1. AMIR-UL-MULK MENGAL, J.---By this common judgment we intend to dispose of following Constitutional petitions, as identical question of facts as well as law are involved in all these petitions: Constitutional Petitions Nos.5, 12, 13, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 84, 85, 87, 88,94, 95 116, 129, 139 and 182 of 1996.
2. We take brief facts of C.P. No.5 of 1996 which are to the effect that the petitioners are carrying on business of ship-breaking at Gadani and the petitioner firm imported a vessel "Asheyra". The LDT of the vessel was 19420 which was built in 1972 at Sweden. The said vessel was beached at Gadani on 5th of November 1995. According to petitioner the Custom duty on the vessel imported for breaking was Rs.1, 375 per LDT plus 25 % . Sales Tax at the rate of 15 % and withholding tax at the rate of 4 % was payable. The case of petitioner was that under SRO 490(1)/95 the Customs duty fort more than Rs.1,375 per LDT plus 25 % was exempt as such the Regulatory Duty being custom duty was equally exempt. However, by means of Notification SRO NO.NIL(1)/95 dated 29-10-1995, the respondent No.2 has levied an additional duty by way of 10% Regulatory Duty.
3. With variations in the name of the vessels and the LDT of the vessels as well as date of beaching at Gadani all the petitions have been filed to challenge the application of Regulatory Duty to such scraped ships in such a manner as to nullify the exemption which the petitioners enjoyed under the subsisting notification issued under section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969, therefore, we need not narrate or mention the names of all the ships as the only point challenged by the petitioners in all the above petitions is imposition of Regulatory Duty at the rate of 10% .
2. We heard Mr. Muhammad A.I Saeed, Advocate as well as Mr. Zahid Alvi as other counsel adopted the arguments of the aforementioned learned counsel for the petitioners. We also heard learned Deputy Attorney-General assisted by Assistant Collector Customs for the respondents.
3. The main grounds urged in support of these petitions challenging the imposition of Regulatory Duty can be conveniently summarised as under:-----
(i) That under S.R.O. 490(1)/95 dated 14-6-1995, liability of the petitioner to pay custom duty on scraped vessel is limited to Rs.1,375 per LDT plus 25 % ad valorem. It is the case of the petitioners that as long as the said S.R.O. Continues to exist no custom duty, be it a Tariff imposed under subsection (1) of section 18 of the Customs Act or a Regulatory Duty imposed under subsection (2) of said section, in excess of the limits laid down by the S.R.O. Is recoverable. In this regard further submission was that regulatory duty is part of custom duty and in any case it is not different from it. It was, therefore, argued that exemption from custom duty under section 19 of the Customs Act, must apply to every levy in the nature of Customs Duty unless the exemption is specifically amended under section 19. Thus the exemption granted to the petitioners will apply to the sum total of custom duty including Regulatory Duty.
(ii) That, relying on PLD 1988 SC 670 it was argued that regulatory duty is a mechanism through which a balance is sought to be created in the local prices consequent to a downward fluctuation in the seller market. In the instant case, the devaluation of the Pakistani Rupee caused sharp increase of costs of the imports thus justifying further exemption but instead, by imposing regulatory duty, the petitioners were further put to loss in an unreasonable manner. In this regard a submission was made that there being no logical or reasonable nexus between the devaluation and the imposition of regulatory duty or between the values in the seller market and the local prices, thus the regulatory duty is uncalled for.
(iii) The third ground agitated was that the Federal Government has been given delegated powers which must be exercised in a just and judicious manner but instead the respondent Government exercised this delegated power in a most unreasonable and arbitrary manner which would adversely affect the, economic fabric of the country.
(iv) The counsel for other petitioners outlined the philosophy and concept of Regulatory Duty.
4. According to him section 18(2) of the Customs Act empowers Federal Government to levy Regulatory Duty. This power in fact is not an absolute power' but in fact it is a 'delegated power'. The object of giving this power was to give authority to the Government to impose, levy for a particular object or purpose.
5. Before proceeding further it would be expedient to, observe that the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs issued Notification SRO No.490(1)/95 dated 14th June, 1995 whereby in exercise of its powers conferred by section 19 of the Customs Act, 1969 (VI of 1969), the Federal Government was pleased to direct that the goods specified in column (3) of the table, --- falling under the heading of sub-heading numbers of the First Schedule to the said Act and specified in column (2) of the said table, shall be exempt from so much of the customs duty specified in the First Schedule to the said Act as is to excess of the rates specified in column (41 of the table and table on item No. 145, in the third column describing nature of goods, ships, boats and other vessels for breaking up is mentioned. The duty paid has been fixed as Rs.1,375 per LDT.
6. Subsequent thereto by another SRO No.542(1)/95 dared 19th June, 1995 the above SRO was amended as follows:-- "In the table in column (1), against No. 145, in column (4), for the letters, figures and words "Rs.1,375 per LDT', the letters, figures and words 'Rs.1,375 per LDT plus 25% ad val', shall be substituted."
7. The aforesaid two notifications (SROs) were issued in exercise of powers under section 19 of the Customs Act.
8. Another SRO 1050(1)/95 dated 29th October, 1995 was issued having effect from 29th October, 1995 in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of section 18 of the Customs Act, whereby the Federal Government was pleased to levy a further regulatory duty on imports of goods appearing in the First Schedule to the said Act. In item No.2 of the Schedule it was said that the goods chargeable to statutory or concessionary rate other than zero per cent. On the import into Pakistan shall be charged to a regulatory duty at the rate of 10 % ad valorem. This SRO was issued on 29th of October, 1995.
9. At the very outset it may be noted that the vires of S.R.O. No.1050(1)/95, dated 29th October, 1995 have not been challenged by the petitioners. The reason as it seems was that the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of Abdul Rahim v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 670) declared that Federal Government has power under section 18(2) of Customs Act to issue S.R.O. Imposing regulatory duty. As such we do not discuss the vires or the authorities which were relied upon, by the petitioners' counsel in that respect.
10. From bare perusal of section 18(2) of Customs Act it becomes abundantly clear that Federal Government is empowered to levy, subject to such conditions, limitations or restrictions, as it may deem fit, by issuing a notification to impose regulatory duty on all or any of the goods specified in First Schedule at a rate not exceeding 100 % of the value of such goods as determined under section 25 or section 25B of Customs Act. In fact such regulations/rules are framed under the statutory power thus within the ambit of the relevant statute. Therefore, a Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom or effectiveness or otherwise of such policy laid down by Regulations.
11. The main challenge coming from the petitioners' side, however, was that in exercise of its powers as conferred under section 19 of the Customs Act, the Federal Government under SRO 490(1)/95 dated 14-6-1995 determined the liability of the petitioners to pay customs duty on scraped vessel to Rs.1,375 per LDT plus 25 % ad valorem. It was, therefore, argued that so long as the said S.R.O.
12. Continues to subsist no custom duty, be it a Tariff imposed under subsection (1) of section 18 of the Customs Act or a regulatory duty imposed under subsection (2) of section 18 in excess of the limits determined under S.R.O. Is recoverable.
13. Undoubtedly the Government reserves the right of exemption which otherwise presupposes liability of paying taxes or duties. In other words granting exemption means existence of liability to pay but for the exemption granted by Government on certain goods. It is a sort of immunity. In Corpus Juris the word 'exemption' has been defined as under:- "Exemption, as applied to taxation, is freedom from the burden of enforced contribution to the expenses and maintenance of Government, Add may include freedom from the burden of taxes accrued and unpaid as well as from the burden of future levies. The term, as here used, presupposes a liability, and is properly applied only to a grant of immunity to persons or property which otherwise would have been liable to assessment. Furthermore, the right to immunity is not inherent in the person or property exempted, but exists only by grant supported on grounds of public policy, the subject-matter of which may take the form of a contract governed by the terms thereof, and subject to the rules of law applicable to contracts."
14. The real controversy is, however, whether this exemption was given in respect of the customs duties as mentioned in section 18(1) of the Customs Act or it equally applies to regulatory duty as prescribed in subsection (2) of section 18 of the Act. In this respect Mr. Muhammad A.I Saeed vehemently and emphatically urged that the Hon'ble Supreme Court declared regulatory duty as nothing more than a custom charge. (PLD 1988 SC 670). Therefore, the S.R.O. Equally applies to imposition of regulatory duty and exempts the same because it is also a custom charge or at least it is not distinct from the customs duty. We are not inclined to accept this argument for the reason that section 18(1) prescribes dutiable goods. In section 18(1) it is clearly mentioned that except as hereinafter provided customs duties shall be levied at such rates as are prescribed in the First Schedule and the Second Schedule or under any other law for the time being in force. The value of such imported goods shall be determined in accordance with section 25 and section 25B of the Customs Act. But subsection (2) of section 18 empowers the Federal Government to impose regulatory duty on all of any of the goods specified in First Schedule at a rate not exceeding 100% of the value of such goods as determined under section 25 or section 25B of Customs Act. The regulatory duty although a custom duty is distinct from custom duty chargeable under subsection
(1) of section 18 of the Customs Act. Whether regulatory duty is a custom duty has hardly any relevance because the Court has to see the pith and substance and not the name of the tax. It has to deeply scrutinise the nature 8 of the duty and the intention of the Legislature. In fact the Legislature delegated the power to the Federal Government to impose regulatory duty which in fact is a charge in addition to customs charges as mentioned in subsection (I) of section 18. If the Government exempts an importer in exercise of powers under section 19 of the Customs Act the exemption extends only to the charges mentioned in the notification but as observed hereinabove the exemption does not obviate the importer from his liability to pay custom duty under different heads. If the argument of Mr. Muhammad A.I Saeed is accepted it would mean that no further regulatory duty could be imposed in addition to what has been mentioned in subsection (1) of section 18 of the Customs Act. But by adding subsection (2) to section 18 the Legislature intended to confer additional power to the Federal Government to levy or impose regulatory duty during the course of the year. The object of regulatory duty as declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court was to enhance the rate of duty at any time during the course of the year so as to achieve a balance. The reasons as mentioned were that it was not possible for the Legislature to know the details of the fluctuating international prices from time to time during the course of the year and for that matter a device or a framework for levying regulator duty was delegated to the Federal 'Government.
15. Another important reason for disagreeing with the argument of counsel for petitioners is that it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to circumvent the power of Federal Government to impose regulatory duty if a part of the custom duty has been exempted under section 19 of the Customs Act. In other words the argument that exemption covers customs duty imposed both under section 18(1) and section 18(2) is not convincing because this exemption is subject to such limitations, restrictions and conditions etc. As imposed by the Federal Government.
16. In the instant case the Federal Government while granting exemption did not exempt the whole of custom duty but determined the rate by two different notifications as Rs.1,375 per LDT plus 25% ad valorem. This means nothing more than the fact that the petitioners were allowed pay custom duties at the rate of Rs.1, 375 per LDT plus 25% ad valorem. This would obviously not deprive Federal Government of its powers to levy a further charge in the shape of regulatory duty. The Federal Government has not exempted the petitioners from payment of whole of the customs duty but this exemption was conditional i.e. The petitioners shall pay custom duties only at the rate of Rs.1,375 per LDT plus 25 % ad valorem instead of making full payment on the value of the goos as determined under section 25 or section 25B of the Customs Act. Thus by no stretch of imagination it can be argued that notification issued under section 19 of the Customs Act would mean that once exemption is granted power under subsection (2) of section 18 cannot at all be exercised. In order to further highlight these reasons it may be observed that an exemption may be given by the Federal Government to a firm or a person that such firm or person should pay a part of the customs duty as determined by section 25 or section 25B of the Customs Act. But this exemption can also to such extent be withdrawn provided no vested right is accrued to a petitioner. In other words the date of withdrawal of such exemption should precede the date when a vessel is beached at the port.
17. It may be observed that such immunity to persons or property can be given as regards customs duty but right to immunities is not inherent right. It is a concession given under public policy. The power to grant exemption includes the power to withdraw it or to change it as well. This brings us to the second limb of the argument advanced by petitioners' counsel Le the Government should have amended the notification if at all the exemption granted was intended to be withdrawn. It may be observed that concession of exemption could be withdrawn by an executive order. It is not necessary that the same must be done by making amendment in the S.R.O. Issuance of second S.R.O. Would mean implied withdrawal of concession of exemption given. However, such withdrawal is subject to the only qualification that the same could not be done if vested rights have accrued to a particular petitioner or person. As per principles of locus poenitentiae the power of receding the concession till a decisive step is taken is always available to the Government. In the instant case although notification determining the custom duty at the rate-of Rs.1,375 per LDT and 25 % ad valorem has not been withdrawn but imposition of regulatory duty tentamounts to the fact that besides the concession given, the petitioners are liable to pay an additional custom duty at the rate of 10% as regulatory duty.
18. From the above discussion it becomes evident that the Government has the powers to impose regulatory duty under subsection (2) of section 18 ,of the Customs Act --------------------- to the extent of 100 % of the value of the goods. Such power is not subservient to section 19 of the Customs Act. There is no provision in the Customs Act to conclude that once an exemption is granted in payment of customs duty, a regulatory duty cannot be imposed by the Government because such plea would militate against subsection (2) of section 18 of the Customs Act where expressly Federal Government has been empowered to further impose a custom duty in the shape of regulatory duty.
19. This view is further supported from plain reading of the S.R.O. In which exemption was granted. The exact words used are: ---.....Shall be exempt from so much of the custom duty specified in the First Schedule of the said Act ...."
20. The Federal Government has intentionally used the word 'custom duty' instead of 'custom duties' or 'regulatory duty'. Therefore, we do not agree with the contention that unless the S.R.O. Is amended/withdrawn by the Government, exemption granted to the petitioner shall apply to the sum total of the custom duties including regulatory duty.
21. Adverting now to the second, argument that regulatory duty being a mechanism through which a balance is sought to be created in the local prices consequent to a downward fluctuation in the seller market, as observed by Supreme Court in PLD 1988 SC 670, the counsel argued that there should be nexus of regulatory duty with the main object as determined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The object according to the counsel was that regulatory duty is imposed to share extra benefits to be earned by an importer if the prices of the goods in the international market fall down thus providing Government an opportunity to share the benefits of the importer on account of fall in the prices of the goods in the international market. The counsel vehemently urged that the petitioner is entitled to challenge an S.R.O. Imposing regulatory duty if it can be proved before the Court that the imposition of regulatory duty has no nexus with the object. Reliance has been placed on PLD 1993 SC 210. We have perused the said citation and observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court. This in fact was a case under Sindh Rent Premises Ordinance and on page 228. Of the judgment (supra) following observations were made:-- "The Regulations have no rational nexus with the objects referred to in sections 6 and 7 and the above clauses (b) and (e) of subsection (2) of section 21-A of the Ordinance. As observed hereinabove in the present case, First Rent Appeals against the order of ejectment granted by the Rent Controller on the ground of reconstruction, are still pending for adjudication in the High Court of Sindh, and therefore, respondent No. l is seeking ejectment of the tenant through the process of the Court in terms of the provisions of the Ordinance and/or of the S.R.P.O. And not with the aid of the Authority under section 14 of the Ordinance and therefore, the ejectment of the tenants, if any, will take place through the process of the Court and not through the exercise of statutory power vested in the Authority under section 14 of the Ordinance, and hence the Regulations purporting to impose a condition upon a landlord/owner of a building which is to be demolished to produce an agreement entered into between him and a tenant for alternate accommodation or for the payment of compensation is foreign to the object and scope of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance. The conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the Regulations are ultra vires on that account, seems to be correct."
22. There is no cavil to the abovementioned proposition but the fact remains that question of calculating the fluctuations in the price in international market with domestic market are all economic and fiscal questions which cannotbe conveniently determined in writ jurisdiction. Even if the sole object of regulatory duty be to maintain a balance between international market and domestic market rates it is indeed difficult to readily determine upward and downward trends in the international and domestic markets unless all the details are placed before the Court and the difference in the prices spiral is exactly brought. As such question of maintaining a balance cannot be determined. It was for such reasons that even the Legislature did nor take upon itself to determine such questions but delegated this authority to the Federal Government. This vexed question therefore cannot be answered as it is not easy to hold that there was no rational nexus with the object of maintaining balance between price spiral in international and domestic markets.
23. The last important question raised by Mr. Muhammad A.I Saeed was that the S.R.O. Imposing 10% regulatory duty is most unreasonable. A query was made from the learned counsel whether on the touchstone of unreasonableness a Court can declare an instrument or regulation as ultra vires or invalid. The learned counsel answered this question in affirmative. In this respect our attention was drawn to the case of McEldowney v. Forde (H.L.(NL)) reported in 1971 Appeal Cases page 632). At page 636 an observation has been made as under:-- "5.This regulation in all the three categories that it deems illegal is invalid because it does not and has not been shown to meet any of the requirements of vires and the material before the Court points to the absence of good faith. "
24. Similarly at page 638 of supra my lords observed as under:-- - "It is an unreasonable and absurd to ban a club because of its name as it would be to dismiss a school teacher because he possessed a foreign name. If the 1967 Regulation is so unreasonable as to be perverse the Courts can intervene and declare the Regulation to be invalid".
25. The counsel, therefore, emphatically urged that instrument can be challenged if it is found to be unreasonable or issued not in good faith. As regards the present S.R.O. The counsel said that the same is manifestly unreasonable because the instrument is not a speaking instrument anti secondly the power to impose charge is a delegated power and not an absolute power and thirdly the purpose for which it could be issued or used cannot be to earn revenue because it falls only within the domain of Legislature to impose such duty as per Article 77 of the Constitution.
26. However, the main argument again was that while imposing regulatory duty the entire related circumstances must be kept in mind. According to him the Courts should lean towards the citizens rather than to Government if fiscal questions detrimental to citizens arise without any legal sanction. It was argued that the object of regulatory duty or any power exercisable under a delegated authority to raise the funds because it is the domain of the Legislature alone which can impose tax. The executive authority, however, cannot impose a tax or levy a duty independently.
27. Since the object of regulatory duty is not to create or--generate revenue, therefore, the rights of the petitioners have to be determined keeping in view the general circumstances. It was again argued that rupee was devalued in October, 1995 which caused a sharp increase in the cost of imported goods thus adding to the liability of the petitioners to pay more. In such circumstances it was not reasonable to impose regulatory duty adding to the agonies of the petitioners. The counsel proposed that the Government ought to have given further concession/exemption but instead of doing so another blow was inflicted upon petitioners by imposition of regulatory duty. The petitioners on the one hand had to face the consequences of devaluation of Pakistani rupee and on the other they were put to pay regulatory duty at the rate of 10% despite the exemption given by the Federal Government. It was argued that this would cause damage to the economic fabric of the country.
28. We have already dilated upon and determined many of these questions in the preceding paras.
29. However, the main argument which now requires consideration is whether issuance of S.R.O. And fixing 10% regulatory duty is unreasonable in the circumstances given by the petitioner's counsel.
30. But before taking circumstances into consideration we think it proper to note what is unreasonable in law. In Black's Law Dictionary the word "unreasonable' means "irrational; foolish; unwise; absurd; silly; preposterous; senseless; stupid ------Not reasonable; immoderate; exorbitant ------------ capricious: arbitrary; confiscatory --------------- From plain reading of this word it becomes clear that unreasonable means immoderate, or exorbitant capricious or arbitrary. Once it is held that the Federal Government has been delegated the powers by the Legislature to impose regulatory duty, its imposition within purview of section 18(2) of the Act cannot be held as unreasonable because no action can be said to be unreasonable if taken within four corners of law. We, therefore, have to see the scope of unreasofiableness within the purview of delegated powers of imposing regulatory duty. According to subsection (2) of section 18 of Customs Act the Government has been empowered to levy a regulatory duty on all or any of the goods specified in 1st Schedule at a rate not exceeding 100% of the value of such goods. But in the instant case regulatory duty to the extent of only 10% has been imposed which is neither exorbitant nor immoderate. It seems that the Government had taken into consideration the circumstances as narrated by the petitioners' counsel and, therefore, though Government could impose regulatory duty extending to 100 % of the value of such goods but taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances it was decided to impose regulatory duty at the rate of only 10% of value. This action of the Government, therefore, in our view cannot be held to be unreasonable.
31. Besides as held in 1991 CLC Note 43 at page 30 that while imposing regulatory duty, only balance is not to be seen, but there are various other factors which would be taken into consideration by the Federal Government.
32. Furthermore as contended by Deputy Attorney-General the question of reasonableness of various valuations cannot be subject-matter of an enquiry in Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court as was held in PLD 1994 SC 363. The relevant, observations appearing at page 394 are reproduced hereinabelow: "27. I have given my serious thoughts to the above submission and I am of the view that reasonableness of the various goods cannot be subject--matter of an enquiry in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction by the High Court. The above controversy requires through factual probe into the matter on the basis of materials to be brought on record by the parties. The remedy if any of the respondents is to make representations through their association to appellant No.3 and/or to approach any other competent forum. I am, therefore, not inclined to accept the above contentions. "
33. As to the second limb of argument that the object of regulatory duty cannot be to generate revenue or tax, it would be suffice to quote from the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Qaisar Brothers v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1991 SC 884). While refusing leave to appeal it was observed as under:-- "7. It may further be observed that levy of regulatory duty not only regulates the price of the item concerned but it also generates additional fund for the public purpose to put constraint upon the exercise of the power contained in subsection (2) of section 18 of the Act of the nature sought to be pressed into service by the petitioner will not be in the interest of the public. This Court already in the case of Messrs Sh. Abdur Rahim, Allah Ditta v. Federation of Pakistan and others (supra) has examined the vires of the regulatory duty and has held that "what is prohibited by the Legislature is the delegation of its functions to make the law but not the authority exercised under and in pursuance of the law itself to another agency". It was also held that levy of the regulatory duty in terms of subsection (2) of section 28 of the Act was intra vires. It may be observed that the Legislature has provided the framework for the levy of the regulatory duty, the extent, the period for which it can be levied and the authority which can levy. The levy of the regulatory duty in question is within the above framework and, therefore, no exception can be taken to it, the impugned judgment of the High Court seems to be in consonance with law."
34. The above observations are a complete answer to the argument of Mr. Muhammad A.I Saeed. It has been held that levy of regulatory duty not only regulates the price structure of the item concerned but it also generates additional funds for the public purpose. Obviously the fund so raised shall be used for the benefit of public at large. Therefore, if by imposition of regulatory duty the profit margin of the importer is clipped additional fund is raised for utilization of public purpose.
35. We now embark upon to determine the additional points raised by Mr. Zahid Alvi learned counsel for some of the petitioners. The first point urged by him was of Promissory Estoppel but before arguing the same his attention was drawn to 1992 SCM R 1652, the relevant observations of which are necessary for reproduction: "The doctrine of promissory estoppel is available in Pakistan against the Government and its functionaries, subject to inter alia, following limitations:--
(i) The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against the Legislature or the laws framed by it because the Legislature cannot make representations.
(ii) Promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for directing the doing of the thing which was against the law when the representation was made or the promise held out.
(iii) No agency or authority can be held bound by a promise or representation not lawfully extended or given.
(iv) The doctrine of promissory estoppel will not apply where no steps have been taken consequent to the representation or inducement so as to irrevocably commit the property or the reputation of the party invoking it; and
(v) The party which has indulged in fraud or collusion for obtaining some benefits under the representation cannot be rewarded by the enforcement of the promise."
36. Besides above authority reliance may be placed to PLD 1991 SC 546 and 1993 SCM R 17.
37. Learned counsel, therefore, in view of above observations of Supreme Court did not emphatically press this point but argued the same in a lukewarm manner.
38. According to Mr. Zahid Alvi the letters of credit in C.Ps. Nos.5 of 1996 to 12 of 1996 were opened prior to imposition of regulatory duty, therefore, a vested right has accrued to the petitioner and it will be harsh if respondents demand regulatory duty on vessels, the letter of credit for which was opened prior to the promulgation of S.R.O. The reply given by learned Deputy Attorney-General was that it is the bill of entry which is material and not opening of letter of credit. Reliance was placed on 1993 SCM R 17.
39. It was next contended by Mr. Alvi as well-as Mr. Saleem that in C.P. No.13 of 1996 not only the letter of credit was opened prior to issuance of S.R.O. But even vessel arrived prior to imposition of regulatory duty. This was again controverted by learned Deputy Attorney-General according to whom an enquiry is pending as regards alteration of date of arrival which in fact was tampered in connivance with Nisar Ahmad Soomro and others and an enquiry is under process. He invited our attention to para. 5 of the counter-affidavit which reads as under:-- "V. The facts and circumstances of the case, the overwhelming, concrete, conclusive and corroborative evidence on record, prima facie establish that the petitioner in connivance with U.D.C. Nisar Ahmed Soomro and other jointly, and severally conspired connived fraudulently falsified, tampered, altered and obliterated official records as stated above, with a view of circumventing and evading the levy of 10% regulatory duty w.e.f. 29-10-1995 to the tune of Rs.27.5 million approximately, to the financial benefit of the petitioner and others. An in-depth and exhaustive enquiry conducted by the Director (Intelligence and Investigation) Customs and Central Excise, South Zone, Karachi on the orders' of the Central Board of Revenue Islamabad vide letter C:No.1(6)s(Val)!93 dated 16-11-1995 confirms the commission of the aforesaid offences by the petitioner and U.D.C. Nisar Ahmed Soomro and others. Photocopy of the Enquiry Report submitted by the Director (Intelligence and Investigations) Customs and Excise and Sales Tax, South Zone, Karachi to the Member, Board of Revenue ------"
40. Besides learned Deputy Attorney-General challenged the maintainability of these petitions on the ground that alternate remedy by way of filing representation to Central Board of Revenue or Customs Authorities was available to the petitioners, therefore, they could not directly invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. Since we have already dilated upon and determined the points urged, therefore, it is not deemed fit to attend this objection at this stage.
41. From the aforementioned decision we are inclined to dismiss all these petitions. However in view of complicated legal questions we do not pass orders as to costs.