The property in dispute which is a portion of 'property No. G-492, situated at D. A. V. College Road, Rawalpindi, was let out by the respondent to the appellant for the business - of a News Agency. The respondent filed an application under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, for ejectment of the appellant from the said premises on the ground that though the property had been let out for purposes of residence but the latter had converted it into business premises and was using it for commercial purposes, that he had made material alterations in the premises without his permission and thus caused damage materially impairing the value of the property and that the same was required in good faith for his personal use as he did not have any other place for residence except the said premises.
2. This application .Was contested by the appellant. He pleaded that he had obtained the premises for commercial purposes of the News Agency and had made some alterations in the structure with the permission of the respondent to make it fit for the business of the said Agency. He further pleaded that neither the property in dispute was required for personal use as a residence nor it could be so required since it was not residential premises. It was also stated that the appellant had already with him sufficient accommodation.
3. The learned Rent Controller has framed the following issues
(1) What is the nature of rented property? If it is commercial then what is its effect on the petition?
(2) Whether the respondent has caused damage to the rented property?
(3) Whether the petitioner requires in good faith the rented property for his personal use?
(4) Relief.
4. The learned Rent Controller decided all the issues against the respondent and dismissed the application by order dated the 12th January 1971. The respondent filed an appeal against this order.
The learned Additional District Judge upheld the findings of the learned Rent Controller on issues Nos. 1 and 2. He found that the premises in dispute were not let out for residential purposes and consequently no question of conversion of the residential premises into non-residential premises without the permis--sion of the Rent Controller arose. He also agreed with the finding of the learned Rent Controller that there was no cogent evidence to prove damage to the property. The learned Additional District Judge, however, reversed the .Finding of the learned Rent Controller on issue No. 3 and ordered eviction of the appellant on ground of requirement of the premises for residential use vide order dated the 19th February 1974.
5. Hence this second appeal.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the premises in dispute being used for commercial purposes and being non-residential in character could not be obtained by the respondent except for use as a shop. He further argued that though the- premises in dispute was a part of' a bigger building but for determining whether the building is residential or non-residential only the use of the portion in dispute should be taken into consideration and not the use to which the entire building is being put. Lastly, he argued that the respondent was already in possession of the house except those portions which were let out for commercial purposes and the ejectment order could not be passed in the absence of proof that the premises already in possession of the respondent was insufficient or unsuitable for his need.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, urged that in view of section 11 of the Ordinance even the respondent had no right to convert the residential premises to non-residential premises for inducting the appellant as a tenant, without the permission of the Rent Controller. As such the premises in dispute would still be considered to be a part of the residential premises and could be caused to be vacated by the respondent for residential purposes. He also submitted that the premises in dispute being a part of a composite building would be treated to be residential in character in view of the definition of 'residential building' in section 2 of the Ordinance. He further argued that even if the premises in dispute be treated to be non-residential, no permission of the Rent Controller would be required for its conversion into residential premises. Lastly he submitted that the other portion of the house which was in possession of the respondent could not be utilised suitably without the premises in dispute which formed the only Baithak or a residential house.
8. The first question is whether the premises in dispute should considered to be a building or a part of a composite building. The expression 'residential building' is defined in subsection (g) of section of the Ordinance as meaning "any building which is not a non-residential building". A "non- residential. Building" is defined in subsection (d) of the same section as meaning "a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade". The implications of these two provisions is very; clear that unless a building is used solely for the purpose of business or trade it will be treated to be a residential building even though some parts of the building may be used for residential purposes and the other parts may be in use for non-residential purposes. This finds support from Muhammad Amin Beg v. Pir Muhammad Khan (PLD 196 5 Lah. 385If the entire building be taken into consideration there is no doubt that since a part of the building is being used for residential purposes, even the portions used for the purpose of business be treated to be a part of a residential building.
(1)
9. To meet this objection the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Muhammad Bashir v.
Sultan Mahmood Khan (PLD 1975 Lah 254He alsorelied upon the definition of the word 'building' in subsection (a) of section 2 as meaning "any building or part of a building". In view of this definition it was held in the above-mentioned case that only' that part of the building is a building within the meaning of the term in section 2(a) of the Ordinance which has been let out for any purpose. The portion which remains in possession of the landlord, although it be part of the building in ordinary parlance, will not fall within the definition of the word ,building' in section 2!a). The 'residential building' will mean, if the whole building is rented out either for residential purpose alone or for partly residential and partly commercial purposes, the whole building and in case only a portion of the building has been rented out either exclusively for residential purposes or partly for purpose of residence and partly for purpose of business, the rented portion of the building. If the let out portion of a bigger building is not used either solely for residential purposes or partly for residential and partly for commercial purposes it will fall within the definition of the expression 'non-residential building'. While considering these three definitions, therefore, the portion of the building which has not been rented out by the landlord and is in his actual possession cannot be taken into consideration. In determining the nature of the portion in dispute, therefore, any portion of the building in possession of the landlord is to be ignored from consideration. Similar view was taken in Manzur Ahmad v. Muhammad Hanif (PLD 1970 Lah. 391) and Muhammad Ibrahim v. Surraya Sultana (PLD 1966 Lah. 406). I am, therefore, in agreement with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that for applying the definitions o 'residential building' and 'non- residential building' only the premises in dispute shall be treated as a building. There is a finding of fact that the building, in dispute was let out by the respondent to the appellant for purposes of business. In view of this the premises in dispute which are being used exclusively for purposes of business shall be treated as non-residential building.
10. The learned counsel for the respondent challenged the correctness of this finding of fact. Such a challenge is not competent in a second appeal unless the finding is based on a misreading of evidence or material evidence is ignored. There is no such defect. On the other hand, I find that the finding is based on correct appreciation of evidence.
11. It was not disputed, and rightly so, that the business of News Agency falls within the expression 'trade or business'. The meaning of the expression was considered in Suba v. Siraj Din (PLD 1977 Lah. 1263), and it was held that any activity which is for the purpose of earning livelihood is that of trade or business. The premises in dispute is, therefore, a non-residential building.
12. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that even the respondent had no right to convert his residential premises into nonresidential premises by letting out the same for purposes of business to the appellant is without any merit. Firstly, the respondent would be estopped from taking this plea and approaching the Court or any Authority for giving effect to it if he had himself violated the law. Secondly, and that is a more important reason, section I1 would not apply to a case of conversion at the time of first letting out of any premises. This section provides that : "No person shall convert a residential building into a non-residential building, except with the permission in writing of the Controller."
The respondent's learned counsel argued that the bar is against all persons and 'generality' of the term "parson" cannot b;, curtailed by restricting its meaning to landlord- and tenant only. It must include even owner of property which is not let out.
13. But this argument ignores the definition of 'building' which means a building which has been let out for any purpose. A building, whether residential or non-residential, is a building and would be governed by this definition. It must be a building which has been let out and is with tenant. It is thus evident that notwithstanding the generality of the word `person' section 11 bars the conversion of the tenanted residential building.
14. The learned counsel, however, submitted that the definition of 'building' should not be applied to section 11 since the bar against conversion is not in respect of all buildings but only in respect of residential building. I have already held that a residential building is also a building but even if the definition of 'building' is not held applicable it will not help the respondent.
15. Now the object of the Ordinance as given in the preamble is to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom in the Province. All the sections of this statute deal with the disputes between landlord and tenant. Thus sections 4 to 9 deal with disputes about rent or its increase, section 10 relates to the amenities enjoyed by a tenant, section 12 is about the powers of the Rent Controller to allow a tenant in the circumstances referred to therein to carry on repairs of the tenanted premises and to deduct the cost so incurred from the rent payable by him, section 13 pertains to right of the landlord to evict his tenant, section 13-A explains circumstances when a tenant despite payment of rent may not be a defaulter, sections 14 to 17 are procedural, section 18 obligates landlord and tenant to furnish some particulars to the Rent Controller, section 19 sanctions penalties for contravention of some provisions of the Ordinance, section 20 authorises the .Government to make rules, section 21 repeals certain enactments and section 22 revives proceedings. All sections except section 11 makes it evident that they regulate the relationship between the landlord and tenant. Only section 11 is left vague in this respect. It provides that 'no person shall convert a residential building. Except with the permission of the landlord'. Words of general import 'owner of property' or 'new owner' have been used in sections 12-A and 13-A but these sections clarify by the use of corresponding word 'tenant' that owner of property means a landlord. But there is no such clarification in section 11.
Does the word `person' connote therefore that the bar and the section should be extended to all residential buildings whether tenanted or not? If the section is so widely interpreted as the learned counsel for the respondent would like, it will give rise to serious anomolies. In that case the landlord will not have a right to use the residential premises occupied by him, for purposes of business or trade without the permission of the Rent Controller. Similarly, where the landlord wishes for the first time to induct a tenant, be will not be able to rent out any portion of his residential premises for being put to commercial used without necessary permission. Does the Ordinance of 1959, which in the interest of the tenant has already placed restriction on the contractual rights of the landlosd in matter of settlement of rent, ejectment and conversion of his residential premises, restrict the enjoyment by him of his property even if it is not let out, by restricting the conversion of residential property into non-residential property. If so whose interest does the Ordinance serve. Certainly this could not be the object of this statute which has been enforced to regulate the relationship of landlord and tenant in order to primarily safeguard the latter's interest. Such an interpretation would be unreasonable. It would not advance the remedy but will only create mischief. It will be an encroachment on the right of property of the subject. There are certain well-established principles of interpretation of statute .-
(1) The primary is that Courts should give effect to the natural meaning of the word if they are clear enough. Government of Pakistan v. Akhlague Hussain, PLD 1965 SC 527 and Ghulam Sarwar v.
Imtlaz Nasir PLD 1966 SC 559.
(2) A statute should be read as a whole: "Every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, page 47). The meaning of a section may be controlled by other individual sections in the same Act. So, too, the apparently general language may be restricted by the more specific provision of the Statute.
(Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, pages 59, 60).
(3) Where a literal interpretation would lead to repugnancy to good sense, the Court may add words to the provision to be construed. The grammatical construction should be departed from if "it is at variance with the intention of the Legislature to be collected from the Statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further". Becke v. Smith (1836) 2 M & W. 191 (195), Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.), p. 43, Working Muslim Mission etc. v. Crown PLD 1956 FC 209) Pakistan Textile Mill Owners AssoJadon v. Administrator of Karachi PLD 1963 SC 137; Muhammad Ismail v. State PLD 1969 SC 241; Khawaja Cyhulam Sarwar v. Pakistan PLD 1962 SC 142; Abdul Mutalib v. Razia Begum PLD 1970 SC 185. An interpretation which advances the object of the Legislature should be preferred. Abdul Majid v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1968 SC 154.
(4) Statutes which encroach upon the rights of the subject, whether as regards person or property, are subject to a strict interpretation. The Court may properly lean in favour of the interpretation that leaves private rights undisturbed. Attorney-General of Canada v. Halle and Garey Ltd. PLD 1952 P C 29; Yousaf Ali v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 467 and Robert Chattan v.
Vassos Papadopoullos PLD 1959 P C 84.
The object of the Ordinance which is clear from not only its preamble but also all its provisions would thus be served by interpreting the wordlt "person" as confined to landlord and tenant. Any other interpretation would lead to manifest absurdity and without any rationale or rhyme or reason would disturb private rights.
16. The learned counsel placed reliance upon Abdul Ghafoor v. Salamat Ullah (PLD 1961 Lah. 233), Kadumal Kherajmal v. Dema Mal (PLD 1969 Quetta 21), and Malik Muhammad Salim v. Muhammad Sadaq and others (PLD 1977 Lah. 794). All these cases are, however, distinguishable and do not lay down such a wide proposition as is argued by the learned counsel for the respondent. These were all cases of tenanted premises where in disputes between the landlords and tenants, questions arose whether the tenants could be ejected at the instance of the landlords for use of the property which would necessitate conversion from residential to non-residential. In Abdul Ghafoor v.
Salamat Ullah a shop with its upper storey was the subject-.Matter of the dispute. The case of the landlord was that he needed the building for his personal residence as well as use, as a shop. It was contended on behalf of the tenant that the building was a scheduled building and could not be got vacated by the landlord except for its use as a scheduled building. It was held that the building was not a scheduled building and the landlord's need could- be given effect to since he required residential portion for his residence and ,the non-residential portion for his business..
During the course of the judgment it was observed that the main intent and object of the Ordinance is to control and regulate the ejectment of tenants by the landlords and not to take away the other rights or superior rights of the landlord to use the building for his requirement.
This case rather goes against the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent since it is clear from it that the object of the Rent Restriction Ordinance was pointed .Out as regulatory of the relationship of the landlord and tenant and not to take away any other right of the landlord to use his own building in any manner he likes.
17. In Kodumal Kherajmal v. Dema Mal it was admitted that the shop had been used as a Baithak for the last 10 or 11 years. It was held that there being. No bar to a conversion of the shop to residential purposes, the conversion of, a room into a Baithak or sitting room could not be objected to. The case is clearly distinguishable on facts since in the present case the premises in dispute have been held to be a separate building which is non-residential in character. In the last case reported in Malik Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Sadaq and others the property had been leased out for residential purposes though it was later converted into non-residential purposes by the tenant without the permission of the Rent Controller. It was in these circumstances that it was held that in spite of this conversion it did not lose the character of a residential building. This case is also not helpful to the respondent since it was a case of conversion by the tenant after the establishment of relationship of landlord and tenant of property which had been let out to him originally as a house.
18. I am, therefore, of the view that the property in dispute cannot be treated to be residential on the ground of any alleged violation of section 11 of the Ordinance by the respondent himself. As stated above, the respondent had the full right to let out a portion of his residential premises or even the whole of the residential portion for commercial purposes without the sanction of the Rent Controller. This objection is, therefore, repelled.
19. The next question raised by the learned counsel for the .Respondent is that since there is no bar to the conversion of non-residential premises into residential premises, he can apply for ejectment of the appellant even from the non-residential premises for being used by him for residential purposes. Section 13(3) deals with the right of the landlord to eject a tenant for requirement of the tenanted premises in good faith subject to certain conditions. These conditions, however, vary in case of residential and nonresidential premises. He can eject a tenant from a residential building if he proves that he is not occupying another residential building suitable for his needs in the same urban area in which such building is situated. He can apply for ejectment of the tenant from the non-residential building for his own use or for. The use of his male children only if he is not occupying in the same urban area any other building for the purposes inter alia of his building suitable for his needs at the time.
20. It is clear from a reading of these two clauses that the landlord can eject a tenant from a residential building if he requires the building for residential purposes and from a non-residential building if he requires it for trade or business since the question of his occupation of a non- residential building when he requires a residential building for his own use and question of residential building when he requires non-residential building for his own us would not be relevant except in the circumstances noted above. It necessarily follows that he can eject a tenant from the same for his personal use for the purposes of business or trade. Since the respondent requires a non-residential building for residential purposes, section 13 cannot help him.
21. I also agree with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that since the respondent is already in possession of a residential building he could not have sought the ejectment of the appellant without pleading that the said building was not suitable for his needs.
No such case is made out in the application for ejectment nor is there any evidence of such unsuitability.
22. None of these points have been taken into consideration by the learned Additional District Judge who has clearly erred in law in allowing the application for ejectment.
23. I allow this appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge and restore the order of the Rent Controller.