' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.---This appeal with the leave of this Court is directed against Lahore High.
Court judgment dated 10-4-1996 against concurrent findings of two Courts below setting aside the same and remanding the suit for decision afresh on the issues already settled. Leave to appeal was granted to consider whether in the circumstances of the case, High Court was justified in condoning the delay of 26 days in filing revision petition by the respondent-Government of Punjab and whether the exercise of discretion would amount to giving preferential treatment to the respondents?
2. Appellants predecessor-in-interest filed a suit for declaration with regard to his ownership being in possession of the suit land measuring 622 Kanals, 8 Marlas and challenging the mutation regarding change of ownership in favour of Forest Department, Punjab as illegal, null and void and of no legal effect upon his rights. He also prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with his possession over the suit land. The suit proceeded on the 'premises that the land was allotted to appellants' predecessor-in-interest in lieu of his verified claim vide RL-II No,25, dated 2-3-1972 and since then he had been in possession thereof as owner.
It was averred that it came to his knowledge that Mutation No,2278 with regard to the change of the ownership of the suit land was sanctioned by Revenue Authorities in favour of Forest Department on 4-9-1979 without any notice or payment of compensation to him, therefore, it was void and inoperative as against his rights.
3. The suit was resisted and various pleas of fact and law were raised leading to the settlement of following issues:--
(1) Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form?
(2) Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi?
(3) Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit?
(4) Whether the property in dispute was confirmed in the name of the plaintiff on 2-3-1972 and he has become the owner thereof?
(4-A) Whether the Mutation No,2278 dated 4-9-1979 is illegal void and against the interest of the plaintiff?
(5) Whether the allotment in favour of the plaintiff is illegal, void and without jurisdiction?
(6) Whether the Provincial Government has transferred the property in dispute to the Forest Department on 9-8-1966 and so it was not available for allotment?
(7) Whether the defendants are the bona fide purchasers for value without notice and are protected under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act?
(8) Relief."
4. Both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their causes.
Learned Senior Civil Judge decreed the suit vide judgment dated 1-10-1985. On appeal, learned Additional District Judge, Gujrat confirmed the findings of the trial Court vide judgment dated 27-2- 1995. Judgments of both the Courts below were assailed in Civil Revision No,1535 of 1995 before the Lahore High Court. The revision petition was found to be barred by 26 days but a learned Judge in Chambers, after condoning the delay, allowed the same and remanded the case to the trial Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law.
5. Sole ground agitated before us, on which leave to appeal was granted, revolves around the exercise of discretion by the High Court in the matter of condonation of delay. It was contended that Government Departments are not entitled to any differential treatment for condonation of delay and they are to be treated at par with an ordinary litigant. We are in no manner of doubt in reiterating and reaffirming the well-settled principle that public functionaries are not entitled to any preferential treatment in the matter of condonation of delay and they are to be treated on equal footing with an ordinary litigant. There is also no cavil with the proposition that with the passage of time a valuable right accrues in favour of the opposite-party, which should not be slightly disturbed and destroyed.
6. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, however, it appears that High Court was not only influenced by the potential and tremendous market value of the land but also prior possession and grant of land to the respondent-Forest Department for afforestation as early as 1965.
Apparently, Forest Department had developed the land by afforestating it with huge investments.
On the one hand, appellants claimed right, title and interest to the land by virtue of allotment in satisfaction of a verified claim, Forest Department strongly urged their prior title and right over the property in suit. In fact important overwhelming documentary evidence exhibited on behalf of the respondents in support of their case (subject to objection), was not decided till final judgment and thus not considered, prompted the High Court in remanding the case to the trial Court for recording further evidence and decision afresh in accordance with law. It is a matter of common knowledge that, in our social, economic and cultural set-up, Government Departments and public functionaries generally pay little heed to the public interest, which has mostly been treated as subservient to the private interest. It has been oft-noted that Government cases generally fail on account of neglect in appearance, mishandling or improper conduct for various reasons, which need not be highlighted in the case in hand. Paramount consideration behind the exercise of discretion in remanding the case to the trial Court, after condoning delay, seems to be the public interest rather than any other consideration.
7. Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is always discretionary and equitable in nature and no party is entitled to it as of right. Likewise, discretion to condone the delay is wide enough in a Court depending on variety of factors, particularly, sufficient cause shown by a party to the satisfaction of the Court. No hard and fast rule can be laid down to tie down the hands of a superior Court.
Superior Courts always act in aid of justice other than to it, subject however, to the law and the Constitution. Technicalities of law are always avoided and discouraged in order to do complete justice and to ensure that justice is not only done but also seen to have been done. Rules of procedure are enacted for fostering the ends of justice and preserving the rights rather than to stifle the dispensation of justice and, unless they are unsurmountable, ends of justice always outweigh the manner of practice and procedure. There can be no cavil with the proposition that the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, is empowered to deal with the question of limitation before it. It cannot, thus, be said that while condoning the delay in entertaining the revision petition, High Court acted without jurisdiction. Once it is conceded that High Court had the jurisdiction to exercise its discretion for condonation of delay, this Court would not interfere with the exercise of discretion unless it is made to appear on the face of the record that the discretion was exercised illegally or arbitrarily. Legal formalities and technicalities are intended to safeguard the paramount interest of justice and devised with a view to impart certainty, consistency and uniformity to administration of justice and to secure the same against arbitrariness, errors of individual judgment and mala fides. Generally speaking the object of a superior Court, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, is to foster the ends of justice, preserve the rights of parties and to right a wrong and, keeping this object in view, it may in equity, set aside or annul a void judgment or decline to enforce it by refusing to intervene in the circumstances of the case.
8. Analysing the precedent case-law, it may be observed that the view taken by this Court in the case of Irtiqa Rasool Hashmi v. Water and Power Development Authority (1980 SCM R 722) reads as under:- "4. The question whether limitation should not be condoned lies within the discretion of the authority before whom a matter is agitated and this discretion cannot be interfered with unless it has been exercised illegally or arbitrarily. This is not the case here. The result is that this petition must, therefore, fail which is dismissed hereby."
' Aforesaid dictum was approved and reaffirmed by this Court in Naseem Ahmad Chaudhry v.
Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (1995 SCM R 1655). Identical question arose in Water and Power Development Authority v. Zahoor .Ahmad (1994 SCM R 960), in which it was observed that 'admittedly the Service Tribunal had the jurisdiction to condone the delay, which it did'. The contention raised that the Tribunal failed to decide the question of limitation in accordance with law was repelled by this Court with the observation that generally this Court does not examine the question of condonation of delay.
9. On a careful consideration of the pros and cons of the controversy between the parties and in- depth consideration of the submissions advanced at the Bar, we are firmly of the view that exercise of discretion in the case in hand does not suffer from any inherent defect of law, arbitrariness, lack of jurisdiction or acting on surmises and conjectures. Suffice it to point out that the High Court was fully satisfied with the sufficiency of cause shown by the respondents for condonation of delay for vital and sound reasons. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court, which is neither illegal nor unreasonable or against the settled norms of jurisprudence.
10. For these reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.