' MUHAMMAD BASHIR KHAN JEHANGIRI, J.---This petition for special leave to appeal arises from an order dated 10-6-1996 passed by a learned Division Bench of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, whereby Writ Petition No,529 of 1995 filed by the petitioner was dismissed in limine.
2. The brief facts of the case are that by virtue of Mutation No,2056 sanctioned on 16-1-1977, Haji Nazir respondent No,1, purchased from the petitioner, land measuring 330K-19M comprised in Khasra Nos. 1511 and 1516, situate in the revenue estate of Regi Lalama, Tehsil and District Peshawar.
On 18-4-1985, Haji Awal Khan, respondent No,2, moved an application before the Deputy Land Commissioner, Peshawar (respondent No,5) for cancellation of the aforesaid mutation on the ground of its being in contravention of the provisions of paragraph 24 of MLR-115 (hereinafter called as the Regulation). It appear that this objection of respondent No,2 found favour with respondent No,5 and, therefore, by the order dated 27-5-1985 the said mutation was cancelled holding it to have contravened the provisions of paragraph 24 of the Regulation. This order was, however, set aside by the Land Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Peshawar (respondent No,4) vide his order dated 28-4-1988 remanding the case to respondent No,5 for further action. Respondent No,5 after remand again by order dated 29-11-1990 cancelled the sale mutation holding it to be in contravention of paragraph 24 of the Regulation. Feeling aggrieved, Haji Nazir respondent No,5 challenged the aforesaid order before the Land Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Peshawar but it too was dismissed on 3-3-1991, whereby the order of cancellation of the impugned mutation was affirmed. Haji Nazir respondent No,1, therefore, filed yet another revision petition before the Chief Land Commissioner/Member, Board of Revenue, N.-W.F.P. Respondent No,3 in order to assail the orders of respondents Nos. 4 and 5. Respondent No,3 after hearing the parties, while accepted the revision petition, set aside the order of the forums below and thus the impugned mutation stood revived. This time, the petitioner felt aggrieved and moved a review petition before respondent No,3 but it proved abortive as it was dismissed on 13-4-1995.
3. The order of respondents Nos. 3 and 5 were challenged in Writ Petition No,529 of 1995 by the petitioner. The learned Judges of the Division Bench, while dismissing in limine the Constitution petition held as under:- "We feel that alternative remedy is available to the petitioner by approaching the Civil Court for the redress of his grievance, therefore, we are unable to entertain this writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed."
4. Sardar Akhtar Ali Haidry, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the petitioner has reiterated before us the contention which he has raised before the High Court that the impugned sale mutation having been validly annulled by the competent authority that it was violative of the provisions of paragraph 24 of the Regulation could not be restored by respondent No,3 and, therefore, the matter being of public importance the leave to appeal should be granted. The learned counsel further submitted the learned Judges have in declining the grant of relief to the petitioner relied on the ground of pendency and, withdrawal of his suit on the same cause of action between the parties. According to him neither any such suit was filed nor it was withdrawn.
5. Raja Abdul Ghafoor, learned counsel for the private respondents, has maintained that conceding for the sake of arguments, that no suit was pending or if it was pending, it had been withdrawn, the writ jurisdiction being discretionary could be refused by the High Court on the settled principle for grant or refusal of such a relief.
6. It is a common ground between the parties that the petitioner had himself sold the disputed land to respondent No,1 by Mutation No,2056 attested on 16-1-1977. The question is whether in these circumstances the High Court, acting in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, should at all have granted relief to the petitioner ignoring his own conduct being party to the aforesaid conscious contravention of the provisions of the Regulation. Assuming that the impugned orders made by respondent No,3 were factually ill-founded still looking to the conduct of the petitioner in having himself sold the land in dispute to respondent No,1 the discretionary relief ought not to be granted by the High Court to help a petitioner who has been party to the contravention complained against him. It is settled law that the writ jurisdiction is not to be invoked in aid of injustice. In Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali etc. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1973 SC 230, a Full Bench of this Court has laid down the parameters of the exercise of the writ jurisdiction by the superior Courts in the following paragraph:- "An order in the nature of a writ of certiorari or mandamus is a discretionary order. Its object is to foster justice and right a wrong. Therefore, before a person can be permitted to invoke this discretionary power of a Court, it must be shown that the order sought to be set aside had occasioned some injustice to the parties. If it does not work any injustice to any party, rather it cures a manifest illegality, then the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not to be allowed to be invoked."
7. In support of the principle enunciated in the precedent case of Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali (supra), the learned Chief Justice and the Judges followed the law consistently upheld in England and made pointed reference to the cases of (1) Reg v. Eastbourne Corporation (1900) 83 LTR 338, (2) The Queen v. The Eastern Counties Railway (1843) 12 LJR 271 and (3) The Queen v. Lord Newborough (1869) LR 4 QB 585.
8. In the same manner, in the incident case, if the High Court, in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of 1973, came to the conclusion that the orders of respondents Nos.4 and 5 cancelling the impugned mutation were illegal and without jurisdiction, and those of respondent No,3 justifiable particularly on the ground of the conduct of the petitioner himself to have sold the land to respondent No,1 and then attempting to take ill-gotton gain, it could legitimately refuse to set aside the orders of respondent No,3, even though the latter was clearly without jurisdiction. We are, however, convinced that the orders passed by respondent No,3 were not shown in any manner to be violative of paragraph 24 of the Regulation. In this context reference may be made to Settlement Authority and others v. Mst. Akhtar Sultana PLD 1976 SC 410, wherein a Full Bench of this Court upheld the principle that where an authority of exclusive jurisdiction has taken certain act, which is well within its competence, the High Court should be slow to interfere with the act of such authority, and, therefore, should not have interfered with the auction held under orders of the Central Government.
9. Another principle in the realm of writ jurisdiction well entenched in our system as elsewhere is that a void order is not always to be struck down regardless of the consequences of such a decision, but that a void order shall be struck down provided there is no statute or principle of law which would make it unjust or inequitable to strike it down. In S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and another 1978 SCM R 367, this clarification was termed as very important and that is why, for example, a writ may be refused against a void order if this would enable the petitioner to circumvent the provisions of a statute. Similarly in Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din v.
Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1964 SC 829 a writ petition had been filed against an order which this Court held was void. Nonetheless the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by acquiescence on the part of the petitioner. There is also ample authority for the proposition that a. Writ against a void order may be dismissed if the petitioner is estopped by his conduct from challenging it or if he has been guilty of laches.
10. In the instant case, as stated earlier, the petitioner having himself sold the land to respondent No,1 and getting the mutation therefor attested long before the writ was filed in the High Court. The petitioner is, therefore, estopped not only by acquiescence but also by his conduct from challenging it.
11. This petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed.
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