The facts, forming background of this case may be briefly narrated. An ejectment petition was filed by respondents Nos.1 and 2 on 11-5-1987 against the petitioner in respect of portion of property No. S-66-R-14 situated at 6-Maclagan Road, Lahore (first floor), being used by the petitioner as a residence. Ground for ejectment, as urged, was that the husbands of respondents Nos. l and 2 needed the disputed premises by way of additional accommodation for use as office, store and workshop. It was contended that the ground-floor of the property (presently in their possession) was to be converted into a show--room of Jewellery Shop and offices etc. Were to be shifted to the first floor. It was mentioned that the second floor was already with the landladies and it was being used as a workshop.
The petition was contested by the petitioner and several pleas were taken both on legal as well as factual plane. Almost four years were consumed in this contest. Ultimately, the learned Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment petition on 30-4-1991. Appeal was filed by respondents Nos. l and 2 which was accepted by Additional District Judge and eviction of the petitioner was ordered vide judgment dated 11-3-1993. A writ petition was filed by the petitioners (W.P. No.4616/93 which was accepted on 14-6-1994 and the matter was remanded to learned Additional District Judge for decision of the appeal afresh. In post remand proceedings of appeal, the learned Additional District Judge maintained his direction for eviction of the petitioner. This is vide judgment dated 28- 9-1994. Hence this writ petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that under the law, the respondents- landladies could not seek eviction of the disputed premises for use of their respective husbands. In this behalf, he has referred to section 13(3)(i)(a) of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 to contend that a plane reading of this provision leaves no room for doubt that the need of the husbands for a rented property cannot be treated to be need of the landladies (wives).
With a view to illustrate the point, he drew my attention to section 15(2)(vii) of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 and section 17(4), sub-clause (b)(i) of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963.
It Was also urged that the disputed premises presently being used for residential purpose cannot be got vacated for the purported commercial use i.e. Setting up the offices etc. Learned counsel contended that prior permission of Rent Controller under section 11 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 not having been obtained, the eviction application merited rejection.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the contesting respondents has argued that the disputed premises can be lawfully claimed to be vacated by them for use-of their husbands. It was also submitted that provisions of section 11 of the Ordinance was being misconstrued and that the permission of the Rent Controller in terms of this section was not called for.
4. Fate of this case hinges on interpretation of relevant provisions of law as the facts are not in dispute.
I propose to take up the plea of learned counsel for the petitioner for comparative study of relevant provisions dealing with the question of need for personal use of the landlord/landladies as available in different statutory instruments, in force, in our country. In my view, there is no need for this exercise. The present case arose out of proceedings under West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and only its relevant provision i.e. Section 13(3)(i)(a) is to be examined in the light of the precedent case-law so as to understand its true import.
The point for determination is as to whether the need of the husbands would be included in the personal need of the landladies (wives) or not. This question has been exhaustively dealt with in "Adamali Hasanali v. Mst. Rubab Bai" (PLD 1965 (W.P.) Karachi 408) and it has been that that expression "for his own occupation" as occurring in section 13(3)(i)(a) is to be construed liberally. At page 411 it has been laid down: "The above examination of the provisions of law on which counsel for the appellant has relied leads to the conclusion that the requirements of paragraph (b) have been properly taken into consideration by the learned District Judge and that the words 'for his own occupation' which occur in paragraph (a) should be taken to include all genuine requirements of the land and not to be restricted to the requirement of a shelter for his own body 'and the bodies of his children. This is indicated by the words 'suitable for his needs' which occur in paragraph (b). The needs of the landlord cannot be discriminated so as to separate the inner needs and outer needs of his body because both of them are projected on his environments."
This question has been succinctly dealt with by Mr. Justice Khalil-ur-Rehman Khan (as his Lordship then was) in "Abdul Rashid v. Mst. Adila Musarrat" (1982 CLC 149). After referring to two authorities namely Muhammad Younas v. Iqbal Begum (PLD 1980 Lah. 577) and Ghulam Mohyuddin v.fMst.
Nazir Bibi (1983 SCMR 715) the conclusion drawn at page 152 of the report reads as under:--- "Considering the present set-up of the society the physical circumstances and the religious and- social norms, it cannot be denied that husband is the economic sustainer of the wife and the family and the business is conducted by the husband for the benefit of the wife and the family and the Legislature is not ignorant of the conditions prevailing in the society. Keeping in mind these very circumstances, the Legislature employed the word 'use'---a word of wide signification. Legislature he words 'own use' therefore include within its connotation the beneficial enjoyment of the shop irrespective of the manner, the mode and the method adopted by the landlord/landlady provided that the manner, the method and the mode adopted is for his or her own benefit.
To my mind, the Legislature by employing the words 'own use' is not contemplating the person of the landlord/landlady or the physical occupation by the landlord or landlady rather the emphasis is on the: word 'use'. The Legislature is not providing for the categories of persons but providing for the beneficial use of the non-residential buildings by the landlord/landlady for own benefit and or for the benefit of his or her male children. The interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant would tend to encourage dishonesty and the landlady seeking eviction from non- residential building will have to make a false plea that she requires a shop for running her own business through her husband when we are cognizant of the fact that in our social set-up vast majority of our lady do not conduct business through their husbands. Hence there appears to be no valid reason for limiting the words 'own use' to the requirement of doing business through agent or servant."
Respectfully following the above enunciation of law, I hold that respondents Nos. l and 2 could lawfully seek eviction of the disputed premises for use and occupation of their husbands.
5. The next question relates to interpretation/application of section 11 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that prior permission of the Rent Controller for conversion of the residential property into a commercial one was necessary and since this permission had not been obtained by the respondents, the ejectment petition must fail. I am afraid this is not so. The ejectment application contained an averment about the need of the respondents/landladies for use of the disputed premises for commercial purposes. No specific permission for conversion of residential property into non-residential was required. The plea that ejectment petition filed by the landladies in respect of residential premises for non---residential purposes has been accepted would be deemed to be sufficient compliance of section 11 of the Ordinance. See Mst. Zubaida Sultana v. Dr. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 1992 ALD 164(2) (Lahore). Also see Sooba v Siraj Din (PLD 1977 Lah. 1263). This objection being devoid of force is overruled.
6. The three-storied building, containing the disputed premises-(first floor) is situated in commercial area. Already the ground floor and second floor are being put to use for commercial purposes. The desire to use the disputed floor also for commercial purposes has been found by the two learned Tribunals to be genuine. I see no reason to differ with the findings.
7. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no force in this petition. Dismissed. No costs.