' The brief facts giving rise to this revision petition are that petitioner was owner of land measuring 3 Kanals and 16 Marlas bearing Khasra No,6151 situated in Chunian according to Jamabandi 1958-59.
Out of said Khasra Number petitioner sold away some land by way of different sale-transaction and at the time of filing the suit he was owner of land measuring 1 Kanal and 18 Marlas. The contents of the plaint reveal that petitioner had enmity with respondent No,1 who to cause damage to him by playing collusion with other respondents took over the possession of land to the extent of 1/2 marlas. The petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction' but the same was dismissed as respondents at the time of filing of that suit completed through possession. The petitioner filed present suit on 25-5-1975 for possession after demolishing structure from the suit land. The respondents filed written statement controverted the allegations levelled in the plaint. Out of the pleadings of the parties. The trial Court framed the following:-- ISSUES:
(1) Whether the suit land belongs to the plaintiff? OPP
(2) Whether the defendants have constructed mosque over the suit land without prior permission of the plaintiff? If so, what effect? OPP
(3) Whether the suit is barred under res judicata? OPD (based upon preliminary objection No,2).
(4) Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form? OPD
(5) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD
(6) Whether the suit is frivolous and vexatious and the defendants are entitled to special costs?
ON)
(7) Relief.
' The trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment, and decree dated 5-11-1986. The petitioner being aggrieved filed appeal before the learned District Judge, who disposed of the same vide judgment and decree, dated 24-6-1987 as the Iearned counsel for the petitioner made offer which was accepted by the learned counsel for the respondents; hence the present revision petitioner.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that impugned judgment is beyond the scope of statement of the counsel for the petitioner. The respondents denied the possession and ownership of the petitioner in their written statement, therefore, impugned judgment is result of misreading and non-reading of the record; that the management of the, mosque was not a matter in dispute, but the question 'of illegal construction of the mosque and re-delivery of possession, of the land in dispute to the petitioner were involved in the case. The statement of petitioner's counsel was wholly irrelevant and uncalled for; that the compromise was unlawful inasmuch as consent of the petitioner was never obtained at any stage of the case before passing the decree as the contents of Power of Attorney do not authorise the petitioner's counsel to give statement to settle the dispute by way of compromise. He relied upon the following judgments:- ' AIR 1968 Ker. 213; AIR 1960 Bom.20 and KLR 1990 CC 587.
' He further stated that compromise decree is beyond the scope of the suit, the 1st appellate Court did not advert to the contents of the plaint and written statement, therefore, impugned judgment is result of misreading and non-reading of record; that petitioner has never given any express or implied permission to his counsel to compromise the suit in the above manner, therefore, statement of his counsel is not binding; that statement of petitioner's counsel is against law as the petitioner's counsel does not ask from him about his faith and Chairty cannot be made without the permission of petitioner; that Mosque has been constructed on the land of the petitioner without his consent, therefore, the same is in violation of the Injunction of Islam.
3. The learned counsel for the respondents raised preliminary objection that revision petition is not maintainable as the 1st Appellate Court passed consent decree against the petitioner by virtue of section 96 of C.P.C.; that the contents of power of attorney clearly reveal that petitioner's counsel is competent to give the statement before the Court which was accepted by the learned counsel for respondents, therefore, judgment of the 1st Appellate Court is in accordance with law laid down by the superior Courts in the following judgments: ' 1994 SCMR 1248; 1971 SCMR 634; 1982 CLC 2029; AIR 1930 PC 158; 1979 CLC 518; PLD 1969 Lah. 365 and 1979 CLC 337.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the contents of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record myself. It is better and appropriate to reproduce the operative part of the offer of the learned counsel for the parties:--{{URDU TEXT}} ' The aforesaid statements of the learned counsel for the parties reveal that offer of petitioner's counsel contained two options--- which are as follows--
(1) to withdraw the appeal in case the respondents shall pay the price/ consideration of the land in question;
(2) the management of Mosque be handed over to petitioner, then petitioner shall withdraw the appeal.
' The statements of respondents' counsel clearly reveal that he accepted second offer of petitioner's counsel. The suit was decreed by the learned 1st Appellate Court in view of the statement of learned counsel for the parties. It is admitted fact that 1st Appellate Court passed the consent decree against the petitioner on 24-6-1987; the petitioner has two alternative remedies to agitate the consent decree by way of filing review before the 1st Appellate Court or application under section 12(2), C.P.C. It is also admitted fact that the petitioner has only challenged authority his counsel and neither filed any suit for damages nor filed an application/-complaint for professional misconduct against his Advocate. In such situation the statement of petitioner's counsel must be given due weight. It is settled proposition of law that Advocates are competent to give statement on behalf of the parties as the contents of the power of attorney duly authorised them to do so as the principle laid down in the following judgments: ' Rehmat Ali's case 1985 CLC 72; Wher Ali's case 1982 CLC 2029; Wourndra Nath Mathra's case AIR 1930 PC 158; 1994 SCMR 1248; 1971 SCMR 634; 1979 CLC 518; PLD 1969 Lah. 365 and 1979 CLC 337.
The offer as mentioned above made by the petitioner's counsel and accepted by the respondents' counsel; the statements of the learned counsel for the parties are binding upon the parties, therefore, parties cannot resile from it as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Saleem Ahmad's case 1974 SCMR 224. I am also fortified by the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court 1997 SCMR 1079 Mst. Bashiran Bibi's case and 1972 SCMR 567 Muhammad Humayun Khan's case . In the present case contract arrived at between the parties through their counsel was neither void nor frustrated, therefore, it was consent decree, hence, revision against the consent decree is not maintainable by virtue of section 96(3), C . P.C.
' In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merits in this revision petition and the same is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.