This appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure assails the judgment and decree dated 19th July 1972, passed by the District Judge, Quetta in Civil Suit No. 15 of 1970 decreeing the suit of the respondents in the sum of R9. 19,525 with costs.
2. Precisely the facts as set out in the plaint are that Shop No. 1-26/9 Jinnah Road, Quetta was jointly owned by the respondents. On 16th April 1967 one Commander Sajjad. Development officer, of the appellant Bank approached the first respondent to obtain the shop on rent. The first respondent offered to lease out the shop at a monthly rent of Rs. 550 to which Commander Sajjad agreed and passed on a letter to the first respondent specifically undertaking on behalf of the appellant-Bank that he accepted the terms of tenancy offered by the first respondent.
Simultaneously he executed another agreement denoting that the appellants bad taken possession of the shop premises with effect from 16th July, 1967. A formal lease decd was agreed to be executed between the parties on a future date when one year rent as advance was also to be paid to the respondents as neither the advance rent was paid nor the formal lease deed was executed by the appellants for quite some time the first respondent reminded then through a letter for the fulfillment of both these undertakings. The Deputy Controller. Development of the appellant bank wrote back to him on 26th January 1968 that he should see him in his office on any working day so that the matter could be discussed and mutually settled. Subsequently also several letters were a changed between the parties and in these letters the first respondent always asked the appellant to execute the lease deed and pay him the advance rent and he alway3 received a reply that the case had not yet been approved by the Head Office. In one of the letters written by the Deputy Managing Director of the appellant-Bank on 17th October 1968 the first respondent was asked to agree to charge rent from the date when necessary alterations had been carried out rn the shop in order to make it suitable to house a bank therein. But the respondent did not agree to this suggestion and insisted upon charging rent from the date on which the possession of the shop was taken over by Commandar Sajjad I e. 16th July 1967. Thereafter two more letters were sent by the appellants to the first respondent in quick succession. In one of these letters dated 27th November 1967 the appellants showed willingness to pay rent with effect from March/April 1968 when the bank was likely to start functioning in the disputed shop. In this letter ii was also mentioned, that the possession of the shop should be handed over in March/April 1968 meaning thereby that they had not already taken over the possession; although the letter of Commander Sajjad suggested to the contrary. This letter was replied by the first respondent specifically mentioning that he did not agree to charge rant from March/April 1968 as proposed by the appellants but would charge rent with effect from 16th July 1967 when the possession of the shop was actually taken over by the appellants' representative.
3. Since no rent was paid by the appellants to the respondents in spite of taking over the possession of the disputed shop on 16th July 1967 and repeated reminders thereafter 1 the first respondent filed an application for their ejectment on the ground of failure to pay the agreed rent with effect from 16th July 1967 to 30th July 1968 I.e. Vie date of filing of eviction application. This application was hotly contested by the appellants Inter alia on the ground that the keys of the shop had been handed over to the appellants by the first respondent on 1st October 1967 and not earlier and therefore neither the appellants could be treated as respondents' tenant in the shop in question nor they could be considered entitled to recover rent for the period proceeding 1st October, 1967. The Rent Controller framed an issue in order to determine whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties or not. Another issue was framed to determine if the rate of rent was Rs. 550 per month. He answered both the issues in the affirmative; hence an appeal was preferred to the District Judge. Quetta who allowed the same vide order dated 30th September 1969 and remanded the case to the Rent Controller for fresh adjudication of both the issues. This remand order was challenged in second appeal before this Court but was upheld vide decision dated 20th April 1970. Consequently the case went back to the Rent Controller who tried the same and finally made an order of ejectment of the appellants on 18th January 1970 as a result of non-compliance with his order made under section 13 (6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 directing them to deposit the rent in the Court @ Rs. 550 per month for the entire period mentioned earlier. This Order, it appears, was not challenged in appeal and therefore the findings on the issues with regard to relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the rate of rent assumed finality.
4. The respondents thereafter filed a suit on 14th July 1970 for the recovery of Rs. 19,525 being the rent at the rate of Rs. 550 per month for the period from 16th July 1967 to 30th January 1970, the date on which they obtained back the possession of the shop from the appellants. As the plaint was not signed by the second respondent when it was presented to the Court, an objection was raised by the appellants in their written statement that the suit was not maintainable owing to this defect. A preliminary issue was framed to determine this point and the trial Court vide order dated 11th May 1971 allowed the learned counsel for the respondents to sign the plaint in his capacity of legally constituted agent of the 2nd respondents. Thereafter the following issues were framed to decide the ease on merits:---
(a) Whether the suit was within time?
(b) Whether the defendant had been tenant of the plaintiffs for the period stated in the plaint?
(c) If Issue No. 2 is decided in favour of the plaintiff's what was the rate of rent settled?
(d) Relief.
5. At the stage of evidence the respondents made an effort to prove in evidence the decisions of the Rent Controller, Quetta District Judge, Quetta and this Court in rent proceedings but the same was not allowed. Sub--sequently an application was submitted by the appellants to seek permission of the Court to place the above said judgments on record, and then to prove them in evidence in accordance with law, and the Court vide order dated 13th September 1971 allowed this application. Finally eau 20th March 1971 the trial Court allowed these judgments to be proved in evidence. The case proceeded further and Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were ultimately decided in respondents' favour while on Issue No. 3 it was held that the rate of rent was Rs. 550 pet month.
Consequent upon this finding the decree impugned in this appeal was passed in respondents' favour.
6. Mr. Basharatullah, the learned counsel for the appellants bas assailed the impugned judgment and decree on the ground that (a) the suit should be treated to have been instituted on 11th May 1971 i.e. The data on which the counsel for the respondents had signed the plaint on behalf of the second respondent and the period of 3 years for which the rent could legally be claimed should be computed from this date and not from the date on which the plaint was initially filed; with the result that rent for the period preced--ing 11th May 1969 should be held to be irrecoverable due to bar of limitation (b) the judgment of the Rent Controller. Quetta, the District Judge, Quetta, and this Court, though Inter Varies judgments, should be held inadmissible in evidence and, (c) Commander Sajjad who entered into agreement with the respondents, not being a legally constituted agent of the appellants, and his acts having not been expressly ratified, the liability to pay rent of the disputed shop should not be imposed upon the appellants.
7. Dealing with the first contention of the learned counsel, it may be remarked that it is an admitted feature in the case that the plaint was not signed by the second respondent when it was presented to tae Court. However, the learned counsel not only conceded before me but had conceded earlier also before the trial Court that the plaint could not be rejected owing to this defect as it was a curable defect. But he vehemently contended that the plaint should be considered to have been validly filed on 11th May 1971 when it was signed by the learned counsel for the respondents pursuant to express permission of the Court. As a result, the claim of rent for three years prior to this date should have been entertained and the teat of the claim preceding this date should have been held barred by time. Now the main question that arises for adjudication is as to whether by mischief of the said defect the plaint should not be treated to have been filed on 16 h July 1967 when it was actually filed. Signatures, verification and drafting of the plaint in a particular manner are matter of mere procedure and the law-making provisions for the same cannot be strictly construed.
What is to be kept in mind, in this regard is that an aggrieved part approached the Court with a tangible claim enforceable under law, an paid adequate court-fee on the subject matter of the suit and also disclose relevant facts so as to enable the Court to adjudicate upon the matter. Nothing more than that is necessary to press a claim. The Code of Civil Procedure lays down a procedure for the drafting of the plaints as well a for signatures and verification by the parties, but it is only in order t facilitate the work of the Courts and to avoid any possibility of ambiguity In the plaint, or for that matter in the pleadings of the parties, due to lack of necessary details or insertion of unnecessary details or failure to disclose the entire claim capable of decision in one suit.
Signatures and verification a primarily meant to land authenticity to the pleadings. Compliance with sue rules would help in adjudicating a claim completely and effectively; otherwise the result may be different. Apparently that is why the Legislature has avoided to use such language in the relevant rules which could compel the A Courts to construe them very strictly. Not only this, the rules regulating such procedure also allow the facility of amending the pleading so as to remove the defects which might have crept in the pleadings inadvertently. The policy of the Courts has also been to allow amendment of the pleading liberally. Verification and Signatures on the plaint is one such matter which strictly relates to the procedure and the rules in this regard are to be liberally construed. In the light of what has been discussed above, omission to sign the plaint by one of the joint plaintiffs cannot be regarded matter which may be capable of giving rise to any penal consequence. The intention and purpose of law being to impart substantive justice and not to thwart it by stifling the proceedings under such pretexts it can b said without any fear of contradiction the plaint in such circumstances shall be considered to have been validly filed on the date on which it was actually filed and such a defect can always be cured at any subsequent stage. There are ample authorities to support the view treat amendment of the pleadings which includes the signing and verification of the plaint is a mere matter of procedure as a plaint not signed at the time of its presentation to the Court could be signed at any subsequent stage 1 even at the appellate stage. In Shrkiawal Khan v. Deputy Commissioner. Sargodha (PLD 1968 Lab. 527), it was hold with reference to rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure that if the plaint was not properly signed and verified at the time of its presentation but it was duly entered in the register of suits it would be sufficient to regard that it was properly filed on that date. Any irregularity in the matter of signing and verification of the plaint could be cured subsequently. A similar question arose in Rajib Aft v. GaJrat Bus Service (PLD 1961 Kar. 486) and it was held that there was no bar to the amendment of the pleadings even at the appellate stage. It is thus apparent that the rules of the Court with regard to procedure are meant to help in promoting the proper administration of justice, and not otherwise. In the end the case of Nabi Bux v. Pakistan (PLD 1969 Kar. 566), may also be quoted. It was held in this case that unintentional omission to sign the pleadings could be rectified by signing the pleadings subsequently and this rule of procedure could he pressed into service even up to the stage of appeal. Mr. Sasharatullah, the learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon Prince Line LUnrtted v. Trade of the Port of Bombay (AIR 1950 Bom. 130). In this case the main point under consideration was with regard to limitation. Though the facts of this case are not on all the fours with the instant case and even otherwise it cannot be attached much Importance as we are supposed to be guided by the ease law developed in our country, yet the question involved in this can may be mentioned here with precision. The main question was with regard to limitation and it was held while allowing the amendment that the defendant would be at liberty to plead the bar of limitation at subsequent stage. In the instant case as well the right to plead the bar of limitation had not been denied to the appellants but in view of the authorities on the point that the defect created by not signing and verifying the plaint could be cured at a subsequent stage, and after it was so cured, it shall be considered to have never existed and the plaint shall be deemed to be effective from the date on which it was actually filed, the bar of limitation as pleaded by the learned counsel is rendered meaningless. Accordingly in my view the finding of the trial Court that the entire claim was within time despite defect in the plaint is free from any legal infirmity.
8. I have already mentioned earlier that the first round of litigation between the parties was in the Court of the Rent Controller, Quetta where the respondents had successfully filed an eviction application against the appellants. At the stage of evidence in this case the respondents tried to rely upon the judgments of the Rent Controller, the District Judge and this Court passed in the Rent cases. Initially the trial Court held that these judgments were not relevant, but subsequently on 13th September 1971 these judgments were allowed to be placed on record. On 29eh March 1972 they were finally allowed to be proved in evidence. Mr. Basharatullah has urged before me that these judgments though Inter-parties judgments were not legally admissible in evidence and that no decree could be passed in the suit by placing reliance on them. Here I may make it clear that main controversy between the parties was on the point of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant. The appellants fir3t contended that they had not taken the shop on rent at all, then said, that they had not taken it on rent for the entire period as claimed by the respondents. It was also urged that Commander Sajjad who had taken the shop on rent on appellants' behalf was riot their legally constituted agent and therefore they were not liable to pay rent to the respondents. As far as these contentions are concerned the findings arrived at by the Rent Controller in rent proceedings and upheld by both the appellate Courts have not at all been made basis for passing the impugned decree. On the other hand the trial Court has independently arrived at its conclusions on the basis of evidence led before it by the parties. Therefore, even if these judgments are completely excluded from consideration no prejudice would be caused to the respondents' case. I have given my anxious consideration to the point raised before me keeping in view the provisions of sections 40, 42 and 43 of the Evidence Act and the case-law on the point and I am of the view that the inter pastes judgments though not conclusive evidence for or against the parties on any point dealt with In them, they can be relied upon to prove a statement or admission made in the earlier case and also to discover the nature of the pleadings in g previous litigation in comparison to the stand in the subsequent case in respect of the same subject-matter. In this view I am supported by the case of Malik Din and others v. Muhammad Aslam (PL D1969S0 130).
Since Mr. Basharatullah, the learned counsel for the appellants did not contest that the respondents had not been able to prove their claim through oral and documentary evidence adduced before the trial Court. I need not touch this aspect of the case.
9. The last contention of the learned counsel was that Commandar Sajjad in his capacity of Development Officer was not competent to enter into any agreement with the respondents on behalf of the appellants Bank, therefore, the liability if any, should have been imposed directly upon him and not upon the appellants. In this context I have to remark that the, conduct of the appellants has all along been such that it cannot be inferred by any stretch of imagination that they disowned the acts of Commander Sajjad. In case they wanted to do so it was necessary for them to intimate to the respondents at the earliest opportunity that they did not acknowledge the liability created for them or Commander Sajjad as be was not their legally constituted agent. In the absence of such a step it is too late in the day to raise this objection at the appellate stage. Here I may recapitulate, the relevant facts by referring to the documentary evidence. The respondents have produced in evidence the agreement executed by Commander Sajjad which is in the form of two letters. In these letters it has been specifically mentioned that the shop in question had been taken over by him on appellants behalf and formal lease deed was to be executed later on. The advance rent was also agreed to be paid to the respondents. Subsequently the Deputy Controller, Development requested the first respondent on 29th January 1968 to meet him in this connection.
They met and discussed the issue and subsequently both the parties exchanged several letters ; the last of them being of 5th January 1968 written, by the Deputy Director of the appellant Bank wherein it was also said that they were agreeable to keep the shop with them provided the rent was charged with effect from March/ April 1968 when the proposed branch of the bank was likely to be opened in this shop. It is thus apparent that during the period from 29th February 1968 (when the first letter was written by Deputy Controller, Development of the appellant Bang to the first respondent) uptill 5th January 1968 (when the last letter was written by Deputy Managing Director refusing to keep the shop in case the rent was not charged from March/April 1968) at no stage it was urged that Commander Sajjad was not their agent and that they were not prepared to pay the rent on the basis of his commitment. Failure to say so during all this period clearly implies that the appellants ratified the acts of Commander Sajjad. All what was tried during this period was to avoid to pay rent for the period when the shop was not utilised and some other amends in the agreement of lease hone and there. Under section 186 of the Contract Act it is not necessary that the authority of the agent should be p express. It can also be implied. In the instant case from the attitude adopted by the appellants it is crystal clear that Commander Sajjad was considered by them as their agent and that is why they did not say a single word to disown the liability incurred through him. In this connection provisions of section 187 of the Contract Act can also be pressed into service. It runs as under ; "187. An authority is said to be express when it is given by words spoken or written. An authority is said to be implied when it is to be inferred from the circumstances of the case; and things spoken or written, or, the ordinary course of dealing, may be accounted circumstances of the case.".
For the reasons given above I do not find any substance in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs.