' TANVIR AHMED KHAN, J---Leave to appeal is sought against the judgment dated 19-11-1998 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, whereby petitioner's Civil Revision No,684 of 1996 was dismissed upholding the order dated 18-4-1996 of the learned District Judge, Sahiwal.
2. This case has got a chequired history wherein the parties instead of getting their first appeal against the judgment of the learned Civil Judge decided on merits are embroiled in technicalities for the last more than two decades. The facts briefly stated for the disposal of this petition are that the petitioner secured land measuring 104 Kanals and 15 Marlas vide registered sale-deed dated 19-5-1976 for a consideration of Rs,85,109. The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, Wali Muhammad, filed a suit for possession through pre-emption in the year 1977. He valued his suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs,39,000. The petitioner took an objection to the same and the learned trial Court vide its order dated 9-10-1977 after examining the 'Jhar Paidawar' held the valuation of the suit at Rs,61,951.20 and directed the respondent to amend the plaint accordingly by making up deficiency in the court-fee. Pursuant to this ordei the respondents' predecessor-in-interest filed the amended plaint making up the deficiency in the court-fee.
3. This suit was resisted by the petitioner and the learned trial Court out of divergent pleas taken by the parties framed Issues. After recording evidence of the respective parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide its judgment/decree dated 14-6-1982.
4. The respondents/pre-emptors aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Court filed an appeal, which was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Sahiwal, vide his judgment dated 23- 12-1982.
5. The petitioner filed R.S.A. No,21 of 1983 in the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, assailing the very competency of the first appellate Court to hear the appeal as at that time pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court was Rs,50,000. The trial Court on an objection raised by the petitioner determined the valuation of the suit as Rs,61,951.20. The respondents/plaintiffs, accordingly, amended the plaint and valuation for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction was fixed at Rs,61,951.20. On this basis it was argued that the first appellate Court vested with no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. On the contrary, it was argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that since in the decree sheet prepared by the trial Court, the valuation of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction was recorded as Rs,39,000, i.e, the amount which was originally fixed in the suit, therefore, they were misled by the same and filed the appeal before the learned District Judge. This argument did not find favour with the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court as, according to him, it was the valuation given in the plaint which would control the forum of appeal. The respondents in this case having accepted the order of the trial Court dated 9-10-1977 determined the valuation of the suit at Rs,61,951.20 by filing an amended plaint. The learned Judge after hearing the parties, through a detailed judgment dated 19-11-1991, accepted the appeal of the petitioner and set aside the order of the first appellate Court dated 23-12-1982. He, however, directed that the first appellate Court to pass an order for the return of memo. Of appeal to the respondents for presentation before the proper Court.
6. The respondents challenged this judgment before this Court through C.P.S.LA. No,1071 of 1991. In the meantime, the respondents also approached the first appellate Court in terms of the High Court's judgment dated 19-11-1991. The learned District Judge on 20-1-1992 returned the memo. Of appeal. Since the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court was already enhanced to Rs,2,00,000, as such, the respondents re-filed/represented the memo. Of appeal before the District Judge on 25-1-1992 with an application to keep it pending for awaiting the decision of aforementioned petition filed by them before this Court because of the enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned District Judge,
7. This Court upheld the order of the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court passed in R.S.A.
No,21 of 1983 on 19-10-1991 vide its judgment dated 2-12-1992.
8. Subsequent thereto, on 12-1-1993 in view of the decision of this Court, the respondnets/pre- emptors filed an application before the learned District Judge, Sahiwal, for restoration and decision of the appeal on merits which was kept pending before the said Court for awaiting the decision of this Court in C.P.S.L.A. No, 1071 of 1991. Alongwith this application, a petition under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was also filed, wherein it was stated that the respondents/pre-emptors prosecuted their matter in good faith earlier before the District Judge because of the amount mentioned in the decree sheet, which was Rs,39,000 and at that time the pecuniary jurisdiction of the first appellate Court was Rs,50,000. The petitioner objected to this position and the learned District Judge, Sahiwal, vide his order dated 6-12-1993 dismissed the application of the respondents for the requisition of the memo. Of appeal so as to dispose of the same on merits. It was held by the learned District Judge that the memo. Of appeal was returned to the respondents on 20-1-1992 who had not presented the same before the competent Court of jurisdiction afresh in accordance with the direction of the High Court given in judgment dated 19-10-1991 rendered in R.S.A. No,21 of 1983.
9. The respondents aggrieved by the said order filed Civil Revision No,837 of 1994 before the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan. A learned Single Judge vide his judgment dated 1-11-1995 held that sufficient compliance of the order of the High Court dated 19-10-1991 was made when the learned District Judge returned the memo. Of appeal on 20-1-1992 which was re-presented/re- filed by the respondents in his Court on 25-1-1992. It was further held that the learned District Judge, Sahiwal, while returning the memo. Of appeal on 20-1-1992 did not give the certificate as required under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. On the memorandum of appeal that he had no pecuniary jurisdiction. It is pertinent to mention here that the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court was up to Rs,50,000 on 23-12-1982. However, the same stood enhanced to Rs,2,000 on 14-6-1986 during the pendency of R.S.A. No,21 of 1983 before the High Court. It is admitted that on 19-10-1991 on which date the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court directed the first appellate Court to return the memo. Of appeal to the respondents for its presentation before the proper Court, on that date the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court had already been enhanced to Rs,2,00,000. It was, accordingly, held that the appeal of the respondents was pending before the District Judge, Sahiwal, with effect from 25-1-1992 and their application dated 12-1-1993 filed after the decision of this Court on 2-12-1992 dismissing C.P.S.L.A. No,1071 of 1991 was accepted directing the District Judge to dispose of the appeal on merits.
10. Pursuant to the order dated 1-11-1995 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Civil Revision No,837 of 1994, the District Judge, Sahiwal, took up the appeal for its decision on merits. The petitioner took up the plea that the respondents' appeal was hopelessly barred by limitation as they themselves filed the appeal before the District Judge choosing a wrong forum and they were fully aware of the value of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction because the same was enhanced vide order dated 9-10-1977 by the trial Court and the respondents thereafter submitted the amended plaint accordingly. The petitioner pleaded that they intentionally selected the wrong forum, as such, they deserved no leniency in the matter of condonation of delay. On the contrary, the respondents argued that the jurisdictional value given on the face of the decree sheet was Rs,39,000, as such, the appeal was prosecuted in good faith before the learned District Judge.
11. The learned District Judge, Sahiwal, after hearing the parties vide order dated 18-4-1996, held that the respondents prosecuted their appeal before the District Judge in good faith which subsequently turned out to be a wrong forum. The return of the appeal and its formal presentation of 25-1-1992 after the judgment of the High Court in R.S.A. No,21 of 1983 would not render the said appeal barred by time as by that time, the jurisdictional value of the District Court was enhanced to Rs,2,00,000. Resultantly, vide order dated 18-4-1996 the learned District Judge overruled the objection of the petitioner on the point of limitation.
12. The petitioners filed Civil Revision No,684 of 1996 against the aforesaid order in the Lahore High Court which has been dismissed through the impugned order dated 19-11-1998. Hence, this petition for leave to appeal.
13. We have given our anxious consideration to the entire facts of the case and the documents appended with this petition. We are sorry to hold that this is one of many other cases wherein parties are trying to non-suit their adversaries simply on technical grounds. It is admitted by the parties that upon the decree sheet prepared by the trial Court while dismissing respondents' suit through its judgment dated 14-6-1982, the jurisdictional value of he same was mentioned as Rs,39,000. On this basis the respondents filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Sahiwal, because at that time his pecuniary jurisdiction was Rs,50,000. It was the act of the Court demonstrated in the decree sheet which prompted the respondents to file the appeal before the learned District Judge. So, in this background, it would really be a harsh view to non-suit the respondents for approaching the wrong appellate forum of the learned District Judge, Sahiwal.
14. Similarly, when the respondents were directed by the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court vide his order dated 19-11-1991 passed in R.S.A. No,21 of 1983, his direction to the learned District Judge to pass an order for the return of memo. Of appeal to the respondents for its presentation before the proper Court was also simply to prolong the litigation as by that time the jurisdiction of District Judge had already enhanced to Rs,2,00,000 with effect from 14-6-1986 during the pendency of the aforesaid R.S.A. So, the proper order to save the time and expenses of the parties should have been that the appeal of the respondents before the learned District Judge, Sahiwal, 'be considered as pending' instead of entering into all this rigmarole which had consumed considerable time of the Court and prolonged the agony of the parties. As already stated, all this litigation in this case subsequent to the judgment of the trial Court is going on for all these years due to the fact that the amount of Rs,39,000 was mentioned by the trial Court in its decree sheet. It was the act of the Court in preparing the decree-sheet in this manner which led the respondents to file an appeal before the learned District Judge, Sahiwal.
15. The maxim "Actus curiae neminem gravabit" (an act of the Court shall prejudice no man), as already stated, is now fully engrained in our system of administration of justice. This principle was considered by this Court in the case of Rashad. Ehsan and others v. Bashir Ahmad and another (PLD 1989 SC 146) in the following words: ' the maxim ' Actus curiae neminem gravabit' comes into play, with a view to obviate hardships and which may otherwise be the result of the errors of the Court itself. Thus, where a noncompliance with the mandatory provisions of a law occurs by complying with the direction of the Court, which is not in conformity with the law, the party complying therewith is not to be penalised. Indeed, the law becomes flexible to absorb such abnormalities and treat the infractions as harmless. Where the directions issued while administering the law have been followed but it is found that the authority itself had acted in deviation of the law in some particulars, the party acting in accordance with such directions is not held to be blameworthy."
16. In the case of The State v. Asif Adil and others (1997 SCMR 209) it has been held that it is a well- settled proposition of law that a party should not be made to suffer on account of act/omission on the part of the Court or other State functionaries. Reference in this behalf is also made to the following cases:--
(i) Muhammad Hand and others v. Muhammad and others (PLD 1990 SC 859);
(ii) Fateh Khan v. Bozo Mir (PLD 1991 SC 782);
(iii) Abdul Rashid v. Abdul Salam and others (1991 SCMR 782);
(iv) Muhammad Afsar v. Mst. Munawar Jan (PLD 1961 (W.P.) Lah. 199);
(v) Central Exchange Bank Ltd. v. Ch. Dilawar Ali Khan and others (PLD 1965 (W.P.) Lah. 628);
(vi) Mian Ijaz Iqbal and others v. Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce and another (PLD 1983 Lah. 1);
(vii) Hafiz Muhammad Ahsan v. The State (1987 P.Cr.LJ 2434); (viii)Ghulam Haider and others v. Mst. Raj Bharri and others (PLD 1988 SC 20);
(x) Muhammad Raman and another v. Haji Karim Bakhsh and 5 others (1988 CLC 448);
(xi) Iqbal Ahmad v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and 3 others (1989 CLC 1365);
(xii) Abdul Rashid v. Abdul Salam and others (1991 SCMR 2012);
(xiii) Naseer Ahmed v. District Judge, Multan and 4 others (PLD 1992 Lah. 92);
(xiv) Iftikhar Baig v. Muhammad Azam and others (1996 SCMR 762);
(xv) Imran Ashraf and 7 others v. The State (2001 SCMR 424);
(xvi) Ghulam Hussain v. Jamshaid Ali and others (2001 SCMR 1001); and
(xvii) The State v. Asif Adil and others (1997 SCMR 209).
17. There is another principle of law that Judges are duty-bound to apply the provisions of law in their true perspective and the same cannot be avoided simply on the ground that the said provisions of law were not brought to their notice by the parties. I am fortified in this regard from an earlier illuminating judgment rendered by this Court reported as PLD 1992 SC 236 where it was held as under:-- "18. The learned counsel who represented the respondents in the High Court by not bringing to the notice of the High Court the law laid down by this Court on the subject did not render good service to their clients. Besides, it has been laid down by this Court in Muhammad Sarwar v. The State (PLD 1969 SC 278) that a Judge must know the adage that a Judge must wear all the laws of the country on the sleeves of his robe and failure of the counsel to properly advise him is not a complete excuse in the matter." (Underlining is ours).
18. It is also to be appreciated that the litigation in this case was started as far back as in the year 1977. Nearly quarter of a century has passed and the end of litigation is not within sight. The trial Court dismissed the suit as far back as on 14-6-1982. More than 19 years have gone by but even the first appeal against the said judgment has not been disposed of by now. The petitioner has tried to non-suit the respondents simply on technical grounds. It is an established principle of law that the cases of the parties be decided on merits and technical knock-out should sparingly be resorted to.
However, the petitioner in this case has successfully embroiled/involved the respondents in technicalities for a period spreading over more than two decades. This state of affairs has certainly contributed to the pendency of cases before the higher forums. Unless and until this sort of practice is not arrested with an iron hand, the pendency in the Courts would never come to an end and the parties would spend their entire life and earnings in litigation. Reference in this behalf is made to the cases of Imran Ashraf and 7 others v. The State (2001 SCMR 424), Nazir Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Din and others (2000 SCMR 440), Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam and two others (PLD 1963 SC 382) and the case of Manager, Jammu and Kashmir, State Property in Pakistan v.
Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678).
19. Resultantly, for what has been stated above, the instant petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed and leave declined.
20. Before parting with this judgment we observe that we may have awarded heavy costs against the petitioner in the present case but since the same was not adverted to at the time of hearing of the petition, as such, we consider it proper not to impose the same in spite of the fact that circumstances of this case demand that heavy costs should have been inflicted upon the petitioner.