' AJMAL MIAN, CJ.---This is an appeal with the leave of this Court against the judgment dated 18- 10-1993 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh in Constitution Petition No,D-337 of 1993, filed by the respondent against the order of termination of his services under Regulation 11 of the House Building Finance Corporation Service Regulations, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations), allowing the same.
2. Leave to appeal was granted to consider the question whether the High Court was justified in issuing the writ in the above Constitution Petition in presence, inter alia, the judgment of this Court in the case of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and 2 others v. Muhammad Sharif 1988 SCMR 597.
3. The brief facts are that the respondent joined services of appellant No,1 as an Assistant Manager.
He was subsequently promoted as a District Manager in Grade HI. The respondent while working as the District Manager of appellant No,1 at Sanghar received above termination order dated 20-9- 1993 which reads as follows: "Termination of service under Regulation 11 of HBFC Service Regulations, 1957. --In terms of Regulation 11 of HBFC Service Regulation, 1957 and the terms of his appointment, the services of Mr. Inayatullah Shaikh, are terminated with immediate effect. He will be paid three months' substantive pay in lieu of the notice as per abovementioned Regulation and terms of his appointment.
' He will be entitled to all the service/terminal benefits as admissible under the Rules.
' He is hereby advised to settle his account and collect his dues from the department concerned.
(Sd)
(Shahnaz S. Hamid), General Manager (P&T.)"
' The respondent challenged the above order through the above Constitution Petition, which was allowed inter alia on the ground that under Regulation No,26, the inquiry should have been held as above termination of service amounted to punishment. Thereupon, the appellant filed petition for leave to appeal, which was granted to consider the above question.
4. In support of the above appeal Mr. Mahmood Iqbal, learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended as under:--
(i) That the High Court was not justified in holding that Regulation 11 is subject to Regulation 26 or it is to be read in conjunction with the same. According to him, the above two Regulations are independent and therefore, the appellants were entitled to terminate the respondent's services simpliciter in terms of Regulation 11;
(ii) that there was not violation of principles of natural justice in case of termination under Regulation 11; and
(iii) that the High Court has wrongly held that the order of termination was passed by the General Manager instead of the Managing Director.
5. On the other hand, Mr. M.M. Aqil, learned counsel for the respondent. Has contended as follows:-
(i) that, since the termination of the services involved deprivation of the livelihood, the same could not have been done without invoking Regulation 26 of the Regulations;
(ii) That the principles of natural justice were violated as enunciated by this Court in the case of Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. PIAC and another (1994 SCMR 2232);
(iii) That in any case, since the appointment of the respondent was under statutory rules under which the competent authority to terminate the services of the respondent was the Managing Director, the order passed by the General Manager was without jurisdiction as held by the High Court.
6. Adverting to the first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, it would be advantageous to reproduce Regulations 11 and 26 of the Regulations, which read as follows:- "REGULATION 11.--(i) The Corporation may dispense with the services of a permanent employee by giving three months' previous notice in writing without assigning any reason or, in lieu thereof, a sum equivalent of his substantive pay for three months.
(ii) Services of temporary employee may be terminated on one month's previous notice in writing without assigning any reason or on payment of one month's pay in lieu thereof.
"REGULATION 26. Punishment and Appeals---(i) Subject to the provision of Regulation 11 an employee who commits a breach of the rules and regulations of the Corporation or who displays negligence, inefficiency or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interests of the Corporation or in conflict with its instructions or commits a breach of discipline or is guilty of any, other act of misconduct or insubordination or who is convicted of a criminal offence shall be liable to the following penalties..."
7. The perusal of the above-quoted sub-para. (i) of Regulation 11 indicates that it inter alia empowers the Corporation to dispense with the services of a' permanent employee by giving three months' previous notice in writing without assigning any reason, or in lieu thereof, a sum of equivalent of his substantive pay for three months. Whereas sub-para. (ii) of the above Regulation, deals with the services of temporary employees, which is not relevant for the disposal of the present case. It may further be noticed that Regulation 26 deals with punishment and appeals. It provides that subject to the provision of Regulation 11 an employee who commits a breach of the rules and regulations of the Corporation or who displays negligence, inefficiency or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interests of the Corporation shall be liable to the penalties provided for thereunder.
8. We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the High Court that Regulation 11 is to be read with Regulation 26 of the Regulations and the services of an employee of the Corporation cannot be terminated under, Regulation 11 without holding inquiry under Regulation 26 of the Regulations. The above two Regulations deal with different situations. In this regard it may be pertinent to reproduce the- following extract from the judgment of this Court in the case of Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and 2 others v. Muhammad Sharif (1988 SCMR 597), wherein somewhat identical provisions were considered, which reads as follows:-- "It is clear from these two distinct provisions of Staff Services Regulations applicable to the respondent that two distinct powers were available to the competent authority and there was no bar expressed or implied to the competent authority invoking ,either or any one in particular. In the case Abdul Karim v. West Pakistan Province PLD 1956 SC 298 which none of the Courts has noticed, it was held by this Court that an employee whose services could be terminated on one month's notice could on the basis of a notice be removed though charge-sheet had been served With regard to his misconduct and an enquiry was in the offing. It was held that it is open to the dismissing authority not to have recourse to the power of dismissal which is a drastic step and which affects subsequent employability of this public servant but to terminate service on one month's notice in accordance with the condition of his employment. Again in the case Water and Power Development Authority v. Muhammad Ali 1987 SCMR 261, it was held that 'if the law provides the appellant authority with two different modes for terminating the services of its employees the mere fact that it has, to begin with, elected to act under one mode would not in the absence of a bar in the law preclude it from adopting the second mode at a later stage."
9. It may be observed that the Corporation may terminate the services of an employee under Regulation 11 simpliciter, provides it acts in good faith without any discrimination and in the interest of the Corporation and not on extraneous considerations. This Court has repeatedly held so in a number of cases including the case of Aleem Jaffar, Ex-Line Superintendent, WAPDA, Lahore v.
WAPDA through its Chairman, Lahore and 2 others (1998 SCMR 1445) while construing somewhat similar provisions, namely, section 17(1-A) of the Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958, incorporated by Act XIII of 1994, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:-- "At this stage it may be appropriate to observe that prior to the amendment of the above subsection (1-A) of section 17 by Act XIII of 1994 on 6-7-1994, it was also provided by this Act that the respondents-WAPDA can retire or remove its employees without assigning any reason after giving him not less than thirty days' notice or pay for the period by which such notice falls short of thirty days. In this regard reference may be made to the case of Aijaz Nabi Abbasi, v. Water and Power Development Authority and another (1992 SCMR 774), wherein it has been held that WAPDA has the power to remove or retire its employee at any time without assigning any reason after giving him not less than thirty days' notice or pay him for the period by which such notice falls short of the thirty days. However, it was pointed out that the above power was not unfettered or unbridled or arbitrary by observing as under:-- 'Though section 17(1-A) of the Act seemingly confers on the Authority plenary power to remove or to retire an employee of WAPDA at any time without assigning any reason after giving him not less than thirty days' notice or pay for the period by which such notice falls short of thirty days, however, it does not mean that the Authority enjoys above power unfettered or unbridled or arbitrary. The object of conferring such power seems to be to make easier for the Authority to remove from service surplus and/or inefficient and/or corrupt employees without holding long drawn departmental enquiry in order to make the establishment more viable and efficient and, therefore, exercise of the above power should be directed to achieve the above objective. It is to be exercised in good faith by the repository of the power, untainted with bias or mala fide or consideration other than the above objective and, therefore, any action in violation of the above basic norms will warrant interference by the Tribunal and this Court.'
' The above view has also been referred to in a recent judgment of this Court in the case of WAPDA and others v. Sikandar Ali Abro and others (1998 SCMR 137)."
10. Adverting to the submission as to whether the principles of natural justice can be pressed into service it may be observed that the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the case of Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. PIAC and others (supra) to urge that the issuance of show-cause notice was required. In this behalf reference may be made to a portion of para. 8 of a leave granting order in the case of United Bank Limited and others v. Ahsan Akhtar and others (1998 SCMR 68):-- "We would not like to comment on the merits of the case as the above. Questions are to be examined by the High Court. However, we may observe that the judgment in the case of Mrs. Anisa Rehman (supra) was rendered by one of us (Ajmal Mian, J.), the ratio of the above judgment is that even an employee of Corporation cannot be demoted while in service in violation of the principle of natural justice. It did not lay down that the principle of master and servant consistently enunciated by this Court in the following cases:--
(i) Lt.-Col. Shujauddin Ahmad v. Oil and Gas Development Corporation (1971 SCMR 566);
(ii) Chairman of East Pakistan Development Corporation v. Rustam Ali (PLD 1966 SC 848);
(iii) Lahore Central Cooperative Bank Limited v. Pir Saifullah Shah (PLD' 1959 SC (Pak) 210); (iv), Zainul Abedin v. Multan Central Cooperative Bank Limited (PLD 1966 SC 445);
(v) Shahid Khalil v. P.I.A.C., Karachi 1971 SCMR 568;
(vi) A George v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PLD 1971 Lah. 748);
(vii) R.T.H. Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation (PLD 1974 SC 146); (viii)Muhammad Yousaf Shah v. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PLD 1981 SC 224);
(ix) Anwar Hussain v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others (PLD 1984 SC 194);
(x) Anwar Hussain v. The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and others (1992 SCMR 1112);
(xi) Raziuddin v. Chairman, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and 2 others (PLD 1992 SC 531);
(xii) Chairman, WAPDA and 2 others v. Syed Jamil Ahmad (1993 SCMR 346); (xiii)Muhammad Umar Malik v. The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. Through its President, Karachi and 2 others (1995 SCMR 453) is no longer the correct law."
11. It may be stated that if an order under Regulation 11 of the Regulations is competently passed bona fide as indicated above in the cited case, the principles of natural justice cannot be invoked.
The case of Pakistan and others v. Public-at-Large and others (PLD 1987 SC 304) decided by the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court in respect of retirement of civil servants and the employees of the statutory corporate bodies, wherein it was held that the show-cause notice was necessary, has no application to the present case, nor the case of Khawaja Ghulam Sarwar v. Pakistan through the General Manager, P.W.R., Lahore (PLD 1962 SC 142) is applicable, wherein it was held that as the appellant in that case was a civil servant and was governed by the Constitutional provisions in the Government of India Act, 1935, his service could not be terminated under clause (a) of the service agreement being a permanent employee, as admittedly the services of the respondent is not governed by a Constitutional provision.
12. Referring to the last submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the termination order though signed by the General Manager, was passed by the Managing Director, it may be observed that the High Court has concluded as under:-- "No doubt the Managing Director has been delegated full powers in respect of appointments, promotions, and awarding of punishment including termination/dismissal of all officers except officers in management cadre, but the Managing Director cannot further delegate such powers to the General Manager. The impugned order, dated 20-9-1993 has been passed by General Manager of respondent No,1 Corporation. There is no indication in the said order if it was factually passed by the Managing Director, with the General Manager only communicating the same to the petitioner.
Vain attempt by learned counsel for the respondent to persuade us to believe so, . Is fruitless. In this way the impugned order is ultra vires of the powers of the General Manager, as it could be passed only by the respondent No,1 Corporation, as per Regulation No,11 read with Regulation No,26 (as amended) or at the most by delegates of the Corporation."
13. Before us also the appellant failed to produce any order of the Managing Director whereby the services of the respondent were ordered to be terminated. The learned counsel for the appellants has solely relied upon para. 6 of the comments wherein it was asserted that the order was passed by the Managing Director. However, factually no such order has been produced before us in spite of the above finding of the High Court. The respondent had also been taken in service after the judgment of the High Court in 1994 and some other employees have also been reinducted into service on the basis of the above judgment of the High Court. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the judgment under appeal on the above ground found favour with the High Court.
' 'The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.