SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--- Leave to appeal was granted to examine, whether in view of the notification under subsection (3) of section 1 of the West Pakistan EmployeesSocial Security Ordinance, 1965 (Ordinance X of 1965 hereinafter referred to as the 'Ordinance') there was any room left for holding that M/s. Cowasjee and Sons (Lighters) was a separate establishment within the meaning of the Ordinance.
2. By a notification dated 29-4-1972, expressed to be under subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance, the Government of Sindh was pleased to apply the provisions of the Ordinance w.e.f, Ist May, 1972 to the employees and the employers of the establishments mentioned in the Schedule to that Notification and order that "the employees of the said establishments and their dependents will be entitled to the benefits to the extent and in the manner provided in sections 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 of the Ordinance. The Schedule to the Notification had three-column headings. The first one had the S. No,, the second showed the area and the third the name of the establishment. At Serial Nos.6 and 7 appears the following entry:- S. No,AreaName of the Establishment
6. Site Cowasjee and Sons, Keamari Karachi.
7. " British India Engineering works West Wharf Road Karachi
3. The appellant served on the respondent a notice of demand dated 10th of June, 1978 with regard to the payment due from M/s. Cowasjee and Sons (Lighters) which the respondent straightaway challenged by a Writ Petition but the matter was remanded to the Social Security Institution for re- appraisal of the liability and its nature. The Commissioner, Sindh EmployeesSocial Security Institution, Karachi held that Messrs Cowasjee and Sons was not liable to pay for the dock workers because they were not legally its employees. On the second issues, namely, liability of M/s. Cowasjee and Sons (Lighters), the Commissioner, however, held that "although it appears that the employees of these units are separate from each other yet all the 3 units work in connection with their main firm i.e, M/s. Cowasjee and Sons (1961) which is already notified for coverage under the Scheme". He fmally granted the relief as hereunder:- "In view of the above facts, I hold that M/s. Cowasjee and Sons (1961) are not liable to pay social security contribution in respect of their dock workers but are legally obliged to pay the social security contribution due from them in respect of the insurable workers of the Lighter division."
4. The Institution refixed the liability by treating M/s. Cowasjee and Sons as comprising of three units under the same management namely,- M/s. Cowasjee and Sons; M/s. Cowasjee and Sons (Lighters); and M/s. British India Engineering Works; all liable to contributions to the Institution. M/s. Cowasjee and Sons (Lighters) challenged the levy in the Social Security Court under section 59 of the Ordinance and succeeded on 15-9-1982. The Presiding Officer held as hereunder:- "After perusing all the documents available on record, I have come to the conclusion that though Cowasjee & Sons (Lighters) and Cowasjee & Sons (1961) are owned by the same partners but they are separate entities. Ample evidence is available on record to show that the fields of activity of both the concerns are quite separate. Separate accounts are maintained, so also the employees of both the concerns are in no way connected with each other. There are separate unions and separate settlements were arrived at between the C.B.A. And the management. As such in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as quoted above, I am of the view that though the two contains are owned by the same Directors but they have no connection so far as the field of activity is concerned."
5. An appeal was thereafter preferred under section 64 of the Ordinance in the High Court. The High Court noted as hereunder:- "The evidence produced shows that M/s. Cowasjee and Sons (Lighters) were issued Lighterage Contractor's Licence (Ex.3/B) on 18th August, 1979 which is a distinct business from that of Stevedores for which M/s. Cowasjee and Sons were granted by Karachi Port Trust Stevedores Licence dated 30th September, 1980 (Exh.3/C).
Nothing has been brought on the record by the appellant that the employees of Cowasjee and Sons (Lighters) are working for and/or in connection with the notified establishment namely M/s. Cowasjee & Sons (1961). On the contrary the documentary evidence produced shows that the bank accounts, labour and the Collective Bargaining Agents of the two organisations are also separate.
It would also be relevant to note here that even the contribution payments under Rule 3 (4) of the Employees Old-Age Benefit (Contribution) Rules, 1967 are made by each of these two concerns in respect of their own employees separately."
The learned Judge in the High Court heavily, relied on the decision of the High Court in Messrs Kashmir Corner v. Sindh EmployeesSocial Security Institution, Karachi (PLD 1975 Karachi 36) which came up under examination before this Court in Kohinoor Chemical Co. Ltd. And another v. Sindh EmployeesSocial Security Institution and another (PLD 1977 SC 197). It upheld the judgment of the Social Security Court holding M/s. Cowasjee & Sons (Lighters) not liable under the notification referred to in para 2 above.
6.. The mainstay of the case of the appellant before us was the deed of partnership of M/s. Cowasjee & Sons particularly, its clause '5', which mentioned as hereunder:-- "That the Partnership business shall be to work at Stevedores, Dubashes, Steamer Agents, Salvage Contractors, Provision Merchants and Suppliers, Contractors for supplying labour, own, charter, hire lighters, tubes etc. And own workshop for repairing steamers, lighters, etc. And to deal in all other connected lines of business as has been hitherto carried on by the said firm."
7. According to the learned counsel representing the appellant, all the three business/units given separate names were in fact carried on under one umbrella, as regards the ownership, the management and the undertaking. On that account, the generic expression "Cowasjee & Sons" given its ordinary and plain meaning would extend to and cover all such industrial and commercial activities as were undertaken by the partnership. Additional support for this submission is sought from the fact that in the Income-tax Assessments throughout, the assessee has been showing all his businesses and setting of the profit and loss of one against the other.
8. As against the above submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the empowering provision of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance, the notification invoked by the appellant treating M/s. Cowasjee & Sons as not generic enough to include British India Engineering Works and the distinctness of the establishment and lack of its integrality with the other business activities of M/s. Cowasjee & Sons. He has, in the context, relied on the decisions of the Indian Supreme Court in The Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Chaibasa Cement Works, Jhinkpani v. Their Workmen (AIR 1960 SC 56), Management of Pratap Press, New Delhi v. Secretary, Delhi Press WorkersUnion, Delhi (AIR 1960 SC 1213), Workmen of the Straw Board Manufacturing, Co.
Ltd. v. M/s. Straw Board Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (AIR 1974 SC 1132) and Isha Steel Treatment, Bombay v. Association of Engineering Workers, Bomaby and another (1987) 2 Supreme Court Cases 203].
9. Section 1 of the Ordinance is reproduced hereunder:- "1. Short title, extent, commencement and application.--(1) This Ordinance may be called the Provincial EmployeesSocial Socurity Ordinance, 1965.
(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.
(3) It shall come into force at once but shall apply only to such areas, classes of persons, industries or establishments, from such date or dates, and with regard to the provision of such benefits as Government may, by notification, specify in this behalf."
10. An examination of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance as reproduced above makes it clear that a notification under it can be by reference to any one or more of the indicators contained therein i.e, the specified areas, the specified classes of persons, the 'specified industries or establishments. Besides, the dates could vary in respect of the benefits allowed. In the case before us, the only two things specified were the area and the industry or establishment. There are again three indicators in the specific notification in respect of the respondent which show that in the matter of industry or establishment each of its activity was taken to be distinct and separate notwithstanding the identical umbrella of the proprietorship which was a partnership. If the idea was to cover the partnership in all its manifold industrial and commercial activity then the notification should have shown as M/s. Cowasjee & Sons and should not have mentioned M/s. British India Engineering Works or treated the two as separate for purposes of notification. This separation in the notification clearly indicates that the various activities of the same partnership were distinguished one from the other and the partnership as such was not the subject-matter of the notification.
Secondly, it appears to be the normal reasonable approach also to the power conferred and exercised. Such a notification has to be preceded on the administrative side by a survey of the range of commercial and industrial activity and identification of those which can and ought to be brought under the cover of Social Security. It is assumed that this antecedent step had been taken.
The learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that no such survey was undertaken or completed and it was just by the general appearance of the industrial and commercial activity carried down by these organisations or concerns in a particular locality that they were notified. If that was so, then it was a hasty and a sudden and swift act which is likely to land the institution in such confusions.
Thirdly, the Institution itself from 1972 to 1976 was not aware nor did it bring within its cover under this notification, M/s. Cowasjee and Sons Lighters. It was only in 1978 that it became aware of what it considered to be the proper scope, purpose and effect of notifying M/s. Cowasjee and Sons. Such an inference is not supportable either on the language of the notification or by bringing within its net both M/s. Cowasjee and Sons and M/s. British India Engineering Works also, on the treatment that the Institution afforded to M/s. Cowasjee and Sons from 1972 to 1978.
11. It is true that the notifications under Ordinance have to be liberally construed and the benefit to be extended to the largest number of persons. This is so where the two interpretations of a notification are possible. It cannot, on the basis of such a rule of interpretation be urged that the establishment covered by notification being one by interpretation it should be so extended to include more than one. The proprietary interest or ownership being not the test in the notification but the commercial activity as such the notification cannot be given the extended meaning which the learned counsel for the appellant seeks.
12. In the circumstances, no merit is found in the appeal which is dismissed with no order as to costs.