' ZIA MAHMOOD MIRZA, J---This is a petition for leave to appeal from an order dated 11-1-1994, passed by the learned Judges of a Division Bench of Lahore High Court allowing a miscellaneous application (C.M.565/C/1993) moved by the respondents/decree-holders seeking extension of time for the, deposit of the balance amount and dismissing the petitioner's applications C.Ms. 2789/C/90 and 603/C/1993.
2. Facts relevant for the disposal of this petition, briefly stated, are that a suit for possession through specific performance of an agreement to sell brought by the respondents against the present petitioner was decreed by the trial Court on 24-1-1990 "subject to payment of the balance amount of Rs,2,56,000 within three months, from the date of this judgment" failing which, it was directed, their suit shall stand dismissed. Petitioner preferred an appeal (R.F.A. 20/1990) in the Lahore High Court to challenge the decree of the trial Court. The appeal was admitted to regular hearing on 6- 2-1990 and the execution of the impugned decree was suspended. The interim order of stay of execution was later confirmed in the presence of the learned counsel of both the parties on 5-5- 1990. On 18-9-1990, the petitioner made an application (C.M. 2789/C/1990) stating that since the respondents/decree-holders had failed to comply with the direction contained in the decree regarding the payment of the balance amount within the time fixed in the decree, the suit stood dismissed. An appropriate order was, therefore, sought to be passed in the appeal. The application was, however, kept pending on the statement of the petitioner's counsel that in view of the order suspending the execution of the decree, his application may be taken up along with the appeal. It, appears that the petitioner moved another application (C.M. 5429/C/90) seeking the same relief as was prayed for in the earlier application. The second application was dismissed on 27-1-1991, with the observation that the petitioner overlooked the fact that the operation of the decree stood suspended and that the previous application of similar nature was ordered to be heard along with the main appeal.
3. On 29-3-1993, an application (C.M. 1/C/93) was moved by the petitioner for withdrawal of the appeal. The application was allowed and the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn on the same date, of course, without notice to the respondent/decree-holders.
4. Sometime later, the respondents on coming to know that the appeal had been dismissed as withdrawn moved an application (C.M. 565/C/93) praying that the time for deposit of the balance amount may be extended as the said amount could not be deposited in view of the suspension of the execution of the decree. Alongwith this application, respondents also made another application (C.M. 3/C/93) praying that pending the decision of their main application (C.M.
565/C/93), they may be allowed to deposit the balance amount. By an order dated 1-11-1993, respondents were allowed to deposit the balance amount in the trial Court within two months on or before 2-1-1994 which amount they are stated to have deposited on 15-11-1993. It appears that the petitioner made an application (C.M. 603/C/93) for recalling the orders dated 26-10-1993 and 1-11- 1993 contending that three months' time allowed to the respondents in the decree of the trial Court for depositing the balance amount even if counted from 29-3-1993 when the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn stood expired on 28-6-1993.
5. Learned Judges of the Division Bench after hearing the learned counsel for both the parties accepted the application of the respondents/decree-holders and extended the time for deposit of the balance amount up to 16-11-1993 and dismissed the applications moved by the petitioner vide order dated 11-1-1994 impugned herein holding that the execution of the decree having been suspended on 6-2-1990 when the time was still available to the respondents to deposit the balance amount as required by the trial Court's decree, "it was the duty of the Court while dismissing the appeal as withdrawn on 29-3-1993 to have passed consequential order for extending or granting further time to respondent/decree holders to deposit the balance amount after issuing him notice as previous to that they could not comply with the direction contained in the decree for deposit of the same within three months due to orders dated 6-2-1990 and 5-5-1990 passed by this Court for suspension of execution of decree, thus it was the act of this Court on account of which they were not in a position to comply with the said direction and on account of omission of this Court to pass consequential order on 29-3-1993 granting them further time to deposit the balance consideration, they were also not in a position to deposit the said amount. The law is firmly settled that no act or omission of the Court should be allowed to prejudice the rights of the parties and the Court was bound to ractify the error once it was brought to its notice". The High Court took the view that an order for suspension of execution of decree had the effect of suspending the direction in the decree to deposit the balance amount. Note was also taken of the fact that the petitioner himself stated in his application (CM 603/C/93) that the respondent was to deposit the amount within a period of three months from 29- 3-1993 i,e, the date on which his appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. This, according to the learned Judges, amounted to an admission on the part of the petitioner that after the disposal of the appeal, the respondents were to be granted further period of three months for deposit of the balance amount though their contention was that the said period was to start from 29-3-1993. The view taken by the learned Judges in the facts and circumstances of the case was that the execution of the decree having been suspended, the Court when disposing of the appeal was under an obligation to pass fresh order granting further time to the respondents for depositing the amount which was not done and, therefore, they could pass such an order notwithstanding the fact that the appeal had already been disposed of.
6. Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition contended that the appeal, having been withdrawn, there was no lis pending in the High Court and as such the learned Judges of the High Court had no power to extend the time for deposit of the balance sale price. Reliance for this was placed on Shah Wali v. Ghulam Din alias Gaman and another (PLD 1966 SC 983). It was next contended by the learned counsel that the learned Judges of High. Court were Wrong in holding that the plaintiffs/decree-holders could not deposit the amount in compliance with the decree of the trial Court as its execution was suspended in the appeal. Learned counsel argued that the High Court had stayed the execution of the decree and not its operation and, therefore, the respondents were not absolved of their obligation to pay/deposit the balance amount as directed in the decree.
According to the learned counsel, the decree being conditional on the payment of the balance amount by the plaintiffs/respondents, the execution would have commenced only after they had paid/deposited the balance amount. We find no substance in either of these two contentions. The 8 decree passed in the instant case is of a composite and contingent nature.
' Direction therein to pay/deposit the balance amount of sale consideration is a vital part of the decree and it cannot be divorced from the other part granting possession of the suit land through specific performance of the agreement which in fact was conditional on the payment of the balance amount. Suspension of execution of the decree quite logically had the effect of suspending the direction for payment of the balance amount. It does not appeal to reason that while the execution of the sale-deed and delivery of possession of the suit land was suspended thereby depriving the plaintiffs of the fruits of the judgment/decree passed in -their favor, their liability to pay the balance amount remained unaffected by the stay order. Even otherwise, the "execution" is a comprehensive term. It is a process aimed at carrying into effect/enforcing the directions in a decree or a judgment. Seen in this light, stay of execution of the decree also covered the direction for deposit/payment of the balance amount. It is not denied that when the petitioner filed the appeal against the trial Court's decree and obtained the interim order from the High Court suspending the execution of the decree, three months' time specified in the decree for payment of the balance amount had net yet expired. In the circumstances, it was the duty of the High Court, as rightly observed in the impugned order, to have passed a consequential order allowing time to the respondents/decree-holders for deposit of the requisite amount when dismissing the appeal as withdrawn. Such an order was not passed presumably for the reason that the appeal was allowed to be withdrawn in the absence of and without any notice m the respondents. Be that as it may, the omission of the Court to pass an imperatively consequential order could not prejudice the rights of the respondents and it has been rightly so held by the learned Judges in the High Court. It is true that ordinarily when a suit is finally decided and/or the appeal is finally disposed of and the Court is not seized of the matter, it becomes focus officio and it cannot make any order for extension of time. In an appropriate case, however, like the present one, where the execution of the decree was stayed by the appellate Court but when disposing of the appeal, order extending the time or granting further time for deposit of the balance amount which ought to have been made but was not made, the aforementioned rule would not be strictly applicable and the Court would have the jurisdiction to rectify the error and supply the omission as and when the error/omission is pointed out to it. This is precisely what the learned Judges have done in the present case. No exception can, therefore, be taken to the impugned order. Needless to observe that the respondents approached the High Court for extension of time as soon as they came to know that the petitioner had withdrawn his appeal.
' Before concluding we would like to point out that the case of Shah Wali cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguishable on facts. In that case, pre-emption suit was decreed by the trial Court. On appeal by the vendee-defendant, District Judge enhanced the pre-emption amount and directed the successful pre-emptor to deposit the enhanced amount by 30-3-1962.
The pre-emptor deposited the amount on 18-4-1962 which fell short by Rs,123.75.
' The appeal filed by him in the High Court had been dismissed in liming on 9-10-1962. He sought extension of time to deposit the deficient amount. The trial Court refused his request. On appeal, the District Judge extended the time. It was in these circumstances that this Court held that the pre-emptor's suit stood dismissed owing to his default in making payment of the correct amount within the time fixed by the appellate decree and there was no question of extension of the time involved, either by the original Court or by the appellate Court thereafter, the appeal or revision from the appellate decree having already been dismissed.
7. Upshot of the above discussion is that the impugned order of the High Court being perfectly lawful, just and fair does not warrant any interference by this Court. This petition is accordingly dismissed and the leave sought is refused.