AJMAL MIAN, J.--These are four appeals with the leave of this Court. We intend to dispose of the same by this common judgment as they are directed against a common judgment dated 17-4- 1986 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh in Constitutional Petition No,D-914 of 1984, filed by respondent No,1, allowing the same and declaring the Regulations framed by the appellant in Civil Appeal No,79-K of 1987 i,e, Karachi Building Control Authority, hereinafter referred to as the Authority, under section 21-A of the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979 (Ordinance No,V of 1979), hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, and published inter alia in Daily English Newspaper "Dawn" dated 7-4-1984, as ultra vires. Leave to appeal was granted as the questions raised in the petitions were one of law and involved the interpretation of the Regulations framed by the Authority in exercise of the power conferred upon it by section 21-A of the Ordinance.
2. The brief facts are that respondent No,1 purchased in the year 1975 plot of land bearing Survey No,16/1, Sheet GK.8 measuring about 20,269 sq. Yards, situated in Ghulam Kassim Quarters, Eduljee Dinshaw Road, Karachi, with the construction thereon, hereinafter referred to as the suit property.
The suit property was in occupation of about 15 tenants. It seems that respondent No,1, after obtaining the sanction for the construction of a modern double storey building after demolishing the existing structure, filed ejectment proceedings in or about March, 1978, against the tenants under section 13 of the late West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the late Ordinance, on the ground of reconstruction. It appears that while the above ejectment proceedings were pending, the Ordinance was promulgated on or about 3-3-1979.
Pursuant to section 6 thereof, respondent No,1 obtained re-approval of the plan from the Authority on or about 18-2-1980. It further seems that section 21-A was incorporated in the Ordinance by virtue of the Sindh Buildings Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1982 (Sindh Ordinance No,III of 1982), on 6-3-1982. It may be pertinent to mention here that the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (Sindh Ordinance No,XVII of 1979) was promulgated in November, 1979, repealing and replacing the late Ordinance, hereinafter referred to as S.R.P.O.
3. The above rent cases were resisted by the tenants. The learned Rent Controller, after recording evidence and hearing of the parties by his order dated 29-8-1983, granted the ejectment in favour of respondent No,1. Against the above ejectment order, the tenants have filed First Rent Appeals and respondent No,1 also filed First Rent Appeals, which are pending in the High Court for adjudication.
4. It appears that after the filing of the above First Rent Appeals, the Authority, in purported exercise of power under section 21-A of the Ordinance, framed the following two Regulations, hereinafter referred to as the Regulations, which were inter alia published in the Daily English Newspaper "Dawn" of 7-4-1984 as stated hereinabove:-- "REGULATIONS:
(1) Approval of Building Plans or permission for reconstruction of buildings over plot or plots having existing structure under occupation of tenant/tenants shall not be accorded by the Authority unless an agreement is arrived by the landlord/owner and the tenant for alternate accommodation or for mutually agreed compensation.
(2) All permissions accorded/granted by the Authority wherein an agreement between landlord/owner and the tenant/tenants has not been submitted are hereby suspended with immediate effect if no physical construction has been started in pursuance of the permission/approval already accorded, and the premises are still occupied by the tenant."
' It may also be pertinent to mention that following subsection (4) to section 15 of S.R.P.O. Was added on 30-7-1984 by the Sindh Rented Premises (Amendment) Ordinance, 1984 (IV of 1984):-- "(4) Where the landlord constructs the building as aforesaid the tenant who was evicted from the old building may, before the completion of new building and its occupation by another person, apply to the Controller for an order directing that he be put in possession of such area in the new building as does not exceed the area of the old building of which he was in occupation and the Controller shall make an in respect of the area applied for or such smaller area, as considering the location and type of the new building and the needs of the tenant, he deems just and on payment of rent to be determined by him on the basis of rent of similar accommodation in the locality."
5. After that, respondent No,1 filed aforesaid Constitution petition, which was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh in the above terms as stated hereinabove. Thereupon, four petitions for leave to appeal against the above judgment were filed i,e, one petition by the Authority and three petitions by the tenants, which were granted.
6. In support of Civil Appeal No,79-K of 1987, Mr.Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the Authority, has urged that if the preamble of the Ordinance is to be read with the other provisions of the same, it becomes evident that the Regulations are intra vires and have been framed for public good.
' Whereas, Mr. Noor Muhammed, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal No,80-K of 1987, has urged as follows:--
(i) That the object of framing Regulations is to make approval of a plan under section 6 effective; ' that the incorporation of subsection (4) in section 15 of the S.R.P.O. On 30-7-1984 does not affect the Regulations as the former covers the period subsequent to the grant of approval of a plan, whereas the latter relates to the period prior to the grant of approval; and
(iii) that the question, whether the Regulations are reasonable or not, is to be viewed on the assumption that the same are made for reasonable persons and not for abnormal persons.
' Mr. Rustom F. Virjee, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal No,82-K of 1987, has contended as follows:--
(i) That since the approved plan in question had expired, respondent. No,1 had no vested right to get it renewed and, therefore, the Authority was competent to impose any condition as a precondition for granting approval;
(ii) that the Court should make all efforts to uphold the validity of the Regulations as they have been framed in public interest;
(iii) that the incorporation of subsection (4) in section 15 of the S.R.P.O. Does not, in any way, impair the power of the Authority to impose condition under the Regulations for granting approval of a building plan; and
(iv) that the suit property is in occupation of a number of tenants and the appellants in above Civil Appeal No,82-K of 1987 are in possession of a large track of land about 4000/5000 Sq. Yards with the construction thereon and it will be unjust and inequitable if they are deprived of their valuable right.
' Mr. A. Latif A. Shakoor, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing in Civil Appeal No,81-K of 1987 for appellants Nos.3, 4 and 5, Mr. Abdul Kadir Khan, holding brief for Mr. A.Aziz Khan, Advocate-on- Record for appellants Nos.1 and 2 in Civil Appeal No,81-K of 1982, Mr. Amjad Hussain, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for respondents Nos.14 to 16 in Civil Appeal No,79-K of 1987, and Mr. Shabbir Qazilbash, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for respondents Nos.8 and 15 in Civil Appeal No,79-K of 1987, adopted the arguments of the above learned counsel for the appellants.
' Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, learned counsel for respondent No,1 in all the above appeals, has vehemently urged that the basic question in the present case is, as to whether the Regulations are within the ambit of the provisions of the Ordinance or whether they have travelled beyond its purview. According to him, the conclusion of the High Court that the Regulations are ultra vires the provisions of the Ordinance and they are also unreasonable are in consonance with law and, therefore, the above appeals merit dismissal.
7. The basic question which is involved in the present appeals is, as to whether under the provisions of the Ordinance, the Regulations could have been framed. Before proceeding any further, we may observe that the construction of the buildings can be divided into the following three subcategories:--
(i) New construction on open plots; ' Demolition of a building under section 14 of the Ordinance by the Authority and thereafter reconstruction of a new building; and
(iii) A landlord obtains ejectment of a tenant on the ground of reconstruction through a competent Court and thereafter re-construct tile building after obtaining the approval of the plan.
8. In the present case, we are concerned with the above last sub-category as it is a common ground that respondent No,1 had initiated ejectment proceedings in the year 1978 on the ground of reconstruction and obtained order of ejectment in 1983. First Rent Appeals arising therefrom are pending in the High Court for adjudication.
9. Mr. Noor Mohammed has referred to the preamble, sections 2, 6, 6-A, 7-A, 12, 13, 14 and 21-A of the Ordinance in order to contend that the same have vested very vast power in the Authority and, therefore, the Regulations are intra vires. It may be observed that the preamble of the Ordinance provides that "whereas it is expedient to regulate the planning, quality of construction and buildings control, prices charged and publicity made for disposal of buildings and plots by builders and societies and demolition of dangerous and dilapidated buildings in the Province of Sindh;"
Section 2 of the Ordinance lays down that nothing contained in any other law for the time being in force shall apply to any matter regulated by the Ordinance. It may further, be observed that section 6 relates to according of approval to plans and issuance of no-objection certificates for the constructions, whereas section 6-A provides that a builder or developer shall for the purpose of obtaining no objection certificate under section 5 or, as the case may be, under section 6, shall furnish true information of the matters referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (d). It may further be pointed out that section 7 deals with the preparation of the plans and the requirement of employing an architect and a structural engineer in the cases referred to therein. It may also be pointed out that section 7-A empowers the Authority in case of violation of the provision of subsection (1) of section 6 to seal the building or eject the occupants and/or to demolish the building at the cost of the builder.
' It may also be mentioned that section 12 deals with the sale of buildings, by a builder and provides conditions for the same. Whereas, section 13 prohibits increase of sale price of the building advertised under section 12. It may further be pointed out that section 14 covers dangerous buildings and it empowers the Authority either to direct the owners or occupiers to carry out the repairs or to cause the demolition of the building or to demolish it itself after ejecting the occupants of the building. The proviso to the same which was incorporated on 1-11-1984 by Sindh Buildings Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1984 (XXXVII of 1984) confers the right of hearing on the person who is likely to be affected by the action to be taken under subsection (3) of above section
14. It may further be stated that section 21-A, which was enacted on 6-3-1982, empowers the Authority to frame Regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of the Ordinance and the Rules made thereunder for carrying out the purpose of the Ordinance and without prejudice to the generality on the matters enumerated in sub-clauses (a) to (1). It may also be observed that subsection (3) of the above section provides that Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulation, 1973, in the case of Authority of Karachi and the Bye-laws of the Council concerned in other cases duly published, shall until Regulations are framed under the above section, be deemed to be Regulations so framed provided they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Ordinance and the Rules framed thereunder.
10. In our view, sections 6 and 7 and clauses (b) and (e) of subsection (2) of section 21-A of the Ordinance deal with the question of approval and preparation of the plan and therefore the question, whether the Regulations are ultra vires or intra vires, will depend on the construction of the above provisions. It will, therefore, be advantageous to reproduce the same, which reads as follows:-- "Section 6 of the Ordinance ' Approval of plan.---(1) No building shall be constructed before the Authority has, in the prescribed manner, approved the plan of such building and granted no-objection certificate for the construction thereof on payment of such fee as may be prescribed: ' Provided that in the case of a building the construction whereof has commenced before coming into force of this Ordinance, the Authority's approval of the plan and no-objection certificate shall be obtained not later than six months after the enforcement of the Ordinance.
' Explanation.--The word "construct" with all its variations used in this section and hereafter shall include "reconstruct" with all its variations and, additions or alterations.
(2) No building mentioned in subsection (1) shall be occupied by any person or shall be allowed by the builder to be occupied, before the Authority has, on application of the occupant or owner, issued occupancy certificate, in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3) No building mentioned in subsection (1) shall, except with the permission of the Authority, be used for the purpose other than that for which its plans were approved.
(4) Where the Authority is satisfied that the purpose for which' the building is desired to be used is consistent with the approved plans of the building, it may grant the permission under any subsection (3) on such conditions and on payment of such fees as it may fix."
' Section 7 of the Ordinance ' Preparation of plans.---(1) The plan submitted to the Authority under section 6 shall be prepared by and under the supervision of, and signed by, such person or persons referred to in subsection (1) of section 8 as may be prescribed: ' Provided that a structural engineer shall be associated with the architect to prepare the structural designs and drawing and sign them if the building:--
(i) is sixteen meters or more in height from the plinth level;
(ii) consists of five or more storeys, in addition to the ground floor;
(iii) consists of two or more storeys, in addition to the ground floor, situated in the coastal areas notified by the Authority;
(iv) is considered by the Authority to be of special nature: ' Provided further that a town planner shall, in addition to structural engineer, be associated to assist the architect in preparation of the plan if the building is constructed on a plot of two acres or more and the Authority deems that association of town planner is necessary and in that case the plan shall be signed also by the town planner.
(2) An Inspecting engineer shall be engaged for supervision of construction of a building other than a single or double-storeyed building on an area not exceeding four hundred square yards the construction whereof may, instead of inspecting engineer, be entrusted to the supervision of a building supervisor, and the inspecting engineer or as the case may be, the building supervisor shall sign the plan of the building.
(3) The builder and any person or persons associated in any manner with the building including its plan and construction shall be liable for the defects in the structure, plan and construction thereof to such extent and manner as may be determined by the Authority.
(4) The Authority may, for the reason of safe and sound construction, refer the structural design of any building for further examination to a proof engineer who shall scrutinize the design and, if necessary, modify it and the fees or any charges in connection therewith shall be borne by the builder.
"21-A. Clauses (b) and (e) of section 21-A of the Ordinance.--
(b) the manner of approval, grant of no-objection certificates to builders or developers and rates of fees therefor;
(e) the manner of preparation, supervision and submission of building plans;"
A perusal of the above section 6 indicates that its subsection (1) prohibits the construction of any building before the Authority has, in the manner prescribed, approved the plan of such building and granted no objection. It also provides that no objection certificate shall be obtained not later than six months after the commencement of the Ordinance in respect of a building, the construction of which had commenced before the enforcement of the Ordinance. The Explanation to the above subsection (1) explains the word "construct" by providing that the same with all its variations used in this section and hereafter shall include "reconstruct" with all its variations, additions and alterations. It may also be noticed that subsections (2) to (4) thereof deal with the issuance of the occupancy certificate in the manner prescribed, prohibition of the use of the building other than that for which its plans were approved and granting of permission under subsection (3) for occupation of the building on such conditions and on payment of such fees as it may fix.
' It may be mentioned that subsection (1) of section 7 lays down that the plans under section 6 shall be prepared by and under the supervision of and signed by such person or persons referred to in subsection (1) of section 8 as may be prescribed. It also provides that a structural engineer shall be associated with the architect to prepare the structural design and drawing and sign them if the building falls in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of above subsection (1) of section 7. It may further be stated that subsections (2) to (4) contemplate engagement of an inspecting engineer for supervision of the construction of a building referred to in subsection (2). It imposes liability on the builder and any person or persons associated in any manner with the building including plan and construction for the defects in the structure, plan and construction thereof to the extent and manner as may be determined by the Authority in terms of subsection (3). It also empowers the Authority for the reason of a safe and sound construction to refer the structural design of any building for further examination to a proof engineer.
' It may be noticed that above clauses (b) and (e) of subsection (2) of section 21-A empower the Authority without prejudice to the generality of the power referred to in subsection (1) to frame regulations inter alia for providing the manner of approval, granting of no-objection certificate to builders or developers and rate of fees thereof and the manner of preparation, supervision and submission of building plans. Regulation No,1 of the Regulations provides that approval of building plans or permission for reconstruction of buildings over plot or plots having existing structure under the occupation of a tenant/tenants shall not be accorded by the Authority unless an agreement is arrived by the landlord/owner and the tenant for alternate accommodation or for mutually agreed compensation; whereas Regulation No,2 contemplates that all permission accorded, granted by the Authority wherein an agreement between the landlord/owner and the tenant/tenants has not been submitted, stands suspended with immediate effect if no physical construction has been started in pursuance of the permission/approval already accorded and the premises are still occupied by the tenant.
Respondent No,l's case falls under Regulation No,2 as prior to the framing of the Regulations, they had obtained approval and no objection under section 6 on 18-2-1980. The question, therefore, arises, as to whether the above Regulations are covered by above sections 6, 7 and above clauses
(b) and (e) of subsection (2) of section 21-A of the Ordinance.
11. We may now revert to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. Mr.Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui, learned counsel for the Authority, was unable to point out any provision by virtue of which the Regulations can be sustained as intra vires in respect of a case in which the landlord obtains the ejectment of his tenant from the premises on the ground of reconstruction through the Court. However, his submission was that since under subsection (3) of section 14 of the Ordinance, the Authority has been empowered to evict a tenant from the building which may be declared dangerous it has power to ensure reduction of the tenant into the reconstructed building and hence there is nexus between above section 14 and the Regulations. Since section 14 of the Ordinance is not involved in the present case, we would not like to express ourselves definitely as the above question may arise in future which will be decided after hearing the parties concerned.
However, it will suffice to observe that the above submission is plausible.
12. Adverting to Mr. Noor Mohammed's first submission that the object of framing Regulations is to make approval of a plan under section 6 effective, it may be observed that to reinforce the above submission, he has invited our attention to the fact that approval to a building plan accorded by the Authority remains a paper approval as it takes very long period to obtain an ejectment order from a Court on the ground of reconstruction and, therefore, the Regulations by providing that a landlord/owner should enter into an agreement with a tenant in occupation of the building concerned, intends to make the approval of a plan effective. The above submission is founded on the assumption that it will be an easy task for a landlord and a tenant to arrive at a settlement without the intervention of the Court, which is factually not correct as no machanism has been provided to facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement. Even if we were to accept Mr. Noor Mohammed's above contention as factually correct, the Regulations cannot be held intra vires on the above ground, if they do not fall within the ambit of the Ordinance.
13. As regards Mr. Noor Mohammed's second submission that the incorporation of subsection (4) in section 15 of the S.R.P.O. On 30-7-1984 does not affect the Regulations as the former covers the period subsequent to the grant of approval of a plan, whereas the latter relates to the period prior to the grant of approval, it may be mentioned that at the time when the ejectment cases were filed by respondent No,1 in 1978, the late Ordinance was holding the field. Subsection (5-B) of section 13 of the same provided protection to the tenant in case ejectment was granted on the ground of re- construction of the building in the following terms :-- "(5-B) Where, in pursuance of an order under clause (iv) of subsection (2), a landlord has obtained possession of a building (in this subsection referred to as the old building), and constructs a new building on the same site, the tenant who was evicted from the old building may before the completion of the new building and its occupation by another person, apply to the Controller for an order directing that he be put in possession of such area in the new building as does not exceed the area of the old building of which he was in occupation, and the Controller shall make on in respect of the area applied for or such smaller area, as, considering the location and type of the new building and needs of the tenant, he deems just, and on payment of rent to be determined by him on the basis of rent of similar accommodation in the locality."
14. The late Ordinance was repealed and replaced by S.R.P.O. In the Province of Sindh on or about 21-11-1979. The original text of the S.R.P.O. Did not contain any provision corresponding to the above subsection (5-B) of section 13 of the late Ordinance till 30-7-1984 when subsection (4) of section 15 was enacted providing a corresponding provision to above subsection (5-B) reproduced hereinabove in para.
4. Since the matter is sub judice before the High Court in F.R.As., we would not like to express on the question, whether subsection (5-B) of the late Ordinance is applicable or subsection (4) of section 15 of the S.R.P.O. It will suffice to observe that both the above provisions protect the interest of a tenant who is ejected through the process of the Court on the ground of reconstruction. It is true that the Regulations contemplate entering into an agreement between a landlord/owner and a tenant before an approval to a building plan is accorded by the Authority, whereas subsection (5- B) of section 13 of the late Ordinance and subsection (4) of section 15 of the S.R.P.O. Can be pressed into service after the plan is approved and the building is constructed in accordance thereof. No doubt that mere fact that subsection (5-B) of section 13 of the late Ordinance or subsection (4) of section 15 of the S.R.P.O. Provides for the reduction of a tenant ejected through the Court, will not divest the power of the Authority, if vested, under the Ordinance to frame the Regulations in issue.
So the moot question is, whether the Authority had the power.
15. Reverting to Mr. Noor Mohammed's third submission that the question, whether the Regulations are reasonable or not, is to be viewed on the assumption that the same are made for reasonable persons and not for abnormal persons, it may be stated that the question, whether the Regulations are workable or not and whether they are reasonable, are to be determined after taking into consideration all aspects and not merely by assuming that a reasonable tenant would enter into an agreement with a landl9rd by mutual agreement in terms of the Regulations. The question of reasonableness will be touched upon hereinafter at an appropriate place.
16. We may now revert to the submission of Mr. Virjee. According to in, since the approved plan had expired, respondent No,1 had no vested right to get it renewed and, therefore, the Authority was competent to impose any condition as a precondition for granting approval, it may be stated that the High Court has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Rashid Brothers, Faisalabad v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar Khan and another 1981 SCMR 782, in which this Court, while declining a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court, observed that renewal of sanction was only a formality and that it is not reasonable for the respondents/landlords to get the sanction renewed every year during the pendency of the proceedings which have been going on for the last many years. Even otherwise, the above contention is not sound as a public authority like the Authority is to act within the four corners of the statute under which it has been created and, therefore, any condition which is to be imposed, should have rational nexus with the provisions of the Ordinance.
17. Referring to Mr. Virjee's second submission that the Court should make all efforts to uphold the validity of the Regulations as they have been framed in public interest, it may be observed that in support of his above submission, he has referred to the following cases:-
(i) Messrs Pak Army Furnishing Stores v. Syed Ali Akbar Rizvi and 3 others PLD 1985 Kar. 201;
(ii) Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another v.
Paritosh Bhupesh Kurmarsheth, etc. Etc. AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1543;
(iii) P.V. Mani and others v. Union of India and others AIR 1986 Kerala 86;
(iv) Indo-Foreign Import and Export Corporation and another v. Union of India (Company Cases (1984) Vol. 55 page 224);
(v) Dwarka Nath Prasad Atal v. Ram Rati Devi AIR 1980 Supreme Court 192;
(vi) B.V. Narayana Reddy and others v. State of Karnataka and others AIR 1985 Karnataka 99;
(vii) Sultan Mawjee and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and 3 others PLD 1982 SC 174; (viii)Pathumma and others v. State of Kerala and others Supreme Court Cases (1978) 2 page 1;
(ix) Man Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others (1985) 4 Supreme Court Cases 146);
(x) Dr. (Mrs.) Sushma ,Sharma and others v. State of Rajasthan an others 1985 (Supp.) Supreme Court Cases 45.
18. It is not necessary to deal with all the above cases in detail. However, it may be pertinent to refer to the case of Messrs Pak Army Furnishing Stores v. Syed Ali Akbar Rizvi and 3 others (supra), in which one of us Saleem Akhtar, J. (as his Lordship then was), while dealing with an appeal under section 21 of the S.R.P.O. And while considering the Regulations under the Ordinance, pointed out that neither the Controller nor the appellate Court was competent to go into the question of vires of the Regulations. However, at the same time, the following observations were made:- "The Authority has been empowered to grant approval of building plan and no-objection certificate for construction. Grant of such certificate and approval are to be regulated by the Rules and Regulations which are framed for effective cenforcement of the S.B.C. Ordinance. The Authority can, therefore, impose conditions while granting permission for demolition of the building and erection of a new building. It cannot overlook the rights of the tenants, who occupy the premises and have a valuable interest in it. The tenancy right is a valuable right and unless otherwise provided by law it cannot be lost merely because the landlord wants to demolish the building and erect a new building. Therefore, if for re-erection of a new building the Authority imposes reasonable conditions which are not in conflict with the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance the same would be valid and proper. Conscious of the jurisdiction under which I am dealing with the matter, I would refrain from commenting whether the Regulation is ultra vires or invalid. Suffice to say that for the purpose of limited investigation which can be made in this appeal, the Regulation is not patently void or illegal."
' The above observations to the effect that the tenancy right, being a valuable right, cannot be lost because the landlord wants to demolish the building and erect a new building, have bearing on a case where the landlord without the aid of the Court gets a tenant evicted and gets the building demolished under the provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance. If the Authority is instrumental in depriving a tenant, his possession and tenancy rights in respect of a building or a tenement without the intervention of the Court in exercise of power vested in it under section 14 of the Ordinance, the efforts on the part of the Authority to provide for reduction of the tenant into the newly constructed building may have rational nexus with the power exercised under section 14 of the Ordinance, as observed by us hereinabove. Since the case in hand does not involve section 14 of the Ordinance, it is not necessary for us to deal with the above point any further as observed hereinabove.
19. Reference may also be made to the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kurmarsheth, etc. Etc. (supra), which was heavily relied upon by Mr. Noor Muhammad as well as Mr. Virjee, in which the Indian Supreme Court, while examining the question of vires of Regulation 104 framed by the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board under Act 41 of 1965, dilated on the question as to how the issue of vires of a Regulation or a Rule is to be approached or to be examined by a Court. Relevant observations read as follows:-- "In our opinion, this approach made by the High Court was not correct or proper because the question whether a particular piece of delegated legislation --- whether a rule or regulation or other type of statutory instrument --- is in excess of the power of subordinate legislation conferred on the delegate is to be determined with reference only to the specific provisions contained in the relevant statute conferring the power to make the rule, regulation, etc. And also the object and purpose of the Act as can be gathered from the various provisions of the enactment. It would be wholly wrong for the Court to substitute its own opinion for that of the legislature or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act and to sit in judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the regulation-making body and declare a regulation to be ultra vires merely on the ground that, in the view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not help to serve the object and purpose of the Act.
So long as the body entrusted with the task of framing the rules or regulations acts within the scope of the authority conferred on it, in the sense that the rules or regulations made by it have a rational nexus with the object and purpose of the Statute, the Court should not concern itself with the wisdom or efficaciousness of such rules or regulations. It is exclusively within the province of the legislature and its delegate to determine, as a matter of policy, how the provisions of the Statute can best be implemented and what measures, substantive as well as procedural, would have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations for the efficacious achievement of the objects and purposes of the Act. It is not for the Court to examine the merits or demerits of such a policy because its scrutiny has to be limited to the question as to whether the impugned regulations fall within the scope of the regulation-making power conferred on the delegate by the Statute. Though this legal position is well-established by a series of decisions of this Court, we have considered it necessary to reiterate it in view of the manifestly erroneous approach made by the High Court to the consideration of the question as to whether the impugned clause (3) of Regulation 104 is ultra vires. In the light of the aforesaid principles, we shall now proceed to consider the challenge levelled against the validity of the Regulation 104(3)."
20. The other authorities relied upon by Mr. Virjee inter alia lay down that there is a presumption that Regulations or the Rules framed under the statutory power are valid. While examining the question of vires of the statutory regulations or rules, the Court should make efforts to uphold them as valid. Liberal construction should be placed on such regulations/rules and the paramount consideration should be public interest and public good etc. There cannot be any cavil to the above legal propositions nor there can be any controversy on the correctness of the weighty observations of the Indian Supreme Court quoted hereinabove from the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumarsheth, etc. (supra). Once a Court finds that the regulations/rules framed under the statutory power are within the ambit of the relevant statute, it cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the regulations making body and it cannot declare regulations to be ultra vires merely because the Court considers that the impugned regulations will not serve the object and the purpose of the Act.
21. We have already quoted hereinabove sections 6, 7 and clauses (b) and (e) of subsection (2) of section 21-A of the Ordinance and have dilated upon as to the scope and the object of the same.
The Regulations have no rational nexus with the objects referred to in sections 6 and 7 and the above clauses (b) and (e) of subsection (2) of section 21-A of the Ordinance. As observed hereinabove in the present case, First Rent Appeals against the order of ejectment granted by the Rent Contoller on the ground of reconstruction, are still pending for adjudication in the High Court of Sindh, and, therefore, respondent No,1 is seeking ejectment of the tenants through the process of the Court in terms of the provisions of the late Ordinance and/or of the S.R.P.O. And not with the aid of the Authority under section 14 of the Ordinance and, therefore, the ejectment of the tenants, if any, will take place through the process of the Court and not through the exercise of statutory power vested in the Authority under section 14 of the Ordinance and, hence, the Regulations purporting to impose a condition upon a landlord/owner of a building which is to be demolished to produce an agreement entered into between him and a tenant for alternate accommodation or for the payment of compensation, is foreign to the object and scope of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance. The conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the Regulations are ultra vires on that account, seems to be correct. We may observe that subsection (5-B) of section 13 of the late Ordinance, which was in force when the present ejectment proceedings were initiated and subsection (4) of section 15 of the S.R.P.O. Protects the interest of a tenant by conferring right on him to apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing the landlord/owner of the newly constructed building to put him in possession of such area in the new building as does not exceed the area of the old building or which was in his occupation. It also empowers the Rent Controller to determine the rate of rent on the basis of rent of similar accommodation in the locality.
22. As regards Mr. Virjee's third submission that the incorporation of subsection (4) in section 15 of the S.R.P.O. Does not, in any way, impair the power of the Authority to impose condition under the Regulations for granting approval of a building plan, it will suffice to observe that the above contention has already been dealt with hereinabove and the same need not be repeated.
23. This leads us to his last submission that the suit property is in occupation of a number of tenants and the appellants in above Civil Appeal No,82-K of 1987 are in possession of a large track of land about 4000/5000 sq. Yards with the construction thereon and it will be unjust and inequitable if they are deprived of their valuable right, it may again be observed that the appellants in Civil Appeal No,82-K of 1987 are not going to be ejected by the Authority. The ejectment, if any, as pointed out hereinabove, is to be effected through the process of the Court under the Rent Laws which protect the interest of the tenants in the form of above subsection (5-B) of section 13 of the late Ordinance and subsection (4) of-section 15 of S.R.P.O.
24. We may now deal with the second ground which found favour with the learned Judges of the High Court, namely, that the Regulations appeared to be unfair, impracticable, contrary to the general policy and law and, therefore, unreasonable. In this regard, it may be pertinent to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment, which reads as follows:-- "Although it is true that the regulations fail to provide for mechanism for arriving at the agreement contemplated by such regulations but would the regulations be unreasonable on that account? It cannot be denied that by failing to provide such mechanism these regulations provide a lever in the hands of the tenant to coerce the landlord to agree to his terms howsoever unreasonable they may be. Although we are sure, that if any mechanism for execution of agreement between the landlord and the tenant or resolution of their disputes had been provided in the regulations the same would have been more favourable to the tenant. However, if any such mechanism had been provided by these regulations, the position obtaining now might not have been the same.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that these regulations are restrictive in nature vis-a-vis the rights of the landlord and permit the tenant to exercise undue influence over the landlord to agree to his terms and obtain unfair advantage. Moreover, the respondent No,1 while framing these regulations seems to have completely abdicated its authority in favour of the tenant by making the granting of sanction or approval of building plan purely dependent upon signing of agreement between the landlord and the tenant, which otherwise, according to the provisions of the Buildings Control Ordinance, is within the discretionary powers of the respondent No,1. The regulations, therefore, appear to be unfair, impracticable and contrary to the general policy of law and are, therefore, unreasonable."
25. It may be observed that The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition, defines the word "reasonable" as follows:-- "reasonable" (-z-) a.
1. Having sound judgment, sensible, moderate, not expecting too much, ready to listen to reason.
2. In accordance with reason, not absurd; within the limits of reason, not greatly less or more than might be expected; inexpensive, not extortionate; tolerable, fair.
3. (arch.) endowed with faculty of reason."
' From the above quoted meaning of the word "reasonable", it is evident that the question, whether a particular thing or regulation is reasonable or not, will depend on various factors. If a regulation is not workable, it places one party in dominating position as to dictate his terms, it cannot be said to be reasonable.
26. In our view, the High Court has correctly analysed the inherent defect in the Regulations in the abovequoted portion of the judgment and has rightly held to be unfair, impracticable and, therefore, unreasonable. The provisions in the form of subsection (5-B) of section 13 of the late Ordinance and subsection (4) of section 15 of the S.R.P.O. Can stand the test of reasonableness as they are workable and provide mechanism and basis entitling a tenant to obtain more or less equivalent space in the newly reconstructed building in lieu of his old tenement of rent to be determined by the Rent Controller.
27. At this juncture, it may be pertinent to observe that Mr. Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, learned counsel for respondent No,1 in the above appeals, has urged that even a law, if vague and indefinite, cannot be enforced, what to say about a subordinate legislation in the form of regulations. In support of his above submission, he has relied upon the following portion of para. 198 from the celebrated treatise on the Construction of Statutes by Crawford:-- "198. Statutes without meaning.--Indefinite terms. We have seen, that awkward, ungrammatical, inaccurate and inapt expressions, will not generally of themselves vitiate a statute, if the Court, by the process of interpretation, can ascertain with reasonable certainty what the legislature meant.
Nevertheless, a statute to be valid must be capable of construction; that is, it must have an ascertainable intelligible meaning. If the statute cannot be given an intelligible meaning, because of the uncertainty, indefiniteness and vagueness of its terms, it will be wholly inoperative. But the Court must first resort to and use every authorised means in its attempt to ascertain that meaning, although, of course, it cannot supply a meaning where the language is susceptible of none. If there is no indication of the intention of the legislature, obviously, it will be impossible for the Court to discover one or make it effective. In some instances, however, indefinite general terms, if preceded by specific terms, may be rendered definite and hence operative by the doctrine of ejusdem generis."
' The abovequoted extract from the Construction of Statutes by Crawford is in line what we are inclined to hold.
28. The upshot of the above discussion is that the appeals are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
' SALEEM AKHTAR, J.--I have appended my opinion separately.
' SALEEM AKHTAR, J.--I have had the opportunity to read the exhaustive judgment of my learned brother Ajmal Mian, J. Which holding the impugned regulation to be unreasonable and ultra vires keeps the question of its validity in relation to section 14 of the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance open. As I had expressed my reserved opinion in Pak Army Furnishing Store's case while hearing First Rent Appeal filed under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance I would like to add few lines here. In that case the validity of the regulation was not under consideration nor could it be agitated in those proceedings. It may be pointed out that during the period 21st November, 1979, when Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance was promulgated till 29-4-1984 no protection to the tenants as contained in section 15-A of the Ordinance was provided. Some tenants may have claimed benefits of the repealed Ordinance, if applicable, but the fact remains that from 21-11-1979 to 29-4-1984 tenants could be ejected on ground of reconstruction without a remedy of being reinducted in possession after reconstruction of the new building. In ejectment case filed on the ground of reconstruction the Authority constituted under the Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance, 1979 played an important role. It is on its approval of a building plan that a landlord would commence ejectment proceeding on ground of reconstruction.
2. The subject can be divided in two parts, one where the tenant did not have the protection of section 15A and the second where the tenant has such protection. In the former case the tenant is left without any remedy although it is on the approval of the plan by the Authority that the landlord initiates ejectment proceedings. In cases of reconstruction demolition of existing construction is implied. A landlord can demolish a building if he obtains an approved plan for reconstruction of the building in its place. It is pertinent to note that in cases where a tenant has a right to be reinstated in the new premises, obtaining possession on ground of reconstruction does not ipso facto terminate the tenancy in respect of the premises which the tenant occupied at the time of passing ejectment order. The landlord keeps the new building in trust for the benefit of the ousted tenant. Sec Matloob v. Mst. Saceda Khatoon 1988 SCM R 1575. If the landlord on the basis of the approved plan could seek ejectment and the tenants were left without any remedy of being reinstated in possession in the new building, as happened between November 1979 to 30-4-1984, the Authority would have been justified in imposing reasonable conditions which may protect the occupant's right of tenancy. Such protection can be ensured by imposing reasonable conditions which may be in the form of guarantee, security or undertaking by the landlord or agreement with the tenant. Although Sindh Buildings Control Ordinance was in force from 1979, the Regulation was framed on 7th April, 1984, only in respect of plans approved for reconstruction upon plots having building in occupation of the tenants at Karachi. Therefore, its operation and applicability was restricted to a category of plots, persons and places where interest of tenants was involved. Such regulation will be in consonance with the object of the Ordinance inasmuch as it provides safeguard against indiscriminately employing the approval of plan as a vehicle for initiating ejectment proceeding and depriving the tenants from their valuable right of tenancy. The problem has not to be considered from the point of view of the landlords alone but by placing both the view points in juxtaposition and then decide which option will be just and fair and which one will be oppressive and unjust. Whether any settlement, agreement or compensation for saving the tenancy will be just or to allow the tenant to be deprived of his tenancy rights without any remedy can be termed as fair and reasonable. The reasonable character of a rule or regulation cannot be judged in isolation from the whole problem it intends to solve. In these circumstances if any reasonable condition is imposed by the Authority at the time of granting approval of plan or its renewal which may in terms be as provided by section 15-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance or similar to it for giving protection to the tenants, the same would not only be reasonable but within the powers conferred by the Buildings Control Ordinance. As my learned brother has dealt at length with the provisions of the Ordinance I refrain from repeating them.
Suffice to say, the conditions imposed as stated above will be intra vires the Ordinance.
3. The impugned regulation requires the landlord/owner to enter into agreement with the tenant for providing alternate accommodation or compensation. I agree with my learned brother that such condition may be oppressive. However, requiring a landlord owner to induct the tenant in possession of such area in the new building as does not exceed the old building of which he is in occupation at the time of approval or renewal of the plan or an undertaking to this effect by the landlord/owner will be reasonable.