1. ' ALI MUHAMMAD BALOCH (MEMBER).--- The Informant/ Applicant is an automobile company and registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and also engaged in the business of manufacturing the different kinds of vehicles. Respondents Nos.2 to 7 have formed union under the name and style of "Ghandhara Nissan Limited Azad Labour Union"/respondent No,1 and had applied for registration of the union and according to them, they have complied with all the requirements of sections 4, 5 and 6 of IRA, 2008. Informant/ applicant had raised objections before respondent # 8 and also contested appeal before respondent # 9/learned Labour Court on the ground that all alleged members of respondent # 1 are the employees of respondent # 10 being contractor have no concern or relationship with the applicant management, especially when respondent # 10 had its own registered union under the name and style of "Ghandhara Nissan Limited Contractor Workers Union". The applicant had also raised objection that the respondent # 1 cannot be allowed to be registered as union, as there is already a union in existence. Means thereby the same union be allowed double registration. Respondent # 8 being the Authority under Industrial Relations Act passed an order refusing to register the union as claimed by the respondent's # 2 to 7. Respondent # 8 had delayed the matter and no letter of either rejection of registration application or registration certificate was issued, so the respondent # 1 along with its office bearers appealed to the learned Labour Court under section 9(3) of I.R.A.
2. 2010. Learned Labour Court after hearing the parties at length had accepted the appeal and directed respondent # 8 to issue registration certificate to respondent # 1.
3. ' This revision application is directed against the said order on the ground that the order of learned Labour Court is illegal, unwarranted, unlawful and devoid of facts. Secondly, the ground of the revision is that the workers performing their duties with contractor as employed through contractor. Thirdly, respondent # 1 suggested name for registration before respondent # 8 in different name as the same workers were the members of other union. Fourthly, the learned Labour Court directed respondent # 8 to issue registration certificate instead of remanding the matter to respondent # 8.
4. ' This revision is being filed against the order passed under section 9 (3) of I.R.A. 2008, which for ready reference is reproduced as under:---
9. Registration.--- (3) In case the application has been rejected or the Registrar has delayed disposal of the application beyond the period of fifteen days provided in subsection (1) or has not issued a certificate of registration within a period of three days as provided in subsection (2), as the case may be, the trade union may appeal to the Labour Court who for reasons to be stated in its judgment may pass an order directing the Registrar to register the trade union and to issue a certificate of registration or may dismiss the appeal."
5. Mere reading of the above subsection reveals that Registrar of Trade Unions is bound to inform the concerned union about its registration application within fifteen days, but if Registrar fails, the concerned union is authorized to approach the learned Labour Court in appeal. This subsection has not given any character to the employer. Furthermore, the earlier subsections (1) and (2) of section 9 have no reference of employer in any manner hence for ready reference the same are also reproduced hereunder:--- "(1) The Registrar, on being satisfied that the trade union has complied with all the requirements of this Act, shall register the trade union in a prescribed register and issue a registration certificate in the prescribed form within a period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the application. In case the application is found by the Registrar to be deficient in a material respect he shall communicate in writing his objections to the trade union within a period of fifteen days from the receipt of the application and the trade union shall reply thereto within a period of fifteen days from the receipt of the objections.
(2) When the objections raised by the registrar have been satisfactorily met, the Registrar shall register the trade union as provided in subsection (1) and issue a certificate of registration in the prescribed form within three days of the date of the objections having been so met. In case the objections are not satisfactorily met, the Registrar may reject the application."
6. ' All the above three subsections as reproduced having no reference or Character of the "employer" or of "any other trade union" and I am sorry to say that the entire revision application and the law cited by the learned Counsel for the applicant having no reference to that effect. On the other hand learned Counsel for the respondents # 1 to 7 had relied upon a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Essa Cement Industries Workers Union v. Registrar of Trade Unions and others as reported in 1998 PLC 500. Perusal of the judgment reveals that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had not only discussed the powers of the Registrar regarding registration and the manner of enquiry, so the relevant part of the judgment is reproduced as under:--- "(5) As is evident from subsection (2) of section 7, clauses (a) and (b), its provisions are mandatory in nature and a trade union of workmen cannot be registered by the Registrar unless he is satisfied that conditions laid down therein have been fulfilled by the union. Reference to section 8 of the I.R.O. Further indicates that satisfaction only of the Registrar is required. Satisfaction implies proper application of mind and, therefore, the Registrar cannot act mechanically but he must first conduct an enquiry to satisfy himself as to the conditions laid down in subsection (2) of section 7 for registration of a trade union of workmen
(7) So far as the first contention of the learned counsel is concerned, there can be no cavil with the preposition that jurisdictional facts are not immune from scrutiny by the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction and even if it was not possible for the Court to itself embark upon an enquiry in this regard, the matter could be referred to the Registrar for further enquiry. However, as was indicated earlier, the Registrar appears to have satisfied itself as to the requirements of registration before passing an order in favour of the respondent union. The very fact that two enquiries were got conducted by the Registrar in this regard through his subordinate is indicative of his satisfaction as required by the law....
(8) So far as the second contention of Mr. Shahani is concerned, it may pointed out that although, there is no hard and fast rule laid down in the I.R.O. Directing the manner in which an enquiry is to be conducted by the Registrar under section 8, but nothing prevents the Registrar from seeking assistance either from the employer concerned or the union or unions formed by the workmen in the same establishment. However, the Registrar is not party bound to seek assistance either of the employer or such unions. Such question came up for determination before the High Court of Sindh in Bata Show Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Registrar Trade Unions of Sindh (PLD 1978 Karachi 567), where it was observed in this regard: "In other words, there is no room for any challenge by an employer, who may consider itself affected by the decision of the Registrar in favour of a Trade Union. It follows, therefore, that the law does not contemplate any notice to the employer and no grievance can be made if the Registrar or the Appellate Court does not hear the employer."
7. ' If on the basis of above settled law we go through the alleged enquiry report at Annexure "E" Pages 77 to 83, it does embark upon the fact that the Registrar of Trade Union is satisfied with the fact that the respondent # 1 union is not entitled for registration and for the purpose the last para of the said report is reproduced hereunder: "The Manager I.R. And Personnel and Senior Manager of the factory Messrs Ghandhara Nissan Ltd.
8. Informed that after consultation with the High Authority they will be in a position to attend the joint meeting, they will inform about date of joint meeting on telephone lateron."
9. ' In last para page # 77, Assistant Director Labour has noted as under:- "The undersigned also met with Mr. Khalid Ismail Khan, Manager I.R. And Personnel and Mr. Muhammad Abdul Jalil Senior Manager of Factory Admn. Messrs Ghandhara Nissan Ltd. And enquired about the matter. Both informed the undersigned that 194 workers who were engaged through contractor Messrs Continental Engineering Services (Pvt.) Ltd. Messrs Continental Engineering Services (Pvt.) Ltd. Terminated 194 workers because the contract with Messrs Continenetal Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. Has been terminated by Messrs Ghandhara Nissan Ltd. On 29- 1-2011."
10. ' The said alleged enquiry report can be considered as minutes of the enquiry but without support of any document, as the same does not bear signatures on each and every page and only the last page bears certain signatures without any designation and clarification that who were in attendance in the said meeting. Said report having no conclusion about the grant or non-grant of registration to the respondent # 1 union, hence cannot be made basis for refusal of registration.
11. The said report prepared by one Assistant Director Labour, but has not been accepted or rejected by the Registrar of Trade Unions, therefore, has no value in the eye of law.
12. To the contrary of any such report, it is the settled law that in the matter of registration, the employer or any other union has no right to be heard or to be taken into confidence and the law as cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent.# 1 Union is 1998 PLC 500, as cited above. The locus standi of "employer" or "any other person" has been dealt with in the above judgment in para D, "It was observed in this case that the matter of registration is one between a trade union applying for registration and the Registrar and others, including the pre-existing trade unions or the employer have no say in the matter. The same view had earlier found favour in yet another judgment of the same Court in National Beverage Employees Union v. Registrar of Trade Unions, Government of Sindh (1986 PLC 533). This judgment was also relied upon by the learned Judge in Chambers in the present case."
13. Registration of trade union cannot be challenged on the ground that chance of hearing has not been given to the employer or other trade union and the same point has been upheld in the above referred judgment as under:--- "9. It, therefore, follows that neither the employer nor a trade union already existing in the same establishment can claim locus standi to challenge the decision of the Registrar merely on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was provided to it or an objection raised by it before the Registrar was not considered before such decision."
14. ' The grounds taken by the present applicant in this revision application are that firstly the members of the union are the employees of the present applicant establishment. On this point the enquiry as allegedly conducted but the management before the Registrar has not produced any evidence to the same effect or not filed any proof that all employees either working through contractor or they have been terminated before formation of trade union but the alleged enquiry though discarded by this Tribunal has a mention of that the registration application was filed on 28th January, 2011 and alleged termination of contractor was made on 29th January 2011, which shows mala fides of the employer. Even if this Tribunal accepts the contention of the present applicant otherwise this is only a lame excuse without any evidence. The Registrar is the authority to record the evidence, but despite chances given by the nominee of the Registrar, present applicant failed to produce evidence before him. The present applicant has also failed in producing any evidence either before the learned Labour Court or before this Tribunal, hence hear say cannot be considered as evidence.
15. ' The learned Counsel for respondent # 1 union raised objection to the maintainability of the revision application against the order passed in appeal by the learned Labour Court. For this purpose firstly I have to consider the provision of section 55 (4) of I.R.A. 2008 and for ready reference the said section is reproduced hereunder:--- "55. Labour Appellate Tribunal.--- (4) The Tribunal may, on its own motion at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Act in which a Labour Court within its jurisdiction has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of such order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit: 'Provided that no order under this subsection shall be passed revising or modifying any order adversely affecting any person without giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
16. The above provision reflects that any order passed by the learned Labour Court in any provision subject to the revisional authority of this Tribunal and this Tribunal on its suo motu powers or on information may call the R&P of any case or proceedings means thereby either pending or disposed of. This section does not have any mention of only the pending proceedings, therefore, the disposed of matters if not covered by any other provision for the purpose of appeal can be brought before this Tribunal for the purpose of review.
17. ' Though the Tribunal has revisional powers under section 55 (4) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, but the wordings of the subsection reflects that the same are the restricted only to the checking of correctness, legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned Labour Courts.
18. So, while deciding the revision this Tribunal is bound firstly to check the correctness of the order passed on the basis of the facts produced before learned Labour Court and I am of the view in the present case that the impugned order is correct on the basis of the facts produced before the learned Labour Court. Secondly the legality of the order and for said purpose we have to examine the provisions of law i,e, section 9(3) Ibid, as already reproduced supra which provides authority and powers/jurisdiction to the learned Labour Court to hear an appeal against the refusal/non- decision on registration of the application and it is an admitted fact that the registration application was filed on 28th January 2011 and whereas the appeal before learned Labour Court was filed on 11-4-2011, hence legally the learned Labour Court is bound to hear the appeal according to law. Thirdly the propriety of the impugned order as checked by this Tribunal does not require any interference as no illegality has been committed, as the employer in the matter of hearing has no right of any hearing/interference, hence I found nothing in the order of the learned Labour Court.
19. ' Lastly, the question, whether this Tribunal can hear revision application against any order passed by the learned Labour Court, I am in agreement with the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the applicant establishment, especially in respect of judgment in the case of Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Limited v. Mohammed Jawed Iqbal and another as reported in 1986 SCM R 1071 and judgment in case of Jannat Textile Mills Limited v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and others as reported in PLD 1979 Karachi 725.
20. ' With the above observations, the revision application is dismissed.
21. Revision .