Z. A. CHANNA , J.-The point involved in these three constitutional petitions is whether the scope of revisional jurisdiction under subsection (3-a) of section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1968, to which we will refer to as the Industrial Relations Ordinance, is limited to original orders passed by a Labour Court or also extends to appellate orders passed by such Courts.
2. The petitioners are a private limited Company engaged . In the manufacture of textiles and for this purpose they have a mill at A/2, S. I. T. E., Hyderabad. Each of the 3rd respondent, in the 3 petitions was an employee of the petitioners in their factory. Charges of misconduct were framed by the petitioners against each of the 3rd respondents and domestic enquiries held in respect of these charges. The 3rd respondents challenged these proceedings by means of applications under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, to the Junior Labour Court, but their applications were dismissed, vide orders of -the Junior Labour Court dated 3-3-1975, on the ground that the applications were premature. Thereafter, the domestic enquiries were continued and ultimately 'the services of respondents were terminated by the petitioners. The 3rd respondents thereupon filed fresh petitions under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, to the Junior Labour Court, which set aside the termination orders passed against the respondents and ordered their re-instatement in service with back benefits. The petitioners, thereupon, filed appeals against the orders of the Junior Labour Court to the Labour Court, and the latter, by its order, dated 7-11- 1975, dismissed the appeals by a consolidated order. Against this order, the petitioners went up to the Labour Appellate Tribunal in revision, under the provisions of the newly-enacted subsection (3- a) of section 38, Industrial Relations Ordinance, but the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal took the view that its revisional jurisdiction under the said subsection extended only to the original orders passed by the Labour Court and that it was not the intention of the law-maker that there should be interference in revision against the orders passed by the Labour Court on appeal from orders of Junior Labour Court under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, which orders, in the opinion of the learned Appellate Tribunal were deemed to be final.
3. We have heard Mr. Abid Hamid Puri, the learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Fasahat Hussain Riavi, who appeared for the contesting respondents/workmen. Mr. Puri's main contention was that there was nothing in subsection (3-a) of section 38, Industrial Relations Ordinance, to justify the limited construction which the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal had placed on that subsection and that on the contrary the working of that subsection, specially the conferring of the power to call for the record of any case or proceedings under the Ordinance in which a Labour Court had passed an order, clearly indicated that the widest powers have been conferred upon the Labour Appellate Tribunal to interfere with the orders of a Labour Court, wherever the Labour Appellate Tribunal was not satisfied with the correctness, legality or propriety of such orders.
Subsection (3-a), which was added to the Industrial Relations Ordinance by the Labour Laws (Amend--ment) Act, 1977, which came into force on 9-5-1977, reads as follows :- "(3-a).-The Tribunal may, on its own motion at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Ordinance in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order, for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of such order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit: Provided that no such order under this subsection shall be passed revising or modifying any order adversely affecting any person without giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
4. The basic duty of the Courts is to give full effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in a Statute and the purpose of interpretation in relation to a Statute is to ascertain the true intention of the law-maker. Such intention invariably can only be gathered from the words used in the Statute. As stated by Maxwell in his treatise 'The Interpretation of Statutes', Twelfth Edn., pp. 28 and 29; "The rule of construction is 'to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed'. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, 'but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used, 'for it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law.'
Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the Legislature, it must 'be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the Court as to what is just and expedient ; words are not be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the Court is to expound the law as it stands, and to 'leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to other'."
5. A perusal of subsection (3-a) of section 38 of the Industrial Relation Ordinance indicates that widest powers of revision have been conferred upon the Labour Appellate Tribunal to examine the correctness, legality o propriety of any order passed by a Labour Court and to revise and modify it in such manner as it deems fit, consistent of course with the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. No qualifications or limitations have been attached to the word 'order' as used in the said subsection and therefore, with due respect to the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, we are unable to limit the scope of the section by adding qualifying words to the orders which are susceptible to the revisional powers of the Tribunal.
6. A further circumstance which supports us in the above view is the fact that there has also been by the same Act which has introduced sub--section (3-a) in section 38 substitution of subsection
(4) of section 37. The substitution is significant. Whereas, orders and decisions of a Labour Court, other than decisions and awards which were specifically subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, were declared to be final and there was a bar to their being questioned in any manner by or before any Court or other authority, the substituted subsection (4) gives a qualified protection to these residuary orders and decisions of the Labour Court and begins with the words "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Ordinance". The use of this expression can only mean that the orders and decisions of the Labour Court, which previously were given absolute protection and finality, are now subject to euo motu revisional powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Since subsection (4) of section 37 covers all the orders and decisions passed by a Labour Court, which are not subject to appeal, we consider that it will also cover orders passed by the Labour Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In other words, the appellate orders of the Labour Court will also be subject to the suo moru revisional jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, just as other orders passed by the Labour Court, the only limitation being, as provided in subsection (3) of section 37, that such orders should not be appealable.
7. Although, we have taken the view that the appellate orders of the Labour Court against which revision applications were filed by the petitioners, are subject to the suo motu revisional powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, that is not the end of the matter. It would be noticed that no party has been given a right to apply to the Labour Appellate Tribunal in revision. Not only is the exercise of such power by the Tribunal to be of its own motion or suo motu, but further it can be exercised at any time. We do not think that by conferring this power, the Legislature, while denying a right of appeal to a party, intended to give a practically identical right, by way of revision; to a party, which right moreover could be exercised at any time. As we construe subsection (3-a) of section 38, its intention was to correct basic errors in the exercise of its jurisdiction by Labour Courts which have been brought to the notice of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The distinction between suo motu exercise of revisional powers and the exercise of revisional powers on the application of a party has been considered by this Court in two decisions, reported as Hyderabad Rehabilitation Trust v.
Government of Sind (PLD 1978 Kar. 802) and Caltex Oil (Pakistan) Limited v. Province of Sind (PLD 1978 Kar. 968). In the former case, it was observed that in acting on the information of its subordinates, the revising authority would obviously be acting of its own motion and not on an application. In the latter case, after reviewing the case-law on the subject, it was observed that if an unsuccessful or disgruntled party to a dispute is permitted to invoke the suo motu revisional powers of a competent authority, the very purpose of prescribing the limitation period for filing of such applications and the distinction between exercise of suo motu revisional powers and initiation of proceedings upon revisional applications, specially by aggrieved parties, would be obliterated.
No doubt, the two reported decisions are in regard to the revisional powers under section 10 (2) of the Sind Urban Immovable; Property Act, 1958, which provides two types of revisions, one on the basis of an application made by an aggrieved party within the prescribed - period and the other exercise of suo motu revisional powers by the competent authority at any time. The fact that in the instant case no right has been given to a party to submit a revision application to the Labour Appellate Tribunal is significant. There are a number of laws which provide both for making of revision applications by parties and the exercise by the competent authority of suo motu revisional powers. The Legislature is expected to be fully aware of this position. The fact that it has not chosen to confer any right on a party to file a revision application indicates that suo motu exercise of revisional powers are to be exercised, as the words themselves clearly indicate, upon information received by the competent authority or upon its own motion and not on being moved by an application by an aggrieved party. In the case of Abdul Majld Sheda v. Noor Jahan (PLD 1967 SC 221) the Supreme Court, while construing the scope of revision under section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, which also provides for only exercise of suo motu revisional powers by the Settlement Commissioner, observed that there was no right given to any applicant to move a revision petition before the Settlement Commissioner. We are, therefore, of opinion that the revision applications filed by the petitioners in the instant case were misconceived and are not permissible under subsection (3a) of section 38, Industrial Relations Ordinance.
8. Even otherwise, we find that there is no merit in these petitions. It is an admitted position that the domestic enquiry was held by the petitioners behind the back of the 3rd respondents in the three petitions, and that they were not duly served. It is common ground that the second show cause notice to them was sent by post to the office of their Trade Union, but all these notices were returned un-served as the office had been sealed by the police. The petitioners should have been aware of this fact. Moreover, there was evidence before the learned Junior Labour Court that immediately after the first order of the Junior Labour Court, holding that the applications by the 3rd respondents were premature, they had, on the 5th of March, 1975, gone to the factory of the petitioners, but the required notices were not served on them at that time or thereafter. In the circumstances, the Junior Labour Court was within its jurisdiction to set aside the orders of the dismissal of the 3rd respondents and equally the Labour Court acted correctly in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners.
9. For the reasons stated by us above, we find no merit in these petitions. We would accordingly dismiss the same with costs.