' The facts giving rise to this regular second appeal are that the respondent, Muhammad Pervez and three others, filed a suit against the appellants, Jang Bahadur and three others, for possession cif a piece of land by pre-emption. The suit land was sold for an ostensible sale price of Rs, 9,400.
The respondents, however, contended that the sale had taken place, in fact, for Rs, 1,425. The trial Court found that the sale price of Rs, 9,400 was neither fixed in good faith nor actually paid. The market value of the suit land at the time of its sale, in the opinion of the said Court, was Rs, 3,048.
The suit was, therefore, decreed on the payment of Rs, 3,048.
2. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court the defendants went in appeal before the District Judge. During the course of arguments before him, learned counsel for the plaintiffs offered to pay Rs, 4,000 as sale price and this offer was accepted by the learned counsel on other side. The learned District Judge, therefore, fixed the market value at Rs, 4,000 and modified the decree accordingly. As the defendants were not satisfied with the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, they have come up in second appeal to this Court.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the learned counsel who represented them before the first appellate Court had no authority t accept the offer of Rs, 4,000 made by the learned counsel for the respondents. This is, however, not 'correct. I have gone through the Vakalatnam executed by the appellants in favour of their counsel. It is on the file o the learned District Judge. In this Vakalatnama, they clearly authorised their counsel to make any statement or enter into compromise on the' behalf. Learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to cite any law or other authority on the point that in spite of the aforesaid authorisatio by the appellants, which is embodied in the Vakalatnama, their counsel could not accept the offer made by the opposite counsel without securing separate authority from them in this regard. In my view, the authorit given to him by means of the Vakalatnama was enough for the purpose. They cannot, therefore, now wriggle out of the commitment made, by their counsel on their behalf.
4. No other point was raised by the learned counsel for the appellants.
5. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limine.