1. ' This judgment shall dispose of both the appeals arising between same parties and against almost identical orders rejecting two applications under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. Moved by the appellant in Rent Cases Nos.790 of 1987 and 849 of 1990 filed for eviction of respondent No, 2 by respondent No, 1 from southern portion of Shop No,2-A/179, Baber Market, Landhi.
2. ' For proper appreciation of the facts and points raised in these appeals, it is necessary to give in some details the background of the cases between the parties. Respondent No,1 filed Rent Case No,790 of 1987 against respondent No,2 on the ground of default in payment of rent from 1-5-1984 to 31-51 986 as well as bona fide personal requirement in respect of the demised shop for his own use and occupation.
3. ' Respondent No,2 in his written statement denied default as well as personal requirement of respondent No, l. He stated that in fact appellant Dr. Muhammad Rafique was the owner of the premises and he had paid rent to him up to date. He further pleaded that agreement of tenancy in his favour had not been renewed.
4. ' Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective contentions and learned Controller by his order dated 3-12-1989 directed the eviction of respondent No,2 from the demised premised on the ground of default in payment of rent. He, however, did not record any finding on the issue relating to bona fide personal requirement of the respondent No,1.
5. ' Respondent No,2 challenged this order in F.R.A. No,811 of 1989 which was allowed vide judgment dated 20-9-1992 whereby Rent Case was remanded to the learned Controller with a direction to decide the case afresh in accordance with law after affording the parties an opportunity to lead additional evidence in support of their respective contentions. After the remand of the case, appellant moved an application under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. For being joined as party which was dismissed on 13-3-1993 by the learned Controller with the observation that he could not go beyond the direction given by the High Court in F.RA. No,811 of 1989. It is as against this order that F.RA. No,217 of 1993 was filed.
6. ' It may be pertinent to observe that appellant had filed Suit No,745 of 1986 against the respondent No,1 who is his father for specific performance of contract in respect of House No,C-1/16, Landi Colony whereas respondent No,1 had filed Rent Case No,280 of 1986 against his son i,e, appellant. In Suit No,745 of 1986, both the parties entered into a compromise on 6-3-1988 whereby respondent No,1 agreed to withdraw Rent Case No,280 of 1986 for ejectment of his son from House No,C-1/16, Landi Colony, Karachi and that he would continue to reside therein. It was further agreed that title to Shop No,179, Baber Market, Landi would remain with appellant Dr. Muhammad Rafiq but it would remain in use of respondent No,1 either by doing business there himself or by letting out the same and receiving its rentals during his lifetime. This compromise was accepted by a learned Single Judge and in terms thereof the suit was dismissed as withdrawn, the same diy.
7. ' On the basis of this right and authority acquired from the appellant, respondent No 1 filed Rent Case No,849 of 1990 against respondent No,2 for his ejectment on the ground of bona fide personal requirement of the shop in good faith for his own use. This case was also resisted by respondent No,2 who denied that respondent No,1 was the owner of the premises. He contended that no title in property had passed on to respondent No,1 who could not file ejectment case against him on the ground of personal requirement. He referred to earlier rent case and remand thereof in F.RA. No,811 of 1989.
8. ' After the close of evidence of respondent No,1 but before the cross-examination of respondent No,2 on his affidavit-in-evidence, appellant moved an application under Order I, rule 10 for being impleaded as party to the rent case which was dismissed by the Controller vide order dated 24-5- 1993 with the observation that this application had been filed in connivance with respondent No,2 to delay the proceedings of the case. Besides, Intervener had not mentioned whether he wanted to join the proceedings as applicant or opponent. In any case, learned Controller came to the conclusion that he was neither necessary nor proper party and therefore his application was dismissed as misconceived. This order has been impugned in F.RA. No,270 of 1993.
9. ' I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and gone through the record and proceedings.
10. Provisions of Order I, Rule 10 lay down the principles for striking out or addition of parties to a suit already instituted. Most essential criteria for impleading a party to a suit, whether as plaintiff or defendant, is, to determine whether his presence before the Court would be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Notwithstanding the fact that the provisions of C.P.C. With the exception of the provisions contained in section 20 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (hereinafter referred as the Ordinance) are not applicable to the proceedings before the Controller. It is well-settled that equitable principles contained in C.P.0 for just and proper conduct of proceedings are attracted in the proceedings before the Controller. Now the controversy raised by the appellant is that respondent No,1 could not seek ejectment of respondent No,2 without permission of the appellant who had not transferred ownership rights in respect of the demised premises in favour of respondent No,1. Be that as it may, by reason of the compromise entered into between son and the father in Suit No,745 of 1986, respondent No,1 has undoubtedly acquired the status of a "landlord" within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Ordinance. Even the terms of the compromise order would show that he has acquired a lifetime interest in respect of the demised premises of his own use for conducting business by himself or letting out the same and receiving its rentals. Appellant having agreed and consented to the vesting of these rights in favour of respondent No,1 in the circumstances would not seem to be a necessary party to the eviction proceedings before the Controller. His presence before the Controller for the purpose of deciding ejectment cases brought by respondent No,1 against respondent No,2 would neither advance the cause of justice nor facilitate the decision of the rent cases on merits. In my view, appellant having divested himself of his right to collect rent of the premises or to use it for his own occupation cannot be allowed by any stretch of argument to say that he being owner of the demised premises was necessary party to the eviction proceedings or that respondent No,1 could not seek ejectment of the tenant in occupation of the premises.
11. Instead of justifying and supporting the cause of the appellate for being impleaded as party to the ejectment proceedings Mr.Narain Das, learned counsel for respondent No,2 advanced arguments to urge that ejectment applications were not maintainable before the Controller for want of title of respondent No,1. There is no dispute that respondent No,1 did not acquire any title to the demised premises but he acquired a right to utilize the premises for his own use and unless he was able to eject a tenant from the premises he would not be able to use the same for his own business. At any rate this point can be raised before the Controller during the course of enquiry and not in the instant appeals brought by an intervenor before this Court.
12. Mr. Narain Das vehemently argued that the compromise between the parties is a nullity in law as it was not registered under section 17 of the Registration Act and that the transfer of property by way of gift without divesting right of ownership was illegal and void. In my view the point urged in these appeals is totally irrelevant and misconceived as in the present 'appeals this Court as appellate authority under the Ordinance is only called upon to examine the correctness and validity of the impugned orders refusing to implead the appellant as party to the proceedings and not the conduct or maintainability of the eviction applications brought by respondent No,1. Learned counsel had cited the following cases:--
(1) 1991 SCMR 1699.
(2) PLD 1973 Karachi 284.
(3) 1994 CLC 932.
(4) PLD 1992 Azad J&K 29.
(5) 1992 SCMR 1741.
(6) PLD 1986 Quetta 198.
(7) 1973 SCMR 289.
(8) 1987 CLC 1753.
13. ' In the case at Serial No,1, the point involved was whether right 15f ejectment conferred by section 14 of the Ordinance could be exercised only by owner of premises and not by persons who had been included in the extended definition of term "landlord" in provision of section 2(1) of the Ordinance.
14. ' In the case at Serial No,2, principle of estoppel against a tenant and licensee in possession was dealt with by Noorful Arfin, J. (as he then was). It was held that relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end whet' tenant is evicted by real owner or when there is even a threat of eviction by real owner.
15. ' In the case at Serial No,3, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that person authorised to receive rent of premises on behalf of landlord could not institute proceedings against tenant for his eviction on the ground of his personal need, because only owner of premises could file such proceedings.
16. ' In the case at Serial No,4, a learned Judge of Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court, dealing with an appeal under sections 17 and 54 of the Transfer of Property Act held that Transfer of Property Act and Registration Act, both having been enforced in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, machinery under Registration Act, 1908, was available when consent "decree was granted in 1968 and right of ownership in immovable property could have been transferred through modes recognized by law.
17. ' In the case at Serial No,5, the view taken was that operative part of document produced in Court simply stated that executant was dividing his property among, his prospective heirs during his lifetime but no where had acknowledged transfer of proprietary rights in their favour divesting himself ownership thereof. Gift of property in the circumstances was thus not proved in favour of donee.
18. ' In the case at Serial No,6, the view taken was that in order to attract sections 17 and 49 of Registration Act, existence of a document required to be registered would be necessary.
19. ' In the case at Serial No,7, it was held that an agreement which is not registered in terms of section 17 of the Registration Act, could not be made a basis for an assertion of title in the suit property, but it could certainly be used for the collateral purpose of showing the nature of the cause of action which arose to the plaintiffs on the rejection of the relevant mutation.
20. ' In the cases at Serial No,8, a learned Judge of this Court held that owner of premises having also been included in definition of "landlord" under section 2(0, tendering of rent by money order in name of co-owner of premises or depositing same in his name, could not be considered not to be in the name of landlord.
21. ' A glance at these cases would indicate that learned counsel has tried to confuse the real point in controversy and expected that this Court would, abdicate upon the merits of the rent cases which are already sub judice the lower forum awaiting final decision. I am not at all impressed by the contentions raised and it would seem that the learned Controller was right in observing that the prayer for joining as party had been made in collusion with the tenant i,e, respondent No,2.
22. ' On the other hand while controverting the point raised by learned counsel for respondent No,2, learned counsel for respondent No,1 has referred to the cases of Ghulam Dastagir and others v. Mst.
23. Marim and others 1991 CLC 1526 and Nawabuddin v. Qamar Oil Mills 1989 SCMR*205.
24. ' In the first case Syed Abdur Rehman, J. (as he then was) held that legal heirs of parties in earlier suit who were parties and signatories to consent statement filed in execution proceedings, were estopped from reopening the said matter again in view of the fact that consent statement amounted to family settlement and an adjustment which was at par with a compromise and was protected under Order XXIII, Rule 3, C.P.C. Such compromise being sacrosanct had created estoppel against the parties to that agreement who has entered into it and had signed it, though it could not operate as res judicata. Such estoppel would arise with regard to all matters dealt with actually or by necessary implication in such an adjustment and amounted to a contract between parties and had as such a binding effect upon all those who had signed it--Registration of consent statement between the parties which resulted in adjustment or compromise was a mere formality and parties to that family arrangement could get same registered or if it required stamp could be stamped even at a later stage, but signatories to that statement could not be allowed to back out from same merely on ground that same was not registered.
25. ' In the second case Hon`ble Supreme Court set aside an order passed by the High Court allowing intervenors to be impleaded with petitioner as landlord on the ground that they could not be considered to be either necessary or proper parties as they were not joining the proceedings as co-owners but actually setting up a title adverse to the landlord. Finding the assumption on which they had been impleaded as co-owners as incorrect, Supreme Court held that their presence in the proceedings would not only be improper but prejudicial to the purpose for which the landlord had been litigating before the Rent Controller. In the facts of this case it would appear that appellant in both the cases was raising title adverse to the rights of the respondent No,1, therefore, in my view he was neither necessary nor proper party to the proceedings before the Controller.
26. Accordingly both the appeals are without any merit and hereby dismissed. Learned Controller shall proceed with the cases expeditiously as the progress in both the cases has been considerably delayed by reason of pendency of these appeals. Office shall send R & Ps. To the lower Court immediately.