SYED MUDASSER AMEER, J.- Through the instant writ petition, petitioner has sought the following prayer: - "It is submitted that by acceptance of writ petition, the judgment & decree impugned be declared void, unlawful & of no effect upon the rights of the petitioner."
2. The present writ petition arises out of a tenancy dispute between the petitioner and respondent No.1. The respondent/landlord, namely Tariq Nawaz Khan through Muhammad Sohail, being the lawful owner and landlord of the subject premises, initiated legal proceedings by filing an ejectment petition under Section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance of 1959") against the tenant/petitioner, who is in possession of the rented premises. The ejectment petition was filed on the ground of personal need for his own business; at the time of renting the shop, petitioner/tenant had orally assured the landlord that whenever the suit shop is required to him, he will vacate the same in one month. Upon service of notice, the tenant appeared before the learned Rent Controller and submitted a written reply, contesting the claims and assertions made by the landlord. In view of the pleadings of both parties, the learned Rent Controller was pleased to frame issues for the proper adjudication of the matter.
After recording of evidence of the parties and after hearing arguments the learned Rent Controller dismissed the petition of the landlord vide order dated 19.02.2020. Aggrieved by the said order/judgment, the landlord preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge- V/Model Civil Appellate Court, Haripur, under the relevant provisions of the law. The said appeal was accepted/allowed vide judgment and order dated 08.07.2020. Dissatisfied with the impugned judgment of appellate Court dated 08.07.2020, the petitioner/tenant has now challenged the same through this petition.
3. Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties were heard in considerable detail and the record perused with their able assistance.
4. The respondent/landlord instituted an eviction petition under Section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 against the petitioner/tenant, seeking his eviction from shop No.1 situated at Old Bus Stand, GT Road, Haripur on the ground of bonafide personal need for his own business.
5. Perusal of the record reveals that in an earlier round of litigation, the present petitioner, Muhammad Ziafat, had instituted Rent Petition No. 12/RC against the legal heirs of the original landlord, Akhtar Nawaz Khan. In the said petition, the petitioner sought permission to deposit the rent of the suit shop in the Court, asserting that all the legal heirs of the deceased landlord were individually demanding rent from him. In order to avoid any future dispute regarding the payment of rent, the petitioner deemed it appropriate to seek directions from the Court. The learned trial Court, after due proceedings, vide judgment and decree dated 11.04.2018, held respondent Tariq Nawaz Khan to be the lawful landlord of the suit shop and accordingly directed the petitioner/tenant to pay rent exclusively to him. The petitioner assailed the said judgment and decree before the appellate Court; however, his appeal was dismissed, thereby upholding the findings of the trial Court. Consequently, the status of respondent Tariq Nawaz Khan as the landlord of the suit premises attained finality and attained a decretal character. Despite this, the respondent, while replying to paragraphs No. 1 and 2 of the rent petition presently under adjudication, maliciously attempted to dispute the respondent's status. Furthermore, he vehemently denied the authority of Muhammad Sohail to act as his attorney. He asserted that in the earlier rent proceedings, one Mr. Jehanzeb had been pursuing the case on his behalf and that Muhammad Sohail's petition for impleadment in Rent Petition No. 12/RC, based on an alleged authority letter, had been dismissed by the Rent Controller, Haripur. It was further argued by the petitioner that no appeal or revision was filed against the said dismissal, which according to him, cast doubt on Muhammad Sohail's authority. The trial Court, in the impugned judgment and decree, concluded that it was not the respondent himself who required the suit shop for his bona fide personal use, but rather his attorney Muhammad Sohail, and thus, the requirement lacked legal sanctity. This finding was primarily based on an admission made by Muhammad Sohail, who appeared as PW-3, during the course of his cross-examination. However, this conclusion overlooks a crucial legal aspect: the respondent, Tariq Nawaz Khan, had formally delegated all his rights and powers as landlord to Muhammad Sohail through a duly executed authority letter as well as a special power of attorney. Under the law, a person who is duly authorized to collect rent and manage tenancy matters may validly act as landlord for the purposes of initiating and pursuing ejectment proceedings. Therefore, Muhammad Sohail, being vested with such authority, was legally competent to act as landlord and to seek possession of the suit shop for his bona fide personal need. It is also pertinent to note that although Muhammad Sohail's application for impleadment in Rent Petition No. 12/RC was dismissed by the Rent Controller, Haripur, such dismissal did not amount to a rejection of his legal authority. At the relevant time, respondent Tariq Nawaz Khan was already impleaded in the said rent petition, and as per procedural law, where a principal is already a party to the proceedings, his attorney need not be impleaded separately. This reasoning was also the basis for dismissal of the impleadment application, as reflected in the order dated 04.04.2018 passed by the learned Rent Controller, Haripur. Thus, the authority letter in favour of Muhammad Sohail continued to hold legal effect and was subsequently reaffirmed and supplemented by the execution of a special power of attorney in his favour by the landlord/respondent. Both the authority letter and the special power of attorney unambiguously reflect a comprehensive delegation of landlord's rights by respondent Tariq Nawaz Khan to Muhammad Sohail, thereby conferring upon him the status of landlord in respect of the suit shop.
Accordingly, Muhammad Sohail was fully competent to maintain the ejectment proceedings, either in his own name or on behalf of the respondent. Although the present rent petition and subsequent appeal were filed in the name of the respondent by Muhammad Sohail as his attorney, it does not alter the legal position that Muhammad Sohail, being duly authorized and empowered to receive rent and manage tenancy affairs, could also have filed and prosecuted the proceedings in his own name. In a similar situation, in the case of Syed Amjad Shah Versus Muhammad Afzal, etc (PLD 1987 Lahore 280) the honourable Lahore High Court held as follows:- "7. Since the crucial question in this litigation, which goes to the root of its maintainability is as to whether petitioner falls within the statutory definition of "landlord", I advert to section 2(c) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the text of which has been set out hereinunder :-- "2(c) `landlord' means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised and every person from time to time deriving the title under a landlord."
A perusal of the above reveals that the rubric to this clause is the expression "entitled". The intention of the framers of this piece of legislation is clearly beyond any ambiguity that a person to be a landlord within the meanings of the above clause is not restricted to a person who actually receives rent, but it also contemplates within its ambit, a person who is eligible to receive rent though he might have never in fact received rent in the past. To illustrate this point, one may say that, an attorney, an estate Manager, owner, co-owners etc. are the persons who simultaneously at a given point of time, are entitled to receive rent and thus are landlords.
8....Therefore, I am of the opinion that both Syed Amjad Ali as well as Syed Yaqub Ali, fall within the statutory expression of "landlords" a defined above and thus are entitled jointly as well as severally to institute ejectment proceedings;"
Section 2 (c) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Urban Restriction Ordinance, 1959 being the same, the said interpretation is fully applicable to the instant case. Further reliance in this regard is placed on the cases of Dr. Burjor N. Anklesaria Versus Mr. Zenobia and Another (1982 SCMR 98), M. Yakoob Versus Ch. Barkat Ali (1982 CLC 500), Saleh Muhammad Versus Mst. Halima and others (1984 CLC 916), Sardar Muhammad Versus Khawaja Muhammad Nazar (2004 CLC 289), Chaman Zada Versus Shah Zeb and 2 others (2014 CLC 151), Mst. Humera Sajid Versus Muqarrab Khan Puni and another (2008 CLC 650), Chaman Zada Versus Shah Zeb and two others (2014 CLC 151), Nawab Ali Versus Dr. Umar Ikram (2016 YLR 293), Muhammad Nayab Versus Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and 2 others (2016 MLD 1095) & Muhammad Islam Versus Additional District Judge and others (2024 YLR 776).
6. Record also reveals that the father of the respondent had admittedly received a sum of Rs.70,000/- from the petitioner as advance payment. However, the effect of such receipt was not recorded or reflected in any subsequent rent agreement or documentation, most likely because, under the terms of the original rent agreement, the said advance amount was to be adjusted against the monthly rent over time. It appears that this adjustment ought to have been completed long ago. Moreover, the petitioner has failed to bring on record any solid, independent, or cogent evidence to substantiate his assertion that he continued to make regular monthly rent payments separately and in addition to the adjustment of the advance amount since the execution of the original agreement. In the absence of any reliable proof of such continued and separate payments, the claim of advance payment loses its relevance. Accordingly, the petitioner's reliance on the alleged advance amount paid to the original landlord, Akhtar Nawaz Khan, has no bearing on the merits of the instant case and carries no legal significance in determining the present landlord-tenant relationship or the obligations arising therefrom.
7. The record further reveals that the ejectment petition filed by the landlord was dismissed by the learned trial Court solely on the ground that the tenant had not committed default in the payment of rent. However, the learned trial Court failed to properly consider or give due weight to the fact that Muhammad Sohail, who had been lawfully delegated all powers and authority of the landlord through a duly executed special power of attorney, required the suit shop for his personal bona fide need. It is a well-settled principle of law that when a landlord, or a duly authorized attorney standing in the shoes of the landlord, requires the rented premises for personal bona fide use whether for residence or for carrying out a business the tenant is under a legal obligation to vacate the property and hand over its possession. Refusal on part of the tenant to do so renders him liable to be ejected from the premises under the applicable rent laws. In the present case, the learned trial Court, while passing the impugned judgment and decree, erred in both appreciation of the evidence and correct application of the law. It failed to consider the legitimate and bona fide requirement of Muhammad Sohail, who had been fully empowered to act as landlord. The petitioner/tenant, therefore, has no lawful justification to retain possession of the suit shop and is liable to be ejected, as the landlord rightfully requires the premises for his personal use and business purposes.
8. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court is in accordance with law and based on proper appreciation of the record and the evidence available on file. The landlord, Muhammad Sohail, has successfully established his case by producing cogent, reliable, and reasonable evidence in support of his claim. The appellate Court has rightly concluded that Muhammad Sohail, being the duly authorized landlord, has a genuine and bona fide need for the suit shop for his personal use. Accordingly, the order passed in favour of the landlord is just, legal, and fully supported by the facts on record. In view of the above, the petitioner/tenant has no lawful justification to retain possession of the rented premises and is liable to be ejected. The landlord, Muhammad Sohail, is therefore entitled to retrieve possession of the suit shop to fulfill his bona fide personal requirement.
9. Insofar as the contention of the petitioner that the ejectment petition was filed in the name of one "Tariq," and therefore, "Sohail" is not entitled to seek the ejectment of the petitioner from the disputed shop premises, such misdescription or error in the title of the suit amounts to a technical irregularity, which should not obstruct the course of justice. The Courts are required to decide cases on their merits rather than allowing technicalities to defeat substantive rights. In this regard, reliance may be placed on the cases of Tauseef Ahmad Versus Fauzia Akram and another (2013 MLD 679), Muhammad Bashir and another Versus Province of Punjab through Collector of District Gujrat and others (2003 SCMR 83), Javed Iqbal Versus S.M.Khuram Wasti Advocate, (2000 CLC 126), Khan Bahadar and others Versus Mir Abdul Qayyum and another (2020 CLC 893) & Bibi Fareeda Versus Jan Bibi (PLD 2025 Balochistan 18), wherein it has been held that technical defects in the description of parties or title should be overlooked, provided the identity of the parties is otherwise clear and no prejudice is caused to either side.
10. Admittedly, the tenancy in the present case is based on an oral agreement. In the absence of any written contract specifying the duration of the tenancy, such an arrangement is to be construed as a month-to-month tenancy in terms of the applicable legal principles. It is a settled proposition of law that oral tenancies, unless otherwise agreed upon, are presumed to be monthly tenancies under the relevant tenancy laws. In this regard, reliance can be placed on cases of Muhammad Islam Versus Additional District Judge and others (2024 YLR 776) and Muhammad Nayab Versus Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi and 2 others (2016 MLD 1095), Asad Ali Khan Versus Special Judge Rent (PLD 2019 Lahore 363) and Muhammad Taufeeq Versus Muhammad Nawaz and 2 others (2015 CLC 1187), wherein it has been held that in the case of oral agreements, the tenancy shall be deemed to be on a month-to-month basis, terminable in accordance with law.
11. It is also settled that an attorney or a new owner, having lawfully acquired title to the property, is fully competent to institute ejectment proceedings on the ground of bona fide personal need. In the present case, Sohail, acting either as an attorney on behalf of the lawful owner or having himself become the new owner of the premises, (as he later did), was legally entitled to file an ejectment petition for his personal use and necessity. The law does not prohibit an attorney or successor-in-interest from asserting such a right, provided the requirement is genuine and supported by evidence. In support of this proposition, reliance may be placed on the case of Salahuddin Ahmed Versus Khurram Sultan Abbasi and others (2025 YLR 652) and Muhammad Amin Versus Muhammad Asif Askari and others (2025 MLD 344), wherein it has been held that a duly authorized attorney or a new owner may initiate ejectment proceedings on the ground of bona fide personal requirement.
12. Since the petitioner is seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari to declare the impugned judgment and order of the learned appellate Court dated 08.07.2020 as illegal and against the law, he was required to prima facie establish that either learned appellate Court has exceeded its jurisdiction or that it has not properly exercised its jurisdiction or that it lacked jurisdiction. However, the petitioner could not point out any excess of jurisdiction or improper or unreasonable or illegal exercise of jurisdiction vested in the appellate Court, or that the impugned order is based on misreading and non-reading of evidence or that it is not in accordance with law, therefore, the same is maintained. In the case of Amjad Khan vs. Muhammad Irshad (deceased) through LRs reported as 2020 SCMR 2155, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that: "the High Courts must not exercise their constitutional jurisdiction in order to interfere with the discretion exercised by lower Courts unless the same suffers from jurisdictional, factual or legal errors. In other words, such interference would be justified in cases where the impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction or is based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, or is not in accordance with the law. If none of these errors is present, the High Courts must not exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of lower Courts merely because it reached a different conclusion as to the controversy than the latter.
Similarly, in the case of "Chief Executive Mepco & others v/s Muhammad Fazil & others" reported as 2019 SCMR 919, the Hon'ble Apex Court has declared that: "where the Court or the Tribunal has jurisdiction and it determines specific question of fact or even of law, unless patent legal defect or material irregularity is pointed-out, such determination cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution."
In the case of "Chairman NAB v/s Muhammad Usman & others" reported as PLD 2018 Supreme Court 28, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held: "that the powers of judicial review vested in High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is no doubt a great weapon in the Judge's hands, however, the same shall not be exercised in a case where discretion is exercised by the subordinate court/Tribunal in a fair and just manner without violating or disregarding statutory provision of law, likely to occasion the failure of justice. Ordinarily such extraordinary jurisdiction shall not be exercised at random and in routine manner."
13. In view of the above discussion, no interference by this Court in the findings recorded by the learned appellate Court dated 08.07.2020 is warranted and thus this petition being bereft of merits is dismissed.