The dispute in this appeal relates to Shop No. 11-20 S-1, Railway Road, Kasur which was let out by respondent to Abdul Rashid, appellant. An application for eviction was filed on 27-3-1975 against the appellant, his brother Muhammad Iqbal and one Muhammad Shafi on the following grounds "(1) That the appellant has sublet the shop to respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
(2) That the shop is required for Sh. Ghias Ahmad, the husband of the landlady, for running personal business ; and
(3) What the shop has been damaged by the appellant."
This application was contested by the appellant as well as respon--dents Nos. 2 and 3 by filing a joint written statement in which it was, however, admitted that the shop was rented out by respondent No. 1 to the appellant and there is no subletting of the shop as respondent No. 2 is his real brother and a joint business is being conducted in the shop and that respondent No. 3 was working as their servant. The necessary issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller and after recording the evidence of the parties the eviction application was rejected. The appeal of the landlady, however, succeeded as the learned District Judge, Kasur vide his judgment, dated 2-10- 1978 reversed the findings on Issue No. 1 observing that "the real question is whether the appellant wants the shop in good faith for the personal use of her husband or not. The evidence in this case fully justifies the claim of the appellant that she requires the shop bona fide for the use of her husband as there is a shortfall in his business of power-looms." Hence this second appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that a non--residential building cannot be got vacated by a landlady for the personal use of her husband under section 13 (3) (ii) (a) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. He maintained that husband of a landlady does not fall within the purview of the aforesaid clause as he is not one of the categories of persons for whose benefit a non-residential building could be got vacated. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Younus v. Iqbal Begum (PLD 1980 Lab. 577). The learned counsel for the respondent land lady in reply relied on Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din v. Mst. Nazir Bibi (PLD 1980 Civil (SC) 787). In the precedent case the ejectment order on the ground that the shop was needed by the spouse (husband) of the respondent landlady for his personal use was upheld and the petition for Special Leave to Appeal was dismissed. The observations made by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court are as under :- "---..It has come on the record that the husband of the landlady is already doing business which shows that plea of doing business on the part of the husband is not a new enterprise to be now embarked upon by him for the first time. It has further been proved that husband of the landlady had earlier another shop with him from which he was evicted and thereafter started doing business in the rented shop presently in his occupation. If in order to avoid such like constant threats of eviction, the present shop is required by him for personal use, his need is quite genuine and perfectly bona fide."
The learned counsel basing his submissions on the above-quoted observations contended that had there Lordships of the Supreme Court not considered the husband as falling within the purview of clause (a) of section 13(3) (ii) of the Ordinance, they would not have upheld the order of eviction merely because the requirement of the husband was held to be genuine and bona fide.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the respective points of views of both the learned counsel and I am of the considered view that the submission of the appellant's counsel is without substance.
5. Section 13 of the Ordinance so far as it relevant for the purposes of determination of the question involved is reproduced as under :- Section 13(3)(a).-A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession :-
(i) in the case of a residential building, if
(a) he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occu--pation of any of his children ;
(ii) in the case of non-residential building or a scheduled building or rented land, if-
(a) he requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his male children ; It would be seen that in case of residential building the words used are,- " . . . . . Requires it in good faith for his own occupation." whereas in the case of a non-residential building the words are,- " . . . . . Requires it, in good faith for his own use."
The word `use' is of wider connotation than the word `occupation'. The meaning of the word `use' as given at page 469 of New English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Volume X, Part I is-- "The act of employing a thing for any (especially a profitable) purpose, the fact, the state or condition of being so employed ; utilization or employment for or with some aim or purpose, application or conversion to some (especially good or useful) end."
Again at page 470 in paragraph 20 the meaning of the word use' is given as under "The character, property or quality which makes a thing useful or suitable for some purpose ; capability for securing some end ; usefulness, utility, advantage, benefit."
6. I have not been able to persuade myself to agree with the aforesaid reasoning. With respect and most humbly I am of the view that such an intention cannot be imputed to the Legislature.
Considering the pre--sent set up of the society, the physical circumstances and the religious and social norms, it cannot be denied that husband is the economic sus--tainer of the were and the family and the business is conducted by the husband for the benefit of the were and the family and the Legislature is not ignorant of the conditions prevailing in the society. Keeping in mind these very circumstances the Legislature employed the word 'use'-a word of were signification. The words 'own use' therefore include within its connotation the beneficial enjoyment of the shop irrespective of the manner, the mode and the method adopted by the landlord/landlady provided that the manner, the method and the mode adopted is for his or her own benefit. To my mind the Legislature by employing the words 'own use' is not contemplating the person of the landlord/landlady or the physical occupation by the landlord or landlady rather the emphasis is on the word 'use'. The Legislature is not providing for the categories of persons but is providing to the beneficial use of the non-residential building by the landlord/ landlady for own benefit and or for the benefit of his or her male children. The interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant would tend to encourage dishonesty and a landlady seeking eviction from non residential building will have to make a false plea that she requires a shop for running her own business through her husband when we are cognisant of the fact that in our social set up vast majority of our ladies do not conduct business through their husbands. Hence there appears to be no valid reason for limiting the words "own use" to the requirement of doing business through Agent or servant. It has been demonstrated above that the objection will disappear if a landlady is just to assert that the husband who will be occupying the shop is to run the business under or in partnership with her. Such a contrivance when employed, it is admitted, would bringing the case within the purview of the aforesaid clause. The Legislature cannot be imputed the intention of promoting dishonesty and even otherwise such an interpretation cannot be given in spite of the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the provisions of Rent Laws should be construed strictly as the purpose of the law is to prohibit undue eviction of the tenants. I may add at this stage that the view taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din's case can only be taken if the aforesaid provision is interpreted in the manner indicated above. It was and it cannot be suggested that the learned Judges of the Supreme Court while deciding the above-noted case were not aware of the provisions of section 13 (3) (ii) (a) of the Ordinance. The contention o the learned counsel for the appellant is, therefore, repelled.
The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the learned District Judge erred in reversing the finding of the Rent Controller on the question of bona fides of the requirement of the husband. I have gone through the evidence on record with the help of the learned counsel for the parties and; I am satisfied that the view taken by the learned District Judge that the evidence in the case fully justifies the claim of the landlady that she requires the shop bona fide for the use of her husband, is sound. The learned Additional District Judge has arrived at this finding after scrutiny of the evidence and the relevant material on record. The finding so recorded is not amenable to interference in second appeal.
7. No other point has been argued. The net result of the above discussion is that the appeal is without any merit and is, therefore, dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Appellant is, however, given two months' time to vacate the premises subject to payment of rent, .