' This is an appeal against the order dated 25-5-1976 passed by the District Judge, Gujranwala by which he dismissed the appellant's appeal under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance against the order of his eviction passed by the Rent Controller on the 17th of May, 1975. The admitted facts are that the premises in dispute are residential in character and have been under the tenancy of the appellant for the purpose of residence and that they are a part of a bigger residential building. The respondent's application for ejectment was based on two grounds. The first ground was that of default while the second was of personal requirement for use of the premises as a free dispensary for charitable purposes. Both the grounds were contested. The rate of rent as claimed by the respondent was also disputed. The issues framed on that question as well as about default were decided in favour of the tenant (appellant). Issue No, 3 was found in favour of the respondent and it was held that he required the property bona fide for his personal need to set up a free dispensary. The learned Rent Controller allowed the application for ejectment subject to the respondent's depositing in proof of his bona fides a sum of Rs, 75,000 in the name of Fazal Free Dispensary within one month, in default of which the application for ejectment was liable to fail. It is not disputed that this amount was deposited in time thus rendering the ejectment order operative. The learned District Judge maintained the eviction order on the same ground.
2. This appeal was admitted to a hearing to consider the question whether opening of a Free Dispensary was covered by the words "own use" in section 13(a)(ii) or whether a residential building could be got vacated for use as a non-residential building.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant argued both these points. He particularly argued that the purpose for which the ejctment order had been passed is a purpose for use of the premises for business or trade. According to him business or trade does not necessarily involve profit seeking. In addition he also addressed arguments on the question whether the respondent had been able to prove his bona fides.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the appellant is not being ejected for use of the premises for business or trade. Consequently it is not at all an ejectment for residential premises. He argued that trade or business necessarily involve an intention to earn profits, In the present case the respondent is seeking the ejectment for setting up a free dispensary. This object does not involve conversion of a residential property into a non-residential property. He further urged that the question whether the requirement of the respondent was bona fide, is a question which is determined by a finding of fact.
5. I agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that if the respondent has a right to seek the ejectment of the appellant with the object of setting up a Free Dispensary, the question whether his requirement is bona fide is concluded by a finding of fact. The only questions to be considered, therefore, are the legal questions.
6. Section 13(3) allows a landlord to apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession (1) in the case of a residential building, if he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children and if he is not occupying another residential building suitable for his needs at the time, in the same urban area in which such building is situated an (ii) in the case of nonresidential building, if he requires it in good faith for his own use and for the use of his male children and he or his said child is not occupying in the same urban area any such building or rented land suitable for the purpose of his business or needs. It is clear from these provisions that a residential building can be acquired by him for his own occupation or for occupation of any of his children provided he is not occupying any other residential buildings suitable for his needs in the same urban area. He can require a non- residential building, if he requires it for his own use or for the use of his male children and he or his child are not occupying any non-residential building for the purpose of his business which may be said to be for bis needs.
7. The expressions 'residential building' and 'non-residential building' are defined in section 2, clauses (d) and (g), A non-residential building means a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade. A residential building on the other hand means any building which is not a non-residential building. Evidently a building which is of a composite character and is being used partly for the purposes of business or trade and partly for other purposes will still remain a residential building. Even if the purpose of setting up a Free Dispensary be deemed to be a purpose of business on trade, a part of the building being in use as residence the character of the disputed building shall still remain residential since the portions of the building other than the disputed.
Premises are in use for purposes of residence IA This will not involve conversion of a residential building into a nonresidential one.
8. Even if it involves such a conversion, the appellant cannot have grievance on that score since section 11 authorises a Rent Controller to allow such conversion by an order in writing. The finding and order of the Rent Controller as maintained by the first appellate Court would amount to permission as required by the above section.
9. The next question is whether the respondent requires the building for trade or business. The words "trade or business" are not defined in the Ordinance or in the General Ciauses Act. The expression "trade" according to Oxford English Dictionary means "the practice of some occupation, business, or profession habitually carried on, especially, when practised as a means of livelihood or gain ; a calling ; formerly used very widely, including professions ; now usually applied to a mercantile occupation and to a skilled handicraft, as distinct from a profession and specially restricted to a skilled handicraft, as distinguished from a professional or mercantile occupation on the one hand, and from unskilled labour on the other." In short it means "anything practised for a livelihood". The expression "business" on the other hand has more extensive meaning than the wore "trade" Harris v. Amery (1) (per Willes, J.). Since it may include occupations which would not strictly come within the meaning of the word "trade" Rolls v. Miller (2) (per Pearson, I.). But this expression also means "anything which occupies the time and attention and labour of a man, for the purpose of profit". Smith v. Anderson (3) (per Jessel M. R.). The amplitude of the term "business" was explained by an illustration by Jesse! M. R. In this case. He remarked that :- "There are many things which in common colloquial English would not be called a business, when carried on by a single person, which would be so called when carried on by a number of persons.
For instance a man who is the owner of a house divided into several floors and used for commercial purposes, e g. Offices would not be said to carry on a business because he let the offices as such. But suppose a company was formed for the purpose of buying a building, or leasing a house, to be divided into offices and to be let out-should not we say, if that was the object of the company, that the company was carrying on business for the purpose of letting offices? The same observation may be made as regards a single individual buying or selling land, with this addition, that he may make it a business, and then it is a question of continuity. When you come to an association or company formed for a purpose, you would say at once that it is a business, because there you have that from which you would infer continuity. So in the ordinary case of investments, (1)LR 1 CP148 (2) 53 L J Ch. 101
(3) 15 Ch. D 258 a man who has money to invest, the object being to obtain his income, invests his money, and he may occasionally sell the investments and buy others, but he is not carrying on a business."
' A literary society was not, therefore, held to be a business. (Re Bristol Authenaeum (1).
10. There are cases in which it has been held that in its wider amplitude the word "trade" may not be confined to sell or purchase and may be extended to include manufacture. Such cases are referred to in Chopda Municipality v. Motilal (2). But the common object of "trade" or "business" has generally been considered to be the earning of livelihood. Any activity whether of trade or business is commercial in nature and has to be distinguished from extra-commercial activities like gambling. State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala (3).
11. The words "trade" or "business" in the definition of non-residential building in section 2 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, have not been used in a different sense. They clearly denote an activity the object of which is to earn profit and not to purchase or procure things (medicines) for the purpose of distribution by way of charity among the poor. I, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the object of ejectment in the present case is not an object connected, in any manner, to a trade or business or an object with which ejectment of a tenant from a non-residential building is permissible under the Ordinance.
12. Lastly the question is whether requirement of the premises for being used for charitable purposes is recognised by the Ordinance as a ground for ejectment from a residential building.
Section 13(3) (a) as stated above, allows a landlord to claim ejectment of a tenant of a residential building only if ho requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children It was held in Mumtaz Hamayum v. Habib.Ur-Rahman (4) that the emphasis in this provision is more on the words "own occupation" rather than on the word "requires". It was further held that 'need' not always be personal in the sense of contituting his strictly individual and personal need, but it may be a need for one's children. But then it must be the need of the children and no other relation. In Adam Ati Hussan All v. Rabab Bhai (5), the scope of the needs of the landlord was d scussed. It was held that the needs of the landlord cannot be discriminated so as to separate the inner needs and outer needs of his body because both of them are projected on his environments. His hunger may be projected in the form of a need for servants ; nor can "his needs" be restricted to physical needs in contradistinction to social, economic, intellectual, emotional and spiritual needs, which may be projected in the form of a need for a sitting room, for an office, for a wife, for children, for a room reserved for prayers or for a room reserved for maintaining a library.
The needs would differ from landlord to landlord and some of those which may be genuine in one case, may not be so in another case ; nor is it open to the landlord to declare his needs as his own subjective decisions, firstly, because' his needs reflect the ideas of the society and secondly because his rights are controlled by the society. The character of the social order to which he belongs places the general limits on his needs and his own characteristics place special limits on them. In Abdus Salam Akhtar v. Dr. Najam Parvaiz
(1) 43 Ch. D 236 (2) AIR 1958 Born. 487
(3) AIR 1957 SC C99 (4) PLD 1969 Lah. 886
(5) PLD 1965 Kar. 408 (6) 1976 SC MR 52 ' it was held that personal need of the landlord includes need of those dependent on him including needs of family members.
13. Applying the principles of these authorities it will be clear that "own occupation" by the landlord may include the occupation for need of his dependants and that need might also have arisen due to the circumstances of his life, his social status or position, his social, moral or legal obligations etc. He may even need a sitting room, a room for an office, room for wife and children, room for prayer, room for his own library but his requirement must be of personal occupation for the purpose of residence. The opening of a mere dispensary is neither such an occupation nor involves personal occupation of the property, since admittedly the respondent does not belong to the medical profession. Opening of Free Dispensary is really a charitable object which involves the use of the premises for the benefit of the public and not for the visible benefit of the landlord though the ultimate object of the charity may be his spiritual aggrandisement. However laudable the object with which the respondent has submitted the application for ejectment, it does not fall within the scope of section 13 of the Ordinance. I have, therefore, no alternative but to allow this appeal and set aside the orders of the Rent Controller and the first appellate Court and dismiss the application for ejectment. I order accordingly. I will, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.