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2007 YLR 1700

GHTJLAM MUHAMMAD and 3 others vs Mst. MARYAM BATOOL and 32 others

Citation2007 YLR 1700
CourtLahore High Court
Case No.Civil Revision No.2368 of 2001,
Date2007-03-02
Judge(s)Syed Asghar Haider
ResultPetition dismissed

' SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, J.--- The respondents Maryam Batool, Shainal Mehmood and Farrukh Mehmood filed an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Through their next friend, Mst. Jehan Afrooz, to get, set aside the judgment and decree dated 4-9-1990 passed by the Additional District Judge, Khushab, passed pursuant to a compromise made in appeal titled Shainal Mehmood and others v. Ghulam Muhammad and others, pleading that compromise (Exh.C.1/1/3) was a result of fraud, misrepresentation and without jurisdiction, being violative of the provisions of Order XXXII, rule 7, C.P.C. And also detrimental to their rights. The petitioner Ghulam Muhammad contested the application, filed reply, whereafter the following issues were framed.

' ISSUES:--

(1) Whether the petition is time-barred? OPR

(2) Whether the petitioners are estopped by their word and conduct to file this application? OPR

(3) Whether the petition is not maintainable in its present form? OPR

(4) Whether the impugned order dated 4-9-1990 is based on fraud, misrepresentation and liable to be set aside? OPP

(5) Relief.

' After contest, the application was allowed, the compromise and decree was set aside, observing that appeal shall be deemed to be pending and be decided, thereafter in accordance with law.

Aggrieved thereof, the petitioners filed the present petition.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the petition was barred by time, the application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Is not maintainable, the minors had turned major earlier to the filing of the petition, non-adherence to the provisions of Order XXXII, rule 7, C.P.C. Is a mere procedural irregularity and cannot vitiate the compromise and decree, thus the compromise is legally effective and binding upon the parties and the application does not fall within the ambit of fraud and misrepresentation. To fortify his contentions, he relied upon the following precedents:~ (PLD 1991 Supreme Court 197) "Government of Sindh and another v. Ch. Fazal Muhammad and another", (PLD 1991 Supreme Court 202) "Safdar Ali and others v. The State and another", (1998 SCMR 1078) "Abdul Aziz and 6 others v. The Member, Board of Revenue and 15 others", (PLD 2002 Supreme Court 403) "Dilmir v. Ghulam Muhammad and 2 others", (PLD 2005 Lah. 74) "Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi v, Muhammad Bashir", (1997 SCMR 134) "Taj Din and another v. Mst. Mehr and 7 others" and (1993 SCMR 710) "Lai Din and another v. Muhammad Ibrahim".

3. The learned counsel for the respondents defended the impugned judgment and stated that the provisions of Order XXXII, rule 7, C.P.C. Are mandatory and binding upon the parties and any deviation in that respect is fatal, thus decree cannot sustain. To augment their submissions, they relied upon the following precedents:~ (2001 MLD 740) "Tassadaq Hussain and another v. Afzal Mumtaz and 2 others", (2003 CLC 1792)

"Hafiz Muhammad Islam v. Muhammad Bashir", (2003 CLC 1798) "Communication and Works Department through Secretary v. Messrs Pavital/PIVATO Joint Venture and 2 others", (1985 SCMR 1228) "Syed Muhammad Anwar, Advocate v. Sheikh Abdul Haq", (1985 SCMR 1232) "Bashir Ahmad v.

Ahmad-ul-Haq Siddiqui" and (1980 SCMR 267) "Smt. Vidayabai and others v. Moorajmal".

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment.1 .

5. The proposition as put up by learned counsel for the parties relates-to interpretation of Order XXXII, rule 7, C.P.C., and its effect, in case, the provisions are not complied with and adhered to. Before adverting further, it would be appropriate to point out that Issues Nos.l to 3 were not pressed by the petitioners during the proceedings in application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Before the learned Additional District Judge, Khushab, the other grounds addressed today were either given up or not raised before the appropriate forum, therefore,, they cannot be permitted to be urged. Thus, the matter shall be confined to Issue No.4 only.

' Rule 7 of Order XXXII reads :- "Agreement or compromise bv next friend or guardian for the suit.-

(1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian."

A bare reading of Rule 7, C.P.C. Makes it explicit and clear that no next friend or guardian shall without leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of the minor, thus proceedings to the contrary cannot sustain. No express leave was obtained by the Court nor was it so recorded, in the stated proceedings, therefore, mandatory provisions of Order XXXII, rule 7, C.P.C. Were not complied with. Now adverting to the submission of the learned counsel, that non-adherence to this provision is a mere procedural deviation and not fatal to the proceedings. I am afraid the contention of the learned counsel is without force, it is incumbent upon (he parties as well as the Court to adhere to the procedure prescribed, because any departure in this context can compromise vital interests of the minors.

The Court itself is bound to ensure compliance and cannot permit departure in this context.

Therefore, adherence to procedure is absolute and unqualified, the rigor is so strict, that not only the parties are required to follow it, but the Court itself is required to oversee compliance. Where law required a thing to be done in a particular way, it has to be so done. As procedure ordained was not adhered to, therefore, the compromise and decree was rightly set aside. The matter does not relate to non-adherence of procedure only but tantamounts to violation of procedure.

Therefore, it is fatal to the proceedings and as such the compromise and decree pursuant thereto cannot sustain. All precedents except (1997 SCMR 134) "Taj Din and another v. Mst. Mehr Mai and 7 others" are distinguishable on facts as they do not relate to the proposition in hand. Even the precedent cited supra does not help the cause of the petitioner as it has been clearly stated in it, that it is the duty of the Court if need be to appoint guardian, but no guardian was appointed in the present matter.

6. Thus, the impugned judgment is in complete harmony and consonance with law. Resultantly, this petition has no merits and is dismissed. No order as to costs.

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