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1971 SCMR 634

DR. ANSAR HASSAN RIZVI vs Syed MAZAHIR HUSSAIN ZAIDI AND 3 Other

Citation1971 SCMR 634
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K-83 of 1971 L. P. A. No. 140 of
Judge(s)N/A
ResultLeave refused

1. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.-Petitioner, Dr. Ansar Hassan Rizvi, has challenged the legality of the order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Sind and Baluchistan passed in a Letters Patent Appeal, declaring the order of the Chief Settlement and Rehabili--tation Commissioner, dated the 25th August 1961, and the order of the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, dated the 4th April 1960, as without lawful authority. Both these orders are in favour of the petitioner, and they held that the disputed house had been rightly transferred to him on the basis of his possession.

2. According to the petitioner, he and respondent No. 1 Syed Mazahir Hussain Zaidi, came to possess two adjacent houses bearing -Rehabilitation Nos. 57 and 55 in the year 1948. The petitioner claims that he was in continuous possession of House No. 57 till the 28th of February 1959, when he was forcibly ejected by the Rehabilitation authorities. It has been stated that the disputed house, namely; No. 57, is an independent-self-- contained unit. In a memorandum of the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, dated the 9th of July 1956, it has been stated that the portions with the petitioner and respondent No. 1 have sufficient accommodation, and status quo should, therefore, be maintained. Respondent No. 1 filed an. Appeal before the Addi--tional Rehabilitation Commissioner from the aforesaid order of the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner and asked for ejecting the petitioner from the said house No. 57, but the appeal was dismissed on the 18th of August 1957. Respondent No.1 preferred a revision before the Rehabilitation Commissioner from the said order of the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner. Respondent No. 2 was not a party to these proceedings. On the 24th January 1958, the Rehabilitation Commissioner passed an order on the basis of a compromise. The compromise was to the effect that the petitioner should vacate the said house No. 57, and go over to house No. 105 which the respondent No. 1 undertook to vacate for the petitioner. It may be mentioned here that in the said revision proceeding the petitioner admitted that he had entered into possession of the disputed house with the permission of respondent No. 1. The petitioner filed an applica--tion for review from the said order dated the 24th January 1958, but it was dismissed on the 22nd February 1958. The petitioner, therefore, filed Writ Petition No. 93 of 1958 in the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi, which was disposed of in terms of a com--promise consented to by the petitioner's Advocate (vide Exh. `E'). The petitioner's review application from the said order of the High Court was dismissed by a Division Bench on the 19th February 1959 (vide Exh. `F').

3. The petitioner has alleged that respondent No. 1 forcibly occupied the disputed house on the 28th February 1959, in the absence of the petitioner. The petitioner has further stated that in pursuance of a notice dated 21st May 1959, inviting applica--tions under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilita--tion) Act, 1958, for transfer of houses .In possession of the claimants on and since the 20th -December 1958, he filed a C. H. Form on the 30th of May 1959, for transfer of the disputed house and claimed continuous possession from 1948 till the 28th of February 1959. The Provisional Transfer Order was issued to the petitioner on the 23rd November 1959. Respondent No. 1 alleged to have filed C. H. Form for the transfer of both the houses Nos. 56 and 57 although he was in possession of House No. 56 only. On the 1st of December 1959, the Deputy Settle--ment and Rehabilitation Commissioner after notice to the respondents, cancelled the aforesaid P. T. O. Pertaining to House No. 57, on the ground that the respondents were neither allottees nor in possession of the house in accordance with the Settlement Scheme. Having been aggrieved by this order, respondent No. 1 filed an appeal before the Additional Settlement and Rehabilita--tion Commissioner and the appeal was allowed on the 1st of March 1960. On the 4th of April 1960, however, the petitioner's revisional application was allowed by the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, and it was, inter alia, found that house No. 57 was a self-contained house (vide Exh. J). The revision petition of respondent No. 1 from the aforesaid order dated 4-4- 1960, was dismissed by the Chief Settlement Commis--sioner on the 25th August 1961 (vide Exh. A).

4. Subsequently, a Permanent Transfer Deed (Exh. L) was issued to the petitioner. Both respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed Writ Petition No. 144 of 1963, and challenged therein the legality of the aforesaid two orders dated the 4th April 1960, and the 25th August 1961, on the ground of divisibility of the house, and of unauthorised possession of the petitioner. This petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on the 24th August 1965. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 thereafter filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 140 of 1965, which was allowed on the 8th of April 1971, and the said two impugned orders were declared as without lawful authority. Hence the present petition for special leave to appeal.

5. The learned Judges of the High Court held in the Letters Patent Appeal that the petitioner was not in possession of the disputed house within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. In our opinion, the Court was well within its jurisdiction to do so. The finding of the Court is fully supported by the fact that the petitioner had himself admitted that he had come to possess the disputed house with the permission of respondent Syed Mazahir Hussain, and that on the date he applied for transfer of the house in dispute he was not in possession of it.

6. The possession, such as has been claimed by the petitioner, is not contemplated under section 2, subsection (6) of the aforesaid Act, which runs as follows :- "(6) Possession.-' Possession' means possession obtained in pursuance of an order passed on or before the 20th day of December 1958, by Rehabilitation Authority or any other officer authorised or permitted by the Central or Provincial Governments : Provided that if a question arises whether an officer was so authorised or permitted the decision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner in that behalf shall be final: Provided further that the Central Government may, by order in writing direct that a class or classes of such persons as have not obtained possession as aforesaid shall subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, be deemed to be in possession for the purpose of this Act."

7. Besides the petitioner's possession of the disputed house before the crucial date, i.e., the 20th of December 1958, has been disputed.

8. It is pertinent to mention here that the matter had been compromised twice, once before the Rehabilitation Commissioner on the 24th January 1958, and again before the High Court on the 7th January 1959, and the petitioner had agreed to vacate the disputed house.

9. The contention that the Advocate of the petitioner had no authority to compromise the Matter on behalf of the petitioner is untenable. The Privy Council has held in the case of Sourendra Nath Mitra and others v. Tarubala Dasi (AIR 1930 P C 158), that unless there is specific authority to the contrary, and in the absence of a written authority such as a vakalatnama an Advocate has implied authority of his client to settle the suit. It has not been contended that the learned Advocate concerned held any vakalatnama which expressly or impliedly debarred him from entering into a com--promise. Nor anything has been produced to show that the learned Advocate's implied authority was countermanded by the express direction of his client.

10. In these circumstances if the learned Judges of the High Court in the Letters Patent Appeal felt that there was no legal basis for the two impugned orders, we are unable to find any fault with it.

11. It seems to us, however, that the Settlement Authorities were of the opinion that the house was divisible, and consisted of two self-contained units. If this be true, respondent No. 1 could not get both the units. It is, however, for the Settlement Authorities to take such steps as they may be advised.

12. With these observations we dismiss the petition.

Cited by 24 cases

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