' KHAWAJA MUHAMMAD SAEED, J,--- This appeal by the leave of the Court is directed against the judgment of the High Court passed on 28-4-2000 whereby the writ petition filed by the appellants seeking quashment of the amended rules framed for the employees of the Azad Kashmir Logging and Sawmills Corporation alongwith the seniority list prepared under the rules was dismissed.
2. Necessary facts briefly stated are that the appellants who claimed for themselves to be M.Sc.
And B.Sc. In Forestry respectively and employees of the Corporation challenged the appointments orders of pro forma respondent in Corporation service on various grounds through separate writ petitions. In Writ Petition No,408 of 1997, the decision of which is under challenge in the present appeal, the appellants alleged the pro forma respondent was inducted in the service of Corporation in colourful exercise of jurisdiction against the spirit of rules. In order to regularize their illegal appointments an amendment was made in the rules by the Board and enforced without the approval of the Government. Under these rules a seniority list has been prepared in which pro forma respondents have been shown senior to the appellants. In the background of these facts they prayed for the quashment of the amended departmental rules prepared and enforced without prior approval of the Government and seniority list prepared under these rules.
3. In the written statement pro forma respondent as well as the officials of the Corporation repudiated the contents of the writ petition. They defended the appointments of pro forma respondents that they were appointed in accordance with the rules. It was further pleaded that the Board of Director has got legal competence to frame rules under section 7 of the AKLASC Corporation Ordinance IV of 1968 (as amended) (hereinafter shall be referred as AKLASC Ordinance, 1968). The service of the employees of the AKLASC, according to the respondents, is governed by the AKLASC Ordinance, 1968 and AKLASC Employees Service Rules, 1977. According to official respondents, in order to improve the working of the AKLASC, its structure was reorganized and rules were amended to meet the requirement of the changed structure. They denied that any change in the rules was made with mala fide intention. It was specifically pleaded that section 7 of the AKLASC Ordinance, 1968 empowers the Board of Directors to frame rules in order to prescribe the procedure for the appointment of employees and fix their terms and conditions of service including matters relating to disciplinary actions. It was further contended that approval of the Government was not required for effecting amendment in the rules. This writ petition was ultimately dismissed by the learned Judge in the High Court on following grounds:--
(i) that section 7 does not require any approval of the Government for framing rules relating to the services of the employees of the Corporation;
(ii) that it is not the requirement of law to publish rules of the Corporation in Government Gazette;
(iii) that rules were not framed to extend any benefit to pro forma respondent. Therefore, the contention of mala fide raised by the appellants was rejected; and
(iv) that on account of these rules the pro forma respondent has not been given undue benefit in the matter of further promotions.
4. Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, the learned counsel for the appellants, argued that amendment effected in the AKLASC Employees Service Rules, 1977, which were framed with the approval of the Government, could not be made effective without previous approval of the Government. He based his argument on section 17 of the AKLASC Ordinance, 1968. He further argued that these rules have been framed with mala fide intention in order to extend undue benefit to respondents and for this purpose illegally framed the rules which were not published in the Government Gazette.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents, Mr. Muhammad Farid Khan, Advocate, argued that section 7 of AKLASC Ordinance, 1968 has conferred vast powers to the Board of Directors to frame rules to prescribe the procedure for the appointments in the Corporation including the matters relating to disciplinary actions etc., therefore, amendment effected through impugned rules in the original rules of 1977 suffers from no legal defect. He further argued that in order to improve the working of the Corporation its service structure was changed. According to the learned counsel, to meet the requirements of changed service structure an amendment in the rules became imperative which was made and enforced by the Board, having exclusive competence under AKLASC Ordinance in this regard. He further argued that there was no intention behind these rules to extend any undue benefit to any class of employees of the corporation. He further submitted that the general provision contained in section 17 was not applicable as this section has no concern with the rules which are framed by the Board under section 7 of the AKLASC Ordinance, 1968. On account of specific provision contained in section 7, the general rule making provision embodied in section 17 shall not apply, as such, the learned Judge in the High Court has rightly held so. He further argued that under the provision of the AKLASC Ordinance, 1968 or the rules framed for carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance, it is not required that the rules framed by the Board of Directors in exercise of the powers available to it under section 7 shall be published in the Government Gazette. According to him under the ordinance, the Board is legally competent to frame the rules which were accordingly framed by it. Therefore, rules framed by the Board of Directors cannot be ignored merely on the basis of non-publication in the Government Gazette. He denied this allegation that amendment in rules was effected to benefit pro forma respondent, as his appointment in the service of Corporation stood assailed by the appellants in the High Court.
According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the impugned rules were framed on January 11, 1996 whereas writ petition was filed on May 20, 1997, which makes it clear that these rules were net framed to extend any benefit to the pro forma respondent. The learned counsel further argued that different service units have been established for the improvement and smooth working of the Corporation. In each unit, persons having different qualification have been absorbed. Their seniority, therefore, cannot be common. These rules, in view of these facts; cannot extend any undue advantage to the employees of any unit of the Corporation in the matter of further promotion. Therefore, the contention of the appellants in this regard, in the opinion of the learned counsel for the respondents, is without any justification.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. The paramount question which requires interpretation is as to whether the amendment in the AKLASC Employees Rules, 1977 could not be given effect to without prior approval of the Government.
According to the learned counsel for the appellants in the light of section 17 of the AKLASC Ordinance, 1968, no rule can be promulgated and enforced without the prior approval of the Government. On the other hand the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that under section 7 of the AKLASC Ordinance, 1968, the Board of Directors is competent to promulgate rules to prescribe the procedure for appointments in the Corporation and this power is not controlled by the general rule making provision embodied in section 17 of the AKLASC Ordinance, 1968. In order to resolve this important law point it appears appropriate to reproduce here both sections 7 and 17 in extenso: -- "7. Officers and Servant of the Corporation.--- (1) The Board may, from time to time, appoint for the Cooperation, subject to the scheme and the contract, such officers, advisers, experts consultants or other employees as it may consider necessary for the performance of its functions.
(2) The Board shall prescribe the procedure for appointment and terms and conditions of service of the officers and servants of the Corporation and shall be competent to take disciplinary action against such officers and servants.
17. Rules and Regulations.--- The Corporation may, with the approval of the Government, make such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance."
7. It is the fundamental principle relating to the interpretation of a statute that it should be read as a whole and no part or word of it should be omitted from consideration. It is also an admitted principle of interpretation of statutes/rules, that the intention behind the statute/rules must be taken into consideration which can be gathered from looking into the statute/rules as a whole and further that all attempts should be made to reconcile various provisions of the statute for rational meaning avoiding redundancy to any provision thereof. This view is supported by many authorities.
Few out of them are reproduced for the sake of reference:-- ' In Rafiq Akhtar Chaudhry v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government PLD 1982 SC '(AJ&K) 124 the following guidelines were provided by this Court in this regard:-- "23. Firstly, it is to be seen as to how the rules are interpreted. The fundamental rule of interpretation to which all others are subordinate is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent that made it. That intent can be gathered from looking into the document as a whole and the Courts have to interpret the law as it is and not to correct and make law as this is exclusively the function of Legislature. No part or word of a statute can be omitted from consideration in interpreting it."
(Underlining is ours).
' Again in State v. Nadeem and 4 others 1996 MLD 506 at page 512 the following principle was laid down:-- ' ".... The answer can be found in the principle that it is duty of the Courts to interpret different sections in a statute in order to harmonise various sections or subsection in a statute. As such we cannot extend an interpretation which will not be harmonious, thus rendering subsection (1) as redundant to subsection (2-A) of Cr.P.C. ..."
' In Messrs Kamran Industries v. The Collector of Customs (Exports), 11th Floor, Customs House, Karachi and 4 others PLD 1996 Kara 68 the provisions of Customs Act, 1969 and Customs Export Processing Rules, 1981, were under challenge and following principle was laid down after the survey of case-law on the subject:-- ' ".... Accordingly, the Customs Authorities acted completely without jurisdiction to proceed with the process of examining the value and description of the goods. In arriving at the above conclusion we have also resorted to the cannons of construction that a statute/instrument/document is to be read as a whole (State Bank of Pakistan v. The Director, Military Lands and Cantonment, Rawalpindi PLD 1990 SC 827) and an attempt has to be made by the Court to first reconcile various clauses for a rational meaning (Muhammad Azam Muhammad Fazil & Co. v. N.A. Industries, Karachi PLD 1977 Kar. 21), while avoiding redundancy to any part thereof (Afzal Stores v. Sindh Labour Court No,5 PLD 1977 Kar. 756)...."
' In a case reported as Muhammad Hussain v. Mian Mahmood Ahmed and 3 others PLD 1970 Lah.
140 it was laid down as follows:-- "2. It is well-settled that in constructing a statute it is the duty of the Court or a Tribunal to determine the express intention of the Legislature. The primary rule of interpretation undoubtedly is that if there is no indistinctness or conflict of thought in the language used in the statute as also there is no elasticity or vagueness inherent in it which may make it difficult to ascertain, with precision, the intention of the Legislature as expressed by the words used, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the Legislature. If the words are in themselves precise and unambiguous, and admit but of one meaning, seldom any difficulty in interpretation arises. The language in such cases has got to be taken as decisive of the intention of the Legislature and should not be departed from. However, in cases where there is doubt about the meaning of the words used in a statute, a recognized method of construction is to take the words in the sense in which they would harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view. But, if the intention is manifest, hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature ...." (Underlining is ours)
' In a case reported as Institution of Engineers, Pakistan Engineering Centre v. Pakistan Engineering Council and another 1996 CLC 129 wherein the controversy raised was in respect of various provisions of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976, it was laid down at page 135 as under:- ' "... It is well-settled that the statute must be read as a whole, and one provision contained therein cannot be interpreted in isolation of the other. A conjunctive reading of various provisions especially sections 8, 9 and 15 shows that the powers of withdrawal of recognition vesting in the Council can be exercised by the Executive Committee on behalf of the council . "
' In a reference filed by the President of Pakistan, PLD 1957 SC 219 under defunct Constitution, 1956 the apex Court of Pakistan laid down the following principles of interpretation:-- ' ".... The first object of the Court is to discover the intention of the author and such intention is to be gathered from the words used in the statute or document.
' .... The second rule is that the intention of the Legislature in enacting a statute ought to be derived from a consideration of the whole enactment in order to arrive at a consistent plan. It is wrong to start with some a priori idea of that intention and to try by construction to wedge it into the words of the statute.
' ... The third rule is that statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made.
' ... The fourth rule is that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply."
8. The above authorities support our view which we have expressed in para. 7 of this judgment.
9. Judging the provisions of Ordinance, 1968, from this angle, it becomes clear that Azad Kashmir Government felt it appropriate, to establish a Corporation in order to implement its complex scheme relating to Logging and Sawmills. For this purpose initially an Ordinance was promulgated which later on was approved by the AJK Legislative Assembly. In the definition clause of the same the "Government" is defined as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and word "prescribe" is defined as prescribed by rules and regulations. In section 7 which we have reproduced in the earlier part of this judgment, the Board has been authorized to make rules for the appointments in the Corporation of such officers, advisors, experts, consultants or other employees as it may consider necessary for the implementation of the scheme and contracts in prescribed manner.
The reading of the whole statute makes it clear that the Board has to function according to the approved guidelines of the Government. Under section 17 it has been made clear that rules and regulations are to be framed by the Corporation which. Shall be enforced with the approval of the Government. Thus, section 7 empowers the Corporation to make rules and regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Ordinance with the approval of the Government.
' In Muhammad Rashid Choudhry v. Chairman, AKLASC and others 1993 PLC (C.S.) 1201 it was observed by this Court as follows:-- ' "... Under section 7 of the Mad Kashmir Logging and Sawmills Corporation Ordinance, 1968 the Board of the Corporation has been authorized to appoint for the Corporation Officers, employees etc. And the Board has been given powers to prescribed the procedure for appointment as well as the terms and conditions of service of the officers and servants of the Corporation. The word 'prescribed' has been defined in the Azad Kashmir Logging and Sawmills Corporation Ordinance to mean 'prescribed by the rules or regulations'. Section 17 authorises the Corporation, with the approval of the Government to make rules and regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Ordinance. Consequently the Mad Kashmir Logging and Sawmills Corporation Employees Service Rules have been framed..."
10. The view of this Court expressed in Muhammad Rashid Choudhry's case find support even from the original rules termed as the Mad Kashmir Logging and Sawmills Corporation Employees Service Rules, 1977, which were framed to meet the requirement of AKLASC Ordinance, 1968. The original rules were enforced with the approval of the Government as is apparent from the words used in the beginning of these rules which are reproduced below:-- "Azad Kashmir Logging and Sawmills Corporation Employee's Service Rules, 1977 ' In exercise of the powers conferred by section 17 of the Azad Kashmir Logging and Sawmills Corporation Ordinance, the Corporation is pleased to make and notify with approval of the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the following rules governing the terms and conditions of services of its employees."
' The amendment in these rules, therefore, should have been made with the approval of the Government whereas this was not done in the present case. The impugned amended rules were enforced without the prior approval of the Government when it was directed by the Board that seniority list under these amended rules shall be prepared. Sessions 7 and 17 must be read together in order to avoid the apparent repugnancy between them. It is also settled principle of law that if there are apparently two conflicting provisions in the same enactment the one which appears in the statute at the later stage would override the former one and the same shall be considered operative. We in the light of above discussion approve the view which was earlier expressed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed Choudhry's case about AKLASC Employees Service Rules, 1977. If the amendment carried in the rules in the wisdom of the Board is necessary then it must obtain the approval of the Government as required by section 17 of the AKLASC Ordinance, 1968. As impugned amendment in these rules has been enforced without prior approval of the Government, therefore, we hold that these rules have got no legal sanction behind them. Therefore, if any seniority list has been prepared under these amended rules that shall also be without legal authority behind it.
11. The next question is about the publication of the rules in official Gazette. The original rules, as said earlier were made with the prior approval of the Government and stood published in the official Gazette. Therefore, any change in these rules should also be effected in the same manner.
Even otherwise any law including rules having the force of law which are related to the rights and obligations of the citizens must be made known to them.
' In Muhammad Tariq Khan v. The State and another PLD 1998 SC (AJ&K) 17 the following principle has been laid down by this Court:-- ' "... The purpose clearly is that before a law is applied to the citizens it must be made known to them that a law has been made which creates rights and obligations. This may be done by beating of drum or by wide publicity which covers all population or any other method of wide publicity." (Underlining is ours)
12. As these rules are related to the rights and obligations of the employees of the Corporation which is established by the Government and is supervised by it and its rules are framed with the approval of the Government, therefore, it is held that any amendment in the rules like original rules shall be published in official. Gazette.
' This appeal is accepted in the terms indicated above. Consequently the judgment of the High Court, dated 28-4-2000 in the present case is set aside with no order as to costs.