' These 3 appeals are directed against 2 separate orders passed by the learned 1st Labour Court on 4th December, 1979, in Applications Nos. 291/ 77 and 292/77, dismissing the preliminary legal objections that the said grievance applications were not maintainable on the ground of limitation.
2. Admittedly, the impugned orders are interlocutory orders. This Tribunal has repeatedly been holding that no appeal lies from an interlocutory order passed by a Labour Court and that appeal lies only against the final order or decision, given on an application under section 25-A, I.R.O. In the case of Alwin Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Mohammad Sardar Khan, .Decided on 11th February, 1980, it was observed as follows : - "As provided in sub-clause (3) of section 37, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, an appeal lies only against an award, or a decision given under section 25-A, or section 34, or a sentence passed under clause (c) of subsection (5) of section 55. It may be noted that the word 'decision' in section 25-A was substituted for the word 'award' by Act V of 1972. It is thus obvious that the intention of the Legislature is that an appeal would lie against the final decision given by the Labour Court on a grievance application and not against an interlocutory order. Since the impugned order is obviously an interlocutory order, no appeal lies against it."
3. I will also refer to a recent decision of the Karachi High Court under the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, reported as Gul Dad Khan v. Rahim Shah, wherein it was held that an appeal lies in respect of an order passed under sections 4, 10, 12 and 13 of the Ordinance only if it finally disposes of the whole case. In view of the. Above decisions, Mr. Muneeruddin did not dispute the proposition that no appeal lie against the impugned orders.1
4. No doubt, every order passed by the Labour Court under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in which no appeal lies, is subject to exercise of suo motu revisional powers of this Tribunal as provided in subsection (3-A) of section 38. I. R.0., but as was pointed out by a Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in the case of Jannat Textile Mills v.,S.L.A.T. a revision application by a party purporting to be under subsection (3-A) of section 38, I. R.0., was misconceived and not B permissible, As such, the present appeals cannot be treated as revision applications for the exercise of suo motu powers.
5. Since the legal position appears to be undisputed that no appeals lie against the impugned orders, it will be open to the aggrieved party to challenge the findings in these orders if appeals are preferred against the final decisions.
6. For the reasons stated by me above, I would dismiss the 3 appeals in question on the ground that they are not maintainable. PLD 1973 Kar. 19 PLD 1979 Kar. 725