' JAVED IQBAL, J.--This petition for leave to appeal is directed against order dated 26-5-2005 whereby the revision petition preferred on behalf of Lahore Development Authority has been dismissed by the learned single Judge of Lahore High Court, Lahore in chambers, being barred by time.
2. Mr. Iftikhar Ahmad Mian, learned Advocate Supreme Court entered appearance on behalf of petitioner and contended that the provisions as enumerated in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 have been misinterpreted and misconstrued resulting in serious miscarriage of justice. In order to substantiate the sand point it is argued that the revision petition has been dismissed on technical ground of limitation while it should have been decided on merits which were not considered at all.
It is next argued that the order impugned is not in consonance with law laid down by this Court in case titled Muhammad Bashir v. Province of Punjab (2003 SCMR 83).
3. We have carefully examined the contentions as agitated on behalf of the petitioner in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. The learned single Judge in chambers has dismissed the revision petition by means of order dated 26-2-2005 which is reproduced herein below for ready reference:-- "At the very outset, learned counsel for the respondent No,1 has pointed out that this revision petition is badly time barred. The petitioner LDA has filed an application seeking condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908. In view of the period of limitation specified in section 115, C.P.C. Itself the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act have no application. In this view of the matter, the application seeking condonation of delay is misconceived and is therefore, dismissed as a result the petition being time barred is also dismissed."
4. A bare perusal of the above reproduced order would reveal that the revision petition being barred by time has been dismissed with the observation that the provisions as enumerated in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 would have no application in such like cases. The learned Advocate Supreme Court was asked pointedly that as to how the provisions as enumerated in section 5 read with section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1908 would be applicable but no answer could be given except that the order impugned is not in consonance with the dictum as laid down in Muhammad Bashir's case (supra). The dictum as laid down in the above referred to case has been perused. There is no cavil to the proposition that "revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is always discretionary and equitable in nature and no party is entitled to it as of right. Likewise, discretion to condone the delay is wide enough in a Court depending on variety of factors, particularly, sufficient cause shown by a party to the satisfaction of the Court. No hard and fast rule can be laid down to tie down the hands of a superior Court. Superior Courts always act in aid of justice other than to its, subject however, to the law and the Constitution. Technicalities of law are always avoided and discouraged in order to do complete justice and to ensure that justice is not only done but also seen to have been done. Rules of procedure are enacted for fostering the ends of justice and preserving the rights rather than to stifle the dispensation of justice and unless they are unsurmountable, ends of justice always outweigh the manner of practice and procedure."
Muhammad Bashir v. Province of Punjab 2003 SCMR 83). It is, however, to be noted that the dictum as laid down in Muhammad Bashir's case (supra) would have no application as altogether a distinctive proposition has been dealt with. It may not be out of place to mention here that the "law of Limitation is a rule of procedure a branch of the adjective law. It governs the process of litigation and limits the time after which a suit or other promptitude in the prosecution of remedy and requires the litigant to take legal recourse with due diligence, as the laws assist those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. The Law of limitation further aims at to extinguish stale demands. According to Johan Voet, "the controversies should be limited to fixed period of time lest they should be immortal when man is mortal" For this reason the statute of Limitation has been termed as statute of repose peace and justice. The doctrine of limitation founded on public policy and expediency. To secure the quiet and repose of the community it is necessary that the title to property and matters of right in general should not be in a state of constant uncertainty, doubt and suspense. Moreover, the interest of the State requires that there should be an end of litigation. All the same the Statute of Limitation is not so rigid as to impose total embargo for availing of legal remedies where the litigant has a just cause not to pursue his legal recourse. The legislature has wisely laid down exceptions to cover such causes and wherever a just and sufficient cause has been shown, the Courts have generously condoned the delay" (Commentary on the Law of Limitation by M. Mahmood).
5. In our considered view that law of limitation cannot be considered merely a formality and required to be observed being mandatory in nature. The purpose of law of limitation to help the vigilant and not the indolent. A helping hand may not be extended to a litigant having going into deep slumber, on having become forgetful of his rights. Concerned person has, however, to be made aware of the invasion of his interests, and such awareness has to be ascertained as a matter of fact. (Secretary, Finance Division v. M. Iqbal Solangi 1993 A PLC (C.S.) 877, Rehmat Bibi v.
Ghazanfar Hussain PLD 1983 SC (AJ&K)25).
6. It is well settled by now that this Court does not interfere with the exercise of discretion qua the question of limitation by the High Court and the order impugned neither illegal nor unreasonable but well-based does not warrant interference. In this regard we are fortified by the dictum laid down in the following authorities:- ' Muhammad Bashir v. Province of Punjab (2003 SCMR 83), Irtiqa Rasool Hashmi v. Water and Power Development Authority (1980 SCMR 722), Naseem Ahmad Chaudhry vs. Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (1995 SCMR 1655), Water and Development Authority v. Zahoor Ahmad (1994 SCMR 960).
7. It is worthwhile to mention here that a stipulated period of limitation of 90 days has been mentioned in section 115, C.P.C. Which was added by Act VI of 1992 C.P. (Amendment) Act, 1992 which came into force on 24th May, 1992. The learned Advocate Supreme Court could not give any reasonable justification that as to why the limitation should be condoned and in absence of any lawful justification no such concession can be given. A similar proposition was discussed in case titled Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah (2001 SCMR 286) and it was held as follows:-- "There is no cavil with the argument that if the Statute governing the proceedings does not prescribe period of limitation, the proceedings instituted thereunder shall be controlled by Limitation Act as a whole. But where the law under which proceedings have been launched prescribes itself a period of limitation like under section 115, C.P.C. Then benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be availed unless it has been made applicable as per section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, as held in the cases (i) The Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co. Ltd. (AIR 1935 Bombay 35),(ii) Abdul Ghaffar and others v. Mst. Mumtaz (PLD 1982 SC 572), (iii) Ali Muhammad 4nd another v. Faza Hussain and others (1983 SCMR 1239), (iv) Collector of Customs (Appraisement) v. Messrs Saleem Adaya, Karachi PLD 1999 Karachi 76) and (v) Haji Muhammad Asharf v. The State and 3 others (1999 MLD 330)."
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that the petition being meritless is dismissed and leave refused.