KHAWAJA MUHAMMAD SAEED, C.J.---Supra titled appeals arise out of a common judgment of the High Court, dated 30-7-2003. As identical question of fact and law are involved in both the appeals, these therefore shall, be disposed of through this single judgment.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present appeals, are that for the sale of logs, wood furniture and other joinery items, the Government established appellant-Corporation as a corporate body under Ordinance IV of "1968 with its principal office at Muzaffarabad and other sale depot office at Mirpur. In the light of audit report, the Additional Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax issued a show-cause notice to the appellant /Corporation in Appeal No.159 of 2003 on 20-4- 2000 and second show-cause notice was issued to appellant-Corporation in Appeal No.160 of 2003 on 1-7-2000 calling upon it to deposit the sales tax entered in these notices. The appellant- Corporation raised various objections, therefore it was provided right of hearing by respondent No.2. Objections were turned down and vide two separate orders passed on 6-10-2000 and 23-1- 2001, the appellant-Corporation was held liable to pay sales tax and as the same was not deposited within the period prescribed under law, as such it was directed to deposit additional tax along with penalty. The appellant-Corporation challenged the legality of this order before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter to be referred as the Tribunal). However, its appeals were dismissed through common order cjated 7-6-2001. Two separate appeals were filed in the High Court by the appellant/Corporation on 17-7-2001. Both the appeals were dismissed through consolidated judgment which is under challenge before this Court. Hence these appeals.
3. Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation in both the appeals, argued that the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was adopted through Ordinance No.III of 1992, but it was enforced in Azad Kashmir from 7-3-1992 because the requisite notification was not published in the official Gazette prior to this date, therefore, all the functions performed by the officials under the Sales Tax Act were illegal. Moreover the Authorities under section 30 of the Act were not appointed in accordance with the standard laid down under the said section. According to him in this case as the sales tax was not fixed through any adjudication order therefore non-payment of the same could not invoke the provision of penalty and additional tax as postulated under sections 33 and 34 of the Act. Alternatively the learned counsel argued that all the items which are sold by the appellant-Corporation are agricultural products which stood exempted from the payment of sales tax. According to the learned counsel, the appointments of officials under the Sales Tax Act were not notified in the official Gazette therefore, all the actions 'taken and functions performed by them under the provisions contained, in Sales Tax Act are without lawful authority and therefore of no legal effect. According to the learned counsel even though under section 1(3) of the Sales Tax Act, the said Act was enforced at once but the Government of Azad Kashmir vide. Notification No FD/2533-2533/92, dated 7-3-1992 made it applicable from 1st day of March, 1992. The relevant notification, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant reads as follows:-- "In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (3) of section 1 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, as adopted in Azad Jammmu and Kashmir, the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is pleased to appoint the first day of March, 1992, to be the date on which the said Act shall come into force."
Later on the Sales Tax Act was adopted by the AJ&K Assembly which received the assent of the President on 13th March, 1993. The learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation submitted that the official respondents who assumed their functions under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act were not justified to exercise the Authority under this Act prior to the date of publication of relevant notification in the official Gazette as was requirement of law. Reliance was placed on the following case-law.
PLD 1971 AJ&K 118) it was observed that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Council Order No.111 of 1957 has not been published in the Gazette. As it was mandatory that the Government order under section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act empowering officers to grant sanction for prosecution under this Act of the staff removable by them, to be published in the official Gazette and as the same has not been so published, this order, in the light of the wording of rule 10 of the Rules of Business of 1952, has not come into force so far. The result is that there is no sanction or valid sanction. Sanction in such cases invests the Court with jurisdiction; that without such a sanction the Court has no jurisdiction to try the accused and the proceedings are invalid which require no authorities as the matter is itself very clear.
2004 CLC 937 it was observed that any law/rules having the force of law relating to rights and obligations of the citizens must be made known to them. As the rules relating to rights and obligations of employees of the Corporation were framed with the approval of the Government, any amendment in the rules like original rules shall be published in the official Gazette.
1984 CLC 2687 (Karachi) it was observed as under:-- ....................... The demand of Rs.2,60,000 at the rate of Re. 1 per k.g. being the difference in the price prevailing prior to 26th June, 1981 and the price fixed through Notification, dated 26th June, 1981 depends upon the validity of the Notification, dated 26th June, 1981. In respect of this Notification, dated 26th June, 1981 the learned Additional Advocate-General was asked whether such notification had been published in the official Gazette, as section 3(1) of the Sindh Food Stuffs (control) Act, 1958, requires such order to be notified in the Gazette in view of the meaning of the word "notified" order given in section 2(c) of the Act, 1958. The learned Additional Advocate-General has very frankly admitted that this Notification was not published in the official Gazette. In view of this statement, the demand of the Rs.2,60,000 on the basis of the unnotified order, dated 26th June, 1981 is without lawful authority. We have already taken this view in the connected Constitutional Petition No.D-657 of 1981 decided by us today."
4. While elaborating his second objection the learned counsel for the appellants argued that initially the Sales Tax Act of 1951 was applicable in the State which was repealed and the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was enforced through adaptation in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. However, the notification for the enforcement of said Act was not published in the official Gazette well in time nor the appointment of officers in terms of section 30 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 were notified prior to 4-1- 1999. On this date for the first time officers were notified in the official Gazette. The learned counsel placed reliance on Annexure 'PO' appearing at page 72 of the paper book in Appeal No.159 of 2003.
According to the learned counsel the appointments have been given retrospective effect from the date of adoption of Sales Tax Act, 1990 which is bad in law. In fact this has been done with mala fide intention to cover the show-cause notices issued to appellant-Corporation on 20-4-2000 for the period commencing from July, 1998 to February, 2000. According to the learned counsel, as no Collector of Sales Tax Department was appointed and notified, therefore, this said notice was given by a person having no legal authority. Reliance was placed by him upon the following authorities.
1997 SCMR 503) it was observed as under:-- "As regards the above second controversy, namely, whether the water rates specified in Resolution No.2 (which was passed on 27-3-1982), are to be recovered retrospectively or prospectively from the date of the Resolution, it may be stated that it is well-settled proposition of law that Notification or an administrative order cannot operate retrospectively to the disadvantage of the person affected by it and, therefore, the conclusion of the High Court seems to be in consonance with the above settled proposition of law."
1985 SCMR 699) it was observed as follows:-- "There is nothing on the record to suggest, not has it been contended before us that after the enforcement of the rules on 14-5-1974 making the category of Stenographers, Assistants and Superintendents any Department Promotion . Committee constituted or continued under these rules reconsidered the case of the two appellants and approved of their promotion from a date after 14-5-1974 so as to take back their appointment to a date earlier to 20-5-1975 which is the date of the actual promotion of respondent No.1 . What we find on record is the notification, dated 30-1-1976 confirming them from 7-7-1973 and 11-7-1973. This would amount to passing a retrospective order, without complying with the requirements of the rule which itself is not retrospective and gives no such power."
2000 SCMR 112 it was observed that no executive action can operate retrospectively so as to impair vested rights or impose new obligations. Such principle, however, could not apply in case of legislative provision.
1985 CLC 974 (Karachi)) it was held as under:-- "As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that the aforesaid correction slip had been withdrawn on 19-1-1962, retrospectively, as if the correction slip did never exist and so the petitioner, is precluded from claiming any relief on the basis of the said correction slip, it has no force in law. The Notification, dated. 19-1-1962 can have only prospective effect and not retrospective 'effect even if its operation has been specifically declared to be retrospective in effect. It is a well-settled principle that Executive's power through notification falls within the field of subordinate legislation which does not include power to give notification retrospective effect."
"It is a settled position in law that a notification cannot have any retrospective effect and operates prospectively unless there is a clear provision to that effect in the legislation itself. The other settled proposition in law in that rights which accrue to or vested in a person on account of his having taken some action on the basis of a contract or a policy cannot be taken away by issuing a notification."
1997 PLC (CS) 826) it was held that no rule or notification issued under a statute could be enforced with retroactive operation unless statute expressly so provides.
PLD 1983 Kar. 186) it has been observed as follows:-- ................ The notification does not contemplate reduction in respect of the allotment made before the date of notification. The notification itself provides the rate for future allotments and it is also well-settled that a notification unless otherwise provided by law cannot have a retrospective operation. Therefore the demand of defendant No.1 for recovery at the rate of Rs.10 per square yard was perfectly legal and valid."
5. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the respondents were appointed as Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax and Assistant Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax vide Notification, dated 4-1-1999 but their appointments were wrongly given retrospective effect from the date of adoptation of Sales Tax Act, 1990 to cover up the previous functions performed by them.
According to him no statute can be given retrospective effect to deprive the subjects of their vested rights. Reliance was placed upon the following authorities.
1987 SCMR 1709) it was observed that retrospective effect is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of statute.
2001 MLD 1778) it has been held as under:- "As far application of Act-II of 1975 in PATA with retrospective effect i.e. From 1st July, 1975, is concerned, suffice would be to say that it is well-settled law that Notifications and Regulations cannot be given retrospective effect specially the law, relating to the levy of taxes and cesses.
According to Bennion's Statutory Interpretation 1984 Edn. Pp.151-152 Regulations cannot be applied retrospectively and according to Corpus Juris Secendum Vol. LIX pp.1131, 1135, as a general rule revenue laws such as laws imposing taxes and licences, are neither remedial laws, nor laws founded upon any permanent public policy, but, on the contrary, operate to impose burden upon the public, or to restrict them in the enjoyment of their property and the pursuit of their occupation, and, when they are ambiguous or doubtful will be construed strictly in favour of the taxpayer and against the taxing power. The general rule is that statutes are to be construed prospectively unless it is otherwise specifically given in the statute itself, but that construction would apply to remedial statutes only. Whenever substantive or revenue laws are made they take effect from the date they are enacted and would effect future transaction and not the past ones. In Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. And others v. Federation of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1652), Supreme Court of Pakistan has held that "a notification which purports to impair on existing or vested rights or imposes a new liability or obligation, cannot operate retrospectively in the absence of legal sanction". Learned counsel appearing for the respondents could not controvert the aforesaid legal proposition.
PLD 1969 SC 187) it has been observed as follows:-- "The general principle with regard to the interpretation of statutes as laid down in the well-known case of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited v. Irving (1905 AC 369) is that "if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only", the provisions would be retrospective. "On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act", then "in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day", the legislation would not operate retrospectively, unless the Legislature had either "by express enactment or by necessary intendment" given the legislation retroactive effect.
To the same effect are the observations of Jessei, Master of the Rolls, in the case of In re: Joseph Suche and Co. Limited (1875 .1 Ch. D. 48) where it was observed that as "a general rule when the Legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or onferring any right of action, its enactment, unless in expressterms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. It is said that there is one exception to that rule, namely, that, these enactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action, they have been held to apply to existing rights."
6. The learned counsel in the light of aforesaid submissions argued that the whole exercise by the official respondents is without any lawful authority which point was not properly considered by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court. He therefore craved that by allowing these appeals the order passed by the High Court may be set aside and show-cause notice issued to the appellant- Corporation may also be held illegal and inoperative against its rights.
7. Conversely Ch Muhammad Afzal, the learned counsel for the respondents, argued that only such questions can be raised in appeal before the High Court which are questions of law and arise out of order of the Tribunal as postulated by section 47 of the Sales Tax Act. According to him it is the requirement of section 46 of the Sales Tax Act that all the legal questions should first be raised before the Tribunal for its consideration. If any question is not raised or pressed during the arguments before the Tribunal, the same cannot be raised in appeal before the High Court. He placed reliance upon an authority of Supreme Court of Pakistan in a case titled Ahmed Karachi Halva Merchants v. The Commissioner of Income Tax (1982 SCMR 489). The learned counsel argued that only such a question which was dealt with by the Tribunal or was specifically raised in appeal, even though not decided by the Tribunal, shall be taken and treated as one arising out of the order of the Tribunal. In the same way if a point was not taken in appeal but the same has been decided by the Tribunal, it would be a question arising out of its order. The questions which have been raised before this Court and the High Court in appeal were neither raised before the Tribunal nor were considered by it therefore such questions cannot be held arising out of its order. The learned counsel took us through the order passed by the Tribunal on 7-6-2001, whereby the Tribunal has mentioned the ground raised before it by the appellants which reads as follows:-- "The main ground of appeal is that the items on which the sales tax is imposed are exempted from .The sales tax in accordance with S.R.O. 492(1)/93, dated 14-5-1993."
8. According to the learned counsel the first point relating to enforcement of Sales Tax Act in Azad Jammu and Kashmir was not raised in the memo. Of appeal before the Tribunal nor was pressed during the course of arguments, as such the same was not adjudicated upon by the Tribunal in its order, dated 7-6-2001. The High Court under section 47(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 having limited jurisdiction could not decide the said point as it had not arisen out of the order of the Tribunal.
According to the learned counsel, the objection raised by the appellants about the enforcement of the Sales Tax Act in Azad Jammu and Kashmir is not correct. This point was previously thrashed out by this Court in a case titled Messrs Rasab Brothers y. Deputy Commissioner Excise and Taxation (1993 SCR 346). According to the learned counsel the Sales Tax Act, 1990 was adopted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir vide Ordinance No.III of 1992 and it was made applicable in AJ&K at once. While explaining his view point it was further submitted that under a mistaken belief the learned counsel for the appellants has gathered a wrong impression from section 3 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as enforced in Pakistan, where the date of enforcement of the Act was left at the discretion of the Federal Government. The Federal Government then issued a notification to that effect whereas in Azad Jammu and Kashmir while adopting the Act, the legislature enforced it with immediate effect and finally after issuing Ordinances one after the other it was enforced through an Act of the Assembly which received the assent of the President on 13th March, 1993, Under section 1(3) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, as enacted through adoptation, the Act was enforced at once in this liberated part of the State.
9. While meeting the second objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the C.B.R. Had appointed Sales Tax Authorities as was required under section 30 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. In fact the Sales Tax Act was enforced vide Government Notification, dated 7-3-1992 whereas the Sales Tax Act was legally adopted on 29-3- 1992 by the AJ&K Government. Under section 30 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 it is the prerogative of the C.B.R. To appoint Sales Tax Authorities. The learned counsel once again reiterated his objection that this question was neither raised before the Adjudicating Authority challenging its jurisdictional competence nor was taken in the memo of appeal before the Tribunal and the same was not even pressed during the course of arguments as such it does not find mention in the order of the Tribunal, dated 7-6-2001. Therefore this point does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal, as such the High Court had no jurisdictional competence under section 47(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to resolve the same. According to the learned counsel, this point was raised before the High Court but the same was rejected. According to him, this point has no bearing on the facts of the present case because show-cause notices were issued to the appellant-Corporation on 20-4-2000 and 7-11- 2000 which show that the adjudicating proceedings were taken in the year, 2000 at Mirpur branch and the orders which were challenged by the appellant-Corporation before the Tribunal were passed on 7-10-2000 and 23-10-2000 respectively in the aforementioned two cases. All these proceedings were taken by the respondents after issuance of Notification No.1 of 1999, dated 1-1- 1999 which was issued to meet the requirement of .Section 30 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Prior to that under Circular No.1 of 1991, dated 29-5-1991 issued under section 5(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1991, the C.B.R. Vested with the same powers had appointed the authorities for this purpose. This Notification held the field till 1-1-1999 when it was superseded by a fresh notification.
10. While rebutting the third argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that if the tax is not paid in accordance with law, then the Authority vested with the jurisdiction can impose penalty under section 33(2) CC and demand additional tax under section 34 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. He also contended that the exemption was claimed by the appellant-Corporation in terms of S.R.O. 492(1)/93, dated 4-5-1993 which was rightly declined to it.
11. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have minutely gone through the record of the case along with the reports of the cited authorities. The Audit team of Sales Tax Department observed that the appellant-Corporation conducted sale of Timber through auction from its depots located at Chehla-Bandi and Dhanni Syedan, District Muzaffarabad but did not deposit the sales tax as was required under various provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. Upon this report, respondent No.2 issued a notice to the appellant-Corporation to explain as to why in contravention of such provisions of law besides the sales tax, penalty under section 33 and additional tax under section 34 may not be imposed and recovered from it. The explanation of appellant-Corporation was not accepted by respondent No.1, therefore, in addition to the sales tax, the appellant-Corporation was asked to deposit additional tax along with penalty which was imposed upon it. This order was assailed in appeal before the Tribunal. Only one point was raised before the Tribunal that the item on which the sales tax has been imposed stood exempted from payment of sales tax under S.R.O. No.492(I)/93, dated 14-5-1993. This point was resolved by the Tribunal vide its order, dated 7-6-2001 in the following terms:-- "We have carefully perused the record in the light of the arguments of the parties. S.R.O. 492(I)/93, dated 14-5-1993 has been rescinded vide S.R.O. No.555(I)/94, dated 9-6-1994 and this S.R.O. Has also been rescinded by S.R.O. 473(1)/96, dated 13-6-1996. So the exemption claimed by the appellant has rightly been not allowed by the Department. Sixth Schedule issued under section 13 of Sales Tax Act does not contain the appellant's goods, so exemption from sales tax claimed cannot be given. The appeal has no merit, so it is dismissed."
12. Except the aforementioned point, the appellant-Corporation never disputed the date of enforcement of Sales Tax Act, 1990 either in appeal before the Tribunal or ever pressed such question during the course of arguments before it. Therefore the first two points raised by the learned counsel for the appellants did not arise from the order of the Tribunal, as such appeal before the High Court on these points was not justified in law. Without much discussion this observation finds support from section 47(1) of the Sales Tax Act which reads as follows:-- "Appeal to the High Court.---(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court in respect of any question of law arising out of an order under section 46."
Under this provision of law, the scope of appeal before the High Court is limited and dependent upon such questions which arise out of the order of the Tribunal. This Court has time and again repeatedly laid down that when an act is prescribed to be done in a particular way, it must be performed accordingly or 'not at all. Reference to this effect may be made to the following authorities.
PLD 1980 Lah. 337) it was observed that where law provides for doing of a particular thing in a particular way, all other modes are prohibited.
PLD 1978 SC (AJK) 37) it was observed that this is an elementary principle that if an Act or Rule prescribes a particular method of performance of an act, the act should be performed according to that method alone or not at all.
13. In the High Court certain points were raised which had not arisen out of the order of the Tribunal as those were not taken in appeal nor were even raised during the course of arguments or decided by the B Tribunal. The High Court therefore was not obliged to decide such questions as the right of appeal under section 47(1) of the Sales Tax Act was not available against such questions. The objection about the validity of proceedings conducted by the tax authorities was rightly turned down by the. High Court in the light of Notification No.Tax/C.B.R./05-20/99, dated 1-1-1999. Before the promulgation of aforesaid Notification, dated 1-d-1999, Circular No.1 of 1991, dated 29-5-1991 issued under previously enforced Sales Tax Act, 1951, was holding the field which till the enforcement of Notification, dated 1-1-1999 would be deemed to have been enforced in Azad Kashmir on the force of section 24 of the General Clauses Act read with section 51 of the AJ&K Interim Constitution Act, 1974. Even otherwise all the actions taken and adjudication made from 15- 3-1993 to 12-12-2001 have been validated. Therefore, the objection taken by the learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation challenging the action of official respondents to initiate proceedings under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 is without any legal justification. We therefore, endorse the findings recorded by the High Court in this regard.
14. The appellant-Corporation has claimed exemption from the payment of sales tax under section 13 read with Item No.2 of Sixth Schedule of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 on the ground that the sale of logs, wood furniture and other joinery items is from Agriculture produce. This question was raised by the appellant before the Tribunal, however, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, it was not pressed in arguments as is apparent from the written arguments available on record. In the appeal before the Tribunal under section 46 of the Sales Tax Act only the following two grounds were taken:- "(2) That the Collector, through the written arguments, had been apprised of the facts that the terms on which he has imposed tax and required the payment are exempt from tax vide S.R.O.
492(1)/93, dated 14-5-1993 but the Collector has not assigned any reasons thereto for non- believing the stand taken by the appellant herein. A copy of the above cited SRO is attached and marked as Annexure Hence the impugned order is liable to be recalled and the items identified as exempt in the SRO are solicited to be declared exempt.
(3) xxx xxx xx xx xxx xx xx
(4) That the learned Collector (respondent) hopelessly failed to appreciate that logs in round and rough form do not fall in the category of items which are taxable. That the logs in rough and round form fall in the definition of agriculture produce and are not taxable. The Collector has traversed beyond his jurisdiction and thereby has acted without lawful authority which is of no legal consequence. The impugned decision is not tenable and is to be set aside."
15. We have mentioned in extenso the finding of the Tribunal in para. 7 of this judgment that during the course of arguments only one ground was taken that the items on which sales tax is imposed stood exempted from the payment of sales tax in accordance with S.R.O. 492(1)/93, dated 14-5- 1993. The other ground was not pressed during the course of arguments therefore it shall be presumed that the same was abandoned by the appellant. A point abandoned by a party cannot be agitated before this Court. Exemption of sales tax before us is also claimed in accordance with S.R.O. 492(1)/93, dated 14-5-1993. This point was taken before the High Court in the grounds of appeal but while submitting oral and written arguments before it, the same was abandoned. In this regard the impugned order of the High Court reads as follows:-- "(2) The learned Advocate appearing for the appellant raised three objections in written arguments filed in the Court against the legality of the impugned orders which are common in both the appeals, though several grounds had been taken in appeal but have not been argued at bar nor have been mentioned in the written arguments, hence shall be deemed to have been abandoned.
It is contended that;
(1) The Sales Tax Act 1990 (Act IV of 1993) is adopted in AJ&K on 7-3-1992, but is enforced from 7-3- 1993 prior to its adoptation and the notification is not published in official Gazette, hence the functionaries under the Act are performing the functions without lawful authority;
(2) that the authorities visualized by section 30 of the Act are not appointed in accordance with this section;
(3) that the imposition of additional tax and penalty is without lawful as it can be imposed only when the sales tax is not paid within time after adjudication order."
(underlining is ours)
16. There is no affidavit of the counsel who appeared on behalf of the appellant-Corporation before the High Court to the effect that he had pressed the point in oral or written arguments that the items on which sales tax has been imposed stood exempted from the payment of the same, but it has not been decided. We are sorry that we cannot disbelieve the two learned Judges of the High Court who have made the above-quoted observation that except above referred three points no. Other point was raised on behalf of the appellant-Corporation.
17. The learned counsel for the respondents in order to defend the order of the Collector Sales Tax during the course of arguments has referred section 2(16), clauses (a) (b) and (c) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. According to him this exemption/protection can be claimed only by the Forest Department who is grower of the forests. The appellant-Corporation being lessee cannot claim this exemption as it is selling forest goods in the shape of logs, furniture and other joinery times.
However, as this question stood abandoned by the appellant-Corporation, the same need not be resolved by us in the light of dictum of apex Court of Pakistan in the case reported as Ahmad Karachi Halva Merchants v. The Commissioner of Income Tax (1982 SCMR 489) wherein it has been observed as follows:-- ".... Even on the general principle, where a ground is taken but not pressed, it should be regarded as having been abandoned for all intents and purposes. Accordingly, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no merit. Appeal fails which is dismissed."
18. The dispute in the present appeal is in respect of sale of forest goods by the appellant- Corporation through its Mirpur Branch. This question was not specifically taken with regard to Mirpur Branch in the memo. Of appeal before the Tribunal or during arguments before the High Court. The Courts are not meant to pass orders in vacuum for academic purpose. An aggrieved, person must specifically raise all the questions of facts and law for adjudication firstly before the Taxing Authority, then before the Tribunal and in case his grievance is not redressed, he should plead the same in the memo. Of appeal before the High Court and press during the course of arguments. Any question not specifically pleaded or argued shall be deemed to have been abandoned by the aggrieved person by his conduct.
19. In view of above, these appeals having no force stand disallowed. As the appeals have been decided purely on technical ground against the appellant-Corporation, therefore, it is not felt proper to burden the appellant/Corporation with cost.