SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.-- This is an appeal from the order dated 3-9-1984 of the Federal Service Tribunal whereby the order of the appellant authority removing the respondent from service was set aside and a direction was given that he be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits.
2. The respondent was employed as Lineman under the appellant authority. An Assistant Lineman serving under him died in an accident. An inquiry was held and as a result he was found responsible for the accident. Consequently, departmental proceedings were initiated against him.
During the course of departmental proceedings a charge sheet was served upon him and an inquiry officer was appointed. Before the inquiry officer could submit his report the appellant authority by an order dated 12-1-1983 removed him from service by giving him 30 days pay in lieu of notice. This order was made in pursuance of the provisions of section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958 which empowered the appellant authority, inter alia, to remove from service any of its employees without assigning any reason.
3. The respondent preferred an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal to challenge the said order. The learned Tribunal took the view that once the departmental proceedings had been started against the respondent it was not open to the appellant authority to invoke its power under section 17 (1-A) ibid because in the circumstances his removal from service amounted to a stigma.
In this context it observed:-- "Since the proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules involving specific charge resulted in removal of the appellant from service, it carried a stigma against him Indeed the authority under the cloak of section 17(1-A)of the WAPDA Act punished him which could be done only if he had been found guilty in the proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules. We have) held earlier in a number of cases that when the proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules are initiated for some charges then the relevant authorities are obliged to take those proceedings to a logical conclusion by following the prescribed procedure and then deciding the matter according to law.
They could not abandon the proceedings under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules and change over to section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. Apart from this legal position, as viewed by one of us, (Brig. Abdur Rashid), in Appeal No. 187 (P) of 1982, decided on 3-4-1984, if the appellant is really guilty of the charge then he deserves a more severe punishment than he had been awarded. If on the other hand, there was nothing against the appellant then he has been wrongly punished under the cloak of section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act."
Accordingly, the learned Tribunal accepted the appeal and set aside the order of removal from service and directed the appellant authority to reinstate the respondent in service.
4. It is difficult to support the reasoning of the learned Tribunals, that after it had initiated departmental proceedings against the', respondent it was not open to the appellant authority to take resort to its powers under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. If the law provides the appellant authority with two different modes for terminating the services of its employees the mere fact that it has, to begin with, elected to act under one mode would not in the absence of a bar in the law preclude it from adopting the second mode at a later stage. Perhaps the attention of the learned Tribunal was not drawn to a decision of this Court reported as Abdul Karim v. West Pakistan Province PLD 1956 SC 298 wherein under somewhat similar circumstances the order of termination of services of a Government Servant in accordance with the terms of his employment was upheld notwithstanding the fact that a departmental inquiry was pending against him. The decision in this case was followed by this Court in another case reported as Secretary, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Mir Muhammad Siraj 1970 SCMR 398. This being the legal position the learned Tribunal clearly went wrong when it held that once the departmental proceedings had been started by the appellant authority against the respondent these had to be taken to a logical conclusion and that subsequently it could not invoke its powers under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act to terminate the services of the respondent. The view taken by the learned Tribunal detracts from the power which the legislature has expressly conferred on the appellant authority, without any warranty.
5. We are also not impressed with the argument that the circumstances in which the respondent has been removed from service would attach a stigma to him. The allegations made against him have not been established as the inquiry officer had yet to record his finings thereon before he was removed from service. The order of removal did not assign any reason at all and it was a case of termination simpliciter of the services. There was no question of the respondent's reputation being in any way clouded by such an order.
6. For the reasons stated above we would accept this appeal and set aside the order of the Federal Service Tribunal. There will be no order as to costs.