' MUHAMMAD ZAHOORUL HAQ, J.--These two appeals have been filed by Karachi Development Authority in respect of a consolidated judgment in respect of Civil References Nos. 6 of 1969 and 6 of 1972 dated 18-2-1974 passed by a Single Judge of this Court and the further order in Review in the same two references passed on 18-3-1974.
2. The relevant facts are that the land in question was acquired in 1958 and the Deputy Commissioner, Karachi had awarded compensation in 1962, but the same was set aside in Reference No, 152 of 1962 by the High Court on 17-12-1965 and the matter was remanded for further enquiry. On 25-6-1966 the Deputy Commissioner made awards in respect of the land in dispute in respect of Mst. Fatima Bai and others and on 29-8-1971 in respect of Shirin Khanum. He allowed Rs, 3,000 per Acre for unrestricted tenure land Rs, 2,250 per Acre for restricted tenure land. Reference No, 6 of 1969 was filed on 15-3-1969 and Reference No, 6 of 1972 was filed on 26-10-1972. The Single Judge decided the two references together on 23-4-1973, but that judgment was set aside in L.P.A.
Filed by the respondents by Judgment dated 26-9-1973 and the matter was referred back to the Single Judge for decision. This Single Judge on 18-2-1974, awarded enhanced compensation Rs, 3,000 per Acre for restricted tenure land and Rs, 3,750 per Acre for unrestricted tenure land, plus 15% of the compensation for compulsory acquisition.
3. The respondents made a review application which was decided on 18-3-1974 and the review was allowed and compensation was enhanced to Rs,7,260 per ,acre for unrestricted tenure land and Rs,4,840 per acre for restricted tenure land plus 15$ of the compensation plus interest at 6$ per annum.
4. No appeal has been filed by the Government in this case.
5. However, the K.D.A. Has filed these two appeals on 10-9-1974 against the judgment dated 18-2- 1974 and the order dated 18-3-1974. The main contention of Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, learned counsel for the appellants was that no notice has been served upon K.D.A. By the High Court in respect of the two references as required under section 20-C of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended on 17- 12-1969, whereby issue of notice was made compulsory to the Local authority on whose count the land had been acquired.
6. Messrs Hassan A. Shaikh and S. Semi Ahmad learned counsels for the respondents addressed us on the preliminary point that the appeals were time-barred. Their submission is that the copy of the judgment filed alongwith the two appeals, shows that the copy had been applied for on 18-2- 1974 and the cost had been estimated on 21-3-1974 and the copy was delivered on 3-4-1974. But the appeal was filed only on 10-9-1974 with a mere 10 Rupees Stamp-paper and ultimately the court-fee of Rs, 15,000 was supplied on 9-12-1974. Article 151 of Limitation Act provides a period of 20 days for inter-court appeal and therefore, the appeal, if competent, was clearly time-barred.
7. Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the judgment and order of the High Court respectively dated 18-2-1974 and 18-3-1974 are void in law in as such as no notice had been issued to K.D.A. And therefore, the appellant could file the appeal at any time, or it could even ignore the above judgment and order. Reliance is placed upon PLD 1976 SC 37 where it was held that if an order is without jurisdiction, it need not be set aside. Reliance was also placed on 1971 SCMR 681 where it was held that if statute itself provides for opportunity of show-cause notice, then failure to give such notice renders the impugned act void ab initio.
8. The other side relied upon 1983 SCMR 168 (171) where it was held that even if the transfer order be void, the assumption that the Court must strike it down regardless of consequences, is a total falacy. Reference was also made to PLD 1975 B J 29(32) where it was held by a Single Judge of Lahore High Court that in a case where the party affected by an order has no notice of the same and has come to know of it after some time, then time starts running from the date that the party has knowledge. In PLD 1970 Lah. 6(17) it was held that a party would be entitled to challenge the order counting the time from the date of knowledge. On page 30 of the same decision it was observed that date of the knowledge of the order is the starting time for the aggrieved party to file an appeal within the prescribed time. In that case the party affected by the order had no knowledge of the order and, therefore, it was observed that the plea of limitation could not be entitled to challenge the order within the prescribed time counting the period from the date of knowledge.
9. The respondents also relied upon 1978 SCMR 367, where it was observed that there cannot be hard and fast rule that a void order must be struck down in every case. However, explaining the dictum of their Lordships in the case of Aslam Zia PLD 1958 SC 104 it was observed "but a void order must be struck down provided there is no statute or principle of law which would make it unjust or unequitable to strike down the void order."
10. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court and the High Court it appears to us that a void order where a party has not been given a hearing, should be regarded as a void order and ordinarily it should be struck down as void. However, if the party complaining of the order having been passed against him, has come to know of the same on a particular date, then it can file an appeal against the order counting the time from the date that he came to know of that order. This appears to be a reasonable view, because a party cannot be allowed to wait for all the time in the world and then file an appeal in Court much beyond the time limit which has been prescribed for an appeal even if it is counted from the date of actual knowledge of the order which was passed in the absence of the affected party. The party having come to know of the order cannot be allowed to waste all the time and then come to the appellate Court saying that since the order was void as initio, therefore, I have come here to get the same set aside and I have taken my own time and am availing the remedy of the appeal irrespective of the date of my knowledge of that order.
11. In the circumstances of this case, it appears to us that these two appeals, if they were competent, were filed much beyond the time which could be reasonably taken by the appellant.
The copies of the judgment and order supplied by the appellant clearly show that they had the knowledge of the two orders on the relevant dates i.e, 18-2-1974 and 18-3-1974 and they had obtained the copies on 3-4-1974, but they wasted about five months and then filed the appeal without explaining as to why the appeal was filed so late. Only explanation rendered was that the Government had informed the K.D.A. That a decision has been made against them. Even the date of information by the Government to the K.D.A. Is not mentioned. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that both the appeals, if competent, were unreasonably delayed beyond time and filed more than five months after the delivery of the copies filed with the appeal and therefore, they should be dismissed on that count.
12. There is, however, a much stronger objection to the competency of the appeals submitted by Mr. Khawaja Mansoor, learned counsel for the respondent in H.C.A. No, 2 of 1975. He submitted that the appeals by Local Authority, for whose benefit the land had been acquired by the Deputy Commissioner, were not competent. He relied upon proviso to subsection (2) of section 50 of Land Acquisition Act which provides as under:- "Provided that no such local authority or Company shall be entitled to demand a reference under section 18."
' In this respect he relied upon a judgment of this Court in H.C.A., No, 72 of 1981 decided on 3-4-1984 where it was held that K.D.A. Had no right to file an appeal. The learned counsel also relied upon PLD 1975 Pesh. 1(10) where it was held that local authority has no right of appeal.
13. Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman has no answer to this judgment, but he merely stated that this appeal was directed against a void order and therefore, it was competent.
14. We do not agree with his submission. Since K.D.A. Was not competent to file an appeal, therefore, it could not have filed these appeals. In fact in PLD 1960 Dacca 467 this position had been explained and it has been observed that the local authority could appear and adduce evidence, but it had no right to demand a reference under section 18 and muchless had it a right of appeal against a decision of District Judge made upon a reference under section 18 of Land Aquisition Act.
15. We have, therefore, no choice in the matter, but to treat these appeals as incompetently filed and, therefore, dismiss the same.
16. Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, faced with this situation, had made an oral request that if the appeals were not treated as competent, they may be treated as writ petitions under the extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. We are, however, not prepared to grant that discretionary favour to the appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the law in respect of the incompetency of the appeals had been interpreted by the High Court of Peshawar in PLD 1975 Pesh. 1 and reiterated by this Court in April, 1984, but the appellant took no notice of the same and continued to press these appeals. Moreover we do not want to exercise discretion in converting an appeal into petition in favour of a party who had waited for more than five months in bringing its grievance before the High Court in the form of incompetent appeal. We, therefore, do not accede to this request. Moreover the matter of compensation in respect of the acquisition of these lands has been pending decision of the Court since 1958 and, therefore, we do not see any justification to allow the opening of the whole dispute again and thus deprive the respondents of the compensation which had been allowed to them after protracted litigations. Therefore, we do not accede to the request of Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman.
' The result is that these two appeals are dismissed as incompetent.