MUHAMMAD NAEEM ANWAR, J: - Hashim Khan, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, instituted a suit on 26.07.2014 seeking a declaration that the transfer of property measuring 01 Kanal 13 Maria, out of Khasra No. 3853 measuring 02 Kanals 11 Marla, situated in the revenue estate of Ghari Muwaz Khan, Tehsil and District Kohat, via Mutation No. 19514 dated 31.03.2014, was in fact a sale transaction. It was asserted that Saad Ullah Khan, the vendee, had purchased the property for consideration of Rs. 100,000/-, but to defeat the plaintiff's right of pre-emption, the transaction was mischaracterized as an exchange, which is contrary to the actual facts and thus warrants rectification. Along with the declaratory relief, the plaintiff also sought a permanent injunction to restrain the vendee from interference and construction over the suit property and further prayed for possession thereof through pre-emption. The plaintiff averred that he received information of the sale on 21.07.2014 at 3:00 PM from his son, Khayyam Khan, while present at his residence in Shah Abad Colony, Kohat. He immediately made a formal declaration of his intention to pre-empt the property and subsequently had a notice under Section 13(3) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre- emption Act, 1987 ("the Act of 1987") prepared and dispatched via registered post with acknowledgment due (AD) on 23.07.2014. Being a co-sharer and holder of a superior right under the head of appendages, the plaintiff claimed preferential entitlement over the vendee/respondent and thus sought a decree in his favour.
2. The respondent was proceeded against ex parte. Upon completion of the evidence, the learned Civil Judge, through ex parte judgment and decree dated 31.10.2019, decreed the suit and directed the respondent to deposit the remaining amount of Rs. 25,80,446.35 within thirty days, failing which the suit would be deemed dismissed. Pursuant to the ex parte decree, the respondent applied for attested copies through Application No. 8282 dated 31.10.2019. The certified copies were prepared and handed over to him on 09.12.2019. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application before the learned Civil Judge seeking permission to deposit the remaining pre-emption amount under Section 25 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987. The application was allowed on 06.01.2020, whereby he was granted seven days' time to deposit the said amount. This order was challenged by the petitioner through Civil Revision No. 01 of 2020, which was allowed by the revisional court through the impugned judgment and order dated 27.01.2022. Hence, the instant petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner/decree-holder contended that the decree dated 31.10.2019 was passed ex parte, whereupon the petitioner applied for attested copies on the same day. However, the judgment was authored, finalized, and consigned to the record room on 09.12.2019, the date on which the attested copies were handed over to the petitioner. Upon receipt of the judgment and decree, the petitioner immediately moved an application seeking permission to deposit the decretal amount, which was duly allowed by the learned trial court. He further argued that the specific decretal amount was not announced in open court at the time of pronouncement of the judgment, and thus the petitioner could not have ascertained the exact figure required for compliance. It was only upon receiving the attested copies that the petitioner came to know that the decree pertained to a sum of Rs. 25,80,446.35/-. Accordingly, the subsequent deposit made by the petitioner in pursuance of the trial court's permission was in full conformity with law. He maintained that the learned appellate court, in reversing the order of the trial court, exceeded its jurisdiction and acted contrary to the settled principles of law. He placed reliance on the cases of "Rahamdal Khan Vs. Ihsan Ullah & others" (2022 CLC 2106), "Wali Khan Vs. Waheed Ghani Khan" (2013 MLD 360), "Sherin & 04 others Vs. Fazal Muhammad & 04 others"
(1995 SCMR 584), "Abdul Ghani Vs. Ghulam Sarwar" (PLD 1977 SC 102), "Iftikhar Baig Vs. Muhammad Azam & others" (1996 SCMR 762), "Fida Hussain Vs. The State & others" (PLD 2002 SC 46), "Saiawal Khan Vs. Wali Muhammad & others" (2002 SCMR 134), "Jawad Mir Muhammadi & others Vs. Haroon Mirza & others" (PLD 2007 SC 472), "Ghulam Haider & others Vs. Mst. Rai Bharri & others" (PLD 1988 SC 20), "Fateh Khan Vs. Boze Mir" (PLD 1991 SC 782), "Ghulam Hassan Vs. Jamshed Ali & others" (2001 SCMR 1001), "Abdul Qudoos Vs. Commandant Frontier Constabulary, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar & another" (2023 SCMR 334), "Abid Jan Vs. Ministry of Defence through Secretary, Islamabad & others" (2023 SCMR 1451), "Lal Khan Vs. Imdad Hussain" (1995 MLD 737), "Muhammad Irshad Khan Vs. Muhammad Tariq Baig & 02 others" (2008 CLC 300), "Nazir Ahmad & another Vs. Abdullah" (1999 SCMR 342), "Rehmat All Vs. Nabi Alunad & 02 others" (2000 YLR 789), "Ghulam Rababi Vs. Muhammad Fiaz & another" (2016 CLC 1547), "Aniurn. Sarwar Butt & another Vs. Additional District judge, Guiranwala & 02 others"
(2022 YLR 1077) and "hag_ Hussain & 03 others Vs. Qaiser Mahmood & 03 others" (2021 YLR 183).
4. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent/judgment debtor contended that once the judgment was pronounced, it was incumbent upon the decree-holder to deposit the decretal amount within the period fixed by the learned trial court. Upon pronouncement of the judgment, the trial court became functus officio, and therefore, neither could any application be competently filed by Hashim Khan (the decree-holder), nor could the trial court lawfully entertain or allow such an application. It was further argued that the trial court failed to properly appreciate this legal position, and the appellate court rightly rectified this illegality. He in support of his submission placed reliance on the cases of "Jehanzeb Khan Vs. Jan Muhammad" (2009 MLD 837), "Rahamdal Khan Vs. Ihsan Ullah & others" (2022 CLC 2106), "Shuiat Ali Vs. Muhammad Riasat & others" (PLD 2006 SC 140), "Wali Khan Vs. Waheed Ghani Khan" (2013 MLD 360). .5. Arguments heard record perused.
6. The central issue requiring determination is whether the trial court, after pronouncement of the decree and preparation of the judgment, was empowered to extend the time stipulated therein for deposit of the pre-emption amount. It is an admitted fact that the pre-emptor's suit was decreed ex parte on 31.10.2019, with the trial court directing the pre-emptor to deposit the remaining amount of Rs. 25,80,446.35 within thirty days of the order. It is further undisputed that the pre-emptor applied for attested copies on the same day, i.e., 31.10.2019, and the said copies were delivered to him on 09.12.2019. It is also a matter of record that, upon receipt of the attested copies, the pre- emptor filed an application seeking extension of time for deposit of the remaining pre-emption amount.
7. The Pre-emption Act, 1987 prescribes two distinct timelines. Under Section 24(1), deposit of one- third of the pre-emption amount is mandatory and non-compliance entails dismissal of the suit.
However, the present controversy pertains to Section 25 of the Act, which, as interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, is directory in nature. There is nothing on record to suggest that the pre- emptor was informed of the exact amount payable under the decree at the time of pronouncement of judgment. The specific amount of Rs. 25,80,446.35 became known to the decree-holder only upon receipt of the attested copies on 09.12.2019, pursuant to application No. 8282 dated 31.10.2019. In the case of Raharnclal Khan v. Ihsan Ullah & others (2022 CLC 2106), after considering various precedents including 2013 MLD 360, 1999 SCMR 342, 1991 SCMR 2149, 1986 SCMR 849, PLD 2006 SC 140, and 2005 SCMR 1664, this Court held that trial courts ordinarily do not issue a short written order at the time of pronouncement that specifies the exact pre-emption amount and related directions. Consequently, the Registrar of this Court was directed to circulate a copy of the said judgment among the District Judges for further dissemination to Civil Judges of the province.
8. While the decree was announced on 31.10.2019, attested copies were provided only on 09.12.2019.
In the absence of a written short order specifying the amount and conditions, the pre-emptor could not reasonably be expected to comply with the direction prior to receiving the attested copies. Learned counsel for the petitioner rightly contended that no short order was issued by the trial court. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the trial court appropriately allowed the application for extension. Though section 25 of the Act does provide the period of 30 days but without any penal consequence for deposit of the remaining amount and has consistently been held to be directory by the Superior Courts.
9. It is also noteworthy that the judgment-debtor, despite not having contested the suit initially, subsequently challenged the trial court's order allowing the application, leading to its reversal and dismissal of the pre-emptor's suit. The trial court's order was based on a proper and lawful interpretation of Section 25 of the Act of 1987, considered in conjunction with the factual timeline regarding the preparation and delivery of the judgment and decree. The application was filed promptly after receipt of attested copies, and the trial court committed no legal error in granting it.
The reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent on precedents was misplaced as those cases are clearly distinguishable on facts. The revisional court, in accepting the revision petition, acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Judicial orders must be clear and self-explanatory; they should not require speculative interpretation or mental exertion to ascertain their true import. Thus, the trial court's order, being in conformity with established legal principles, was lawful, whereas the revisional court's order is untenable in law.
10. For the reasons stated above, this petition is allowed. The judgment and order of the revisional court are hereby set aside, and the order of the trial court is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.