception of the tenancy till the expiry of the lease agreement on 14-8-76,' as he failed to take legal proceedings in respect thereof within reasonable' time, on the contrary he continued to accept rent.
Furthermore, as pointed out hereinabove that in the rent application the allegation of default is very vague, no particulars of the alleged defaults have been given. In am view a landlord cannot succeed on the ground of default without pleading full particulars in the rent application. A vague allegation that the tenant {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1971 Lah. 610 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' has committed deliberate defaults in payment of rent is not sufficient to maintain an application for ejectment on the above ground.
' The finding arrived at by the learned Rent Controller on the question of default seems to be correct and, therefore, the respondent cannot support the order under appeal on the above ground.
10. In view of the above discussion the result is that the appeal fails as I have upheld the finding of the learned Rent Controller on the question of the respondent's bona fide personal requirement.
The appeal is therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. However, I grant 60 days' time from today to the appellant to hand over the vacant possession of the tenement in question to the respondent.