' Mst. Raisa Bibi, Managing Director, Atif Flour Mills (private Limited), Mansehra, instituted a suit against WAPDA in the Court of Civil Judge, Mansehra seeking declaration that the notice of disconnection under section 54-C of Electricity Act, 1910 is invalid and ineffective upon her rights and for issuing an injunction to the defendants to permanently restrain them from demanding any amount contained in their notice and from disconnecting the electricity supply to the Mills of the plaintiff.
2. Simultaneously an application for issuance of ad interim injunction was made which was partly accepted in that the learned Civil Judge restrained the defendants from taking any adverse action against the petitioner such as disconnecting the electricity connection but made it conditional to the effect that the petitioner shall deposit the electricity charges in arrear amounting to Rs,1,38,945.
3. Aggrieved therefrom the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Mansehra who admitted the appeal for regular hearing vide his order dated 4-3-1989 but again made it conditional to the payment of the aforesaid amount by the next date which was fixed as 3- 4-1989. In the same order he suspended the operation of the impugned order of the learned trial Court. Hence this revision petition.
4. I have heard Mr. Muhammad Rafique Goira, Advocate learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Fazal Gul, Advocate learned counsel for the respondents in support of their respective pleas and also perused the record of the case with considerable degree of care.
5. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the grievance of the petitioner before the learned appellate Court was to absolve her of the deposit of amount ordered by the trial Court while issuing the order of maintaining status quo and that although the appellate Court admitted the appeal for full hearing, yet at the same time, it ordered the deposit of the alleged arrears.
According to the learned counsel, the impugned order of the learned appellate Court is self- contradictory inasmuch as, once the arrears are deposited the very purpose of appeal shall be defeated. He, however, maintained that making the petitioner to pay such a huge amount is entailed with a great risk of injustice to the petitioner by burdening her with the same without establishing the petitioner's liability to pay it. He, therefore, urged that the petitioner may be absolved to make the payment of Rs,1,38,945 till the decision of her suit. He relied on the case Haji Sher Muhammad v. WAPDA through its Chairman and 2 others reported in PLD 1988 Lah.
511.
6. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that so far as the order of the learned trial Court qua restraining the defendants-respondents herein from disconnecting the supply of electricity to the Mill was concerned, even that was contrary to the express provisions of section 54-C of the Electricity Act, 1910 as amended by Electricity Ordinance 1979 but regarding the question of depositing the arrears of electricity charges, the learned counsel submitted that at the first instance it is against section 56-D of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and at the second instance the payment of the arrears being a matter of pecuniary nature, it cannot be said to cause an irreparable loss in the well-understood meaning of the term. He relied on the case of Messrs Kohistan Travel Service and another v. Province of Punjab through Collector, Lyallpur reported in PLD 1977 Lah.
85. He, therefore, urged that both the learned lower Courts were right in directing the petitioner to deposit the outstanding amount against him.
7. I have given my serious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective pleas.
8. I am afraid, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot be controverted on the legal premises in that a pecuniary loss, if any, has been held, in a chain of authorities, as not an irreparable loss---one of the three basic conditions of issuing a temporary injunction; a good prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the petitioner, being the other two. And in the absence of the requisite element of "irreparable loss", in the instant case, the A apprehended pecuniary loss, cannot be held as a good ground for issuance of a temporary injunction.
9. Again, a reference to section 54-C of the Electricity Act (IX of 1910) as amended by Electricity Act (IX of 1910) as amended by Electricity (Amendment) Ordinance (LXII of 1979) would indicate that as per its proviso, a plaintiff is required to deposit with the Court the amount assessed against him and in the event of his failing to do so "any order, prohibiting the licensee from discontinuing the supply of energy to the premises, shall cease to have effect". Such being the case, I find that the temporary injunction restraining the defendants to discontinue the supply of electricity to the petitioner, if not made contingent by way of directing the petitioner to pay the outstanding electricity charges, shall be clearly violative of the express provisions as contained in section 54-C of the Electricity Act, 1910. The only flaw which I notice with the impugned order of the learned appellate Court is that instead of ordering the outstanding amount to be deposited in Court, the learned District Judge, Mansehra vide his order dated 4-3-1989 seems to have directed the petitioner to make the payment presumably to the respondents, which needs to be corrected.
10. As regards the authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am of the view that it hardly advances his case in any manner inasmuch as the matter pertained to issuance of temporary injunction, in that case, was confined to restraining the defendant from discontinuing the supply only which, in the instant case, has already been granted in favour of the petitioner by the trial Court.
11. In the context of the foregoing, I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned orders of both the learned Courts are in accord with the law. While directing the petitioner to deposit the arrears of electricity charges amounting to Rs,1,38,945 and finding them as unexceptionable, I maintain the same, provided that the petitioner shall deposit the amount of Rs,1,38,945 in the trial Court in the form of National Savings Certificates, the profit whereof shall be the entitlement of the petitioner, irrespective of the decision of her suit.
12. Resultantly this revision petition fails and is dismissed accordingly. Costs will follow the event.