' CH. IJAZ AHMAD, J.--- We intend to decide the following writ petitions by one consolidated judgment having similar facts and law:-
(1) Writ Petition No,5683 of 1988, (2) Writ Petition No,13457 of 1999, (3) Writ Petition No,5680 of 1988,
(4) Writ Petition No,4524 of 1988, (5) Writ Petition No,5783 of 1988, (6) Writ Petition No,4566 of 1994,
(7) Writ Petition No,5262 of 1989, (8) Writ Petition No,5655 of 1988, (9) Writ Petition No,5707 of 1988,
(10) Writ Petition No,10738 of 2000, (11) Writ Petition No,13548 of 2000, (12) Writ Petition No,1533 of 2000, (13) Writ Petition No,21816 of 2000, (14) Writ Petition No,8782 of 2000, (15) Writ Petition No,1913 of 2000, (16) Writ Petition No,1912 of 200 , (17) Writ Petition No,1597 of 2000, (18) Writ Petition No, 162 of 2000, (19) Writ Petition No,4588 of 2000, (20) Writ P tition No,2159 of 1992, (21) Writ Petition No,14790 of 1999, (2k) Writ Petition No,2164 of 1991, (23) Writ Petition No,4595 of 1998, (24) Writ Petition No,9564 of 1998, (25) Writ Petition No,9245 of 1991, (26) Writ Petition No,8987 of 1991, (27) Writ Petition No,4091 of 1991, (28) Writ Petition No,6121 of 1994, p9) Writ Petition No,11613 of 1996, (30) Writ Petition No,11607 of 1996, (31) Writ Petition No,11608 of 1996, (32) Writ Petition No,11609 of 1996, (33) Writ Petition No,11610 of 1906, (34) Writ Petition No,17753 of 1995, (35) Writ Petition No,14960 of 1999, (36) Writ Petition No,14959 of 1999, (37) Writ Petition No,14647 of 1999, (38j Writ Petition No,11612 of 1996, (39) Writ Petition No,11611 of 1996, (40) Writ Petition No,4088 of 1993, (41) Writ Petition No,11091 of 1991, (42) Writ Petition No,1734 of 1989, (43) Writ Petition No,4525 of 1988, (44) Writ Petition No,5831 of 1988, (45) Writ Petition No,311 of 1989, (46) Writ Petition No,359 of 1989, (47) Writ Petition No,314 of 1989, (48) Writ Petition No,382 of 1989, (49) Writ Petition No,315 of 1989, (50) Writ Petition No,4922 of 1989, (51)'' Writ Petition No,4305 of 1989, (52) Writ Petition No,6007 of 1988, (53) Writ Petition No,5646 of 1988, (54)
Writ Petition No,312 of 1989, (55) Writ Petition No,1743 of 1989, (56) Writ Petition No,313 of 1989, (57)
Writ Petition No,7149 of 1989, (58) Writ Petition No,20024 of 2001 and (59) Writ Petition No,8424 of 2002.
' The petitioners have challenged the vires of Notification dated 25-2-1988 issued by respondents under section 28 of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975 (No,XXX of 1975) whereby rates and fees have been levied in respect of water supply and sewerage operations under the heading of Sewerage and Aquifer Charges.
2. Mr. Zahid Hamid Khan, Advocate submits that rates and fees claimed by the respondents on the basis of aforesaid Notification are illegal and without lawful authority and raised following arguments in support of his claim:--
(i) That notification dated 25-2-1988 (attached with the report and parawise comments by the respondents), must be read as a whole, the opening part of the said notification reveal that the respondents have prescribed rates and fee in respect of its water 'supply and sewerage operations w,e,f, Ist January, 1998; item No,2 sewerage consists of following three categories: --
(a) Domestic (connected with water supply) at the rate of 10% of water rate;
(b) Industrial/Commercial (connected with water supply),
(i) Industrial Rs,2.50 per 1000,
(ii) Commercial Re.0.50 per 1000 gallons,
(c) Industrial, commercial, Government and semi-Government organization, corporate bodies etc. (Not connected with WASA water supply but directly connected with sewerage), size of tube-well 1- cusec Rs,5,000 per month, 1/2 cusec Rs,2,500. Rate to increase or decrease in proportionate to the rate of one cusec.
' According to him if the notification is read as a whole then it is not sustainable in the eyes of law on the well-known doctrine of pith and substance. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:
(1) Syed Ghulam Ali Shah v. The State through A.D.M. And Tribunal, Sanghar PLD 1970 SC 253; (2) Pir Rashid ud Daula and 3 others v. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan PLD 1971 SC 401, (3)
Brig. (Retd.) F.B. All and another v. The State PLD 1975 SC'506, (4) Central Provinces and Babar Sales of Motor Spirit AIR 1939 FC 1, (5) The Progress of Pakistan Co. Ltd. v. Registrar, Joint Stock Companies, Karachi (2) The Islamic Republic of Pakistan -PLD 1958 Lah. 887, (6) The Pracha Textile Mills Ltd. v.
Pakistan and others PLD 1963 Kar, 319, (7) Haji Multan Zareen and 56 others v. Government of N.- W.F.P. And another PLD 1980 Pesh. 137 and (8) Nishat Mills Ltd., Nishatabad, Faisalabad v. The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Food and Agriculture and 4 others PLD 1994 Lah.
175.
(ii) That there is difference among the words charge, rate, fee and tax as they have different meanings. He relied upon following:-- DEFINITIONS co Dictionary Webster's Unabridged Dictionary ofCharge A fee or price charge; a pecuniaryRate Any tax assessed andFee A charge or payment for serviceTax A sum of money demanded by English Language Black's Law Dictionary 5th Edition.
The Oxford Dictionary Fourth Edition.burden, encumbrance, tax or lien; cost, expense Price of or rate of something; Incumbrance, lien or claim Expense Price demanded for service or goods.paid to a Local Government Charge to public for service (of a public utility).
Price for service measured by specific unit or standard Measure of value, tariff charge, cost.
Assessm ent levied by Local Authority for local purposes.Charge fixed by law for services of public officers or for use of a privilege under control of Government Sum payable to Public Officer for performing his function Remuneration of lawyer etc. or any professional man.Government for its support or for specific facilities or services levied upon income, properties etc. Burdensome charge, objection etc. Any contribution imposed by Government upon individuals for the use and service of the State Essential characteristics that it is not a voluntary but a forced contribution exacted pursuant to legislative Authority.
' He also relied upon the following judgments in support of his contention qua the meaning of aforesaid words:--
(1) Mian Ejaz Shafi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 Kar. 604; (2) Mondi's Refreshment Room and Bar, Karachi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another PLD 1983 Kar. 214 and Ahmad Khan v. (1) The Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court, West Pakistan, through the Registrar, High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, (2) The Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore and (3) Muhammad Saeed PLD 1968 SC 171.
(iii) That respondents have no authority to impose fee without rendering any service. It is contended that in fact the respondents have levied fee in the garb of tax, therefore, impugned notification is ultra vires the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and liable to be set aside. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:
(1) Mian Ejaz Shafi and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 Kar, 604, (2) Ayaz Textile Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Commerce and another PLD 1993 Lah. 194, (3)
Sindh Glass Industries Limited v. Chief Controller of Import and Export, Islamabad and 2 others 1990 CLC 638, (4) Rahimullah Khan and 65 others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary, Agricultural Forest and Cooperation Department, Peshawar and 5 others 1990 CLC 550, (5) Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Gujranwala Steel Industries and another 1990 CLC 197, (6) Mahboob Yar Khan and another v. Municipal Committee, Mian Channu and 2 others PLD 1975 Lah. 748, (7) Abdul Majid and another v. Province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1960 Dacca 502, (8) Mondi's Refreshment Room and Bar, Karachi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another PLD 1983 Kar. 214,
(9) Ahmad Khan v. (1) The Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court, West Pakistan through the Registrar, High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore, (2) The Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore and (3) Muhammad Saeed PLD 1968 SC 171, (10) Sheikh Muhammad Ismail & Co.
Ltd., Lahore v. The Chief Cotton Inspector, Multan Division, Multan and others PLD 1966 SC 388 and
(11) Collector of Customs and others v. Sheikh Spinning Mills 1999 SCMR 1402.
(iv) That the word 'land' includes underneath water and in this regard sought fortification from section 3(g) of L.D.A. Act, 1975, section 3(a) Land Acquisition Act, 1894, section 49, Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 and rule 2 (3) of Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 1986 and 1990. Thus the respondents have no authority to impose the fee in question in violation of Articles 23, 24, 77 and 127 of the Constitution. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:--
(1) Malik Muhammad Saleem and another v. Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division, Rawalpindi and 3 others PLD 1976 Lah. 1233 and Lt.-Col. Muhammad Amin Khan v. Government of West Pakistan and others PLD 1966 Lah.
111.
(v) That respondents have no lawful authority to impose the tax in question under the provisions of the L.D.A. Act. The only competent Authority is the Legislature to impose the tax in question, therefore, impugned notifications are not sustainable in the eyes of law. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:--
(1) M. Afzal & Son and others v. Federal Government of Pakistan and another PLD 1977 Lah. 1327 and
(2) Messrs Dewan Textile Mills Limited, Karachi v. Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and 3 others 1984 CLC 1740.
(vi) That respondents imposed fee in the garb of tax, which cannot be imposed by incompetent authority without adopting the proper procedure prescribed under the Constitution. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments: ' Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. And others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582 and Government of Pakistan and others v.
Muhammad Ashraf and others PLD 1993 SC 176.
(vii) That under the provisions of the L.D.A. Act, 1975 the respondents have no authority whatsoever to levy fee/charges on private tubewells of the petitioners. Hence this levy is not sustainable in the eyes of law on the well-known principle of excessive delegation, In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:
(1) Messrs Sh. Abdur Rahim, Allah Ditta v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1988 SC 670, (2)
Zaibtun Textile Mills Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1.983 SC 358 and (3) The Province of East Pakistan v. Sirajul Hach Patwari PLD 1966 SC 854.
(viii) That writ petitions do not merit dismissal on the principle of laches. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:--
(1) Pakistan Post Office v. Settlement Commissioner and others 1987 SCMR 1119, (2) Province of Punjab through Secretary, Irrigation and Power Development, Lahore v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and others 1991 SCMR 1592 and (3) Ardeshir Cowasjee, Karachi and 4 others v. Messrs Multiline Associates, Karachi and 2 others PLD 1993 Kar.
237.
(ix) That respondents have no authority under the law to impose the charges through impugned notifications in violation of section 28(2) of the L.D.A. Act, 1975.
(x) That respondents cannot impose charges without permission of the Authority on the tubewells in view of section 29 (2) of the aforesaid Act.
(xi) That the documents attached by the respondents with the report and parawise comments clearly reveal that the charges have been imposed by the Chairman of L.D.A. And the matter was never placed before the Authority. Therefore, action of the respondents is hit by section 4 and section 3 (b), (g), (k) of L.D.A. Act, 1975.
(xii) He summed up his arguments that charge/fee has been imposed by the respondents to meet the demands of loaning agencies as is evident from the summary submitted by the respondents to the competent Authority, which cannot be made basis for such a levy.
5. Mian Nisar Ahmad, Advocate the learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No,5707 of 1998 submits that petitioner had installed two tubewells before the enforcement of Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975 and there is no contribution of the L.D.A. Authorities qua the installation of the aforesaid tubewells of the petitioner. He summed up his arguments that right to water is common to all. In support of his contention he relied upon "Hadis Nabvi" mentioned in "Mishqat-ul-Masabih".
6. Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No,13457 of 1998 who has only challenged vires of the impugned notification to the extent of aquifer charges submits: (1) that Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975 was framed by the competent Authority with specific purpose and object as is evident from the Preamble of the Act read with sections 3(b), 3(g), 3(k), 6(2)(iii), 10(3), 13, 19, 25, 27(2), 28 and 29 which clearly reveal that Legislature had framed the law for,water supply. The aforesaid provisions of law must be read as an organic whole keeping in view the word "water supply". The respondents have no authority whatsoever under the law to impose the said charges on the petitioner as the said aquifer charges has no connection whatsoever with the water supply. He highlighted the meaning of word "Aquifer" as defined in Dictionary.Com which is to the following effect:-- "underground bed or layer yielding ground water for wells and springs etc."
' He also relied upon the meaning of word "Public water supply" as defined in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volumes 35-A and 44-A which are to the following effect:-- "Public water supply, as used in the title to act March 4, 1884, P.L.32, is not limited to water supply owned and controlled by a Municipal Corporation, but should be construed as meaning a supply of water, for public and domestic use, furnished or to be furnished from waterworks." (Volume 35-A)
"The term 'water supply' and `water rights' generally do not have the same connotation, the latter term meaning generally the right to divert water by artificial means from a natural stream or spring." (Volume 44-A).
' He also relied upon the meaning of the word "land" as defined in American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 63A which is as follows:-- "The word 'land' included not only the soil, but everything attached to it, whether attached by the course of nature, as trees, herbage, and water, or by the hand of man, as buildings, fixtures and fences and includes many things besides the soil itself, as waters, grass, stones, buildings, fences, trees and the like and in fact all things which have become a part of the soil.
' The ancient maxim `cujus est solum, ejus usque ad coelum et ad infernos' means that land, in its legal signification, extends from the surface downward to the centre of the earth and upward indefinitely to the skies, so that whatever is in a direct line between the surface of any land and the centre of the earth belongs to the owner of the surface. From this it is said to follow that whether what is subterranean is solid rock, mines, or porous soil, or salt springs, or part land and part water, the person who owns the surface may dig therein and apply all that is there found to his own purposes."
' He also relied upon the definition of word "land" as defined in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 24 which is as under:-- "'land' includes not only the face of the earth but everything under it.
' Owner of land in fee has right to surface and to everything beneath and above it. "'land', in its full legal signification, comprehends not only the soil, but any building on it, and includes not only the face of the earth, but everything under it or over it. "'land' which is the soil of the earth, includes everything erected on its surface, or which is beneath it.
' Possessor of surface of soil will be deemed to be in possession of whatever lies underneath surface, since 'land' includes, not only ground or soil, but everything attached to it above or below. "'land' has an indefinite extent upward and downward from the surface of the earth and thereby includes whatever may be erected upon it and whatever may lie in a direct line between the surface and the centre of the earth.
' If a man grants all his lands he grants thereby all his mines of metal and other fossils, his words, his waters, and his houses, as well as his fields and meadows. "'land' according to Lord Coke, includes not only the ground or soil, but everything which is attached to the earth, whether by the course of nature, as trees, herbage, and water, or by the hand of man, as houses and other buildings; and, has an indefinite extent, upwards " as well as downwards, so as to include everything terrestrial, under or over it."
' He also relied upon the meaning of water and water rights as defined in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Volume 34A which is as follows:-- "A water right is 'property' . The right to the use of water is `property' and it is part and parcel of the land."
' He relied upon a maxim from Trainer's Latin Maxims which is as follows:-- "A coelo use ad centrum---- From the heavens to the centre (of the earth). This phrase is used to denote the extent of the right of a proprietor of land, who, on his feudal investiture in the land, becomes entitled to everything pertinent or belonging to it, whether above or below ground, such as houses, trees, minerals."
(II) That impugned notification is not in accordance with law laid down by the superior Courts. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:-
(1) Biafco Industries v. Federation of Pakistan 2000 CLC 170,
(2) Messrs Nishat Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 1997 MLD 3194, (3) Shahtaj Sugar Mills v. Province of Punjab 1998 CLC 1912, (4) Nishat Tek Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1994 Lah. 347, (5) Saif Textile Mills v. Pakistan through Secretary PLD 1998 Pesh. 15, (6) Muhammad Ismail v. Chief Cotton Inspector PLD 1966 SC 388 and (7) Sohail Jute Mills v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1991 SC 329.
(III) That the impugned charge is a tax and the respondents have no authority whatsoever to impose tax through the impugned notification as it is violative of Article 77 read with Article 127 of the Constitution and the law laid down by the superior Courts. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:-
(1) Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Pakistan through Secretary 1992 SCMR 891, (2)
Province of Punjab v. NICCC 2000 SCMR 567, (3) Assistant Collector Customs v. Gadoon Textile Mills 1994 SCMR 712, (4) Gadoon Textile Mills v. Assistant Collector and others PLD 1992 Pesh. 191, (5) Brig.
(Retd.) F.B. Ali v. The State PLD 1975 SC 506 and (6) Muhammad Nurullah v. Municipal Corporation, Karachi PLD 1960 SC 24.
(IV) That section 29 of L.D.A. Act is also hit by Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution.
(V) That respondents, have no authority to levy the charge through the impugned notification even under section 29 of the Act as section 29 - is not a charging section. In case the petitioner instals his tubewell in violation of section 29 then the respondent has no authority to impose the charge through the impugned notification but could only proceed in accordance with law under the Act.
(VI) That respondents have not issued any notification qua the area with regard to the premises of the petitioner, therefore, the respondents have no authority whatsoever to issue impugned notification and impose impugned charge.
(VII) That the water underneath the land of the petitioner is a property of the petitioner in view of aforesaid definitions as well as Article 260 of the Constitution. Therefore, the petitioners have lawful authority to hold and dispose of his property so long as the petitioners continue as owners of the land and cannot be deprived of the benefits. Therefore, action of the respondents is not in accordance with law. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:--
(VIII) (1) Muhammad Ismail v. The State PLD 1969 SC 241, (2) Dehli Transport CorporatiON v. D.T.C.
Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101 and (3) K. Anjaiah and others v K. Chandraiah and others (1998) 3 SCC 218.
(IX) (VIII) He summed up his arguments that action of the respondents is also hit by Article 25 of the Constitution as per law laid down by the superior Courts. He relied upon the following judgments:--
(X) ' Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon PLD 1993 SC 341, (2) C.B.R. v. Sheikh Spinning Mills 1999 SCMR 1442 and (3) Ellahi Cotton Mills v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1997 SC 582.
(XI) ' Mr. Mahmood A. Sheikh, Advocate for petitioner in Writ Petition No,4588 of 2000 submits that respondents imposed the charge to meet the expenses of the loaning agencies, therefore, impugned notification is not sustainable in the eyes of law. In support of his contention he relied upon 1992 AC 48 (It is pertinent to mention here that there is no judgment at this page). It is stated that the petitioner had closed the premises in 1993, therefore, impugned bills sent by the respondents to the petitioner on the basis of impugned notification are not sustainable in the eyes of law as the respondents had sent the bills in question to the petitioner without finding the ground realities at the spot.
(XII)
7. ' Mr. Faisal Zaman, learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No,382 of 1989 and Writ Petition No,8424 of 2002 has highlighted the changes in section 28 and section 29 of the L.D.A. Act which originally were as follows:--
(XIII) "28. Rates and rees.- (1) With the previous consent of the Government adequate funds may be raised by the Authority from time to time, to meet the cost of its schemes by imposing rates, fees and other charges.
(XIV) (2) The rates, fees and other-charges shall be such as to provide sufficient Revenues--
(XV) to cover the operating expenses including taxes, if any, an interest to provide adequate maintenance and depreciation;
(XVI) to meet repayments on long term indebtedness to the extent that such repayments exceed the provision of depreciation;
(XVII) to finance the normal year to year extension of any of such schemes and to provide a reasonable portion of the cost of future major expansion of such schemes.
(XVIII)
29. Fees on tubewells,--- (1) The Authority shall have the exclusive right to use ground water resources within the area.
(2) The Authority may levy rates on private persons or private bodies who have installed or may instal tubewells within its jurisdiction.
8. The aforesaid sections were amended by the competent Authority to the following effect by Lahore Development Authority Act, 1'976 (Act VI of 1976):- Amendment to section 28 of Act No,XXX of 1975, -- In the Principal Act, in section 28, in subsection (2), after the words 'other charges' and before the word 'shall' the words 'for water supply, sewerage and drainage schemes' shall be inserted.
Amendment to section 29 of Act No,XXX of 1975,-- In the Principal. Act, in section 29, subsection (2) shall be substituted as follows:-
(2) No person shall, without the permission of the Authority, instal a tubewell at such places within the area, as may be notified from time to time in the official Gazette by the Authority."
9. The impugned notifications qua the levy with regard to fee/charge by the respondents were issued by the respondents under the amended provisions of the L.D.A. Act, 1975. Unamended provisions of sections 28 and 29 empowered respondents to levy impugned charges but after the amendment, Legislature in its wisdom, had withdrawn the said power. Hence, the impugned notifications are not sustainable in the eyes of law.
10. On the basis of aforesaid provisions of law he submits that petitioner in Writ Petition No,382 of 1989 had only challenged the vires of the Aquifer charges. The respondents have no lawful authority to levy the said charge on the petitioner under section 28 of the Act as the respondents neither provide any water supply nor prepared any scheme for the benefit of the petitioners. He further submits that respondents admitted in written statement, in reply to paragraph No,3 on merits and in reply to Ground No,2 that impugned notification had been issued by the respondents under section 28 of the Act and not under section 29 (2), therefore, the same is not sustainable in the eyes of law. He further submits that petitioner had installed his tubewell in his factory in the year 1952 before the enforcement of the L.D.A. Act, 1975 and the respondents had not provided any facility to the petitioners, therefore, action of the respondents is not within the parameters of the L.D.A. Act, 1975. In support of his contention he relied upon the following authority Collector of Customs and others v. Sheikh Spinning Mills 1999 SCMR 1042.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No,5436 of 2001 submits that the impugned notification is not in accordance with law as the same has been issued by the respondents without applying independent mind, proper criteria and prior approval of the Government. He further submits that petitioner has challenged only vires of the domestic charges imposed by the respondents through the impugned notification. He further submits that they have enhanced charges in question without fulfilling the requirements of section 28 of the Development of Cities Act, 1976. He further submits that respondents have only authority to impose the charges in question by floating a scheme for the area in question whereas in the present case respondents had not prepared any scheme.
12. Sheikh Zia Ullah, the learned counsel for the respondents contesting the petitions made the following submissions:--
(i) That preamble of the Act also contained various items to improve the quality of life in the Metropolitan area by evolving policies and programmers relating to the improvement of the environment of housing, industrial development, traffic, transportation, health, education, water supply, sewerage, drainage, solid waste disposal and matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. The L.D.A. Authorities and its predecessor-in-interest institutions had floated various schemes in Lahore for the said purposes especially the drainage system. Waste water either domestic or industrial are firstly fallen in the main drainage maintained by the respondents and through it is thrown into the river. Therefore, the respondents were well within their right to levy the impugned charges on the petitioners for utilizing drainage of the respondents.
(ii) That the petitioners in Writ Petition No,5683 of 1988 had admitted in para.3 and grounds that disposal system of the petitioner's industry is connected with the main drainage system of the respondents. The petitioner in this writ petition has also admitted that he had already been paying sewerage charges to the respondents in the shape of tax under the provisions of the._, Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. Hence, the petitioner in the aforesaid writ petition has admitted to the extent that petitioner is paying sewerage tax to the respondents. He, therefore, urged that on the basis of the admission the petitioner is not in a position to wriggle out from this situation on the well-known principle of estoppel and waiver.
(iii) That tax collected from the petitioners under the provisions of Punjab Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958 received by the competent Authority under the provisions of said Act is not returned to the L.D.A. Authorities. The respondents only receive grants and loans from the Government as is envisaged in section 27(2)(a) of the Act. The Authority has, therefore, lawful authority to impose the impugned charges through the impugned notifications in view of Article 177(2) of the Constitution.
(iv) That L.D.A. Authorities created a fund by virtue of section 27(1) under the name and style of Lahore Development Authority Fund. The authority can utilize the funds in connection with its functions under the Lahore Development Authority Act which inter alia includes the payment of salaries and remunerations to the members, officers, servants, experts and consultants of the Authority. Moreover, the Lahore Development Authority is well within its right by virtue of section 27(2) to credit the fund which shall be credited for the following purposes:--
(a) Grants and loans made by the Government;
(b) All moneys received from Federal Government or any international agency by way of grants, loans, advances or otherwise;
(c) All fees, rates and charges received by the Authority under the Act; (d)
(e)
(f)
(v) That by virtue of subsection (3) of section 27 the aforesaid sums in respect of services related to water supply, sewerage and drainage are credited separately to the head "water supply and sanitation" and all other sums to the head "urban development" and, therefore, the respondents are well within their right to impose fees by virtue of section 27(2)(c).
(vi) That contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that fees be equated with the services provided by the respondents has no force on the well-known principle of pith and substance.
' In support of his contention he relied upon PLD 1996 SC 392 (there is no judgment on this page).
(vii) He further urges that fee must not be corresponding with the expenditure. The respondents have already imposed drainage fees/charges under the provisions of Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 which provides the drainage system by virtue of sections 11, 52 and 55 of the said Ordinance. The said provisions were also available in Municipal Act, 1911. He further relied upon sections 58, 59 and 60 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance.
1979. He highlighted the aforesaid sections and submits that aforesaid sections be read with section 3(b) of L.D.A. Act, 1975 which contemplates "area" as the Lahore Metropolitan Area to which the Act applies alongwith section 3(k) according to which "service area" means an area to be notified as such by the Government and in which Agency provides services. The respondent is providing service of sewerage to whole of the notified area of Lahore Metropolitan Area. Therefore, respondents are well within their right to levy the fee/charges in question through the impugned notification. The competent Authority has notified the area under the provisions of the L.D.A. Act, 1975 vide Notification dated 19-5-1975. He further submits that on the basis of aforesaid provisions of law the respondents have established sewerage and drainage system in whole of tise notified area in terms of section 6(2)(iii) read with section 6(3)(ix). The respondents have also lawful authority to delegate the powers to WASA by virtue of section 10(2) read with subsection (3) of section 10.
(vii-a) That in case the private persons/industrialists are allowed to instal their tubewells then the water level of the notified area would be lowered down automatically which will create difficulties for the agency as well as citizens of the notified area. Therefore, respondents are well within their right to impose the fees in question under the provisions of aforesaid Act.
(viii) He also relied upon the meaning of word "mineral" from the Concise Dictionary, 4th Edition, which means mineral water and simple water. The water under the land is a mineral water. Which belonged to the Federal Government, in view of section 49 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967.
Therefore, the respondent has lawful authority to levy the charges in question.
(ix) That right of property is subject to reasonable restrictions in view of Article 23 of the Constitution. The respondents could impose reasonable restrictions qua the use of the water underneath land of the petitioners. He further urges that it is the duty and obligation of the respondents under the provisions of L.D.A. Act, 1975 to provide sufficient water to the inhabitants of the notified area under the provisions of the L.D.A. Act, 1975. The respondents have lawful authority to impose aquifer charges in view of section 28 (1) which contained other charges read with Preamble, which also contained water supply, sewerage, drainage, solid waste disposal and matters connected therewith and incidental thereto, therefore, tubewell installed by the petitioners falls within the parameters of the water supply, therefore, action of the respondents is valid in the *eyes of law.
(x) That respondents had issued notification on 16-6-1991 under section 29 (2) of the L.D.A. Act, 1975 and imposed reasonable restriction to the extent that no person shall without the permission of the Authority instal a tubewell at such places within the area as notified by the Authority in the official Gazette. Therefore, action of the respondents is in accordance with the law laid down by the superior Courts. In support of his contention he relied upon Niaz Ahmed Khan v. Province of Sindh and others PLD 1977 Kar.
604.
(xi) That respondents has lawful authority to impose the charges in question for the purpose of repaying the loan received by the respondents from the loaning agency.
13. Syed Mansoor Ali, Advocate for petitioners in rebuttal submits that provisions of L.D.A. Act do not envisage any "mineral". The Legislature in its wisdom has specifically mentioned the word "land" in section 3(g) which includes earth water. He further submits that respondents did not bring on record any sufficient material to -substantiate that water level is disturbed on account of installation of private tubewells by the petitioners in their own properties. He further submits that subsection (2) of section 28 prescribes schemes namely water supply, sewerage and drainage.
Therefore, the respondents have only authority to levy charges qua the aforesaid, schemes as is envisaged by section 28(2)(ii) and (iii). Aquifer charge is outside the aforesaid schemes. He further submits that section 28 is hit by Articles 25 and 23 of the Constitution. Therefore, impugned notification is not sustainable in the eyes of law. In support of his contention he relied upon Government of Balochistan v. Aziz Ullah Memon PLD 1993 SC 341. He further submits that in certain laws power of control of water has been assigned to certain authorities. The word 'control' means to regulate. It does not mean to prohibit the petitioners to instal their tubewells in their own lands.
He relied upon section 11(1)(2) of WAPDA Act.
1958. Section 56 of Punjab Soil Reclamation Act, 1952. He further submits that the word 'area' begins with small 'a' in section 29(1), therefore, the area mentioned in section 29(1) is not the area as defined in section 3(b). The respondents have authority of control qua the buildings as is envisaged by section 6(2)(v) and the respondents have framed the building regulations. The respondents have also authority to acquire land of the citizens by virtue of section 13. For the purpose of preparation and execution of schemes under the provisions of L.D.A. Act, 1975. He summed up his arguments that action of the respondents is also in violation of Article 18 of the Constitution.
14. Mr. Zahid Hamid Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners in rebuttal submits that respondents had already received the sewerage charges from the petitioners since 1967 under the provisions of Greater Lahore Water Supply Sewerage and Drainage Ordinance, 1967. He further submits that respondents have mentioned this fact in Item No,3 of budget of the respondents (attached with the written statement as Annexure R/51. He further submits that respondents have no authority under the provisions of L.D.A. Act, 1975 to impose' aquifer charges as is evident from sections 28 and 29 of the L.D.A. Act.
1975. He controverts the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that on account of the installation of the private tubewells by the petitioners the water level of the area had decreased. He further urges that respondents did not provide any services to the petitioners; therefore, respondents have no authority to levy the impugned charges from the petitioners through the impugned notifications. He further submits that Article 172 (2) of the Constitution is not attracted in the present case. The authority to impose the charges in question had been withdrawn in the amended provisions of L.D.A. Act, 1975 in the year 1976 whereas the impugned notifications were issued by the respondents in the year 1988, therefore, respondents had no lawful authority to impose the sewerage charges as well as the aquifer charges from the petitioners through the impugned notifications.
15. We have considered the contention of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
16. It is better and appropriate to reproduce the relevant provisions of L.D.A. Act, 1975 in order to resolve the controversy between the parties. The preamble of the Act reads as follows:-- ' Whereas it is expedient in the public interest to establish a comprehensive system of Metropolitan Planning and Development in order to improve the quality of life in the Metropolitan area of Lahore.
Established an integrated Metropolitan and regional development approach and continuing process of planning and development, to ensure optimum utilization of resources, economical and effective utilization of land and to evolve policies and programmes relating to the improvement of the environment of housing, industrial development, traffic, transportation, health, education, water supply, sewerage, drainage, solid waste disposal and matter connected therewith and incidental thereto;
(i) "Area" means the Lahore Metropolitan area to which the Act applies:
(ii) "Land" includes earth, water and air, above, below or on the surface and any improvements in the structure customarily regarded as land and benefits arising out of land and things attached to earth or permanently fastened to earth;
(iii) "Service area" means an area to be notified as such by the Government and in which Agency provides services.
(iv) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any rules framed thereunder the Authority may exercise such powers and take such measures as may be necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Act.
(v) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing subsection, the authority shall-
(vi) Develop, operate and maintain water-supply, sewerage and drainage system within the service area of the Water and Sanitation Agency to be established under section 10(2) of this Act.
(vii) Issue interim development orders for area for which a scheme is under preparation and restrict or regulate by general or special order any change in the use of land and alteration in building structures and installations;
(viii) The authority may be general or special order, delegate to the Director-General, a Committee constituted under section 12, an Agency, a member or an officer of the Authority, any of its powers, duties or functions under this Act or the rules made thereunder subject to such conditions as it may deem fit to impose.
(ix) The Authority shall establish by special order, an Agency; hereinafter called the Water and Sanitation Agency.
(x) Save as provided in sections 13, 14, 19, 22, 23, 24 and 28 of this Act and the matters specified in the Schedule, the Agency established under subsection (2) shall perform all functions and exercise all powers of the Authority with regard to water supply; sewerage and drainage with power to collect rates, fees and charges for water supply, sewerage and drainage.
Section 27
(1) There shall be formed a fund to be known as the "Lahore Development Authority Fund" which shall vest in the Authority and shall be utilized by the Authority in connection with its functions under this Act including the payment of salaries and other remunerations to the members, officers, servants, experts and consultants of the Authority.
(2) To the credit of the Lahore Development Authority Fund shall be credited--
(a) grants and loans made by the Government;
(b) all moneys received from Federal Government or any international agency by way of grants, loans, advances or otherwise;
(c) all fees, rates and charges received by the Authority under the Act;
(d) all moneys received by the Authority from the disposal of lands. Buildings and other properties, movable and immovable;
(e) proceeds from the self-financing schemes of urban development and environmental sanitation; and
(f) all other sums receivable by the Authority. Section 28
(1) With the previous consent of the Government, adequate funds may be raised by the Authority from time to time, to meet the cost of its schemes by imposing rates, fees and other charges.
(2) The rates, fees and other charges for water supply, sewerage and drainage schemes shall be such as to provide sufficient Revenues:--
(1) To cover the operating expenses including taxes, if any, and interest to provide adequate maintenance and depreciation.
(ii) To meet repayments on long term indebtedness to the extent that such repayments exceed the provision of depreciation.
(iii) To finance the normal year to year extension of any of such schemes and to provide a reasonable portion of the cost of future major expansion of such schemes.
Section 29
(i) The authority shall have the exclusive right to use ground water resources within the area.
(ii) No person shall, without the permission of the Authority, instal a tubewell at such places within the areas, as may be notified from time to time in the official Gazette by the Authority.
Section 33 Whoever contravenes any provision of this Act, or any rules or regulations made thereunder shall, if no other penalty is provided for such contravention, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both.
Section 48
(i) The Lahore Water and Sewerage Authority Act, 1975, is hereby repealed.
(ii) On the establishment of the Authority under this Act, the Town Improvements Act, 1922, shall cease to apply to the area and all schemes, projects, or works started under the said Act and all completed, shall be taken over by the Authority and executed under the provisions of this Act.
(iii) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Lahore Water and Sewerage Authority Act, 1975 and the fact of the Town Improvements Act, 1922, ceasing to apply to the area.
(i) All rules, regulations and orders made, notifications issued, land acquired, schemes prepared or executed, rates and fees imposed, penalties or other charges levied; contracts entered into, suits instituted by or against Lahore Water and Sewerage Authority or the Lahore Improvement Trust or any other right accrued, or liability incurred or action taken or proceedings initiated, shall so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act continue in force and be deemed to have been made, imposed, levied, entered into, instituted, prepared. Executed, accrued or incurred, taken and initiated under this Act;
(ii) The provisions of sections 45, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 and 65 of the Town Improvements Act. 1922, shall continue to apply insofar as the acquisitions made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are concerned and shall be deemed to have always applied.
17. Now we intend to highlight certain principles of interpretation of statutes attracted to the present controversy between the parties.
(I) The Courts cannot supply casus omissus, meaning thereby Court is not competent to fill-up omission on part of Legislature. In K arriving to this conclusion, we are fortified by the following reported judgments:-- ' Imam Bakhsh v. Government of Balochistan PLD 1993 Quetta 24, Muhammad Ayyub v. Abdul Khaliq 1990 MLD 1293, Messrs Chittagong Jute Co. v. Province of East Pakistan and others PLD 1966 Dacca 117, Rehmat Ullah Khan and others v. The State PLD 1965 Pesh. 162 and Excise and Taxation Officer v. Barmashell Storage Co. And others 1993 SCMR 338.
(II) Special provision in a statute excludes the application of general provision. Reliance is placed upon the following reported judgments:-- ' Ch. Pervaiz Elahi v. The Province of Punjab and others PLD 1993 Lah. 595 and Zia-ur-Rehman' case PLD 1973 SC 49.
(III) In case of conflict between the charging section and another section then the charging section will hold the field. In arriving to this conclusion, we are fortified by the law laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in Barmashell Storage Company's case 1993 SCMR 338.
(IV) If the language of the enacting part of the statute does not contain the provisions which should occur in it, then Court cannot derive those provisions by implication in the statute. In arriving to this conclusion, we are fortified by the following judgments:- ' Governor-General of Council v. Municipal Corporation, Madras PLD 1948 PC 211.
(V) A Court has no powers to fill any gaps disclosed in an enactment. Reliance is placed on Khizar Hayat and others v. Commissioner, Sargodha PLD 1965 Lah.
349.
(VI) Any ambiguity in a fiscal statute should be resolved in favour of subject. In other words if there is doubt about the meaning of any provision in such a
(VII) PLD 1993 Kar. 280, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi's case 1994 SCMR 1299, Mirpur Khas Sugar Mills' case 1993 SCMR 920, Mst. Amina and others' case. PLD 1993 Kar.
5. In re: Succession Certificate of Mst. Parveen Akhtar's case. PLD 1993 Kar. 280 and Muhammad Afzal's case1994 CLC 1465.
(VIII) It is not within the domain of the Court to depart from the plain meaning of the expressions used in the statute. In arriving to this conclusion, we are fortified by the following judgments:--
(IX) ' Rehmat Khan's case 1993 CLC 412 and Imam Bakhsh's case PLD 1993 Quetta 24.
(X) That while examining the vires of the provisions of the statute, the Court should make efforts to uphold them as valid. In arriving to this conclusion, we are fortified by Karachi Buildings Control Authorities' case PLD 1993 SC 210.
(XI) The pith and ubstance of the enactment should be considered to find out itS true nature and character. In arriving to this conclusion, we are fortified by the following judgments:-
(XII) ' United Province's case AIR 1941 FC 16 and Shamim-urRehman's case PLD 1983 SC 457.
(XIII) statute, the Courts are to lean against a construction which imposes a burden on the subject.
In arriving to this conclusion, we are fortified by the following judgments:--
(VII) ' Muhammad Aslam's case Intention of Legislature is primarily gathered from language I used by Legislature in the contents of statute. In arriving to this T conclusion, we are fortified by Iqbal Muhammad Khan's case 1992 PLC 549.
(VIII) The best rule of interpretation is plain reading of provision of statute as per principle laid down in Trustee of Fort of Karachi 1990 CLC 197.
(IX) Provisions of statute must be read as a whole and while , interpreting the fiscal statute it should be kept in view the golden rule that there cannot be any tax or fee twice on the same goods as per principle laid down by this Court in Fauji Sugar Mills' case 1996 CLC 592.
(X) It is also settled principle of law that law cannot be interpreted in different way simply on the ground of hardship and that intention of statute must be gathered from plain and unambiguous expression used therein than from any notion as is held in Muhammad Ayyub's case (supra).
(XI) The preamble of statute is the key to understand the statute and if the enacting part of the statute goes beyond the preamble then it is the enacting part which prevails and not the preamble as per principle laid down by Honourable Supreme Court in Sh. Liaqat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 504.
(XV) Enacting part is not controlled by its preamble as per principle laid down in Bashir Ahmad v.
Mst. Zubaida Khatoon 1983 CLC 390. In other words the statement in the preamble is not a binding authority as per principle laid down in Maung Pyu's case AIR 1940 Rang.
84.
(XVI) It is also settled principle of-law that if enactment is clear or unambiguous, no preamble can qualify or cut down the enactment meaning thereby the preamble does not overrule the plain provision of statute. In arriving to this conclusion, we are fortified by D Powel v. Kampton Park Race Course 1899 Appeal Cases 143 and Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways v. Sindh Labour Court 1988 PLC 648.
(XVII) Charging provision, which relates to the levy of charge of fee I which usually states that fee is to be levied and on what matter or goods or property and in which manners and at what rate and matters relevant thereto in a penal statute there should be no departure from general rule that words used in a statute must first be given their ordinary and natural meaning as per principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Government of Pakistan v. Messrs Hashwani Hotel PLD 1990 SC 68.
(XVIII) The Court has no powers to refuse to give effect to the language of the enactment only because that some financial loss may in certain circumstances be caused to the State.
(XIX) While interpreting fiscal Statute one must look to the words of the Statute and interpret them in the light of what is clearly expressed G and nothing can be implied which is not expressed as per principle laid down by Karachi High Court in PLD 1986 Kar.
211. It is modern attitude of the Courts that the Revenue from taxes/fees is essential to theIH running of the State, therefore, heavy duty is cast upon the Court to aid its collection while remaining fair to the subject as per principle laid down in I.R.C. v. Berrill (1981) 1 WLR 1449.
(XX) Prior legislation may in case of ambiguity materially assist in ascertaining intention of the Legislature. In arriving to this conclusion, I we are fortified by State Bhar v. S.K. Roy AIR 1966 SC 1995.
(XXI) The word "ejusdem generis" means of same kind or nature as per principle laid down in Municipal Corporation's case AIR 1942 Rangoon 70. The ejusdem generis doctrine means that where general words immediately follow or closely associated with specific words their K meaning must be limited by reference to the preceding word as per principle laid down in PLD 1989 SC 128.
18.
19. #TBS
20. CLC
21. #TBE
22. Now we intend to highlight the meaning of certain phrases used in the Act:-- ' Sewer ' A sewer is a local improvement within the laws authorizing the authorities for local improvements.
Ryder's Estate v. City of Alton, 51 N.E. 821,823, 175 111.94.
Water works system.
' The laying of water main pipes in a Municipality on particular streets for the distribution of water for the use of the inhabitants is a 'local improvement' for which special assessment may be made under the laws, .Hewes v. Glos, 48 N.E. 922, 923,170 III, 436. A standpipe, reservoir and pumping apparatus in connection with a system of water works do not constitute a "local improvement" for which a special assessm ent by the city is proper under the laws. Hughes v. City of Momence, 45 N.E.
302,164 III 16.
Generally ' It is well-recognized that a public utility is entitled to a reasonable compensation in return for the service it furnishes, and that it may exact reasonable charges in accordance with the service provided or the rates established thereof.
Rates fixed by Public Utilities ' A public utility may, in the absence of a legislative prescription or limitation of rates, fix and exact reasonable rates for service furnished, in which respect the reasonableness of the, rate is to be considered in relation to the value of the property used by the utility in the public service. Thus, in the absence of legislation, carriers are ordinarily entitled to establish such rates and to adopt such policy of rate making as they may deem best. They may voluntarily render service for less than they could be compelled to accept.
23. Sections 28 and 29 amended and unamended has already been reproduced whereas sections 21 and 22 of Water and Sewerage Authority Act, 1975 and operative part of the impugned notification is reproduced hereunder to resolve the present controversy keeping in view the aforesaid principles of interpretation.
Section 21 of Lahore Water and Sewerage Authority Act, 1975 "21. Imposition of fees, etc. --- The Authority may, with the approval of Government, levy rates, fees and charges for water, sewerage and drainage to provide sufficient Revenues--
(i) to cover operating expenses including interest and to provide adequate maintenance and depreciation;
(ii) to meet re-payments on long term indebtedness to the extent that such re-payments exceed the provision for depreciation; and
(iii) to finance the normal year to year extension of the water supply, sewerage and drainage system and to provide a reasonable portion of the cost of future major expansion of such system: ' Provided that on the coming into force of this Act, the rates, fees and charges already notified under the Greater Lahore Water Supply, Sewerage and Drainage Ordinance, 1967 (West Pakistan Ordinance, No,II of 1967) as amended shall apply.
22. Fees on tubewells.--- (1) The Authority shall have the exclusive right to use ground water resources within its jurisdiction.
(2) The Authority may levy rates on private persons or private bodies who have installed or may instal tubewells within its jurisdiction."
Operative part of impugned notification Dated: 25-2-1988 No,DR/230 Lahore Development Authority in exercise of the powers conferred under section 28 of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975 (Act No,XNX of 1975) with previous consent of the Government prescribed the following rates and fees in respect of its Water Supply and Sewerage operations, with effect from 1st January, 1988:
1. Water rates Sewerage
(a) Domestic (connected with water supply) 10% of water rate
(b) Industrial/commercial (connected with water supply)
(i) Industrial Rs,2.50 per 1000 gins
(ii) Commercial Re.0.50 per 1000 gins
(c) Industrial, Commercial, Government and Semi-Government Organizations, Corporate Bodies, etc. (not connected with WASA Water Supply but directly connected with Sewerage ' Size of tubewell Rate per month 1 cusec Rs,5,000 1/2 cusec Rs,2,500 ' Rate to increase or decrease in proportion to the rate of one cusec.
3. Drainage
4. Aquifer charges (Industrial, Commercial, Government, Semi-Government, Organizations and Corporate Bodies extracting water through tubewells)
Size of tubewell Rate per month 1 cusec Rs,5,000 1/2 cusec R1,2,500 ' By mere reading of the aforesaid provisions of law it is crystal clear that competent Authority had initially given power to the Authority to impose aquifer charge under section 29(2) of Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975. The aforesaid provision was amended and as such power was taken away by the competent Authority vide Lahore Development Authority Amendment Act (Act VI of 1976), this being the special provision excludes the general provisions. The "other charges" mentioned in section 28(1) must be read keeping in view the principle of ejusdem generis i,e, the words used by the Legislature in section 28(1). Therefore, contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that respondents are competent under law to impose aquifer charges in view of other charges mentioned by the Legislature in section 28(1) has no force. The levy of aquifer charges is not supportable by the law applicable.
20. In view of what has been discussed above, the writ petitions are accepted to the extent of levy of aquifer charges.
21. Now we intend to decide the issue of sewerage charges. We are of the view that the respondents have lawful authority to impose the sewerage charges as the respondents had floated sewerage system in whole of the notified area. The respondents are thus providing services to the petitioners. The petitioners are taking benefit and making use of the sewerage schemes of the respondents. It is pertinent to mention here that modern city is a social, political, legal and economic unit and, eventually a unit of Government. Being an agency used by the nation or the State for better governance of the people, it evolves its legal system. Civic amenities like roads, sanitations, city hospitals etc. Which contemplate basic and moral entitlement of people. The aforesaid civic facilities have inherent objects i,e, safety, usability and orderly condition. A road cannot be a road unless it is maintained in a usable state and made peaceful. Same is the position with other amenities. In fact the Governmental Agencies provide the facilities on quid pro quo basis. Agencies can provide facilities if user/public pay charge for them. No service can be rendered without fee and charge because otherwise the State or its Agencies would crumble down. The respondents are providing facilities to the people of notified area with regard to sewerage i,e, pipelines, drainage system etc. Even to the people who have installed their own private tube wells because the waste water of their tube wells falls in the sewerage and pipeline of respondents. Therefore, they are well within their right to impose sewerage charges.
' In view of what has been discussed above, the writ petitions to the extent of sewerage charges are dismissed with no order as to costs. Since the controversy could be resolved on the basis of the principles stated above we have not felt it necessary to embark upon the tenability or otherwise of the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. The petitions are accordingly disposed of as indicated above. accordingly.