' We intend to decide Writ Petition No,3106 of 2001 and Writ Petition No,3107 of 2001 by one consolidated order having similar facts and law:
2. The petitioners challenged the vires of the orders of the respondents, dated 23-12-2000 and 4-1- 2000 through these petitions. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab passed the order against the petitioners on the revision petition filed by the private respondents before him without issuing any notice to the petitioners. Further submits that the private respondents filed time-barred revision petition before the Chief Land Commissioner Punjab without impleading the petitioners as respondents. He further submits that respondent No,1 countersigned the order of respondent No,2 without applying his independent mind, therefore, the impugned order of respondent No,1 is not sustainable in the eyes of law. He further submits that basic order, dated 4-1-2000 was passed against the petitioners in violation of the principle of natural justice but this fact was no considered by respondent No,1 while dismissing the revision petition of the petitioners vide the impugned order, dated 23-12-2000. -He further submits that respondent No,2 had no jurisdiction to accept the revision petition which had been withdrawn by the private respondents, therefore, he wrongly assumed jurisdiction, therefore, the impugned order of respondent No,2..Dated- 4-1-2000 is patently illegal and without lawful authority, that this fact was not considered by respondent No,1 at the time of deciding the revision petition of the petitioners which facts show that respondent No,1 had passed the impugned order without perusing the grounds of revision petition of the petitioners, that respondent No,2 accepted the time-barred revision petition filed by the private respondents before him and that it is the duty and obligation of respondent No,2 to dismiss the time-barred petition by virtue of section 3 of the Limitations Act. He further urges that respondents Nos.5 to 8 had challenged the vires of the orders of the Land Commissioner, dated 9-4-1996 after twenty year's without filing the application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. He further submits that respondents Nos.1 and 2 are erred in law in holding that accepting of miscalculated units by the declarant was an estoppel. Clerical and arithmetical mistakes even 'if it be accepted could be corrected at any time and that D.L.C., Bahawalpur and Land Commissioner, Bahawalpur had rightly exercised their powers to amend the produce ' index units and reduced units to a correct level whereas respondents Nos.1 and 2 misinterpreted the principle of stopple and passed the order in favour of the private respondents without any justification. He summed up his arguments that private respondents have no locus standi under the law to file revision petition before the Chief Land Commissioner. He also urges that judgments of both the Tribunals are not in accordance with the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Qazalbash Waqf and others v. Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab Lahore and others (PLD 1990 SC 99). He finally submitted that the original declarant had died before exercising his choice for surrender of his land in view of order of D.L.C.
Under the provisions of the Land Reforms Laws, however, this fact was not considered by both the Tribunals below, therefore, orders of both the Tribunals are the result of misreading and non- reading of the record.
3. We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel of the petitioners and perused record ourselves.
4. It is better and appropriate to reproduce the operative part of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, dated 7-3-1993 in Writ Petition No,553 of 1985/BWP to resolve the controversy between the parties: "The respondents are directed to act upon the choice for surrender of excess land given by the petitioners in pursuance of order, dated 16-9-1982 passed by Commissioner Bahawalpur and deal with the same in accordance with law.
' The aforesaid 'judgment of this Court was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in judgment, dated 30-5-1994 passed in Civil Petition No,748-1, of 1993. Respondent No,1 passed the order against the petitioners on 23-12-2000 and the petitioners filed the aforesaid petitions on 22-6-2001.
The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the well-known principle of laches as per the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Khiali Khan v. Haji Nazir and 4 others (PLD 1997 SC 304).
It is also well-settled principle of law that Constitutional jurisdiction being equitable jurisdiction cannot be exercised in favour of a person who has come to the Court with gross negligence as per the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Moshin Khan and another v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan, Lahore and others (1969 SCMR 306) and Suleman and 4 others v. The Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore (1970 SCMR 574). The question of law has already been settled by the Division Bench of this Court in Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab v.
The Federal Land Commission and 8 others (PLD 1994 Lahore 50) and laid down the following principle: "As has already been observed on the passing of order, dated 27-2-1978 by the Deputy Land Commissioner under the provisions of subsection (5) of section 7 of the Act, the excess land forthwith vested in the Provincial Government and due to this characteristic of this provision of law, it can safely be held that the same was certainly 'Self Executory Provision' having , taken effect long before 23-3-1990, the date fixd in qazalbash's case with effect from which the law was to cease to operate to the extent of repugnency. Merely because further steps were yet to be taken to implement the 'Self Executory Provisions' of the Act such as separation of excess land from the .Land to be retained by the petitioner . Within the permissible limits does not have the effect of rendering the said provision of law as also legal effect of order, dated; 27-2-1978 as non-self- executory or exclusion of the same from the purview of the said expression. This,. View finds support from judgments delivered by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 292 and 293 of 1976 in which identical questions were raised and it was held as under: 'Therefore, even if some of the appellants have yet not surrendered the excess land it would not make any defence for now it is a question of merely implementing the orders already passed by competent Authority. ' In the circumstances the appellants cannot take advantage of the judgment in the Qazalbash Waqf's case' ."
' The aforesaid proposition of law has also been supported by the following judgments:
(1) The Chairman, Federal Land Commission Islamabad and another v. Akhtar Abbas (PLD 1989 SC 550).
(2) Chief Land Commissioner Punjab and others v. Ch. Ata Muhammad Bajwa and others (1991 SCMR 736).
The land of the original declarant was resumed by the Deputy Land Commissioner in the tear 1982 and thereafter this Court directed the petitioners to give choice to surrender area in excess of the land given to the petitioners in pursuance of order, dated 16-9-1982 passed by the Commissioner Bahawalpur and deal with the same in accordance with law vide judgment, dated 7-3-1993. The aforesaid judgment was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide judgment, dated 30-5-1994.
The decisive steps have already been taken. That being so, the case against the petitioners was not covered by the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Qazalbash Waqf's case meaning thereby that the land which was the subject-matter of the present controversy of the petitioner had already vested in the Provincial Government under the Self-Executory Provisions of Land Reforms Law and resumed long before 23-3-1990. It is settled principle of law that judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have prospective effect and not retrospective effect as per the principle laid down in Muhammad Yousuf v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Pakistan, Lahore and others (PLD 1968 SC 101). Therefore, principle of past and closed transaction is attracted in the present case as per the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Noor Din v. The Chairman, Miani Sahib Graveyard Committee, Lahore (PLD 1973 SC 17). It is admitted fact that respondent No,1 passed the impugned order after providing proper hearing to the petitioners.
Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent No,2 passed the order in violation of principle of natural justice was rectified as revision petition of the petitioners were decided after providing proper hearing of the petitioners. The land of the original declarant was resumed under the provisions of Martial Law Regulation No,115 of 1972 but the possession of the land was not taken over by the Land Reforms Authorities. Subsequently land was finally resumed by the Land Reforms Authorities in the year 1982 under the provisions of section 7 of Land Reforms Act of 1977. Therefore, respondents Nos.1 and 2 were justified to pass the impugned orders against the petitioners as the petitioners have acquired the rights being the legal heirs of the original declarant. In this view of the matter the petitioners are estopped to challenge the order of resumption passed by the Land Reforms Authorities on the well-known principle of Estoppel and Waiver.
5. Since substantial justice has been done between the parties, it is settled law that Constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary in character, therefore, keeping in view the aforesaid circumstances of these, cases, we do not exercise discretion in ' favour of the petitioners as per principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following judgments:
(1) Federation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Saif Ullah Khan and others (PLD 1989 SC 166)
(2) Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (PLD 1973 SC 236).
6. In view of what has been discussed above, we find no merit in these petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed.