This judgment will dispose of four writ petitions/namely Petitions Nos.2016, 2197, 2260 and 2261 of 1995. All of these four petitions emanate from common factual background and involve examination of common questions of law. These are therefore, being dealt with by a single judgment.
2. The facts, briefly stated, giving rise to these petitions are that one Mst. Iqbal Begum was the owner of a double storey building bearing No. NE-IV- 19-S-2 situated in Street No. 19 of Faiz Bagh, Lahore. She made sale of this property to Hafiz Zafar Ehsan Qasim, Hafiz Muti-ur-Rehman Tayyab, Hafiz Muhammad Suleman Athar and Qari Khalil-ur-Rehman through four different registered sale-deeds. It has more than one residential units/occupied by different tenants. These petitions, however, concern four residential portions. One of these was/is occupied by Ashiq Ali, second was/is in possession of Mst. Asia Bibi arid Hameeda Bibi, third was/is in occupation of Mu hammad Khalil, while fourth was/is in occupation of Muhammad Suleman.
These occupants were/are tenants and are petitioners in these petitions. Qari Khalil-ur-- Rehman filed four eviction applications bearing Nos.5-2-1994, 6-2-1994, 7-2-1994 and 8-2-1994, on 13-11- 1990, 10-3-1991 and 29-6-1992 respectively. These were moved by him as attorney of Hafiz Zafar Ehsan Qasim, Hafiz Muti-- ur-Rehman Tayyab, Hafiz Muhammad Salman Athar, Qari Naeem-ur- Rehman Tahir, Hafiz Atiq-ur-Rehman Zahir and Qari Muzaffar Iqbal Saleem and were directed against petitioners. Apart from other grounds embodied in these applications, it was alleged that the applicants needed the premises in question for their personal use; that they were living together as a joint family, were dedicated to dissemination of education of Holy and wanted the residential portions for their personal use as well as for the purpose of setting up therein a school for imparting Qur'anic education to the people. These applications were contested.
3. On the pleas of the parties, necessary issues were framed. The parties led their oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective pleas. Upon the consideration of the same, the learned Rent Controller accepted the plea of personal requirements and ordered petitioners' eviction from units in their possession vide four separate orders dated 21-4-1994. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners preferred four separate appeals/which did not fair better and were dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide four separate decisions dated 24-1-1995. This is, how, these Constitution petitions have come to this Court.
4. Sheikh Khalil-ur-Rehman, learned counsel appearing for petitioner in Writ Petition No.2016 of 1995, opened the debate. It was contended by him that there was no sufficient evidence in quality and quantity to prove the personal requirement of respondents/applicants. According to the learned counsel, the building was a very big one/comprising different units which were in possession of these four petitioners; that the respondents had led no evidence to demonstrate that residential area in their possession was not sufficient for their need. On the strength of this circumstance, it was suggested that the decisions, rendered by the two forums below, were clearly bad in law and merited to be set aside. He placed reliance upon Siraj Din v. Suba 1984 SCMR 722, Abdullah Baloch v. Adam Ali PLD 1961 SC 28, Mst. Jana Bai v. Mst. Ghulshan 1984 CLC 1061 and Piyaro v. Din Muhammad 1983 CLC 958. Mian Hameedullah Khan, learned counsel, appearing for petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos.2195, 2260 and 2261 of 1995, next entered the debate. He submitted that at the time of filing of eviction applications, Qari Khalil-ur-Rehman had no authority to file the same against Muhammad Suleman, Khalil Ahmed and Mst. Asia Bibi. According to the learned counsel, the Special Power of Attorney brought on the record was dated 25-5-1993, while eviction applications were filed on 13-11-1990. On these premises, it was suggested that the principle of ratification, as applied by the learned appellate authority, was not attracted to facts and circumstances of the cases in hand. Strength was sought from Munir Hussain v. Mst. Mehrun Nisa PLD 1982 Karachi 71. No other point was raised. On the contrary, Chaudhry Abdul Wahid, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of respondents, vigorously supported the impugned orders. At the outset, he contended that the questions, as to whether 'the rented premises were needed by the respondents for their personal use, was a pure question of fact and so the concurrent conclusions of the two Courts below on this question could not be interfered with in Constitutional jurisdiction.
Reference was made to M/s. Everyday Pictures Ltd. v. Chamman Begum 1983 SCMR 282, Habibullah Khan v. Senior Civil Judge 1982 SCMR 1016, Sheikh Mansoor Ahmad v. Fazal Hasan PLD 1983 SC 167 and Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mrs. Mumtaz Zohra Rizvi 1978 CLR 90. The line of argument of Ch. Abdul Wahid, Advocate, was adopted by Mr. Rashid Murtaza Qureshi, learned counsel for respondents, who also cited to Wali Muhammad Khan v. Ishaq Ali Khan AIR 1931 All. 507 S.B., Genptai Nane Powar v. Jiwanabai Kom Subanna AIR 1923 Born. 44(1) and Qanayat Hussain v. Mst. Sajiddunnisa Bibi AIR 1949 All. 499 to contend that this Court had no power to interfere with the concurrent conclusion of fact reached by the two Courts below.
5. Having penned down the facts, the circumstances of the petition and arguments of the parties, I now proceed to deal with them. As regards the point raised by Shy Khalil-ur-Rehman, Advocate, suffice it to say that it is without any merit. For determination of personal requirement of landlord, the Ren, Controller is obliged to construe the provisions of the Ordinance by following principles of harmonious and objective construction. The expression "landlord" embodied in section 2 of the Ordinance is of wide amplitude. It has a larger connotation than the, word 'owners of the land'. The landlord may be one person or more than one persons and so personal requirement of rented premises may be of one landlord or more than one landlords. Section 13 does not prohibit the filing of eviction application by one of the co-owner/co-landlord. Very clearly one of the co-owners can file an application for eviction of the rented premises. See Nak Muhammad v. Muhammad Shafi 1983 SCMR 180; secondly, that the personal requirement of the applicant is to be adjudicated upon with reference to section 13(3)(i) of the Ordinance. This proviso clearly enacts that if the rented premises is got vacated under the order of Rent Controller end the same is not occupied by the landlord, the tenant, so evicted, shall be entitled to move an application for restoration of the possession of the rented premises. This provision is an effective check against false pleas of personal requirements and adequately safeguards the right of the landlord as well as tenants. The statement of the landlord is to be so evaluated with reference to aforesaid circumstance. See Nasir-ud-Din v. Muhammad Siddique 1981 SCMR 709. Applying these principles to the facts of the case in hand it is quite clear that Qari Khalil-ur--Rehman and sons are co-owners; Qari Khalil-ur- Rehman has entered into witness-box and had categorically stated that the premises in dispute were needed by him and other co-owners for personal use and for setting up a religious school.
The said witness was subjected to lengthy cross=examination but nothing was extracted to demolish his testimony. The statement of Qari Khalil-ur-Rehman exudes confidence and is congruent with the averments embodied in eviction applications. For these reasons, the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners have no value and are accordingly rejected.
6. Now, I will take up the next question as to whether the eviction application filed by Qari Khalil-ur- Rehman were valid in the eyes of law. This question is free from difficulty. It is not denied that Qari Kahlil-ur-Rehman is/was one of the co-owners and is father of the other co-owners/his sons. It is also not in contest that Qari Khalil-ur-Rehman had been dealing with petitioners as tenant, had been collecting rents from them and so had always been acknowledged as one of the co-owners and attorney on behalf of the remaining co-owners. It is also a well-settled principle that the agency need not be created by a written document. It can be inferred from circumstances and the conduct of the parties. This question came up for consideration as back as in 1931 by Allahabad High Court in Khub Chang v. Chitter Mal AIR 1931 All. 372. The celebrated Suleman, J. Speaking for the Bench, said: "We have, therefore, not the least doubt in our minds that the position of Khub Chang was that of an agent of the plaintiff in this business. Agency need not be created expressly by any written document and can be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the parties. In this case we have both; see Jatha Ram v. Mehnga Ram (1916) 33 IC 438. We, therefore, affirm the finding of the Court below on this point. "
These principles were again reiterated by Calcutta High Court in S.N. Barick v. State of West Bengal AIR 1963 Cal. 79.
Dealing with this question it was said: "The relationship of principal and agent may be constituted--
(a) by express appointment of the principal, or by a person duly authorised by the principal to make such appointment;
(b) by implication of law, from the conduct, or situation of the parties or from the necessity of the case, or
(c) by subsequent, ratification by the principal of acts done on his behalf. "
The principles enunciated above were approved by Quetta High Court in Commerce Bank Ltd. v.
Habib Bakhsh PLD 1978 Quetta 45. I am inclined to follow the above principles.
7. Applying these principles to the facts and circumstances of the case m hand it is evident that Qari Khalil-ur-Rehman was one of the co-owners; that he was father of other co-owners who had been residing in Saudi Arabia, was dealing with the petitioners as his tenant and tenant on behalf of other co---owners; that all members of the family had, been maintaining their family jointly; that the deed of attorney dated 27-6-1993 did lend unshakable support to relationship of principal and agent between other co-owners and Qari Khalil-ur--Rehman. On this state of fact, I have no hesitation in saving that the two Courts below were eminently correct in, holding that Qari Khalil- ur-Rehman had been acting on behalf of the remaining co-owners as their attorney. On this view of the matter, the objection of the learned counsel for Ashiq Ali is wholly meritless and deserves to be rejected.
8. As a result of above discussion, all the petitions are found to be devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed. The petitioners shall bear the costs of the proceedings through out.