' On 2-3-1977, complainant Jamal filed a complaint under sections 54 and 55, I. R.
0., against the 2 respondents, Mst. Taj Bakht and Choudhry Najib Rasool, for failing to comply with or fulfilling certain conditions of a compromise entered into by them with him. It appears that process was issued against both the respondents but the same could not be served on respondent Mst. Taj Bakht who remained absent throughout. On 25-10-1979, when the above case was fixed for hearing before the learned VIth LabourCourt, respondent No, 2, Choudhry Najib Rasool, appeared but the complainant failed to appear till 11-00 a. In. Accordingly, both the respondents were acquitted under section 247, Cr. P. C. The complainant filed an application for restoration of his complaint but the same was dismissed by the learned Labour Court on the grounds, firstly, that it was not maintainable, and secondly, that it had no power to set aside its orders of acquittal. The complainant has sought to challenge the said orders by invoking the suo motu revisional powers of this Tribunal under subsection (3-a) of section 38, I. R. O.
2. In Jannat Textile Mills v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court, of which I was a member, has held that while section 38(3-a) confers widest powers of revision upon the Labour Appellate Tribunal to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed by Labour Court and to revise and modify the same, in a manner deemed fit, consistent with the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, such powers, as the subsection itself indicates can only be exercised by the Tribunal on its own motion and not on an application by an unsuccessful or disgruntled party. The revision application thus does not appear to be maintainable on this account alone.1
3. There is an added reason for not interfering with the impugned order of the learned Labour Court.
As appears from the order of acquittal, respondent No, 2 was present on 25-10-1979, on which date the case was fixed for hearing, but the complainant remained absent till 11-00 a. m. No illegality or impropriety was committed by the learned Labour Court in passing the order in question.
Furthermore, the complainant has given no satisfactory explanation for not appearing before the Court in time. According to the restoration application, the complainant had appeared in Court at 9-30 a. m., but learnt that the case was ealled earlier and the accused were acquitted. This appears to be patently a false statement as the learned Court in its order, has specifically stated that the complainant had failed to turn up till 11-00 a. m. No reliance, therefore, can be placed on the word of the complainant. Further more, even if I have any discretion in the matter, I would be disinclined to exercise the same in favour of the complainant by reason of the false assertion made by him.
4. The complainant has relied, in support of his application, on a decision of the Lahore High Court reported in Law Notes 1973 Lab. 245 (?). That decision, however, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the reported case, the order of the learned Magistrate discharging the accused was set aside on the grounds, firstly, that it was a warrant trial case, secondly, an order of disharge could be revised by the High Court in the exercise of its powers under section 439, Cr. P. C., and thirdly, that order was passed in the earlier hours of the morning without apparently giving sufficient time to the complainant to appear before him. In the present case, the respondents were being tried according to the summons procedure a and they were acquitted under section 247, Cr.
P. C. An acquittal even on account of absence of the complainant is not to be lightly interfered with.
Further more, sufficient time was given to the complainant to appear but h failed to put in an appearance.
5. For the reasons discussed above, I find no merit in this revision application and accordingly dismiss the same. PLD 1979 Kar. 725